



Service Improvement Review of Operational Support Policing

Final Report

November 2003



Working for a safer London

MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

Introduction

This is the final report of the Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review, which was commissioned by the Metropolitan Police Authority as part of its Best Value Review Programme. This review has sought to secure improvements in the overall performance of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) by focusing on the functions that support the delivery of policing services to the public by BOCUs.

In London, the primary unit of police service delivery is the Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU or borough). These are able to handle the vast majority of calls for service but, from time to time, they require support from either locally based units (e.g. Criminal Investigation Department [CID]) or pan-London units (e.g. Territorial Support Group [TSG]) to deal with the matter. BOCUs also rely on centrally based staff to support their pre-planned operations (e.g. surveillance units) or take on reactive investigations (e.g. murder investigation teams). It is particularly appropriate when additional responsibilities are being given to boroughs to check that they are being provided with the right level of operational support to help them achieve the strategic aims of the MPS. For the purposes of this Review, 'operational support' is defined as those units that provide support to BOCUs and/or undertake work that BOCUs are unable to undertake, but are not part of the borough command structure.

It is the first review to use a new approach seeking to achieve an improvement in performance. The approach has adopted a more proportionate and flexible application of 4Cs (Consult, Compare, Challenge and Compete) principles.

Principal Benefits

The recommendations resulting from this review are intended to contribute to the goal of continuous improvement in the management of demand by the **MPS having regard to economy, effectiveness and efficiency**. In particular they are intended to ensure that boroughs are provided with the right level of support at the right time at the right cost to meet the policing needs of Londoners in accordance with corporate priorities.

The key anticipated benefits of the Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review are:

1. Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational policing support functions
2. Increased public confidence by improving accountability of operational policing support functions

3. Enhanced MPS performance by clearly defining the contributions of operational policing support functions

Cont'd.

4. Increased public satisfaction by improving MPS response to Level 2 issues.

Scope of the Review and Methodology

The Operational Support Policing Review is a logical next step in a broader view of service delivery. The Managing Demand Best Value Review focused on uniform response policing. It did not encompass either BOCU based support units (e.g. Criminal Investigation Department [CID]) or pan-London units (e.g. SCD7 Serious and Organised Crime).

The Operational Support Policing Review began by conducting systematic research to determine the baseline or 'where are we now' position. This involved identifying policies, responsibilities and structures; conducting a stakeholders' analysis; and reviewing performance information.

HMIC, MPS Local Inspections or MPA Internal Audit have examined many of the specialist functions in the recent past. Actions and recommendations arising from these reviews either have or are in the process of being implemented. It was evident that little would, therefore, be gained by focusing on an individual unit or group of units.

It was agreed by the Review Project Board that the scope of the Review would comprise four strands:

1. **Roles and responsibilities** - How the roles and responsibilities of non-BOCU operational support functions should be defined
2. **Accountability** - How to achieve the accountability of non-BOCU operational support functions to the communities in which they operate
3. **Resources** - How the level of resources allocated to operational support functions is determined
4. **Level 2 (cross-border issues)** - How the response to Level 2 (cross BOCU border demand) can be best satisfied.

The Operational Support Policing Review Team initially conducted a series of focus groups with BOCU Commanders, pan-London Units and the Specialist Crime Directorate to identify the key issues impacting on their ability to deliver either a service directly to the public or to support BOCUs to do so. In addition, an analysis of HMIC Inspection of the MPS, the Damilola Taylor and Victoria Climbié inquiry reports also informed the development of the Review's scope.

This thematic approach encompassed all BOCUs and operational support functions. It was recognised that some work in this area was already

underway or had recently been completed. Where this was the case, the Review has sought to avoid duplicating this effort but drew on the results to inform its work. Those functions with specific national responsibilities (e.g. Special Branch) were not covered because it was considered that their work does not directly support boroughs on a day-to-day basis.

Consultation exercises were conducted to obtain the views of external and internal stakeholders about the service under review. Comparison was undertaken against large UK metropolitan and international police forces. An Independent Challenge Panel was established to provide a robust challenge and inject 'blue sky' thinking. The potential for competition and alternative forms of service delivery was also assessed. Diversity was considered throughout the review and the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), Greater London Action on Disability (GLAD) and GALOP (London's lesbian, gay and bisexual community safety charity) are being specifically consulted about the recommendations.

Overview of Results

The intent of the review team was to provide a description of how the MPS currently manages key aspects of operational support and sets these against a vision of what would be achieved if all the Review's recommendations were implemented.

Annual Assessments

We found that although all operational support units have terms of reference, some of these have been self-determined without reference to BOCUs or an organisational assessment of need. Strict application of terms of reference can, in some circumstances, create anomalies for BOCUs, e.g. the investigation of a violent crime in which the victim has been critically injured may be left with a borough unless death occurs although it still requires investigative expertise and a significant commitment of resources. The resources of the operational support unit frequently define the level of service that they provide.

The review team suggests that, given demands for resources outstrips their availability, some form of strategic prioritisation process is required to ensure that the MPS keeps pace with the changing nature and scale of policing demands in London. **The Review therefore proposes that the justification for and the terms of reference of operational support units should be assessed annually against MPS priorities as defined by the NIM framework and the annual planning process. (Recommendation 1)** This yearly check against the MPS control strategy will ensure that the most effective and efficient use is being made of resources. Further, it is proposed that special care is given to ensure that the operational support functions are properly focused on organisational priorities and that any overlaps of roles and responsibilities are eliminated.

24/7 Central Gateway

Tensions between BOCUs and operational support functions can manifest themselves during certain incidents (e.g. attempted murders) in identifying the most appropriate unit to resolve a demand. Currently boroughs retain responsibility for incidents until they are able to find an appropriate unit to assume ownership.

More importantly difficulties can also occur during ongoing critical incidents where life is at stake, e.g. when information is received about a possible shooting. During such incidents it is vital that boroughs have access to the appropriate support unit as quickly as possible and are not 'passed from pillar to post'. **The Review therefore proposes the establishment of a 24/7 joint central gateway for TP and SCD. (Recommendation 2)** This solution fits in with the strategic changes to MPS working practices being introduced by the C3i Programme. Furthermore it would directly join up SCD and TP and provide a single point of contact for boroughs requiring either fast or slow time advice or support.

TP Tasking

The tasking and co-ordinating processes for pan-London resources prioritises high crime and in particular Operation Safer Streets boroughs. It can therefore be difficult for lower crime boroughs to access operational support assets in support of their local priorities. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some non-Safer Street boroughs, after being consistently unsuccessful in the bidding process, are not asking for support for their local priorities even if it is a problem beyond their capacity to deal with. **The recommendation therefore proposes improving the transparency of the allocation and prioritisation process used in the TP tasking and co-ordinating group to encourage boroughs to bid for the services of TP pan-London units. (Recommendation 3)** Link Commanders would be responsible for championing the bids submitted by their respective boroughs. Where it is not possible to assign resources, the tasking and co-ordinating group could suggest alternative approaches such as collaboration between boroughs or referral to good practice elsewhere. Enhancing the role of the Link Commander in the process will increase the understanding of their respective boroughs and encourage them to bid for support when faced with problems that are beyond their capacity to address.

Operations Protocol

Boroughs are now firmly established as the primary source of policing service delivery across London. Borough Commanders have encouraged and successfully forged closer links with the communities they serve in recent years. However, signal events can very easily destroy equilibrium and ruin vast amounts of hard work. **The Review therefore proposes a protocol to ensure the Integrated Borough Operations Office is informed of operational support units operating proactively in their area, unless to do so would compromise that, or future operations. (Recommendation 4)** As well as avoiding 'blue on blue' situations by the co-ordination of geographical activity, implementation of this protocol will assist in ensuring

that the policing philosophy of the respective borough is acknowledged in the plans of the operational support units. Thus the diverse needs of different communities can be taken into account at the inception rather than on the conclusion of an operation.

Internal Awareness

Historically the intelligence flows from specialist units to boroughs have arguably not been as good as they could be. For example murder investigation teams sometimes do not properly debrief to the boroughs on which they have been operating. A previous paucity of management information regarding the deployment of support units has also led to a lack of transparency in resource allocation. Boroughs are beginning to receive better quality management information about how they have been supported by SCD and SO units but information about future planned operations could be improved. BOCUs also need ensure that there is effective debriefing for investigative teams operating in their area. **The Review team therefore proposes effective debriefing and the introduction of a standing agenda item about current operational support initiatives at borough weekly intelligence meetings (mandatory under NIM) and at the BOCU Tasking and Co-ordinating meeting. (Recommendation 5)** Appropriate, relevant and timely flows of information are vital to achieving the strategic aim of improving team working. Better-informed boroughs are likely to be more sympathetic to the needs of operational support units engendering greater team spirit than perhaps exists when one colleague does not properly understand or appreciate the difficulties being faced by another.

External Awareness

Much of the work of the MPS is invisible to the lay citizen – many layers are hidden underneath the surface like an iceberg. Increasing the visibility of the layers could potentially improve public reassurance about policing in their locality/borough. Residents could be made more aware of the fact that it goes deeper than the familiar local officers and their vehicles that they see. Even internally while a murder investigation is highly visible on a borough. Many other SCD investigations are less evident. **The Review therefore proposes that borough commanders should raise community awareness about the use of operational support resources by boroughs through their local media, local consultative group meetings and other channels of communication. (Recommendation 6)** It is inappropriate and inefficient for members of specialist and operational support units to regularly appear before the many consultative groups attended by the MPS in London. The local media and local consultative groups provide an efficient method of reaching two different segments; first the majority of people who are not members of community organisations; second community representatives who have an interest in policing.

Activity Measurement

The review team found there was tension between BOCUs and operational support unit resources. Arguably the former is short of experience and the latter is short of staff. A cause of the tension was a lack of transparency

about the level of resources allocated to specialist units. The Resource Allocation Formula (RAF) that is used to distribute resources to boroughs is currently being reviewed. The Review found little support for the application of a strict RAF to operational support functions given the diverse range of specialist and support functions in the MPS. However, there is a need to demonstrate the linkages between inputs – the investment in resources - and the outcomes in terms of what is achieved. **The Review therefore proposes that the activities and outcomes of operational support units should be measured in the most effective and efficient way in order to improve performance management and to influence decision-making about the staffing requirements. (Recommendation 7)** Specialist (SCD 7) and support units (TSG) are implementing two different approaches to the issue. Different approaches may be required because of the diverse operational circumstances of units. We accept that the result should, however, demonstrate the relationship between the activities, outcomes and resources thereby informing strategic decision-making about the resources required by an operational support function.

Staff Retention

The review team found that many parts of the MPS now use retired officers to complete specific tasks thereby obviating the need to abstract an experienced police officer from other duties. Hiring retired officers through employment agencies is not cheap. One charges the MPS 75% in addition to what they pay the individual per hour. Furthermore, police work is constantly changing and retired officers' knowledge of law; practice and procedures quickly become dated. Relying on retired staff only addresses the symptom and not the cause of the problem which is officers being financially disadvantaged by serving beyond thirty years. **The Review therefore proposes to seek to retain officers and police staff with relevant experience and skills past their normal retirement point and by further building on work in progress to establish an MPS bank of retired staff. (Recommendation 8)** Increased use of the 30+ Scheme may encourage more officers in key posts to remain after their normal retirement point helping to reduce the loss of experienced staff from both boroughs and SCD. Furthermore since the scheme is largely self-funding, it can be achieved at minimal additional cost to the MPS. The MPS people bank could include retired officers and police staff, reduce the expenditure to employment agencies and give greater flexibility in staffing support posts with individuals with the right knowledge and skills. Moreover by helping to reduce vacancies, it has the potential to reduce the dependency on overtime in a number of operational support areas.

Making Greater Use of Police Staff

There are many posts currently occupied by officers where their police experience is required, but their police powers are not. Converting some of these to police staff posts would help to reduce the need for officers to leave borough based policing. At the time of writing, HMIC is conducting a thematic inspection on civilianisation. **The Review therefore proposes that the potential benefits of increasing the use of non-sworn police staff in operational support functions should be assessed with reference to the**

recommendations of the ongoing HMIC thematic inspection of civilianisation and the MPS Civilianisation Plan. (Recommendation 9) It is recognised that police staff can sometimes be at least as expensive as officers in certain roles when their allowances and training costs are taken into consideration. Moreover the MPS may not be able to attract police staff recruits in sufficient numbers to meet its needs if the establishment is greatly increased. The HMIC thematic inspection is timely and will help to inform future action.

Trainees to SCD

In recruiting staff from boroughs, SCD recognise that not every post needs to be filled by an experienced officer. However, they are obliged to take the best applicant competing for a post and this is likely to be an experienced individual. A possible way forward is to identify and designate posts on the SCD establishment for trainee detectives. **The Review therefore seeks to balance the needs of TP and SCD by proposing to designate and fill suitable posts within the SCD BWT with selected Trainee Detective Constables on six-month attachments as part of the detective development programme. (Recommendation 10)** Selection of TDCs to be attached to SCD would be on the basis of individuals' development needs. The SCD budgeted workforce target (BWT) would not need to increase. The number of experienced detectives needing to be drawn from boroughs would therefore reduce with the creation of the trainee detective posts. This would increase cross-fertilisation of ideas and experience between TP and SCD. The disadvantage to boroughs would be the loss of their trainee detectives for the attachment period but the advantage would be that they would retain the more experienced staff they require for difficult investigations.

Directly Recruited Detectives

The profile of people joining the police service is changing. Some recruits do not intend to stay for thirty years. Others are joining later in life after earlier careers.

Over a two-year period of probation all recruits are required to demonstrate their competency as a police officer before they apply for a specialist role. Most recruits spend their probation working in uniform on a borough. Many police organisations already directly recruit investigators, e.g. in the US the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and very recently in the UK the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). **The Review therefore proposes to recruit into the MPS experienced and skilled investigators capable of being posted as Detective Constables direct from Training School to investigative units. (Recommendation 11)** Individuals selected would attend the initial police-training course at Hendon. They would then attend the Initial Investigator's Course at the Crime Faculty before being posted to an investigative unit where they would complete their probationary period. Recruiting investigators directly into SCD and other units would add to the other proposed initiatives to reduce the need to draw experienced staff away from boroughs. It may also encourage people from under-represented

groups to join the MPS who may be deterred by the present requirement of having to spend a minimum of two years in uniform.

Level 2 Analysis

The National Intelligence Model defines three levels of criminality: Level 1 relates to crime committed in a borough; Level 2 to crimes committed by criminals crossing borough borders; and Level 3 is national or international crime. MPS resources are focused at Levels 1 and 3. A gap exists at Level 2 criminality. The MPS and most other UK forces are meantime unable to quantify the volume of Level 2 criminality. However, some measure may be obtained from distraction burglaries (classified as burglary artifice) that are often committed by criminals that travel across-borders. In 2002-2003 nearly 5000 distraction burglaries were recorded in London – almost 14 a day.

Demand for TP resources (e.g. the TP Crime Squad and TSG) outstrips availability. Resources are prioritised at addressing Level 1 and 2 crimes in the eight boroughs that have the greatest impact on MPS performance. Collaboration between adjoining boroughs and with other forces to address Level 2 crimes does take place but is not widespread. **The Review therefore proposes to improve the analysis of and response to Level 2 crime through the inclusion of NIM problem profiles of cross-border crime issues in the tactical intelligence assessments considered by the TP Tasking and Co-ordinating Group. (Recommendation 12)** The TP pan-London assets do not have the capacity to assume total responsibility for the investigation of Level 2 crime. Therefore the proposal, linked to the earlier recommendation to increase the transparency of the TP Tasking and Co-ordinating Group, should result in greater attention to cross-border crime and as a consequence more collaboration between boroughs.

Drugs Initiative

London is at the centre of most of the trade in controlled drugs in the UK. The NCIS Threat Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2003 suggests that distribution of heroin at a national level continues to be dominated by groups based in London. Similarly the capital is an important hub for major cocaine traffickers. The threat assessment states that there is extensive evidence of the possession and use of firearms by individual criminals and organised criminal groups involved in the trade in Class A drugs.

But MPS enforcement activity is meantime concentrated at Level 1 (borough) and Level 3 (national and international). Some boroughs have their own local drugs units that tackle crack houses and street dealers. A joint SCD7/HMCE initiative is about to commence focusing on, *inter alia*, the enforcement gap in relation to Level 2 drugs crime. **The review therefore proposes to evaluate the effectiveness of the SCD7/HM Customs and Excise initiative in disrupting the availability of Class A drugs at the point of supply in boroughs. (Recommendation 13)** The key to successful drug enforcement at all levels is to ensure that all agencies work together in a strategic and co-ordinated way, exchanging information and using that information to make informed decisions about who, what and where to target the resources available. The SCD Tasking and Co-ordinating Group will therefore be critical to provide the necessary governance to ensure that the initiative focuses on Level 2 and is not allowed to become totally immersed in Level 3 issues. The

evaluation will reveal whether the initiative is having an impact at borough level. Lessons learnt could then be applied to other crime types at Level 2.

Implementation Arrangements

The Review has considered the practicability of its emerging recommendations and improvement plans from an early stage. A full implementation plan will be produced after the Review's recommendations have been considered by the MPA.

However, work is already in progress to develop a SCD/TP gateway, create a People Bank and improve the response to Level 2 crime. These pieces of work will be immediately informed by the findings of the Service Improvement Review.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The current system of borough-based policing has been extremely successful and undoubtedly made the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) more responsive to local needs. However, the present performance management processes tend to compartmentalise activity and bred parochialism on the part of some operational units.

It was evident in this review and from the Managing Demand Best Value Review that the scale of policing demands in London exceed the supply of MPS resources. Therefore either MPS units need to work smarter, more resources obtained or the demand must be prioritised. The consistent theme that emerged throughout was a need for the MPS to get better at prioritising what it does.

More effective prioritisation should focus organisational resources on the needs of Londoners. This implies a bottom-up approach to corporate planning that first identifies the needs of Londoners and then sets MPS priorities accordingly. Corporate priorities should be informed by local needs. Local action should then be an expression of the corporate priorities. 'Corporate' will then relate to everybody in the MPS and not just the centre as at present.

For some, the notion of a specialist can imply that they know more. This can potentially lead to units feeling that they are either in the 'Premier League' or 'lower divisions' according to their work. It may be semantics, but everyone should aim to be an expert in his or her field. The vision of the MPS should be that of a team where everyone recognises that they rely on everyone else to provide a service to Londoners.

Huge tensions exist about resources. In a demand-rich environment, virtually every unit could make a case for more staff and more money. Inevitably there will be winners and losers from the prioritisation process.

Personal relations between individuals should not be a factor in whether or not a borough receives support. Likewise, specialist units ought not to task themselves according to their own objectives without regard to the corporate priorities.

Decisions about the use of operational support resources should reflect the corporate plan and be informed by strong performance management in and across all units. Operational support unit annual plans should have a strong input from boroughs. In return the support units should receive more understanding from boroughs about the need for their resources.

The National Intelligence Model (NIM) provides a decision-making and planning process that can drive forward many of the proposed options. This is complemented by strong leadership that will turn the vision of a team approach to policing London into a reality.

The following chapters set out a number of tactical options that could help to achieve the strategic vision.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SERVICE UNDER REVIEW

This chapter provides the background to the Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review.

2.1 Background to Service Improvement Reviews

The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) took on the duties of a best value authority under the terms of the Local Government Act 1999 when it was established in July 2000. The purpose of best value reviews is to increase effectiveness, efficiency and economy in a specific area of work.

On 9 January 2003 the MPA Planning, Performance and Review Committee (PPRC) reviewed its approach to best value in the light of revised government guidance on Section 5 of the Local Government Act 1999. The new guidance emphasised that authorities have considerable discretion about:

- The number of reviews undertaken
- The manner in which they are undertaken and by whom
- The scope of individual reviews.

The PPRC took the opportunity to adopt a new approach to best value using Service Improvement Reviews to bring about innovation and excellence in policing London by:

- Thinking afresh about the need for a service and how it is carried out
- Asking service providers and others how improvements could be made
- Assessing performance and learning from others who are doing better
- Considering if other ways of providing the service might be helpful.

On 9 January 2003 MPA PPRC adopted the recommendation of MPS Management Board that the 2003/2004 programme of Service Improvement Reviews should include Operational Support Policing. This Review would compliment the then current best value review of demand management and focus on the use of pan-London specialist units.

The Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review was therefore the first opportunity to adopt the new MPA approach that seeks to achieve an improvement in performance. The approach has adopted a more proportionate and flexible application of 4Cs (Consult, Compare, Challenge and Compete) principles.

2.2 Description of the Service Under Review

Uniformed police officers, based on Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU) Response Teams, provide the first wave of response to calls for assistance from members of the public. They are able to resolve successfully the vast majority of spontaneous incidents but, from time to time, they require support from either locally based units (e.g. Criminal Investigation Department [CID]) or pan-London units (e.g. Territorial Support Group [TSG]) to deal with the matter. BOCUs also rely on centrally based staff to support their pre-planned operations (e.g. surveillance units) or take on reactive investigations (e.g. murder investigation teams).

Whilst some units solely provide a support function to BOCUs, others interface directly with the public. For the public the prime desire is for a consistent and seamless policing service regardless of who responds.

The Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review has sought to secure improvements in the overall performance of the MPS by focusing on the functions that support the delivery of policing services to the public by BOCUs. It is particularly apposite when additional responsibilities are being given to boroughs to check that they are being provided with the right level of operational support to help them achieve the strategic aims of the MPS.

The recommendations from this Review are intended to ensure continuous improvement in the management of operational support resources by the MPS having regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, they are designed to ensure that boroughs are provided with the right level of support at the right time and at the right cost to meet the policing needs of Londoners in accordance with corporate priorities.

The key anticipated benefits of the Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review are:

1. Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational support policing functions
2. Increased public confidence by improving accountability of operational support policing functions
3. Enhanced MPS performance by clearly defining the contributions of operational support policing functions
4. Increased public satisfaction by improving MPS response to Level 2 issues.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE AREAS SELECTED FOR DETAILED REVIEW WITH RATIONALE

This chapter explains the rationale underpinning the choice of demand activities selected for 'narrow and deep' scrutiny.

The potential scope of the Service Improvement Review into Operational Support Policing was very broad. It was therefore crucial to identify correctly the 'narrow and deep' areas of research on which the Review Team should concentrate.

The Managing Demand Best Value Review focused on uniformed response policing. It did not encompass the work of either BOCU-based support units (e.g. CID) or pan-London units (e.g. TSG).

Team members conducted systematic research to determine the baseline or 'where are we now' position. This involved identifying policies, responsibilities and structures; conducting a stakeholders analysis; and reviewing performance information.

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), MPS Local Inspections or MPA Internal Audit have examined many of the specialist functions in the recent past. Actions and recommendations arising from these reviews either have or are in the process of being implemented.

The Review Team undertook a series of focus groups with BOCU Commanders, pan-London Units and the Specialist Crime Directorate to identify issues impacting on service delivery. In addition, an analysis of 2002/03 HMIC Inspection of the MPS, the Damilola Taylor and Victoria Climbié inquiry reports has informed the development of the Review's scope.

Appendix A summarises the matters raised in the consultation and links these to the findings of this secondary research.

The four key themes that the Service Improvement Review examined:

1. How to achieve the accountability of non-BOCU operational support functions to the communities in which they operate.
2. How the roles and responsibilities of non-BOCU operational support functions should be defined.
3. How the level of resources allocated to operational support functions is determined.
4. How Level 2 demand can be best satisfied.

The thematic approach encompassed all BOCUs and operational support functions at a strategic level. The Review Team recognised that some work in this area was already underway or had recently been completed. Where this was the case, the Review sought to avoid duplicating this effort but drew on the results to inform its work. Those functions meeting national responsibilities

were not covered because it was considered that their work does not directly support boroughs on a day-to-day basis.

On 21 May 2003 Project Board approved the scope of the Review and on 10 July 2003 the MPA PPRC formally approved the Project Initiation Document.

4. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS OF THE REVIEW

This chapter sets out the processes followed during the Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review. It indicates the approaches taken to the 4Cs (Consult, Compare, Challenge and Compete) and how the important issues of diversity and Health and Safety were addressed.

4.1 Management of the Review


The Service Improvement Review was directed and controlled by a Project Board chaired by Commander Bob Broadhurst, Territorial Policing (TP).

Richard Sumray was the Lead MPA member for the Review.

The Project Board comprised:

Commander Bob Broadhurst	Project Director
Richard Sumray	MPA Lead Member
Sally Palmer	MPA Best Value Officer
David Skelton	MPS Service Improvement Programme Manager
David Wechsler	Independent Challenge Panel Chair
Mike Boyles	MPS ICG Project Consultant
Paul Madge	MPS Human Resources Directorate C3i
Commander Ron McPherson	Specialist Crime Directorate
T/Commander Simon Bray	Territorial Support Group
Chief Supt David George	Borough Commander representative
Chief Supt John Boylin	Superintendents' Association
Chief Supt Michael McAndrew	TP Operational Performance Improvement and Co-ordination
Chief Supt Paul Minton	Diversity Directorate
Det Chief Insp David Tucker	Police Federation
Sergeant Dave Rodgers	MET-TUS (MPS Trade Unions)
Rob Justham	Review Team Leader
Chief Supt David Morgan	Admin Support
Chris Risley	

The team structure is outlined below:



Chief Inspector Mike Gallagher, Chief Inspector Stan Greatrick and Sabrina Cavallini also assisted the review at various stages of its lifespan.

4.2 Consultation

Stage 1 involved consultation with the Senior Management Teams at Bromley and Newham boroughs to obtain views about operational support policing from contrasting outer and inner London boroughs.

During Stage 2, structured interviews were conducted with twelve ACPO-rank officers (i.e. those of Commander rank and above). A questionnaire was also distributed to all BOCU and OCU commanders and staff associations. Articles were also published on the Intranet to give all members of staff the opportunity to comment.

Questionnaires were distributed to Community Police Consultative Groups (CPCGs), MPS-wide and local Independent Advisory Groups and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. Over one-hundred-and-ten questionnaires were returned representing a response rate of over one-third. The questionnaire was also published on the MPS Internet site for any member of the public to comment.

Finally, a focus group was staged with OCU commanders, (Borough and pan-London units, Specialist Crime Directorate [SCD] and Specialist Operations [SO]) to develop options for improvement. Consultation on the final recommendations has taken place with ACPO-rank officers, staff associations, staff support associations and external stakeholders (e.g. Commission for Racial Equality [CRE]).

4.3 Comparison

The MPS was compared with its Home Office group of most similar forces¹: Greater Manchester Police; Merseyside Police and West Midlands Police. Two further metropolitan forces were visited: South Yorkshire Police and West Yorkshire Police. Visits were also made to two forces in the South East region – Hertfordshire Police and Kent County Constabulary – identified as demonstrating good practices and leaders in implementing and adopting the National Intelligence Model (NIM).

Benchmarking was additionally undertaken with international police forces including the Australian Federal Police and New Zealand Police, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) and State of Victoria Police (Australia).

¹ Police Standards Unit. *Police Performance Monitoring 2001/02*. London: Home Office, 2003.

Visits were also made to HM Customs and Excise (HMCE) and the National Crime Squad (NCS) to consider their working relationship with the MPS as well as performance, resources and accountability issues.

Full details of the comparison are included in the Stage 1 and Stage 2 reports.

4.4 Challenge

An Independent Challenge Panel (ICP) was established. The role of the ICP is to challenge the Review Team and provide 'blue sky thinking'. The membership was:

David Wechsler	Chief Executive, London Borough of Croydon – Chair
Carol Fisher	Former Director Central Office of Information
Nicholas Long	MPA Member
Bill Saulsbury	Police Foundation
Sally Willcox	General Manager, BT Government

Their challenges have been incorporated into this report.

4.5 Competition

The potential for alternative forms of service delivery were considered throughout the Review. The ICP also encouraged the Review Team to consider radical solutions throughout the project.

4.6 Diversity

Ensuring equality for all was of fundamental importance to the review. The implications for equality were considered throughout the analysis of each of the four themes.

Consultation was undertaken through Community Police Consultative Groups (CPCGs), MPS-wide and local Independent Advisory Groups.

As findings and recommendations emerged, the impact of these was assessed as to how they affected equality for all. The CRE and Greater London Action on Disability (GLAD) were specifically consulted about the implications of the recommendations.

5. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

This chapter focuses on the roles and responsibilities strand. It considers how the NIM Control Strategy could form the basis for the criteria for an annual assessment of the justification for operational support units. The chapter also examines how boroughs could be helped to find the right support unit to help them first time through a central gateway. It concludes by suggesting the need for greater transparency in the TP tasking and co-ordinating process to increase the level of understanding in BOCUs about prioritisation and the use of pan-London assets.

5.1 MPS Position

In Stage 1 the Review Team found:

1. Although all operational support units have terms of reference, some of these have been self-determined without reference to BOCUs or an organisational assessment of need. Allocated resources frequently define the level of service.
2. Strict application of terms of reference can, in some circumstances, create anomalies for BOCUs, e.g. the investigation of a violent crime in which the victim has been critically injured, but has not died, may be left in the borough still requiring a significant commitment of resources.
3. The tasking and co-ordinating process for pan-London resources favours high crime boroughs. It can be difficult for lower crime boroughs to access operational support assets for their local priorities.

5.2 Consultation

5.2.1 Internal consultation

During the internal consultation for Stages 1 and 2, ACPO officers suggested that non-borough units tend to define their roles and responsibilities very tightly. It was perceived that these units have a tendency to task themselves to their own operations, e.g. following up information from a Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS). These operations may not necessarily be an efficient use of their resources.

Borough Commanders generally stated that they had experienced some variance in the level of service received by their BOCU from pan-London and SCD OCUs. A variety of reasons were suggested for this variance, including resourcing issues. Borough Commanders from non-Safer Streets boroughs commented on their location, size or volume of crime being a disadvantage when it comes to allocation of support units

5.2.2 External Consultation

Most of the respondents to the external questionnaire were familiar with a number of the operational support units. In listing units, respondents were

expectedly most familiar with the overt units (e.g. Air Support Unit, Mounted Branch) and the more publicised units (i.e. Operation Trident).

The questionnaire sought to determine whether respondents perceived these operational support units as necessary and effective. Over half of respondents felt that these units do affect the service provided by the police as a whole. A range of comments was received in relation to this point. The importance of their in-depth, specialist knowledge was noted. Respondents also recognised that having operational support units allows boroughs to focus on the day-to-day policing needs of local communities. There were also some negative comments about their use. One particular comment summarises both sides of the argument, 'The plus is the extra support and resources they bring, but the minus is their lack of knowledge of the local community and commitment to it.'

5.3 Comparison

Direct comparison with other UK forces is difficult as the MPS has more permanent central units to meet the needs of the capital and national responsibilities. Other UK forces tend to second local officers on a needs basis into major inquiry teams creating a different tension particularly when enquiries take longer than expected.

Most forces now use a tasking and co-ordinating process to allocate centrally-based assets to support local policing needs based on the respective force's priorities. An element of accountability is provided by the publication of the tasking schedule, which in turn helps to prevent self-tasking.

Overseas comparison revealed that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has a strategic vision of integrated policing that defines the philosophy of the way the organisation does business. The RCMP Headquarters is the policy centre that has no line authority on the sections but issues guidelines regarding their operating role.

5.4 Organisation and Terms of Reference of Operational Support Units

The Review Team suggests that, given that demand for resources outstrips their supply, some form of strategic prioritisation process is required. Demands change in nature and scale, and it is vital that the MPS adapts to meet evolving policing needs.

In the view of the Review Team, the NIM Strategic Assessment and Control strategy provide a set of criteria against which the roles and responsibilities of support units can be assessed.

The Review Team recommends that the roles and responsibilities of support units should be checked against the MPS control strategy on an annual basis to ensure that they are aligned to organisational priorities.

It must be ensured that the scrutiny process does not become bureaucratic or merely a 'rubber stamping' exercise, which would not fundamentally challenge the existence, role and responsibilities of units. Following the review of terms of reference, some units could be increased in size but others could be reduced or disbanded. Fundamentally, the annual review must challenge the need for a unit against the MPS priorities manifested in the MPS Control Strategy.

The application of the Strategic Assessment should also clarify the wider picture that can be obscured when issues are viewed from perspectives constrained by internal boundaries. It will improve effectiveness and make more efficient use of resources, as they are prioritised against the most important issues.

The Review Team suggests that boroughs should be involved in the challenge process. However, they must act as intelligent customers and clearly define their requirements for operational support.

Recommendation 1

To ensure that the most effective and efficient use is made of resources by conducting transparent annual assessments to examine the justification for, and the terms of reference of, operational support units against MPS priorities as defined by the NIM framework and the annual planning process.

5.4.1 How it would work


As part of the annual business planning process, non-borough OCU's will be required to review their role and terms of reference. This assessment should fundamentally challenge the justification of their existence against strategic needs as defined by the MPS Strategic Assessment and Control Strategy. OCU's should then demonstrate their role and level of resourcing required to support corporate priorities/objectives. Figure 5-1 shows how the Strategic Assessment, Control Strategy and the proposed annual reviews link together.

The respective business groups Senior Management Teams will be responsible for determining whether the business cases presented meet strategic needs and how to match these with resources. Through consideration of the different plans, business groups will be able to map the strategic needs across units thus eliminating overlaps.

DCC2(5) Corporate Planning Group would then collate all business plans and assessments, reviewing them to determine if there is any duplication or gaps in services. BOCU Commanders should have a role in this process. This could be achieved through (a) nominated Borough Commander(s) participating in the assessment process.

In the first instance, it might be beneficial for a more in-depth audit of terms or reference to be undertaken, followed by 'reality checks' in subsequent years.

Figure 5-1. Links between Strategic Assessment, Control Strategy and Annual Reviews



5.4.2 Benefits

- Improved efficiency through co-ordination of strategic resources.
- Links in with Corporate Planning Group's aspirations for a changed business planning process.
- Improved effectiveness by targeting resources at organisational priorities.

5.4.3 Costs

- None – achievable within existing resources.

5.4.4 How to progress

It is suggested that the Directorate of Strategic Development, in conjunction with other directorates, should establish the evaluation criteria and process.

5.4.5 Links with other recommendations

Linked to Recommendations 3, 6, 7, 12 and 13.

5.5 Central Gateway

Tensions between BOCUs and OCUs can manifest themselves in certain incidents (e.g. attempted murder) when identifying the most appropriate unit to resolve a demand. Currently, boroughs retain responsibility for cases until they are able to find an appropriate unit to assume ownership.

More importantly difficulties can also occur during ongoing critical incidents where life is at stake, e.g. information about a possible shooting at a nightclub. During such incidents it is vital that boroughs have access to the appropriate support unit as quickly as possible.

The Review Team suggests that a central access point should be implemented to provide boroughs with fast-time support. It would need to be equipped with knowledge about the capabilities and roles of support units.

Under this proposal, responsibility for negotiating the allocation of a unit to investigate a case would sit with the central gateway. It would effectively give the central gateway the problem of identifying the non-borough unit to deal thereby overcoming some of the difficulties encountered by boroughs when seeking assistance.

The central gateway would also be a source of slow time advice to borough staff dealing with a particular problem. It would be in a position to put staff in touch with the 'experts in the field' (e.g. by putting staff who are considering whether to deploy undercover officers in touch with the Covert Policing Unit).

This recommendation also fits with the Integrated Borough Operations Model being developed by TP to improve local command, control and co-ordination in the C3i environment. Integrated Borough Operations' Units would be able to contact the central point for assistance (whether for advice or for the dispatch of a unit). Work is currently being progressed to merge the SCD reserves to create a single SCD gateway.

This recommendation is seen as additional to the current protocol of ACPO-rank officers liaising to decide which unit should deal with certain incidents. It smoothes the current process to ensure that the ACPO-rank intervention is only required in exceptional cases.

Recommendation 2

To provide boroughs with a more efficient and effective method of accessing the most appropriate support unit to assist with incidents and also to provide a source of advice and information through the establishment of a 24/7 joint central gateway for TP and SCD.

5.5.1 How it would work

Work is currently being progressed to create a single reserve for SCD. Based on this and work underway by TP, the Review Team suggests, as a preliminary estimate, the unit would be staffed by two detective sergeants, one police sergeant, three detective constables, nine police constables, ten

Band E communications operators and one Band F administrative assistant. Each shift would be staffed by three police officers and two communications operators.

The functions of the new single SCD reserve include:

- Offering advice and help line on a 24/7 basis
- Acting as the single point of contact for all SCD callouts
- Acting as the executive arm of Service Intelligence Bureau
- Acting as the single point of contact for TP IBOs.

5.5.2 Benefits

- Boroughs receive an immediate and definitive answer to queries about potential specialist support and the terms of reference of non-borough units, which will better enable them to service demand.
- A 24-hour a day help line staffed with experienced officers who can provide advice and guidance particularly important in the light of the planned expansion of the MPS.

5.5.3 Costs

- Running costs (pay, accommodation and overheads) of the unit are estimated at approximately £1,400,000 offset against existing costs. This figure includes an approximation of £26,000 for technology based on the Integrated Borough Operations trial.
- Opportunity cost of police officers and staff working on the Central Gateway.

5.5.4 How to progress

The Review Team suggests that TP Crime – who are already progressing a similar initiative – and SCD determine how to achieve the operational requirement in the most efficient and effective manner.

Once the unit is in place, the necessity and feasibility of incorporating SO and DCC4 Diversity Directorate into the central gateway should be examined, potentially resulting in a single gateway for all operational commands.

5.5.5 Links with other recommendations


Linked to Recommendations 4 and 5.

5.6 TP Tasking and Co-ordinating Processes

TP pan-London assets are currently focused on the MPS priority of reducing street crime. This results in their almost continuous deployment in a small number of BOCUs, reducing the flexibility to use them in other parts of London. This is illustrated by the graph at Figure 5-2 and the map at Figure 5-3.

The five boroughs that received the most TSG support during the period April – July 03 are all Safer Streets boroughs (Lambeth, Southwark, Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Lewisham). The fifteen Safer Streets boroughs are City of Westminster, Camden, Islington, Hackney, Tower Hamlets, Southwark, Lambeth, Brent, Haringey, Lewisham, Wandsworth, Waltham Forest, Newham, Croydon and Ealing.



Figure 5-2. Number of hours TSG spent on boroughs (April-July 2003)



Source: Operational Policing Measure (OPM)

Figure 5-3. TSG Support to Safer Streets Boroughs

Source: TSG Monthly Management Report, September 2003.



Key to Borough Codes

BS – Kensington and Chelsea	QD – Brent
CW – City of Westminster	RA – Greenwich
EK – Camden	RY – Bexley
FH – Hammersmith and Fulham	SX – Barnet
GD – Hackney	TW – Richmond-upon-Thames
HT – Tower Hamlets	TX – Hounslow
JC – Waltham Forest	VK – Kingston-upon-Thames
JI – Redbridge	VW – Merton
KD – Havering	WW – Wandsworth
KF – Newham	XD – Ealing
KG – Barking and Dagenham	XH – Hillingdon
LX – Lambeth	YE – Enfield
MD – Southwark	YR – Haringey
NI – Islington	ZD – Croydon
PL – Lewisham	ZT – Sutton
PY – Bromley	
QA – Harrow	

The Review Team suggests that boroughs that are currently high crime boroughs have been so historically, and are likely to remain so in the future. Moreover, their particular hot spots have largely remained static.

This is supported by figures for street crime. Lambeth, City of Westminster and Hackney have had the highest rates of street crime for the last four years. Furthermore, eight out of the current top ten street crime boroughs have been among the top ten every year since 1998-9. Three out of the top five street crime boroughs have been in the top five every year since 1998-9, the remaining two having been in the top ten. A table of top ten street crime boroughs since 1998-9 is given at Table 5-1.

Non-Safer Streets boroughs usually cannot obtain TP pan-London assets proactively during normal tours of duty. These boroughs have to pay the overtime costs of the pan-London units if they need them to mount proactive operations in their area. Since non-Safer Streets boroughs do not attract the same level of funding as Safer Streets boroughs, this requirement in itself may discourage them from utilising the services of the pan-London assets.

The Review's Independent Challenge Panel (ICP) suggested that although the use of support assets should be based on corporate priorities, there was still a need for a 'wild card' approach that could facilitate their use. They also suggested that perhaps every borough should be guaranteed at least one period with pan-London unit support every year on the basis that every area has a background need.

The Review Team found anecdotal evidence that non-Safer Streets boroughs are now submitting fewer bids for pan-London resources previous bids having been unsuccessful. It is appreciated that TP must prioritise its investment of resources in areas where they will achieve the greatest return (i.e. achieve the largest crime reduction). However, non-Safer Street boroughs may be faced with a problem beyond their capability. The Review Team therefore suggests that the TP tasking and co-ordinating process should include a capacity to consider requests for assistance and, where pan-London assets are not available, task boroughs to collaborate.

The low deployment of non-borough units on non-Safer Streets boroughs was recognised in responses received from the external consultation questionnaire, for example, 'Support units only cover local hotspots,' and, 'As soon as specialist units go, problems return.'

The Review Team suggests that strategically the issue is about transparency of decision-making. Borough commanders if not party to, should at least understand the rationale underpinning decisions made by the TP tasking and co-ordinating process.

Table 5-1. Top Ten Street Crime Boroughs since 1998

Rank	1998-1999		1999-2000		2000-2001		2001-2002		2002-2003	
	BOCU	BOCU figure as % of MPS total Street Crime offences	BOCU	BOCU figure as % of MPS total Street Crime offences	BOCU	BOCU figure as % of MPS total Street Crime offences	BOCU	BOCU figure as % of MPS total Street Crime offences	BOCU	BOCU figure as % of MPS total Street Crime offences
1	Westminster	11.01	Lambeth	9.73	Lambeth	11.84	Lambeth	11.92	Lambeth	9.06
2	Lambeth	10.20	Westminster	8.55	Westminster	7.74	Westminster	7.41	Westminster	5.89
3	Brent	6.24	Hackney	6.82	Hackney	5.86	Hackney	5.94	Hackney	5.84
4	Hackney	5.88	Haringey	5.71	Haringey	5.50	Southwark	5.72	Newham	5.28
5	Haringey	5.84	Brent	5.41	Southwark	5.32	Haringey	4.66	Southwark	5.02
6	Southwark	5.37	Southwark	5.37	Newham	5.02	Camden	4.57	Haringey	5.01
7	Camden	5.06	Islington	4.91	Brent	4.67	Brent	4.42	Tower Hamlets	4.52
8	Newham	4.33	Newham	4.74	Camden	4.56	Newham	4.40	Brent	4.40
9	Islington	4.17	Camden	4.65	Tower Hamlets	4.29	Ealing	3.97	Ealing	4.34
10	Ealing	4.15	Ealing	4.43	Islington	3.80	Tower Hamlets	3.66	Camden	4.28

Recommendation 3

To increase the transparency of the TP tasking and co-ordinating framework in order to encourage boroughs to bid for the services of TP pan-London units.


5.6.1 How it would work

Link Commanders would be responsible for championing the Proactive Tasking Proformas (PATPs) – bids for central resources for proactive operations – submitted by their boroughs. Where it is not possible to assign resources to PATPs, the TP Tasking and Co-ordinating Group would first make an attempt to suggest alternative approaches that the borough may wish to try (e.g. alternative central resources they could use, identification of good practice on other boroughs from which they could learn). Link Commanders would be responsible for reporting back to their boroughs with reasons for non-allocation when it has not been possible to assign resources.

Borough Commanders would act as deputies to Link Commanders - either one could be nominated per Link Commander, or on a rolling basis. This will also help increase the transparency of the process, which should mean that boroughs that have unsuccessfully bid for central resources in the past are not discouraged from bidding again in the future. The bidding process is set out at Figure 5-4, below.

A self-help guide for boroughs, which explains the criteria needed for bids, should also be developed.

Figure 5-4. The PATP Bidding Process



5.6.2 Benefits

- Increased efficiency and effectiveness of deploying central resources in addressing corporate (and local) priorities, contributing to the MPS vision to make London the safest major city in the world.
- Transparency of tasking and co-ordinating process increased.
- Enables local needs to better taken into account.
- Encourages bids to continue to be tabled.
- Reveals level of suppressed demand.

5.6.3 Costs

- No quantifiable costs identified – achievable within current resources.

5.6.4 How to progress

- Link Commanders to nominate deputies or devise rolling programme.
- Revised process map and self-help guide to be designed and disseminated.
- Link Commanders or deputies to attend meetings, champion their BOCUs' PATPs and report back to BOCUs.

5.6.5 Links with other recommendations

Linked to recommendations 3, 4 and 5.

6. ACCOUNTABILITY

This chapter focuses on the accountability strand. It considers how the consistency and co-ordination of local policing can be improved by better information sharing through the Integrated Borough Operations Office and the tasking and co-ordination process. The chapter also examines how public awareness about the use of operational support units in local communities can be improved.

6.1 MPS Position

The Review Team found during Stage 1 that:

- BOCUs are not always aware of SCD or pan-London activity in their area.
- There are no direct links between SCD and pan-London Units to Community Police Consultative Groups of the boroughs in which they operate. Community accountability of operational support units at a London-wide level is through the MPA.
- Many SCD units have established oversight groups linked to relevant interests but not necessarily local communities.
- Community concern assessments are not routinely conducted other than for homicide and serious crime cases.

6.2 Consultation

6.2.1 Internal Consultation

Internal consultation suggested that local officers were sometimes unaware of other units operating in their area. OCU commanders suggested that some SCD managers are on occasion unnecessarily secretive about their operations. It was thought that enhancing communication might improve the morale of uniform officers who would know that support resources are also working on their problems. Moreover, it was suggested that their local knowledge might save the support unit's time.

The notion of layered policing was also proffered in explaining that much of the work of the MPS is unseen – like an iceberg. Increasing the visibility of the layers could potentially increase public reassurance about policing in an area. Even internally while a murder investigation is highly visible on a borough, many other SCD investigations are less discernible.

Personalities were also felt to play a part in determining the level of interaction between a borough and an SCD or pan-London unit. It was suggested that more emphasis should be placed on set procedures and less on what a BOCU or operational support unit thought about each other.

A trend towards parochialism and less team working emerged. The performance management culture had resulted in some Borough Commanders becoming parochial whereas the MPS needed them to be more co-operative.

6.2.2 External Consultation

The external consultation questionnaire asked how much information communities have about support and specialist units, whether they would like more, and how they feel information is effectively communicated from police to their communities.

There was a very strong request from respondents for communities to be given more information about the work of the units in their local areas, suggesting that the respondents have little knowledge currently and have an interest in finding out more. Respondents suggested an array of potential avenues for communication. These included TV, local radio and local press, website/e-information, poster campaigns and leaflet campaigns.

The majority felt that presentations by the police and support units at Community Police Consultative Groups or other community meetings were a direct method of communicating with local communities.

6.3 Comparison

Perhaps because they are smaller in size, other UK metropolitan forces are able to maintain closer relationships between operational support units and basic command units (BCUs).

In West Yorkshire Police, the Head of Specialist Crime attends formal meetings with BCU Commanders as well as maintaining regular informal contact. During this contact on going and planned operations are discussed with the relevant BCU Commanders. Also in West Yorkshire all BCU commanders receive a weekly e-mail outlining operational support units deployment in their areas, patrols undertaken and the results.

Comparison with GMP, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and Merseyside did not identify any other accountability arrangements between operational support units and communities or with community intermediaries.

6.4 Improving the Consistency and Co-ordination of Policing on Boroughs

London has increasingly diverse communities, all with particular policing needs. News travels fast through formal and informal networks. A particular policing event e.g. a disturbance following a search in one part of a borough can quickly have a knock on effect in adjoining areas and potentially across London.

Boroughs are now firmly established as the primary source of policing service delivery across London. Commanders have encouraged and successfully

forged closer links with the communities they serve in recent years. However, signal events can very easily destroy equilibrium and ruin vast amounts of hard work.

The Review Team therefore suggests that as a general rule BOCUs should know about operations taking place on their areas. Clearly, there must be exceptions to this rule such as anti-terrorist operations where national security is at risk or kidnap investigations where lives are at stake.

During Stage 2 of the review, consideration was given to the appointment of a local liaison officer for operational support units. Guided by the Independent Challenge Panel, it appeared to the Review Team that there were inherent dangers in investing an organisational function in the person of an individual (i.e. the Liaison Officer). In the past, individuals have been trained at great expense to fulfil a particular function (e.g. local advisor on covert techniques) but the function has been lost when the individuals concerned moved on.

Another consideration from Stage 2 was the use of NIM risk assessments in the place of Community Impact Assessments. The Review Team found that the NIM framework provides considerable guidance for Risk Analysis but does not provide any great detail on their link to Community Concern/Impact Assessments (CCA/CIA). There is however, a considerable body of guidance and advice available on the latter within the ACPO Murder Manual and Major Incident Room Standard Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP Manual). The Review Team believes that the present arrangements should remain until the National Intelligence Model has been firmly embedded and the merits of replacing and/or scrapping CCA/CIAs have been fully considered.

The great majority of support units already communicate effectively with the boroughs on which they are operating. The Review Team therefore suggests that the recommendation formalises best practice within the MPS. However, the consultation process has identified the concerns of some Borough Commanders arising when this has not happened. These concerns centre around staff demands, media interest and community reaction.

As well as avoiding 'blue on blue' situations by the co-ordination of geographical activity, implementation of this protocol will assist in ensuring that the policing philosophy of the respective borough is acknowledged in the plans of the operational support units. Thus the diverse needs of different communities can be taken into account at the inception rather than the conclusion of an operation.

The protocol is aimed only at those activities of support units which could impact on the community. No purpose is served in support units notifying boroughs about routine, albeit unconventional activities.

Recommendation 4

To improve the consistency and co-ordination of policing on boroughs by implementing a protocol to ensure the Integrated Borough Operations Office is informed of operational support units operating proactively in their area, unless to do so would compromise that, or future operations.

6.4.1 How it would work

The support unit would contact the Integrated Borough Operations (IBO) office notifying them about the nature of the operation, the geographic area, the likelihood of borough resources being required (i.e. cordons etc.) and the potential for the operation to attract media interest.

The IBO will then be in a position to make a dynamic risk assessment based on intelligence about the area, recent events and evaluate how the proposal correlates with other planned local policing operations. It will then feed this information back to the relevant operational support unit with, if necessary, a recommendation about the appropriateness of the plan. The IBO will then be able to co-ordinate local policing arrangements with the planned operation, e.g. by keeping marked police vehicles out of an area for a period.


If necessary the Borough Commander or her/his representative will be informed and if appropriate they can discuss the matter with the officer in charge of the relevant operational support unit.

If the senior officer in command of the support unit determines that the boroughs should not be informed a decision log entry should be made.

The process is outlined at Figure 6-1.

IBOs are not yet set up, so the full implementation of this recommendation will need to wait. In the meantime, it is suggested that operational support units inform Superintendent Operations on borough.

Figure 6-1. Suggested Process under Recommendation 4



6.4.2 Benefits

- Reduces the likelihood of 'blue on blue' situations.
- Reduces the use of policing methods, which may be at odds with the borough's philosophy of policing.
- Improved intelligence flow with supporting units being made aware of local factors (i.e. tension indicators, community concerns).
- Provides advance notice to borough of possible staff commitments reducing the need for leave cancellations and home disruption.
- Increased awareness by 'visiting' officers of the Health and Safety implications of deploying in a given area

6.4.3 Costs

- None – achievable within existing resources.

6.4.4 How to progress

The Review Team suggests that TP Crime Policy could develop a policy and standard operating procedures in conjunction with DCC 4 (Diversity Directorate), the TP Modernising Operations Programme and SCD policy unit.

6.4.5 Links with other recommendations

Linked to recommendation 2, 5, 6 and 12.

6.5 Improving the Awareness of Boroughs about Support Unit Operations in their Areas

The consultation suggested that historically, intelligence flows from specialist units to boroughs has not been adequate. This is evidenced, for example, by the poor debriefing of murder investigation teams to boroughs on which they have been operating. The computerised intelligence recording system, CRIMINT, has done much to alleviate this, but the basic inadequacies remain.

There is anecdotal evidence that some boroughs are not applying for the services of specialist units such as the TSG because they have historically had little success in obtaining them.

Some Borough Commanders have suggested that the lack of management information regarding the deployment of support units has led to a lack of transparency in resource allocation. The Review Team suggests that this undermines working relationships and impedes team working. At the time of writing, both SCD and SO are in the process of revamping management information provided to boroughs.

The Review Team stresses the importance of appropriate, relevant and timely flows of information to the strategic issue of improving team working. Better informed boroughs are likely to be more sympathetic to the needs of operational support units. This will engender greater team spirit than perhaps exists when one part does not properly understand or appreciate the difficulties being faced by another.

Recommendation 5

To improve internal awareness about the use of operational support resources in boroughs by ensuring effective debriefing and by making this a standing agenda item at the weekly intelligence meeting (mandatory under NIM) and at the BOCU Tasking and Co-ordinating meeting.


6.5.1 How it would work

The weekly intelligence meeting would examine which specialist units had been deployed and what intelligence had been received from them. The weekly borough tasking and co-ordinating meeting would determine what bids for operational support could properly be forwarded to the TP tasking and co-ordinating. BOCUs would also ensure that there is effective debriefing for investigative teams operating in their area.

It is suggested that the borough strategic assessment meeting held under the auspices of the NIM should also have the deployment of specialist units as a standing item on the agenda. This is particularly so where the strategic meeting includes the boroughs partners within the crime and disorder framework. Who will participate in these meetings is apparently not yet clear.

The process is outlined at Figure 6-2.

Figure 6-2. Process under Recommendation 6



6.5.2 Benefits

- Improved effectiveness of local policing operation due to regular analysis of intelligence received from operational support units.
- Regular assessment and submission of appropriate bids for support irrespective of historic results.
- Transparency in the deployment of support units across the MPS.

6.5.3 Costs

- None – achievable within existing resources.

6.5.4 How to progress

The Review Team suggests that the NIM Implementation team could include these requirements in their compliance literature whilst also emphasising the requirement for debriefs of investigations.

6.5.5 Links to other recommendations

Linked to recommendation 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13.

6.6 Local Accountability

External consultation identified a considerable thirst for knowledge about the activities of support units. Given the extensive appreciation of the existence of many specialist units, it is right that their activities should be accountable to the communities in which they operate. However, the strategy of borough-based policing means, to some degree, that support units are accountable to boroughs, and the boroughs are in turn accountable to the local community.

The Review Team suggests that it is inappropriate and inefficient for members of specialist units to regularly appear before the many consultative groups attended by the MPS in London. Surveys have indicated that the public obtain the great majority of information about policing activities from their local media. Therefore, this recommendation proposes that the public are informed through the local media and Community Police Consultative Groups.

Many boroughs have now appointed communications officers to deal with external and internal communications. The Review Team suggests that these staff will be best placed to determine how to communicate information about the activities of operational support units to their local communities.

Recommendation 6

To raise community awareness about the use of operational support resources by borough commanders through their local media, local consultative group meetings and other channels of communication.


6.6.1 How it would work

Borough Media and Communications Officers would be responsible for passing information about the use of operational support resources in the borough to the local media. They will also consider the use of website/e-information, posters and leaflet campaigns as appropriate within the local community following particular operations.

Local consultative groups (e.g. Community Police Consultative Groups, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships) should also be utilised to disseminate information. The Review Team does not envisage that representatives of the units will routinely attend meetings unless specifically requested by the borough or the group.

The process is outlined at Figure 6-3.

Figure 6-3. Process under Recommendation 6



6.6.2 How to progress

The Review Team suggests that TP Partnership Unit should task Borough Liaison Officers to include operational support activities on the agendas of Community Police Consultative Group meetings.

The Review Team recommends that the Directorate of Public Affairs issues advice to Borough Media and Communications Officers about how to promote the work of operational support units in their local areas.

6.6.3 Benefits

- Enhanced visibility of operational support units within the BOCU.
- Increased public reassurance from knowledge that specialist resources are available to assist in policing their local area.
- Improved public understanding about the use of operational support resources.

6.6.4 Costs

None identified – achievable by optimising the use of existing resources.


6.6.5 Links to other recommendations

Linked to recommendations 1, 3, 4, 5, 12 and 13.

6.7 Linkages between Recommendations 4, 5 and 6

The diagram at Figure 6-4 demonstrates the linkages between the Review's recommendations (4, 5 and 6) about accountability. All of the recommendations sit within the context of the National Intelligence Model.

Figure 6-4. Links between Recommendations 4, 5 and 6



7. RESOURCES

This chapter focuses on the resources strand of the Review. It considers how an activity measurement approach could inform the assessment of staffing needs for operational support functions. The potential benefits of greater use of non-sworn police staff are examined. The chapter also suggests how retired staff could be engaged more economically and efficiently. It concludes by considering how experience can be retained on boroughs through the secondments of trainee detectives and the direct recruitment of individuals into investigative functions.

7.1 MPS Position

In Stage 1, the Review Team found:

- Tension between BOCUs and operational support unit resources – one short of experience the other short of staff.
- No transparency about resource decisions for specialist units.
- Operational support units, particularly SCD, rely heavily on overtime to function, raising issues about the work-life balance and how to achieve the Home Office target to reduce overtime.
- The work of operational support units reduces the risks to the MPS, e.g. Trident in the way they deal with black on black crime, SCD7 on serious and organised crime.


7.2 Consultation

7.2.1 Internal Consultation

During the internal consultation, OCU Commanders strongly made the point that the allocation of assets should be made on the basis of problems and their prioritisation. Once these have been identified the resources needed to address them can be allocated. This approach was seen to avoid any problems caused by dividing resources according to organisation silos.

OCU Commanders suggested that they are losing experience with large numbers of staff approaching retirement. This is confirmed by the predicted retirement levels obtained from Human Resources Directorate and illustrated at Figure 7-1.

Figure 7-1. Predicted Wastage Estimates



NB: Based upon 2002/03 rates, and officers retiring after 30 years length of service
 Source: Police – future wastage (leavers) 2003/04 – 2013/14 and consequent recruitment.
 HR Workforce Planning, May 2003.

Many ACPO-rank officers said that the present loss of experienced officers from BOCU must not continue. They questioned the need for experience in many of the support functions, particularly whether SCD always needed to take the best and most experienced individuals from BOCUs. However, present HR policies require the best applicant to be selected for a post. SCD cannot sidestep the best candidate to recruit a less able or less experienced officer.

7.2.2 External Consultation

The external consultation exercise did not specifically focus on resources. However, a number of answers to other questions did pertain to resources, for example, 'Too many officers working in specialist units might lead to insufficient front line staff.'

7.3 Comparison

The Review Team found that most other forces draw staff from local policing to staff major inquiries. Some use an abstraction policy to determine the numbers that should be supplied from different areas. For example, in West Midlands Police each OCU is required to second nine detective constables at any time to murder investigations.

Kent County Constabulary – the force that pioneered the NIM – have one third of their staff centralised. This provides flexibility in moving staff to meet strategic priorities (e.g. from Special Branch to major crime investigations when demand is high). Arguably this flexibility is required to enable smaller

forces to respond to spontaneous demands that would otherwise make a significant adverse impact.

The 2002/2003 HMIC Inspection Report on the MPS states that 'The MPS remains quite centralist in terms of the deployment of its financial and operational assets. Indeed between 1998/99 – 2001/02 the proportion of officers on divisions/BOCUs has fallen from 68% to 63% while over the same period SO has grown from 10% to 17%.' (N.B. SCD has been formed from SO.)

The Review Team found comparison with overseas forces more relevant. Planning and budgeting cycles are harmonized. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has increased the strategic focus on outcomes and achievements with the implementation of performance management via the Balanced Scorecard tool. It is now better able to match resources against organisational goals.


The RCMP states that 'by establishing the clear linkage between expenditures of funding and resources on activities and initiatives that support our strategic priorities and, ultimately, Safe Homes/Safe Communities, we can demonstrate real value for money. And we can tell a better and more balanced story of both our achievements and deficiencies.'

In Australia, the Victoria Police resource allocation is determined by departmental budget funding with the actual distribution of personnel across units dependent on operational priorities. For example the Crime Department was reviewed to determine numbers of personnel per squad. Resources were based on their workloads assessed using: time spent on investigation; life of an unsolved investigation; time constraints placed on investigators by judicial system etc. The analysis identified that in servicing the community statewide, three on-call homicide investigation teams were required.

7.4 Setting the Budgeted Workforce Totals of Non-Borough Operational Support Units

The performance of support units has traditionally been measured on the basis of arrests made, judicial disposals and property recovered. Whilst important, these measures do not monitor the costs of achieving outcomes. The diagram below (Figure 7-2) indicates the links between inputs, outputs and outcomes.

Figure 7-2. Links between Inputs, Outputs and Outcomes



The Police Research Group report, *Central Specialist Squads: A framework for monitoring and evaluation* (1996), examined central squads in five forces including the MPS. Little evidence was found at that time of the use of performance indicators for the work of specialist units; or of any concentrated routines of management review relating to the setting and monitoring of progress against achievable objectives (both qualitative and quantitative). It suggested that this appears to be an area of substantial difficulty, and the question of ‘what would be the effect of halving or doubling the resources devoted to this activity’ is never put.

The report recommended, ‘Support units should be able to demonstrate the relationship between the activities, outcomes and the use of resources. Arrangements should include procedures for the development of business plans and service level agreements; and routine reports of progress in relation to objectives and progress.’

This Review Team believes that the recommendation would make operational support units more financially accountable for their use of resources against forecast and actual performance. In particular it would demonstrate how the work of the support units is aligned to MPS priorities.

The recommendation would also help units to evaluate whether engaging more staff would reduce the overtime costs of support units. This would create and support a strategic business planning process to determine the resource needs of individual operational support units. To a large extent, this proposal mirrors the approaches taken by the RCMP and Victoria Police.

Recommendation 7

To measure activities and outcomes of operational support units in the most effective and efficient way in order to improve performance management and to influence decision-making about their staffing requirements.

7.4.1 How it would work

The Review Team identified two different approaches to this issue currently being taken within the MPS.

The TSG is using the Operational Policing Measure (OPM) to show their deployments on BOCUs. SCD7 Serious and Organised Crime intends to use an activity logger within the new MetDuties package to record the number of hours spent by officers per operation.

In many ways both approaches are similar. It may be that different approaches are required to meet the diverse operational circumstances of units. The Review Team believes that the approaches should be evaluated to determine the most appropriate method of achieving the aim.

The OPM is now an established process. The proposal seeks, where possible, to adapt this methodology to the needs of specialist units.

Methods for determining and recording outcomes need to be defined. The Review Team expects that different types of outcome will require different methods of measurement. It is implicit that clear objectives need to be set for operations in order that outcomes may be determined.

7.4.2 Benefits

- Support units could demonstrate the relationship between the activities, outcomes and, therefore, the use of resources.
- Business groups would be able to determine objectively resources on the basis of operational need.

7.4.3 Costs

- Internal Consultancy Group (ICG) evaluation, estimated at 30 days. Although ICG does not charge for its work, this equates to £13,500.

7.4.4 How to progress

The Review Team suggests that the Internal Consultancy Group be tasked with conducting an assessment of both methodologies. The aim of the evaluation would be to identify the most appropriate method of comparing the forecast use of resources (inputs) by operation/MPS priority against the actual use (through an activity measurement approach) and what is achieved (outcomes) for the investment in resources.

7.4.5 Links with other recommendations

Linked to recommendation 1.

7.5 Achieving a Balance of Experience Across BOCU and Non-Borough Units

OCU Commanders suggested that greater use should be made of retired officers by investigative units to reduce the drain of experienced staff from boroughs. The MPS already makes quite extensive use of retired officers largely obtained through an agency, Police Associates Register (PAR).

Between July 2002 and September 2003 the MPS spent £578,648 on temporary staff from PAR². The pie chart at Figure 7-3 shows the expenditure by various OCUs from July 2002 to September 2003. The three main users are Homicide South (£304,707), Homicide East (£109,391) and Human Resources (£66,949).

Figure 7-3. Expenditure on PAR Staff per OCU (£), July – September 2003




Table 7-1 shows expenditure during rolling 12-month periods since the PAR contract was first let in July 2002. Expenditure has been predicted until December 2003, extrapolated from the historical trend. (Note that the committed expenditure for Safer Streets support has not been included.)

² Not all invoices may have been paid for August and September 2003. July 2002 to June 2003 expenditure is £458,602.)

Table 7-1. Historical and Predicted Expenditure on PAR Staff

Rolling 12-month period	Expenditure (£)
Jul 02 - Jun 03	458,602
Aug 02 - Jul 03	492,308
Sep 02 - Aug 03	514,670
Oct 02 - Sep 03	548,103
Nov 02 - Oct 03 *	577,937
Dec 02 - Nov 03 *	607,771
Jan 02 - Dec 03 *	637,605

* estimated expenditure

The Review Team suggests that whilst retired officers may be part of the answer, they cannot and should not be seen as a panacea. Police work is constantly changing and people's knowledge of law, practice and procedures quickly becomes dated. Moreover, many officers at retirement want to move into new careers or pursue other interests. Others will not have the necessary skills and experience. The pool of suitable staff wanting to continue to work for the MPS therefore may not be large enough to satisfy the demand for resources.

The Review Team suggests that in considering the use of retired staff/officers there is a danger of tackling the symptom rather than the cause, which is officers being financially penalised if they stay beyond their 51st birthday. The MPS is currently one of the forces participating in a Home Office pilot scheme that aims to retain officers beyond 30 years' service. This is called the 30+ Scheme. It allows officers to take their commutation lump sum and to stop paying the 11% pension contributions from their salary.

Only eight MPS officers are taking part in the initial phase of the pilot – five of these come from SCD. The pilot ends on 31 March 2004. If it has been a success, the Home Office may extend the scheme to all police forces and also allow greater flexibility in the numbers of staff who are allowed to participate.

The Review Team suggests that increased use of the 30+ Scheme may encourage more officers in key investigative posts to remain after their normal retirement point. This would help to reduce the loss of experienced staff from both boroughs and SCD. Furthermore, since the scheme is largely self-funding, it can be achieved at minimal additional cost to the MPS.

The Review Team also considered that there is potential to utilise an MPS bank of retired officers that it could call on when required. This would reduce the dependency on the Police Associates Register. The MPS Human

Resources Directorate already has this work in train and it is hoped to launch the MPS People Bank in the near future.

This has the potential to generate some savings to the MPS as it would not be required to pay the agency's handling fee. PAR charges the MPS £17.50 per hour per person they supply and pay the individual concerned £10 per hour.

The Independent Challenge Panel highlighted a possible adverse public relations reaction to the use of retired officers. The Review Team considers this to be a valid point and believes that the same opportunities should be available to police staff, many of whom have specialist skills that could be of continued value to the MPS.

The Review Team therefore suggests that the MPS People Bank should include retired police staff as well as officers. Overall, the recommendation will give greater flexibility in staffing support posts. By helping to fill vacant posts, it has the potential to reduce the dependency on overtime that is evident in a number of operational support areas.

Recommendation 8

To reduce the impact of the loss of experienced officers from borough and reduce vacancies in operational support functions by seeking to retain officers and police staff with relevant experience and skills past their normal retirement point and by further building on work in progress to establish an MPS bank of retired staff.

7.5.1 How it would work

The Review Team suggests that the solution of using retired officers will probably result in a mixed economy of 30+ Scheme officers, officers and police staff from the MPS People Bank and the Police Associates Register and the number of similar organisations.

Directorates seeking staff for a particular enquiry or post will have a range of choices of sources of retired personnel. Extending the range of choice should, in the view of the Review Team, improve the chances of finding the right person for the right post, first time. Managers will be able to take into consideration availability, costs and skills in making their decisions.

7.5.2 Benefits

- Operational support vacancies filled by experienced retired officers and staff on a flexible basis as required.
- Retain experience on borough whilst maintaining experience in SCD.
- Reduction in overtime.
- Saving of £214,000 per annum based on MPS People Bank taking responsibility for 50% of the hours currently purchased from PAR.

7.5.3 Costs

None – achievable within existing resources.

7.5.4 How to progress

The Human Resources Directorate is already doing work on the 30+ Scheme and MPS People Bank. The Review Team suggests that HR be tasked with including police staff into the ambit of the MPS People Bank. SCD and TP would then need to be engaged to identify their likely requirements so that an accurate overall forecast can be prepared.

7.5.5 Links with other recommendations

Linked to Recommendations 9, 10 and 11.

7.6 Making Greater Use of Police Staff

During the consultation, OCU Commanders suggested that they will lose experience with large numbers of officers approaching retirement. Many ACPO-rank officers also told the Review Team that the present loss of experienced officers from BOCU must not continue.

The Review Team suggests that there are many posts where police powers are not required to effectively discharge the function; some of these posts require police experience, others do not. They question whether there is a need for police officers in a number of roles and advocate greater use of non-sworn police staff (e.g. surveillance officers).

Increasing the number of police staff would reduce the need for officers. It would consequently decrease the number of officers required for operational support posts thereby reducing the need for officers to leave borough policing.

However, the Review Team recognises that police staff can sometimes be more expensive than initially predicted and in some cases at least as expensive as officers in certain roles when allowances and training costs are taken into consideration. Moreover, the Independent Challenge Panel also queried whether the MPS would be able to attract police staff recruits in sufficient numbers to meet its needs if the numbers were greatly increased.

Consideration must also be given to retaining a number of posts that are suitable to be filled by police officers on recuperative duties and for officers redeployed under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995.

At the time of writing, HMIC is conducting a thematic inspection on civilianisation. The Review Team suggests that the results of this inspection should be awaited before the MPS takes the matter any further.

Recommendation 9

To assess the potential benefits of increasing the use of non-sworn police staff in operational support functions with reference to the recommendations of the ongoing HMIC thematic inspection of civilianisation and to the MPS Civilianisation Plan.

7.6.1 How it would work

The HMIC report on civilianisation is likely to be published in May 2004. The Review Team suggests that the Human Resources Directorate should consider the position of the MPS once the HMIC recommendations have been published.

7.6.2 Benefits

- Reduce the need to take officers from borough-based policing to fill operational support roles.
- Increase the career development opportunities for police staff.
- Reduce the costs of operational support functions.

7.6.3 Costs

- Risk that police staff may be more expensive in certain roles than officers.

7.6.4 Risks

- Risk that the MPS will be unable to recruit the required numbers of suitable police staff into operational support roles.
- Risk that police staff will reduce the operational flexibility provided by officers.

7.6.5 How to progress

The Review Team suggests that the Human Resources Directorate review and assess feasibility of implementing HMIC's recommendations once they are published in April/May 2004.

7.6.6 Links with other recommendations

Linked to Recommendations 8, 10, and 11.

7.7 Increasing the Experience of Borough-Based Detectives

Direct recruitment by the National Crime Squad (NCS) and the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) of experienced staff is likely to have a significant impact on SCD and a knock-on effect on boroughs. Recent growth in SCD, SO and pan-London units was raised as an area of concern by Borough Commanders who felt it as draining experience from local policing.

Table 7-2, overleaf, shows a snapshot of the average experience of DC and DS ranked officers working on three boroughs. An inner London borough, an outer London borough and a medium sized borough were used as the sample of what is thought to be the position across the MPS.

Research into length of service of CID officers has identified that the average (mean) length of service within the MPS ranges from 10.7 to 14.4 years. The average length of service on CID is between 1 to 4.5 years. To some extent this finding contradicts the original consultation outcomes.

Length of service within SCD is significantly lower than that of BOCU CID officers and the pan-London unit shown. This could be due to a number of factors. For example Operation Trident was originally set up as an intelligence-based initiative by the Metropolitan Police Service in 1998 therefore the unit itself is young within the MPS. The data for murder teams may also be affected by the number of name changes that this unit has had. The data relates to their current name and does not reflect the fact that staff may have been serving with the unit under different guises for several years.

Set against this of course is the consideration that a great many of these officers were borough detectives prior to their arrival on the SCD

Table 7-2. Table Showing the Average Length of Service in MPS and OCU

Unit	Average number of years served in the MPS	Average number of years served on named unit
Kensington and Chelsea BOCU CID	14.4	4.5
Redbridge BOCU CID	10.7	4.0
Lambeth BOCU CID	12.0	1.0
Traffic OCU	18.0	8.0
SCD5 Child Protection	18.5	3.6
SCD1(3) Murder Investigation Team	17.4	2.8
SCD8 Operation Trident	18.1	1.4

N.B. length of service on unit applies only to how long individuals have served on that named unit

SCD finds itself in a difficult position. On the one hand they recognise the need of boroughs to retain experienced detectives, while on the other hand, they need to recruit the best people for the job. If they advertise a post, SCD is obliged to select the best person and probably this will be on the basis of the individual's skills gained through experience.

It is important here to recognise that many detectives aspire to specialisms after learning their trade on boroughs and indeed are encouraged in this. In respect of this issue to some degree 'thus it ever was'.

The Review Team found a great willingness of SCD senior officers to do something about the problem and recognition that not every one of their posts needs to be filled by an experienced member of staff. The conundrum is thus how to legitimately recruit less experienced staff into SCD and other operational support functions.

The Review Team suggests that the answer could be a programme of secondments for trainee detectives to SCD that seeks to broaden the experience base of detectives across the MPS. However, in solving one problem it is vital to avoid creating another in generating a further drain on borough resources.

The Review Team suggests that SCD should be able to identify a range of posts that could be suitably occupied by trainee detectives. These posts would then be designated for trainees. The overall strength of SCD would only be marginally increased as most secondments would be into designated posts rather than as an addition to the establishment.

Detectives across the MPS would gain much greater experience and knowledge of specialist roles. This should not only improve their individual competence but also help to engender greater team working through a better understanding of the demands on different units. It would also lead to a greater cross-fertilisation of ideas and experience between TP and SCD.

The Review Team is cognisant of the risk that the trainee detectives will either never return to their borough posts or because they have been exposed to SCD operations seek to return as quickly as possible if posts are advertised. It is the former that is of greatest concern to senior TP officers.

The secondment programme will therefore require very clearly drafted guidelines setting out the respective expectations coupled to a robust monitoring process.

Recommendation 10

To seek to balance the needs of TP and SCD by retaining experienced detectives on boroughs whilst increasing the capability of SCD to support boroughs through the secondment of selected Trainee Detective Constables from BOCUs to SCD for six months as part of their development programme.

7.7.1 How it would work


Line managers would assess all Trainee Detective Constables (TDCs) to determine if their development would benefit from an attachment to the Specialist Crime Directorate.

SCD would be informed and allocate the TDC to a designated trainee post for a six-month attachment. The TDC will return to the BOCU at the completion of the attachment. It is accepted that not every SCD OCU would be able to take TDCs.

The process is outlined in Figure 7-4.

Trainee detectives would be given a statement of expectations clearly setting out the arrangements and in particular that they will be required to return to their borough after the secondment. This would need to be strictly controlled to ensure all parties benefit from the agreement and that the terms of the attachment are mutually acceptable.

Figure 7-4. Development of Detectives under Recommendation 10



7.7.2 Benefits

- SCD vacancies filled.
- Requirement to take officers from borough is reduced, resulting in boroughs retaining experienced staff.
- Detectives are exposed to the work of SCD at an early stage in their detective career.
- Detectives have a wider breadth of experience.

7.7.3 Costs

- Short-term loss of trainee detectives from boroughs.
- Risk that trainee detectives could get tied into long term investigations from which it may be difficult to achieve their release.

7.7.4 How to progress

The Review Team suggests that SCD could identify the posts that could be designated as suitable for trainee detectives. In conjunction with representatives of the Crime Academy, HRD and TP the programme of secondments would then be modelled to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs and risks.

7.7.5 Links with other recommendations

Linked to Recommendations 8, 9 and 11.

7.8 Direct Recruiting of Detectives

The profile of people joining the police service is changing. Some recruits do not intend to stay for thirty years. Others are joining later in life after other careers.

Police basic training has not changed fundamentally to keep pace with these changes. All recruits are on probation for two years during which time they are required to demonstrate their competency as a police officer. The vast majority are posted from training school at Hendon to a Borough Operational Command Unit. After two years, the recruits are able to specialise and many then take career paths into different areas, e.g. CID, Traffic and TSG.

The Review Team suggests that the time has come to challenge whether recruits always need to follow this route in the initial stages of their career. The Independent Challenge Panel questioned why people who have joined the MPS from an investigative background need to spend two years on the beat before becoming a detective. The Review Team therefore argues that there is an opportunity to fast track people with key skills into investigative roles.

Many police organisations already directly recruit investigators, e.g. in the US the Federal Bureau of Investigation and very recently in the UK the Independent Police Complaints Commission. The Review Team suggests that the MPS advertise for experienced investigators from HM Customs and Excise and other agencies to join as detectives.

Consultation about this recommendation uncovered an overwhelming sense of inevitability that it would and should happen at some stage.

The Review Team suggests that directly recruited investigators would still be able to demonstrate the required competencies even if serving in a specialist role. Some may argue that these roles lack direct community engagement that is a key part of patrolling skills. But in all probability the individuals will be on their second or third career bringing with them a number of years of life skills that most young recruits do not possess. An applicant's communication skills can in any case be specifically checked in the selection process.

The Review Team suggests that the numbers of directly recruited investigators may not be large. They are unlikely to adversely affect officers seeking to become investigators through the normal route.

Recruiting investigators directly into the Specialist Crime Directorate and other units would add to the other proposed initiatives to reduce the need to draw experienced staff away from boroughs. The Review Team also suggests that it may encourage people from under-represented groups (e.g. visible ethnic minorities, females) to join the MPS who may be deterred by the present requirement of having to spend a minimum of two years in uniform.

Recommendation 11

To retain experienced detectives on boroughs by recruiting experienced and skilled investigators into the MPS capable of being posted direct from Training School to SCD and other investigative units.

7.8.1 How it would work

Adverts seeking experienced investigators would be placed in appropriate journals following the precedent of specific adverts for firearms officers. Applicants would be subject to a bespoke selection process that could include a knowledge test on the lines of the national police investigators examination taken by officers on the trainee detective programme.

Individuals selected would attend the initial police training course at Hendon. They would then attend the Initial Investigator's Course at the Crime Academy before being posted to an investigative unit where they would complete their probationary period.

Individuals not achieving the required competency level would be considered for alternative postings if this would assist their development. Ultimately, they would be subject to the same sanctions as for standard entry officers.

Direct entry officers would be eligible to apply for transfer to other posts. Their training needs would need to be met in the same manner as for any other officer transferring from a specialist role.

7.8.2 Benefits

- Wider spread of life skills of detectives within the MPS
- May encourage suitable people from under represented groups to join the MPS.
- Reduces the number of experienced staff needed to be drawn from boroughs.
- Encourages people to join the MPS who may be deterred by thought of having to spend a minimum of two years in uniform.

7.8.3 Costs

- Bespoke advertising and recruiting campaign. Police Review half page full colour advert £3,000.
- Development of selection process. Internal Consultancy Group (ICG) to assist: approximately 20 days. Although ICG does not charge for its work, this equates to £9,000.
- Evaluation of different stages of the initiative. ICG 15 days' work (equivalent to £6,750).
- Additional supervisory burden associated to probationer reports in specialist areas.

7.8.4 How to progress

The Review Team suggests that HRD invite investigative units to identify posts that could be filled by directly recruited officers. HRD and respective units to determine the needs of the recruitment and selection process. Internal Consultancy Group to evaluate different stages of the initiative.

7.8.5 Links with other recommendations

Linked to Recommendations 8,9 and 10

8. LEVEL 2 ISSUES

This chapter examines the present position in relation to Level 2 cross-border issues and suggests improvements in relation to analysis and drugs supply.

8.1 Definition of Level 2

For the purposes of this review, Level 2 is defined as crime that crosses borough boundaries and/or is, by nature, beyond the capacity of a borough to deal with. However, for the most part, this Chapter concentrates on the impact of cross-borough border criminality.

8.2 MPS Position

Initial consultation with BOCU commanders and TP pan-London units highlighted concern about how the MPS identifies and responds to Level 2 crime at a BOCU level.

Boroughs suggested that Level 2 crimes were not being addressed because centrally-based resources are not available to meet the needs of their areas. Demand for TP resources (e.g. the TP Crime Squad and TSG) outstrips availability. Therefore TP prioritises resources at addressing Level 1 and 2 crimes in the eight boroughs that have the greatest impact on MPS performance.

The Review Team found that the MPS effectively addresses Level 1 drugs offences through operations aimed against crack houses and street dealers. SCD 7(7) and the National Crime Squad investigate level 3 drugs offences. But a gap exists at Level 2 where there is no dedicated unit to tackle drugs suppliers who cross borough borders.

Collaboration between adjoining boroughs and with other forces to address Level 2 crimes does take place but is not widespread. The Review Team also found that local intelligence systems do not always effectively identify hot spots that cross borough boundaries. The 'Crystal Palace Triangle' that straddles five boroughs exemplifies this problem.

In summary, the MPS position is:

1. There is a lack of data on the scale of Level 2 criminality
2. Few resources are dedicated to addressing Level 2 crime issues. TP Crime Squad, responsible for Level 2 crime, focuses primarily on street crime
3. There is no dedicated proactive capability to respond to Level 2 drugs issues
4. There is little cross-BOCU collaboration to address Level 2 crime

Cont'd.

5. There is evidence that issues impacting on communities that straddle several boroughs may not be effectively identified, actioned and resourced.

8.3 Consultation

8.3.1 Internal Consultation

As part of the internal consultation, it was suggested that pressure on BOCUs has made them more parochial when the MPS actually needs BOCU and OCU commanders to be more co-operative. The absolute focus on Level 1 criminality skews activity away from cross-border issues. Furthermore, it acts as a disincentive to co-operation and collaboration.

Internal consultation also highlighted a gap in relation to Level 2 drugs enforcement in London.

8.3.2 External Consultation

The external questionnaire asked whether respondents who lived or worked in areas crossing borough boundaries were aware of differences in policing services on different boroughs. Almost one quarter of the respondents stated they were aware of differences in the apparent level of visible police presence on different boroughs.

8.4 Comparison

In 2002 HMIC conducted a thematic inspection of police forces' response to level 2 crimes. HMIC found:

- Nineteen out of twenty-seven forces completed strategic assessments of level 2 crime
- There was very little proactive investigation of level 2 drug trafficking
- The National Intelligence Model will not work unless there is significant engagement by forces with level 2 crime.

Comparison with GMP, West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, Merseyside, Hertfordshire and Kent revealed the following:

- No force has been able to identify the actual volume of level 2 crime within their area or adjoining force areas
- Resources are tasked to tackle identified Level 2 crime that impacts on force performance against set and published priorities, e.g. street crime and burglary

Cont'd.

- No force has identified or produced performance data to capture or identify performance in tackling Level 2 issues
- A number of forces have an independent Director of Intelligence who evaluates level 2 requests for resources within a Tasking and Co-ordinating Process
- In GMP a level 2 Senior Investigating Officer advises and assists BCUs on level 2 crimes. West Midlands Police also has seven Silver Commanders – one for each of their force priorities – who advise BCUs and the Force Tasking and Co-ordinating Group.

Level 2 cross-border crime is not encompassed by performance measures. Therefore the scale of cross-border criminality is unknown and few resources are specifically dedicated to addressing Level 2 issues.

The Review Team found that the scale of Level 2 cross-border crime impacting on London is not known. Comparison reveals that this is in common with the most similar forces in the UK.

Measuring the volume of Level 2 cross-border crime is however easier said than done. The problem is analogous to assessing the amount of crime committed by juveniles, which is largely based on an estimation of the proportion of detected crimes committed by young offenders. Any assessment of the scale of Level 2 cross-border crime will therefore be based on an analysis of detected offences. Analysis of CRIS records, DNA and fingerprint databases, covert human intelligence source and other intelligence reports could also assist with this task.

Meantime operational units whether BOCU or non-BOCU based are not assessed on their response to Level 2 crime. Pressure on boroughs to deliver against their targets has, as an unintended consequence, made units parochial. This absolute focus on offences committed on their own borough deters managers from tackling cross-border issues. As a corollary the Review Team found few examples of boroughs collaborating to tackle shared problems.

Home Office research revealed that investigating officers often came across the problem that more senior officers – either their managers as heads of squads or their customers as area commanders – were reluctant to devote resources to the investigation of criminals who largely offended outside their own area. The report stated, 'Such apparent parochialism is understandable when local councillors and police authorities are holding area commanders and chief constables to account for the rise in crime and fall in detection rates in their areas. It does not, however, assist in investigating cross-border crime.'

The Review Team suggests that the MPS response to significant categories of crime that are probably cross-border in nature, e.g. burglary artifice could be significantly improved. This crime in particular impacts disproportionately on vulnerable victims. Table 8-1 shows the volume of burglary artifice offences over the past three years.

Table 8-1. Volume of Burglary Artifice Offences over Last Three Financial Years

Owning Borough	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003
City of Westminster	116	129	155
Kensington and Chelsea	84	89	96
Camden	181	213	210
Hammersmith and Fulham	141	143	148
Hackney	160	162	183
Tower Hamlets	166	187	219
Waltham Forest	163	281	242
Redbridge	84	109	98
Havering	62	111	118
Newham	117	209	239
Barking and Dagenham	82	145	193
Lambeth	159	221	194
Southwark	239	257	272
Islington	238	206	257
Lewisham	171	246	268
Bromley	100	136	111
Harrow	154	127	123
Brent	211	209	123
Greenwich	110	163	156
Bexley	43	86	75
Barnet	311	274	183
Twickenham	87	84	71
Hounslow	169	131	124
Kingston	50	47	48
Merton	64	122	95
Wimbledon	138	190	165
Ealing	210	196	156
Hillingdon	217	131	122
Enfield	230	282	204
Haringey	172	162	131
Croydon	116	160	169
Sutton	36	58	43
Total	4581	5266	4991

Recommendation 12

To improve the analytical capability and response in relation to Level 2 crime through the inclusion of NIM problem profiles of cross-border crime issues in the tactical intelligence assessments considered by the TP Tasking and Co-ordinating Group.

8.4.1 How it would work

The TP tasking and co-ordinating group is the most appropriate forum to discuss cross-border crimes impacting on boroughs. Intelligence analysts based in TP crime prepare a tactical assessment. Pan-London resources are then allocated on the basis of tactical assessments of crime.

The Review Team proposes that the TP tactical assessment should encompass Level 2 cross-border crime. The TP tasking and co-ordinating group will then be informed about the nature and scale of the problem and in a position to task resources appropriately.

The TP Crime Squad has very limited scope to assume complete responsibility for cross-border crime operations without the assistance of boroughs. In gauging the appropriate response, the TP tasking and co-ordinating group may well consider tasking two or more boroughs to collaborate in order to address a particular problem. Alternative courses of action could be referral to the TP Crime Squad or to the Specialist Crime Directorate tasking and co-ordinating group depending on the nature of the offence(s) involved.

TP tasking and co-ordinating groups are attended by link commanders or their representatives. The Link Commanders will therefore be in a position to orchestrate the relevant boroughs to collaborate drawing on other support as required through the tasking and co-ordinating process.

The Review Team believes that the NIM provides a methodology that should overcome and transcend organisational barriers that currently impede collaboration and co-ordination.

8.4.2 Benefits

- Improved identification of strategic risk posed by Level 2 (cross-border) criminality.
- Improved efficiency through greater collaborative working.

8.4.3 Costs

- None – achievable within existing resources.
- Risk – lack of availability of skilled analysts and analytical software.

8.5 Level 2 Drugs Supply Enforcement

London is at the centre of most of the trade in controlled drugs in the UK. The NCIS Threat Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2003 suggests that distribution of heroin at a national level continues to be dominated by groups based in London. Similarly London is an important hub for major cocaine traffickers. The threat assessment states that there is extensive evidence of the possession and use of firearms by individual criminals and organised criminal groups involved in the trade in Class A drugs.

It is therefore appropriate that reducing drug related crime is an MPS/MPA priority. The MPS/MPA corporate strategy *Towards the Safest City 2003-2005* states, 'We will identify and manage drug related crime (including the supply of drugs and, in particular, Class A drugs).'

The MPS has a Drugs Strategy with a vision 'to make London safer by working in partnership to tackle the supply and use of illegal drugs.' The strategy has two equally important strands – reducing supply and reducing demand. There are three main activities to support the aim of carrying out operations against Class A drug dealers – intelligence, targeting and forensic scientific support.

But MPS enforcement activity is meantime in reality concentrated at Level 1 (borough) and Level 3 (national and international). Some boroughs have their own local drugs units that tackle crack houses and street dealers. SCD7, sometimes in concert with the National Crime Squad, investigate organised networks of drugs suppliers operating at a national and international level. However, the Review Team found a significant gap in relation to Level 2 drugs enforcement.

It is generally accepted that insufficient action is being taken to stop the supply of drugs passing from the importers to street level dealers in London. This may in part be the product of increased attention to other priorities, e.g. counter-terrorism and street crime.

Middle market dealers require a sophisticated and sometimes long term investigation that is beyond the capacity of a borough. They also do not meet the criteria to attract the attention of the National Crime Squad. In essence the middle market dealers are falling between the cracks of enforcement activity and unless checked they can quickly become national or international players.

Many middle market dealers began their activities on the street. Their apparent success, manifested by lifestyles that can seem glamorous, to impressionable young people in deprived communities can attract others into the drugs trade. Not only does this damage the fabric of communities, but also challenges the MPS to provide a robust response in order to maintain community confidence.

The Review Team's original potential solution in the Stage 2 Report proposed a multi agency drugs intelligence capability to focus on Level 2 drugs supply offences. During Stage 3 the Review Team re-considered this approach in

the light of information about a new joint SCD7/HM Customs and Excise initiative targeting middle market drugs suppliers.

Recommendation 13

To evaluate the effectiveness of the SCD7/HM Customs and Excise initiative in disrupting the availability of Class A drugs at the point of supply in boroughs.

The key to successful drug enforcement is to ensure that all agencies work together in a strategic and co-ordinated way, exchanging information and using that information to make informed decisions about who, what and where to target the resources available.

This has been recognised in the multi-agency approach taken to the establishment of the new SCD7 initiative. This specifically includes assets from HM Customs and Excise. At the time of writing, the plans for the new unit were incomplete but it was clear that its terms of reference would include middle tier (Level 2) drug dealers working within London.

Some ACPO officers have expressed concerns that such a Drugs Task Force would self-task itself onto Level 3 dealers that are the responsibility of the National Crime Squad. The role of the SCD Tasking and Co-ordinating Group is therefore critical to provide the necessary governance to ensure that the initiative focuses on Level 2 and is not allowed to become totally immersed in Level 3 issues.

The new initiative came to light at a late stage of the Service Improvement Review. It is therefore apposite to review its impact on Level 2 drug crime on boroughs after a relevant period of operation.

The evaluation of this initiative would identify good practice and lessons to be learnt from taking a multi-agency approach to tackle Level 2 drugs, which could be applied to other Level 2 crime types.

8.5.1 Benefits

- Effectiveness of joint approach tackling Level 2 drugs evaluated.
- Assessment of application this approach to other Level 2 crime types.

8.5.2 Costs

- Nil – achievable within existing resources.

9. CONCLUSIONS

This Review has been founded on boroughs being the primary provider of policing services. However, boroughs cannot and should not for reasons of economy, effectiveness or expertise be the sole source of policing. They therefore depend on the support of other central functions to satisfy the vast array of policing needs in the capital. Some of these functions have their own particular objectives that may not at first sight directly support boroughs. However, ultimately most of these functions are delivered on and for the benefit of people living in boroughs.

The Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review set aside scrutinising organisational issues in favour of a thematic examination of policies and procedures. This approach was grounded in the belief that proposing major structural changes was not a realistic option and potentially would have expended a large amount of work for little return. Furthermore there was no prima facie evidence that any other organisational structure would significantly improve performance.

Unlike some other forces' best value reviews, the Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review has not examined the *raison d'être* for individual support units. Most are subject to regular scrutiny of one form or another and it was considered that the reasons for a major capital city requiring for example an air support unit or mounted section were self-evident.

This Review provides an objective view across four themes: roles and responsibility; accountability; resources; Level 2 issues. Dominating the Review has been the issue of resources. In the demand rich environment of London, almost every operational unit could put forward a cogent case for more resources. The Review has therefore made the case for resources to be matched to policing priorities. Informed by the strategic assessment and control strategy, legitimate decisions can be taken about functions that need to grow, reduce in size or stand still in terms of resources.

Many of the recommendations are linked but they are not dependent on one another. This is illustrated in the matrix at Table 9-1, below.

Table 9-1. Links between All Recommendations Arising from this Review

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
	Annual Reviews	24/7 Gateway	TP tasking	Operations Protocol	Internal Awareness	External Awareness	Activity Measurement	Staff Retention	Greater Use of Police Staff	Trainees to SCD	Direct Detectives	Level 2 Analysis	Drugs Initiative
1 Annual Reviews			X			X	X						X
2 24/7 Gateway				X	X								
3 TP tasking					X	X						X	
4 Operations Protocol					X	X							X
5 Internal Awareness						X						X	X
6 External Awareness												X	
7 Activity Measurement													
8 Staff Retention									X	X	X		
9 Greater Use of Police Staff										X	X		
10 Trainees to SCD											X		
11 Direct Detectives													
12 Level 2 Analysis													X
13 Drugs Initiative													


The Review has emphasised the need for team working to maximise the capability of the organisation. Achieving this will require firm leadership from in particular borough and OCU commanders. Their behaviours and thoughts strongly influence those of their staff – some of whom are the leaders of tomorrow. The recommendations give increased prominence to collaborative working. Inevitably sometimes an individual borough or OCU unit will be a winner but on others they may be a loser, cultural change will therefore need to overcome silo thinking to achieve the best from the limited resources available. Realization of this outcome will require leaders to reflect on their individual management approach, attitude and style.

The Demand Management Best Value Review sought to improve the initial response to calls for assistance from the public. It proposed a Demand Resolution Strategy setting out to improve public satisfaction through a 'right first time' approach to the management of demand. The recommendations of the Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review can be directly linked to the five strands of the Demand Resolution Strategy.

Figure 9-1, overleaf, therefore illustrates how the recommendations of the Operational Support Policing Service Improvement Review will assist the MPS to manage the demand for its services.

Effective prioritisation of resources is at the heart of ensuring continuous improvement in the management of operational support to boroughs. The products of this Service Improvement Review will result in a higher level of confidence that the distribution of resources properly reflect the strategic priorities of the MPS.

Figure 9-1. Links between Recommendations Arising from this Review and the MPS Demand Resolution Strategy



Demand Resolution Strategy Objectives

- 1.1 Improving accessibility of police services
- 2.1 Providing the best service through the most appropriate response
- 2.2 Improve the provision of service by enhancing the response team function
- 3.1 Allocating resources effectively
- 3.2 Planning to sustain capability
- 3.3 Providing effective support & specialist resources
- 4.1 Promoting problem solving
- 4.2 Shaping public expectations
- 4.3 improving staff awareness
- 5.1 Performance management
- 5.2 Monitoring implementation

Operational Support Recommendations

- No.6 External Awareness
- No.1 Annual Reviews
- No.2 24/7 Gateway
- No.3 TP Tasking
- No.5 Interval Awareness
- No.7 Activity Measurement

10. OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The following table provides an overview of the recommendations arising from the review and displays them according to the scale of the benefits they are expected to achieve and the ease with which they could be implemented.

11. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Review Team thanks everyone who has been involved with this Review. Police officers and staff from the MPS, as well as those from other police forces and law enforcement agencies in the UK and overseas, members of the public and non-police organisations have all contributed to the findings of this Review. Without their input, this Review would not have been possible.

12. APPENDIX A: PROGRESS OF DEVELOPMENT OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The matrix overleaf presents an overview of the development of the recommendations arising from the Service Improvement Review of Operational Support Policing. Following initial consultation, four key themes were developed. The end of Stage 1 resulted in 15 'next steps' to address the issues the Review considered. During Stage 2, 22 potential solutions were developed. Finally, these were consolidated in Stage 3 into the 13 recommendations.

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13. APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT

30+ Scheme	Home Office Trial to encourage the retention of skilled staff beyond their normal retirement age
BCU	Basic Command Unit – Home Office defined smallest area of command. In the MPS this is a borough.
BOCU	Borough Operational Command Unit – the MPS's basic command unit
Borough	BOCU
Borough Based Policing	The philosophy of placing the Borough as the basic unit central to policing the Capital
Borough Commander	Officer in Charge (usually a Chief Superintendent) of a Borough
Burglary artifice	Distraction burglary whereby means of entry to premises is by trick, rather than by force or sneak entry.
C3i	The programme of centralising MPS communications and call handling
CCA/CIA	Community Concern or Impact Assessment
Control strategy	Outlines priorities and makes sure that any police activity meets local and national objectives.
Covert Policing Unit	Specialist Department primarily concerned with unconventional police methods
CRE	Commission for Racial Equality
CRIMINT	MPS criminal intelligence recording system
DCC4	Diversity Directorate
GALOP	London's lesbian, gay and bisexual community safety charity
GLAD	Greater London Action for the Disabled
HMCE	Her Majesty's Customs and Excise
HMIC	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
IBO	Integrated Borough Operations office

Level 2	For the purposes of this Review, ' Level 2 ' is defined as crime that crosses borough boundaries and/or is, by nature, beyond the capacity of a borough to deal with.
Levels of crime	Level 1 – local issues Level 2 – cross-border issues Level 2 – serious and organised crime, national and international
Link Commander	Commander responsible for a number of boroughs
Managing Demand Best Value review	The Review that preceded this review looking at accessibility, response to incidents and shaping public expectations
MIRSAP	Major Incident Room Standard Administrative Procedures
MPA	Metropolitan Police Authority
NCIS	National Criminal Intelligence Service
NCS	National Crime Squad
NIM	National Intelligence Model – required to be introduced in all forces by 1 April 2004.
Non-borough units	see Operational Support Unit
OCU	Operational Command Unit
Operational Support Unit	A unit that provides support to BOCUs and/or undertakes work that BOCUs are unable to undertake, but is not part of the BOCU command structure.
OPM	Operational Policing Measure
PAR	Police Associates Register
PATP	Proactive Tasking Proformas (Document submitted to the tasking and co-ordinating group bidding for resources to proactively tackle problems)
PPRC	Planning Performance and Review Committee

Safer Streets boroughs	Designated for additional support due to level of street crime. The 15 Safer Streets Boroughs are: City of Westminster, Camden, Islington, Hackney, Tower Hamlets, Southwark, Lambeth, Brent, Haringey, Lewisham, Wandsworth, Waltham Forest, Newham, Croydon and Ealing.
SCD	Specialist Crime Directorate
SO	Specialist Operations
Statement of Expectations	Document outlining the tenure of an officer at a Unit normally given at induction
Strategic assessment	What is the long-term view for a particular area? What potential changes and developments could there be?
TCG	Tasking and co-ordinating group. Part of NIM. Definition from NCIS (2000): 'Chaired by a senior manager of the command unit who has the authority to deploy the necessary resources and comprise of people with key functional responsibility for the planning and execution of the law enforcement effort.'
TP	Territorial Policing

14. APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS

Recommendation	Costs	Savings
1	Nil costs Achievable within existing resources.	No cashable savings identified.
2	£1.4m (includes accommodation, running costs and staff [2 DS, 1 PS, 3 DC, 11 PC])	Awaits (based on savings from merging reserves)
3	No quantifiable costs identified achievable within current resources.	No quantifiable savings currently identified.
4	Nil costs Achievable within existing resources	Advance notice of staff demands leading to a reduction in need to cancel weekly leave at short notice.
5	Nil costs Achievable within existing resources.	None identified
6	Nil costs Achievable within existing resources.	None identified
7	Internal Consultancy Group evaluation, estimated 30 days = £13,500	nil at this stage
8	Nil costs Achievable within existing resources.	£214k Based on the MPS people bank assuming responsibility for 50% of contracted hours
9	Nil costs	Nil at this stage
10	Nil costs Achievable within existing resources.	Nil
11	Bespoke advertising and recruiting campaign. Police Review half page full colour advert £3,000 Development of selection test (ICG 20 days = £9,000) Internal Consultancy Group evaluation of different stages of the initiative (ICG 15 days = £6,750).	£139k Salary costs based on probationers occupying 0.5% of SCD constable posts
12	Nil costs Achievable within existing resources.	No financial savings identified.
13	Nil costs Achievable within existing resources.	Nil
TOTAL	£1.419m	£0.353m

15. APPENDIX D: IMPROVEMENT PLANS

Recommendation 1	To ensure that the most effective and efficient use is made of resources by conducting annual assessments to examine the justification for and the terms of reference of, operational support units against MPS priorities as defined by the NIM framework.			
Objective(s):	Enhanced MPS performance by clearly defining the contributions of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing safer communities			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None – achievable within existing resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No cashable savings identified. 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Roles and responsibilities of non-borough units are explicitly directed towards the organisational priorities of the MPS, through the framework of the Control Strategy. Corporate planning process will improve the transparency of decisions on the scaling of operational support units. 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
Directorate of Strategic Development, in conjunction with other directorates, should establish the evaluation criteria and process.	DCC 2	June 2004	Evaluation process developed	To instigate annual reviews of operational support functions in line with the strategic planning process.
		Sept 2004	Commence assessments in line with strategic planning process	

Recommendation 2	To provide boroughs with a more efficient and effective method of accessing the most appropriate support unit to assist with incidents and also to provide a source of advice and information through the establishment of a 24/7 joint central gateway for TP and SCD.			
Objective(s):	Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing Safer Communities			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> £1.4m (includes accommodation, running costs and staff [2 DS, 1 PS, 3 DC, 11 PC]) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Awaits (based on savings from merging reserves) 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risk that accommodation cannot be found for a joint SC and TP facility. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved efficiency through co-ordinated intelligence in fast time situations. Boroughs receive an immediate and decisive answer to queries about potential specialist support and the terms of reference of non-borough units, which will better enable them to service demand. Boroughs and other OCUs receive advice and information about certain types of incidents, which will better enable them to service demand. Improved health and safety advice. 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
Existing SCD reserves combined to form central gateway.	SCD	1 Dec 2003	Single SCD reserve in place	MPS Integrated Operations Centre in operation
TP central gateway formed to link with Integrated Borough Operations centres	TP	1 Jun 04	TP gateway in place	
Amalgamate SCD and TP	TP	30 Sep 04	Joint gateway in place	

Recommendation 3	To increase the transparency of the TP tasking and coordinating framework in order to encourage boroughs to bid for the services of TP pan-London units.			
Objective(s):	Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing safer communities			
Additional costs		Estimated savings/benefits		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No quantifiable costs identified – achievable within current resources. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No quantifiable savings currently identified. 		
Non-quantifiable costs		Non-financial benefits		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nil 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved effectiveness as TP tasking and co-ordinating process will be better informed by needs of BOCUs. Increased efficiency by improving the quality of the bids submitted by BOCUs requesting support. 		
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
Link Commanders to nominate deputies or devise rolling programme.	TP	1 Jan 04		
Revised process map and self-help guide designed and disseminated	TP	1 Jan 04		
Link Commanders or deputies to attend meetings, champion their BOCUs' PATPs and report back to BOCUs.	TP	1 Feb 04		

Recommendation 4	To improve the consistency and coordination of policing on boroughs by implementing a protocol to ensure the Integrated Borough Operations Office is informed of operational support units operating proactively in their area, unless to do so would compromise that, or future operations.			
Objective(s):	Increased public confidence by improving accountability of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing safer communities			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None identified – achievable within existing resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advance notice of staff demands leading to a reduction in need to cancel weekly leave at short notice. 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nil 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved effectiveness and efficiency through avoidance of 'blue on blue' conflicts Improved public satisfaction by ensuring consistent policing in tune community needs. Improved effectiveness through intelligence flows – i.e. 'visiting' units aware of local concerns/tensions 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
TP Crime Policy to co-ordinate DCC4, TP Modernising Operations, SCD and SO policy	TP	Apr 04	Publication of police notice	

Recommendation 5	To improve internal awareness about the use of operational support resources in boroughs by ensuring effective debriefing and by making this a standing agenda item at the weekly intelligence meeting (mandatory under NIM) and at the BOCU Tasking and Co-ordinating meeting.			
Objective(s):	Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational support policing functions Enhanced MPS performance by clearly defining the contributions of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing safer communities			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None – achievable within existing resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None identified 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved effectiveness of local policing operation including health and safety issues by regular analysis of intelligence received from operational support units. Regular assessment and submission of appropriate bids for support irrespective of historic results. Transparency in the deployment of support units across the MPS. 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
TP NIM Implementation team to include details in their compliance literature.	TP	April 2003		

Recommendation 6	To raise community awareness about the use of operational support resources by borough commanders through their local media, local consultative group meetings and other channels of communication.			
Objective(s):	Increased public confidence by improving accountability of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing safer communities			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None – achievable within existing resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None identified 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved awareness amongst Community opinion formers of the type of support accessible to Boroughs. Increased awareness of the extent to which the Borough has availed itself of the support Increased accountability of Borough Commanders in ensuring that appropriate bids are made for support Services 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
TP partnership to task Borough Liaison Officers with ensuring that this matter is on CPCG agendas.	TP	April 04	Guidance issued	Issue on all agendas.
DPA to issue guidance to Borough Communications on local communications tactics.	DPA	April 04	Guidance issued	

Recommendation 7	To measure activities and outcomes of operational support units in the most effective and efficient way in order to improve performance management and to influence decision-making about their staffing requirements.			
Objective(s):	Enhanced MPS performance by clearly defining the contributions of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Reforming the delivery of policing services			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internal Consultancy Group assessment, estimated 30 days = £13,500. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nil at this stage 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nil – achievable within existing resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support units could demonstrate the relationship between the activities, outcomes and the use of resources. Business groups would be able to objectively determine resources on the basis of operational need. Improved efficiency by identifying the appropriate methodology for each unit. 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
ICG assess current methods of measurement	DCC 2	30 Sep 04	Evaluation completed	Identification of most effective and efficient method of measuring activities, outputs and outcomes to inform resource requirement.
Implement selected methodology to inform planning processes.	DCC 2	31 Dec 04	Methodology implemented	

Recommendation 8	To reduce the impact of the loss of experienced officers from borough and reduce vacancies in operational support functions by seeking to retain officers and police staff with relevant experience and skills past their normal retirement point and by further building on work in progress to establish an MPS bank of retired staff.				
Objective(s):	Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational support policing functions				
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing safer communities				
Additional costs		Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nil – achievable within existing resources. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> £214 K based on the MPS people bank assuming responsibility for 50% of contracted hours. 			
Non-quantifiable costs		Non-financial benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nil 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved effectiveness by reducing the loss of experience from BOCUs. Improved efficiency and effectiveness by reducing need to draw experienced staff away from boroughs. Improved efficiency through in-house response to requests for contracted staff. 			
Key actions to implement		Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
Fully implement MPS People Bank incorporating retired officers and police staff.		HR	30 June 2004	MPS People Bank fully functioning.	50% of contracted hours to be found from People Bank.
Assess the potential extension of the MPS 30+ Scheme with regard to the Home Office evaluation of the national pilot scheme.		HR	30 Sep 2004	Assessment completed.	Increased use of 30+ Scheme

Recommendation 9	To assess the potential benefits of increasing the use of non-sworn police staff in operational support functions with reference to the recommendations of the ongoing HMIC thematic inspection of civilianisation and the MPS Civilianisation Plan.			
Objective(s):	Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Reforming the delivery of policing services.			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nil 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nil at this stage 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk that police staff may be more expensive in certain roles than officers. • Risk that the MPS will be unable to recruit the required numbers of suitable police staff into operational support roles. • Risk that police staff will reduce the operational flexibility provided by officers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce the need to take officers from borough based policing to fill operational support roles. • Increase the career development opportunities for police staff. 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
Human Resources Directorate review and assess HMIC recommendations [to be published in April/May 2004]	HR	30 Sep 03	Review completed	Increased number of police staff
Implement action plan arising from above		To be advised	Action plan implemented	

Recommendation 10	To seek to balance the needs of TP and SCD by retaining experienced detectives on boroughs whilst increasing the capability of SCD to support boroughs through the secondment of selected Trainee Detective Constables from BOCUs to SCD for six months as part of their development programme.			
Objective(s):	Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Reforming the delivery of policing services.			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nil – achievable within existing resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nil 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Short-term loss of trainee detectives from boroughs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve retention of experienced staff on boroughs. • Improve development of trainee detectives. 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
Identification of posts that could be designated as suitable for trainee detectives.	SCD	June 2004	2-5% of SCD Constable posts to be designated for trainee detectives	Increase average length of CID experience per borough DC
SCD, Crime Academy, HR and TP model the programme of secondments to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs and risks.	SCD	June 2004	Programme developed	
Implement programme of attachments	SCD	September 2004	Programme implemented	

Recommendation 11	To retain experienced detectives on boroughs by recruiting experienced and skilled investigators into the MPS capable of being posted direct from Training School to SCD and other investigative units.			
Objective(s):	Enhanced quality of MPS service to Londoners through improved efficiency of operational support policing functions			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Reforming the delivery of policing services			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bespoke advertising and recruiting campaign. Police Review half page full colour advert £3,000. Development of selection test (ICG 20 days = £9,000) Internal Consultancy Group evaluation of different stages of the initiative (ICG 15 days = £6,750) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> £139k salary costs based on probationers occupying 0.5% of SCD constable posts. 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Additional supervisory burden associated with less experienced officers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduces the number of experienced staff requiring to be drawn from boroughs. Encourages people to join the MPS who may be deterred by thought of having to spend a minimum of two years in uniform. 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
HRD and SCD identify posts that could be filled by directly recruited detectives.	HR	June 2004	Identify suitable posts for directly recruited detectives	Increase average length of CID experience per borough DC
Recruitment and selection process identified and implemented.	HR	June 2004	Process identified	
Implement recruitment process.	HR	Sep 04	Personnel recruited	

Recommendation 12	To improve the analytical capability and response in relation to Level 2 crime through the inclusion of NIM problem profiles of cross-border crime issues in the tactical intelligence assessments considered by the TP Tasking and Co-ordinating Group.			
Objective(s):	Increased public satisfaction by improving MPS response to Level 2 issues.			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing safer communities			
Additional costs		Estimated savings/benefits		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nil – achievable within existing resources. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No financial savings identified. 		
Non-quantifiable costs		Non-financial benefits		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nil – required by National Intelligence Model. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased public satisfaction resulting from increased MPS performance in relation to Level 2 cross-border crimes. 		
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
TP Crime analysts to be tasked with producing Level 2 tactical assessments.	TP	1 Feb 04	Assessments produced	
Consideration of Level 2 assessments by TP tasking and co-ordinating group.	TP	1 Feb 04	Assessments part of TP T&CG process.	

Recommendation 13	To evaluate the effectiveness of the SCD7/HMCE initiative in disrupting the availability of Class A drugs at the point of supply in boroughs.			
Objective(s):	Increased public satisfaction by improving MPS response to Level 2 issues.			
Link to strategic aim/priority	Developing safer communities			
Additional costs	Estimated savings/benefits			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nil – achievable within existing resources. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nil 			
Non-quantifiable costs	Non-financial benefits			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness of joint approach tackling Level 2 drugs evaluated. Assessment of application this approach to other Level 2 crime types 			
Key actions to implement	Lead	Deadline	PI/Milestone	Target
Joint initiative commences operations.	SCD	01 Jun 04	Ops commence	Establish if the joint approach makes an impact on Level 2 drugs supply.
Evaluation conducted.	SCD	31 Dec 04	Evaluation	
Final report considered by SCD and TP.	SCD/TP	01 Apr 05	Considered	