The Bichard Inquiry

Update on MPS Progress against Bichard Recommendations
Recommendation:

1. A national IT system for England and Wales to support police intelligence should be introduced as a matter of urgency. The Home Office should take the lead and report by December 2004 with clear targets for implementation (Page 132)

Action and National lead - Lead: Home Office/ Home Secretary
Action to be taken by Home Office to ensure a National Intelligence System. All forces to provide specified data to a national information sharing system known as CRISP (part of the wider IMPACT programme) running by December 2005.

Progress
At this time it is believed 38 forces have signed up to the CRISP proposal. Of that number, 13 will be able to provide at least one ‘data set’ by 31st December 2005

MPS Activity
MPS will be required to develop a data warehouse capacity that is able to meet CRISP requirements.

Integrated Information Platform (IIP) is current project, which aims to warehouse some of MPS data systems. IIP is scheduled to pilot in June 2005; an evaluation is required to review pilot outcomes against original user requirement.

The MPS has both a system and business imperative to develop a strategic programme to meet the requirement for a warehouse which meets both internal and external national demands.

Risks (MPS Activity)
MPS is not likely to be in a position to warehouse data to support CRISP by December 2005. This risk needs to be managed in light of progress of other forces and the scale and relationship between data warehousing and other MPS IT projects.

The initial project scope for IIP was developed prior to CRISP, therefore the national context is not explicitly included in the project. IIP does not currently include CRIMINT and Firearms Information System, which are necessary to meet the mandated information requirement for CRISP
Project Kick-start has aimed to develop a more strategic system solution to data warehousing for the MPS. To ensure all requirements are met a user requirement and costed business case needs to be developed before further work is progressed.

**Costs to MPS (short / long term)**
Costs to produce MPS statement of requirement £170k. MPS staff costs are based on an opportunity cost. Senior business lead and team (team of five staff in region of £250,000) to support development of requirement will be necessary. Business case will scope out full costs required for a business change programme of work, which will include a business and systems architecture (the outcome will also include a proposal for an enterprise strength MPS data warehouse).

2. The PLX (Police Local Exchange) system, which flags that intelligence is held about someone by particular police forces, should be introduced in England and Wales by 2005 (page 132)

**Action and National lead** - Lead: Home Office/ Home Secretary
The development of a system to facilitate data exchange by identifying everyone information is held about. This will involve the provision of the same six specified areas of information required by CRISP. This would build to develop the National Nominal Index.

**Progress**
CRB currently have iPLX, a set of nominal data supplied by forces to CRB, which will be used to find information on applicants held by forces where the applicant has no address history.

FPLX (full solution) is expected by end of 2005. To support PLX a national search engine is required.

**MPS Activity**
The MPS data warehouse should support the PLX system. To support FPLX will involve MPS extracting nominal details from all the mandated information systems

An interim strategy to fulfil the PLX requirements involves:

MPS supplying ONLY Registry Management System (RMS) data to PLX (interim solution) via encrypted CD-ROM. A trial has shown it is possible to populate PLX with CRIS data by sending an encrypted CD-ROM, and it may be possible to supply Custody and Firearms data in this format.
The MPS Disclosure Group have been informed that it is currently not possible to supply CRIMINT data in the interim PLX system, or in the full PLX system when it is initially introduced. CRB cannot then rely on PLX to contain all relevant information.

**Risks (MPS Activity)**
The strategic business and system programme, which is not yet developed, will be required to support the PLX system. A decision on how MPS will progress with PLX prior in light of other IT progress need to be made by steering group DoI is working with CO4 to deliver solution by end 2005.

Interim solution would require CRB and PITO to return trace to MPS with unique reference number

A dual system, which requires CRB to send all requests (where subject being checked provides home address within the MPS) to CEC to undertake a CRIMINT search. CEC has longstanding capacity issues which impact on their ability to fulfil CRB checks in a timely fashion. This will perpetuate the demand on CEC.

**Costs to MPS (short / long term)**
No costs to MPS, met by CRB.

Costs to extract in region of £350,000

3. The procurement of IT systems by the police should be reviewed to ensure that, wherever possible, national solutions are delivered to national problems (page 133)

**Action and National Lead** - Home Office and PITO .
Not known at this time and National lead

**Progress**
Not reported

**MPS Activity**
Impact on MPS yet to be assessed.
4. Investment should be made available by Government to secure the PNC’s medium and long-term future, given its importance to intelligence-led policing and to the criminal justice system as a whole. I note that PITO has begun this work (page 134)

**Action and National lead - Home Office and PITO**

**Progress**
HMIC will submit draft report to the MPS for checking for factual accuracy. Verbal feedback from HMIC inspectors indicates that that the MPS is to be given a poor rating (note HMIC no longer use red, amber or green in rating).

**MPS Activity**
Up to April 2004, a PNC record could only be created for those individuals arrested and charged with an offence(s). Since April 2004 the Criminal Justice Act 2003 allowed DNA and fingerprints to be taken from those arrested for a recordable offence irrespective of whether they were charged on not.

This has resulted in a 50% increase in workload for PNC staff. This has required work to be prioritised. Within the MPS staff numbers are comparatively low compared to other forces.

Cdr Sawyer chairs a working group to manage issues associated with PNC and the issues from the forthcoming HMIC report.

**Risks (MPS Activity)**
Internal staff issues and capacity has created problems with meeting the targets for updating the PNC system. There is little resilience within the Bureau. To address this risk the MPS PNC bureau requires a significant increase in staff to be introduced over a two-year period. Current uncosted estimates suggest an increase in 40-50 personnel is required to support this function. This level of staff increase will have an impact on other MPS functions, i.e. training

**Costs to MPS (short / long term)**
The staff will be required to be recruited over the next two years. Within 05/06 an increase in 15 staff could be met within existing accommodation. Costings are pending.

Note: From the commencement of the recruitment process to completion of training and full updating capability may take 6 months per person.
5. The new Code of Practice, made under the Police Reform Act 2002, dealing with the quality and timeliness of PNC data input, should be implemented as soon as possible (page 134)

**Action and National lead** - Home Office (Home Secretary) Ongoing review of national policy and procedure (via HMI)

**Progress**
HMIC will submit draft report to the MPS for checking for factual accuracy. Verbal feedback from HMIC inspectors indicates that that the MPS is to be given a poor rating (note HMIC no longer use red, amber or green in rating).

**MPS Activity / Risks / Costs to MPS (short / long term) – As recommendation 4**

6. The quality and timeliness of PNC data input should be routinely inspected as part of the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) and the Baseline Assessments, which are being developed by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (page 134)

**Action and National lead** - HMIC Ongoing review of national policy and procedure (via HMI)

**Progress**
HMIC will submit draft report to the MPS for checking for factual accuracy. Verbal feedback from HMIC inspectors indicates that that the MPS is to be given a poor rating (note HMIC no longer use red, amber or green in rating).

**MPS Activity / Risks / Cost to MPS (short / long term) - As recommendation 4**

7. The transfer of responsibility for inputting court results onto the PNC should be reaffirmed by the Court Service and the Home Office and, if possible, accelerated ahead of the 2006 target. At the least, that deadline must be met (page 134)

**Action and National lead** – Home Office and the Courts Service/ Home Secretary Courts section to prepare for introduction of direct inputting by their staff onto the PNC. This will involve PNC hardware and involve training on such hardware
Progress
Currently the MPS are being assured that the Courts Service are progressing well and will be in a position to meet their deadline in December 2006.

MPS Activity
MPS currently negotiating with Courts Services around concerns regarding:
‘IT’ ownership (tech)
Qualities of data
Marketing / re Faults
Integrity of data
Tech issues
Unsuitable migration of business to some courts

Risks (MPS Activity)
None cited

Costs to MPS (short / long term)
None cited

8. A Code of Practice should be produced covering record creation, review, retention, deletion and information sharing. This should be made under the Police Reform Act 2002 and needs to be clear, concise and practical. It should supersede existing guidance (page 138)

Action and National lead – Home Office, ACPO & Info Comm. Home Secretary to ensure sign-up from all police forces and to provide not only codes of practice but also guidance manual

Progress
IM Codes of Practice will be before Parliament in June 2006.

In the following 6 months between June and December 2006, guidance will be issued to forces on how to meet Codes.

Dialogue with NCPE / HMIC indicates that compliance is unlikely impact on MPS until 06/07.
MPS Activity
An integrated implementation programme for the IM codes of practice is required. It is anticipated that compliance activity will begin from April 2006 (therefore will require funding in financial year 2006/07).

An exception is the MPS data quality team. DoI have built this capability with existing resources but will be seeking to transition into growth (by recruiting to replace those staff temporarily reassigned) during this year.

Risks (MPS Activity)
Costed business case will be submitted to MTFF process for necessary MPS costs including implementation team and training requirement.

A significant risk is posed by the leadership of the Business Process Management capability necessary to demonstrate business changes arising from Code and to effect sustainable Data Quality improvements. MPS leadership issues over business process must be resolved to allow this capability to be resourced and built to the scale required by the codes of practice. Business support for technical developments needs to be scoped and developed.

Costs to MPS (short / long term)
Whole MPS costs are anticipated at £9.2 million over 30 months including £2.8 million growth. This will require approval within financial years 06/07 – 07/

Costs are unlikely to exceed £0.5 million on 05/06, therefore propose they are met within business group. Business opportunity costs have not been scoped.

9. The Code of Practice must clearly set out the key principles of good information management (capture, review, retention, deletion and sharing), having regard to policing purposes, the rights of the individual and the law (page 138)

Action and National lead - Home Office, ACPO & Info Comm./Home Secretary.
To ensure sign-up from all police forces and to provide not only codes of practice but also guidance manual

Progress / MPS Activity / Risks (MPS Activity) / Costs to MPS – As Recommendation 8
10. The Code of Practice must set out the standards to be met in terms of systems (including IT), accountability, training, resources and audit. These standards should be capable of being monitored both within police forces and by HMIC and should fit within the PPAF (page 138)

**Action and National lead** – Home Office, ACPO & Info Comm. /Home Secretary
To ensure sign-up from all police forces and to provide not only codes of practice but also guidance manual

**Progress / MPS Activity / Risks (MPS Activity) / Costs to MPS (short / long term) – as Recommendation 8**

11. The Code of Practice should have particular regard to the factors to be considered when reviewing the retention or deletion of intelligence in cases of sexual offences (page 138)

**Action and National lead** - Home Office, ACPO & Info Comm. /Home Secretary
To ensure sign-up from all police forces and to provide not only codes of practice but also guidance manual

**Progress / MPS Activity / Risks (MPS Activity) / Costs to MPS (short / long term) – As recommendation 8**

12. The Government should reaffirm the guidance in Working Together to Safeguard Children so that the police are notified as soon as possible when a criminal offence has been committed, or is suspected of having been committed, against a child – unless there are exceptional reasons not to do so (page 139)

**Action and National lead** - DFEs
To issue guidance on safeguarding policy to statutory agencies awaiting new legislation June 2005.

**MPS Activity**
The MPS Child Abuse Investigation Command (CAIC) is monitoring developments within DfES. Working Together is currently being revised and further guidance on this issue is expected. The CAIC are working closely with the London Child Protection Committee and are drafting interim guidance, which is being shared with DfES. Any proposed changes to legislation will be addressed through the OCU Commander and the Policy Officer.
Risks (MPS Activity)
Inability to investigate all cases referred to the MPS, managed through a documented threshold policy. Possible increase in recorded crime and resources required to investigate offences. Estimates of numbers is not possible at this stage.

Costs to MPS (short / long term)
Possible increase in demand cannot be scoped at this stage.

13. National guidance should be produced to inform the decision as to whether or not to notify the police. This guidance could usefully draw upon the criteria included in a local protocol being developed by Sheffield Social Services and brought to the attention of the Inquiry.

Action and National lead - DFEs.
To issue guidance on safeguarding policy to statutory agencies awaiting new legislation June 2005.

Progress / MPS Activity / Risks (MPS Activity) / Costs to MPS (short / long term) – As Recommendation 12

14. The Integrated Children’s System should record those cases where a decision is taken not to refer to the police

Action and National lead – DFEs
To issue guidance on safeguarding policy to statutory agencies awaiting new legislation June 2005

Progress

MPS Activity / Risks (MPS Activity) / Costs to MPS (short / long term) – As recommendation 12

15. The Commission for Social Care Inspection should, as part of any social services inspection, review whether decisions not to inform the police have been properly taken (page 139)

Action and National lead - DFEs
Ongoing policy and Service liaison work to take place regarding implementation of this recommendation

Progress

MPS Activity – No required activity identified at this time.
19. New arrangements should be introduced requiring those who wish to work with children, or vulnerable adults, to be registered. The new register would be administered by a central body, which would take the decision, subject to published criteria, to approve or refuse registration. The responsibility for judging the relevance of police intelligence in deciding a person’s suitability would lie with the central body. The police, as now, would be able to identify intelligence, which on no account should be disclosed to the applicant. The DfES, in consultation with other government departments, should decide whether the registration scheme should be evidenced by a licence or card (page 154)

Action and National lead – Home Office / DFEs
DFEs influence the processes and procedures in the setting up of the Register.

MPS Activity – No required activity identified at this time.

20. HMIC should develop, with ACPO and the CRB, the standards to be observed by police forces in carrying out vetting checks. These should cover the intelligence databases to be searched, the robustness of procedures, guidance, training, supervision and audit (page 142)

Action and National lead - Home Lead: HMI ACPO CRB
National Standards and protocols, disseminated through ACPO guidance

MPS Activity
Implementation of National policy through Vetting Working Group

Risks (MPS Activity)
None identified.

Costs to MPS (short / long term)
Not known at this time.

21. All posts, including those in schools, that involve working with children, and vulnerable adults, should be subject to the Enhanced Disclosure regime (page 144)

Action and National lead - DFEs Implementation of National Policy re Vetting of School posts.
MPS Activity
Implementation of National policy through Vetting Working Group.

Risks (MPS Activity)
None identified

Costs to MPS (short / long term)
Not known at this time.

25. Fingerprints should be used as a means of verifying identity (page 147)

Action and National lead - Home Office (Home Secretary) Legislative change needed

MPS Activity – No required activity identified at this time.

27. Registered Bodies should be required to confirm that they have checked the information on the ‘Police Check Form’ in accordance with CRB guidance (page 147)

Action and National lead - Home Office (Home Secretary) Home Office Policy followed by ACPO guidance.

MPS Activity – No required activity identified at this time.

28. The consents that applicants currently give on the ‘Police Check Form’ should be sufficiently broad to enable the requisite checks to be undertaken (page 147)

Action and National lead - Home Office / Home Secretary, Home Office Policy followed by ACPO guidance.

MPS Activity – No required activity identified at this time.
29. Incomplete or withdrawn applications should in future be returned to the Registered Body, and not to the applicant (page 147)

Action and National lead
Lead: Home Office / Home Secretary Home Office Policy followed by ACPO guidance.

MPS Activity – No required activity identified at this time.

30. Proposals should be brought forward as soon as possible to improve the checking of people from overseas who want to work

Action and National lead – Home Office / Home Secretary, Home Office Policy followed by ACPO guidance.

MPS Activity – No required activity identified at this time.

31. As a priority, legislation should be brought forward to enable the CRB to access the following additional databases for the purpose of vetting: Her majesty’s Customs & Excise, National Criminal Intelligence Service, National Crime Squad, British Transport Police, and the Scottish and Northern Ireland equivalents of the protection of the protection of Children Act list and the Protection of vulnerable Adults list (page 147)

Action and National lead - Home Office / Home Secretary, Home Office Policy followed by ACPO guidance

MPS Activity - No required activity identified at this time.