



# PALADIN CHILD

THE SAFEGUARDING CHILDREN STRAND OF  
MAXIM FUNDED BY REFLEX

A PARTNERSHIP STUDY OF  
CHILD MIGRATION TO THE UK  
VIA LONDON HEATHROW



# CONTENTS

<b>ABSTRACT .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>DATA ANALYSIS .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS .....</b>	<b>31</b>

## **ABSTRACT**

The report summarises more than eight months of work undertaken in an attempt to define the nature of child migration from non-EU countries to the UK. This project is a unique partnership effort to combine the different working practices and focus of three statutory agencies: immigration, police, social services and the NSPCC.

1,738 UMs were landed by UKIS in the three month study period. 551 (30%) were 'risk assessed in' by the Paladin Team for follow up enquiries. The details of these UMs were faxed to social services for further investigation.

The presence of the detective at the airport and raised awareness by UKIS staff led to an increase in workload for the local authority. Heathrow Airport is located in the London Borough of Hillingdon and during the Paladin scoping period Hillingdon received 39 referrals of which 31 were accommodated by the London Borough of Hillingdon. If these are compared with the same period last year there were 25 referrals to Hillingdon, which resulted in 12 children being accommodated. Unaccompanied children coming into the UK do put an extra burden on social services departments already under pressure. The examples in Appendix M indicate that Social Services involvement has been necessary for many different reasons. If Operation Paladin had not been operating many of these situations would not have been picked up. As a direct result of this initiative three children have been identified at risk of significant harm and have been added to the Child Protection Register and social services staff have provided parenting advice to numerous families.

At the time of publishing this report, social service departments had been unable to account for 28 of the 551 UMs notified to them. 14 of these have subsequently been located by police investigations either having left the country or presented themselves to claim asylum at Lunar House having given false addresses on entry. The largest group of unaccounted for UMs were African girls in their teens which could confirm the NGO fears that this group fall victim to exploitation in domestic servitude or abuse through prostitution. Police enquiries continue into their whereabouts.

The planning phase for Paladin commenced in April 2003 and the data relevant to this study was obtained during a three month period from August to November 2003. Follow up enquiries are ongoing but data collection concluded at the end of January 2004.

It is recognised that this study has failed to identify any significant levels of trafficking or exploitation but we have only just started out on this journey and now have the firm base of data upon which to build our

response to this crime. Now we have improved our understanding of this subject and we need to ensure we maintain our momentum as we move to the next stage and begin to cross reference data and develop intelligence from other sources to identify those who may have already been trafficked to ensure we prevent further such crimes.

In conclusion, it is worth repeating that this study has not identified any widespread exploitation of migrant children in the UK. However, it should be acknowledged that this study only focussed on one port of entry into the UK and on non-EU passport holders. (Victoria Climbié came in through France on an EU passport). Consequently we are still unaware of the scale of UM's coming into the UK through European channels. Immigration officers currently only have limited powers to screen European passport holders arriving into the UK. As membership of the EU expands, this may increase opportunity for easier trafficking and facilitation of children due to lower levels of scrutiny. It is perfectly legitimate to allow UM's to travel to the UK for a range of purposes. It is the view of the project team that in the past the media have exaggerated the numbers of UM's exploited based on a handful of case studies. Nevertheless, we can do more to ensure we safeguard UM's from exploitation and a more refined Paladin process will allow for better risk assessment and more effective information sharing.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The report summarises more than eight months of work undertaken in an attempt to define the nature of child migration from non-EU countries to the UK. It identifies for the first time key data, which can now be used to safeguard children arriving in the UK and in transit. This project is a unique partnership effort to combine the different working practices and focus of three statutory agencies: immigration, police, social services and the NSPCC.

The planning phase for Paladin commenced in April 2003 and the data relevant to this study was obtained during a three month period from August to November 2003. Follow up enquiries are ongoing but data collection concluded at the end of January 2004.

It should be noted from the outset that the vast majority of UMs arriving at Heathrow do so legitimately and safely. A very small number give rise for concern and it is this group that will be the focus of our future work.

The working group adopted a three-phased approach to Paladin. The first stage involved the initiation of a police child protection presence at London Heathrow, a DC from the Hillingdon Child Protection Unit (CPU).

The second issue addressed by the group was to secure funding to create a bespoke database to input and analyse the data captured by UKIS officers landing a child. Reflex, a Government led initiative allocated £100K to the project to cover the costs of hardware and staffing.

A new form was designed "Notification of Unaccompanied Minor Arrival at Heathrow Airport". This allowed for details of sponsors, 'meeters' and 'greeters' to be recorded along with travel and document details.

The criteria set for completion of the Paladin form was as follows:

- Non EU passport holder
- Under 18 years of age
- Travelling without a parent, legal guardian or older sibling, and
- Not part of a recognised school, church or sporting group visit

UKIS issued all their staff at Heathrow with guidance on law and when to complete the form.

The final element of Phase One was the need to create a support team to process the information captured by UKIS. The MPS contributed a Detective Sergeant and Detective Constable full time to the team. The NSPCC provided one full time social worker and a part time Childrens

Services Manager from its Specialist Investigation Service and Hillingdon Social Services identified a Principal Reviewing Officer to job share with the NSPCC part time worker. Three agency data-inputters were hired to process the forms. The UKIS Heathrow minors teams provided a bridge between the front line immigration officers collecting the data and the support team based at Tintagel House, Vauxhall, London.

The Paladin Database took some months to develop. Initially the team considered using the existing analytical tools available to the MPS such as Holmes II, i2 and Crimint but none of these appeared suitable. The MPS Strategic IT partner Schlumberger-Sema were consulted by the Child Protection Group IT Manager and a proposal was put forward to design a bespoke database using 'Access' software supported by 'Quick Address' to validate input. It consists of seven screens with drop down menus allowing for use at any port and is fully networkable. The screens are as follows:

- Child arrival details
- UK sponsor details
- Social Service actions
- Police actions
- Administrative of proformas
- Summary screen

One of the early significant debates concerned the duty of care the Paladin team owed to the children being monitored. For the first time information on the movement of UM's would be held by child protection agencies and it was accepted we had a duty to assess the risk to the child and pass on the data to local social services or indeed police for further investigation. A risk assessment proforma was designed with six potential risk categories:

- Address already known to Paladin
- Sponsor/greeters address already known
- Under 16 years old and staying more than 28 days (private fostering?)
- No date of return given
- Greeter is already known to UKIS
- Concerns identified by other means, details to be given.

To ensure completion of the intelligence cycle, a proforma was designed for use by the social worker tasked to carry out the follow up enquiries on the child. If a child was risk assessed "in" then a copy of the landing proforma was faxed to the Child Protection Co-ordinator together with the feedback proforma. An explanatory fax front page outlined the process and provided contact details for the Paladin Team for further advice.

The main section of the full report is compiled of forty-nine pages of data in chart, table and written form providing a detailed analysis of the three month scoping period. This data forms the basis to evidence future operational activity, resource deployment and training requirements. It also, for the first time, provides us with accurate data on which to base future risk assessment of UM's entering the UK to raise the threshold for satisfaction for landing.

1,738 UMs were landed by UKIS in the three month study period. 551 (30%) were 'risk assessed in' by the Paladin Team for follow up enquiries. The details of these UMs were faxed to social services for further investigation. This is the first time this process has been tried anywhere in the world and there have been significant learning points along the way. At the time of publishing this report, social service departments had been unable to account for 28 of the 551 UMs notified to them. 14 of these have subsequently been located by police investigations either having left the country or presented themselves to claim asylum at Lunar House having given false addresses on entry.

The largest group of unaccounted for UMs were African girls in their teens which could confirm the NGO fears that this group fall victim to exploitation in domestic servitude or abuse through prostitution. Police enquiries continue into their whereabouts. However, running in parallel to Paladin has been a second strand of "Maxim" known as Operation Kontiki. This is led by the Clubs and Vice Unit of the MPS and has been targeting brothels and massage parlours in London. They have carried out regular visits to premises where women may be providing services of a personal nature and interviewed those involved. They are able to produce a full breakdown and analysis of their findings which, although not available for publication here, clearly show that this market is dominated by Eastern European women. A very small number of juveniles have been identified but none were of African origin. There is little or no intelligence to suggest African girls are being openly exploited for sexual purposes in London unlike some other parts of Europe. Whenever such intelligence is passed to police, action is swift and the background profile of the child is much more likely to be based around drug abuse with a history of neglect leading to a placement in local authority care.

There is a significant contrast to the landed UMs as the profile of those claiming asylum at the airport during the scoping period is very different. Afghanistan is by far the largest donor country and in general UM's claiming asylum at the first opportunity come from war torn regions. More detailed analysis of the profile of UMs claiming asylum at Lunar House is required as it was outside the scope of this study but it is the firm belief of the project team that UMs from other regions will claim asylum once landed and settled with family or friends in the UK.

A number of recommendations arise from this brief summary of the conclusions that can be drawn from analysis of the data gathered

during the scoping study. It is the firm belief of the Paladin team that this scoping study has identified that there is sufficient concern about the numbers of UMs transiting through Heathrow to warrant the creation of a new multi-agency response to child migration.

The section on outcomes and findings highlights the fact that awareness has been raised across the agencies as a result of this initiative and positive intervention by UKIS plays a key role in reducing demand on the wider child protection community. Twenty-six recommendations have been made to address the issues raised by this study.

In conclusion, it is worth repeating that this study has not identified any widespread exploitation of migrant children in the UK. However, it should be acknowledged that this study only focussed on one port of entry into the UK and on non-EU passport holders. (Victoria Climbié came in through France on an EU passport). Consequently we are still unaware of the scale of UM's coming into the UK through European channels. Immigration officers currently only have limited powers to screen European passport holders arriving into the UK. As membership of the EU expands, this may increase opportunity for easier trafficking and facilitation of children due to lower levels of scrutiny. It is perfectly legitimate to allow UM's to travel to the UK for a range of purposes. It is the view of the project team that in the past the media have exaggerated the numbers of UM's exploited based on a handful of case studies. Nevertheless, we can do more to ensure we safeguard UM's from exploitation and a more refined Paladin process will allow for better risk assessment and more effective information sharing.

It is recognised that this study has failed to identify any significant levels of trafficking or exploitation but we have only just started out on this journey and now have the firm base of data upon which to build our response to this crime. Now we have improved our understanding of this subject and we need to ensure we maintain our momentum as we move to the next stage and begin to cross reference data and develop intelligence from other sources to identify those who may have already been trafficked to ensure we prevent further such crimes.

It is the shared vision of the agencies involved in Paladin that the travelling environment be made as safe for children as the domestic environment. This will require the setting of standards and increasing in the threshold for satisfaction to 'land' a UM. This will include the following elements:

- The creation of a new set of risk indicators for use by UKIS
- The development of a new risk assessment process to safeguard UMs




- The creation of multi agency Heathrow Safeguarding Team and, in the long term, dedicated arrival desks for UM's and child friendly immigration detention officers
- Ensuring the learning of Paladin is shared with other ports across the UK
- The proportionate establishment of safeguarding teams at other significant points of entry to the UK
- Crime prevention/self help initiatives for landed children such as the issue of the 'Helpline card' or other 'welcome pack'
- The re-evaluation of training needs to take account of this issue.

## DATA ANALYSIS

### Number of UM arrivals

1904 Unaccompanied Minors arrived at LHR between 26<sup>th</sup> August and 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2003. UK Immigration Officers landed 1738 non-asylum seeking UM to a UK address. A further 166 claimed Asylum on arrival and were either landed to a UK address or looked after by Social Services.


**Figure 1: Total Number of UM Arrivals**



### Age

A greater percentage of minors were in the 12-16 age range with a combined total of 87% of arrivals falling in the 6-16 age group.

**Figure 2: Age Range of Minors**



0-5:102,6-11:523,12-16:984,17-18:104


## Gender

The gender percentage is proportional. There were 871 female UM arrivals compared to 862 male arrivals, however, but it should be noted, with regional differences. For example, it was recorded that Russia had a higher percentage of male arrivals when compared with Nigerians who had a higher percentage of female arrivals (Table 1,page 16).

## Immigration Status

Figure 3 represents Immigration Status information recorded by UKIS on the UM's arrival at LHR. The UMs tended to be mainly visitors to the UK with the minimum length of stay being a week. Most were able to communicate in English. 40% were visitors to the UK. A small percent (8%) were work permit dependants whilst 3% were transit passengers.


**Figure 3: Immigration Status of minors**



## Sponsors - Relationship to Minor

730 (42%) of sponsors were an immediate family member (Family, Family Relation or Other Family Relation). However, majority of the information recorded indicated that the relationship between minor and sponsor was not known or was left blank.

**Figure 4: Sponsors' relationship to minor**




Family-527(30%),Family Relation-172(10%),Other Family Relation-31(2%),Other-135(8%),None/Not Known-872(56%)

RELATIONSHIP	
Family	Mother, Father, Brother, Sister
Family Relation	Aunt, Uncle, Grand Father, Grand Mother, Half-sister, Half-brother
Other Family Relation	Step-Father, Step-Mother, Step-Brother, Step-Sister
Other	Family friend, friend, body guard, partner, school, guardian, Airline, Employer
None/Not Known	None/ Blank records

## Sponsors – Immigration Status

Majority of sponsors for UMs were resident in the UK or work permit holders. 38% (591) of the recorded information on Sponsor's status was not known.

Figure 5: Sponsors' Immigration Status




RESIDENT-639,NOT KNOWN-591,WORK PERMIT-241,VISITOR-107,STUDENT-82,EU-22,TEMPORARY-8,TRANSIT-7,PARTNER-4

## Regional Analysis

The four main regions in the world are Africa, Asia, America and Europe. (World Bank classification). Africa accounted for 38% of the total number of UM arrivals, Europe 21%, Asia 14% and America 27%.

Figure 6: UM per region



AFRICA-629 ASIA-232 AMERICA-452 EUROPE-341

## Top Twenty countries

1084 UMs came from the following twenty countries. 50% (522) were of African origin.

### UM PROFILE

Table 1 represents the age and gender of the top twenty nationalities of UMs coming to the UK via LHR.

**Table 1: UM Profile of the top twenty countries**

NATIONALITY	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	AGE 0 - 5	AGE 6-11	AGE 12-16	AGE 17-18	NOT KNOWN
<b>NIGERIA</b>	185	73	112	12	62	100	10	1
<b>SOUTH AFRICA</b>	142	67	75	8	57	72	1	4
<b>GHANA</b>	89	38	51	7	23	49	9	1
<b>USA</b>	87	33	54	12	23	45	6	1
<b>RUSSIA</b>	62	38	23	0	11	45	1	2
SOUTH KOREA	61	34	27	0	28	32	1	1
JAMAICA	51	23	28	3	24	21	1	2
AUSTRALIA	45	26	19	0	11	32	1	1
ZIMBABWE	43	20	23	10	15	15	2	1
INDIA	41	24	17	5	18	16	2	0
MALAYSIA	36	16	20	2	9	21	2	2
POLAND	36	13	23	5	16	16	2	0
BRAZIL	34	16	18	1	9	19	3	1
CANADA	29	8	21	0	9	19	1	0
PAKISTAN	29	18	11	0	9	18	2	0
ISRAEL	28	12	15	3	10	14	1	0
MALAWI	27	8	19	4	11	11	1	0
CHINA	23	11	12	0	9	13	1	0
ZAMBIA	22	6	16	0	7	15	0	0
KENYA	14	8	6	0	1	10	2	1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1084</b>	<b>492</b>	<b>590</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>583</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>18</b>

Table 2 represents the age per gender of the top five nationalities.


**Table 2: UM Age and Gender Profile of the top five nationalities**

TOP 5 COUNTRIES											
	0-5		6-11		12-16			17-18		Unknown	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Unknown	Female	Male	Female	Male
<b>Nigeria</b>	7	5	35	27	63	37	0	10	0	1	0
<b>South Africa</b>	5	3	27	30	40	32	0	1	0	2	2
<b>Ghana</b>	5	2	10	13	28	21	0	7	2	1	0
<b>USA</b>	7	5	16	7	26	19	0	4	2	1	0
<b>Russia</b>	0	0	5	6	17	27	1	1	3	0	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>

## Gender per top twenty countries

55% (590) of the total number for the top twenty countries was female. 302 (51%) of female arrivals for the top twenty nationalities were of African origin.

Figure 7: UM Gender per country




Male-492, Female-590 (See Page 16 for gender count per country)



## Gender per top five countries




The five countries accounted for a third (566) of UM arrivals to the UK.

Figure 8: Gender per nationality






## Nigeria

Figure 9: Gender, Age and Immigration Status (Nigeria)






## South Africa

Figure 10: Gender, Age and Immigration Status (South Africa)






# Ghana

**Figure 11: Gender, Age and Immigration Status (Ghana)**






# USA

Figure 12: Gender, Age and Immigration Status (USA)



# Russia

Figure 13: Gender, Age and Immigration Status (Russia)



## County

The following chart shows which top ten counties were the final destination of UM arrivals. There were 1134 UM arrivals, of which 53% (603) went to a London address. The graph below and table 8 on page 30 is an address based analysis, using the UK voters register. It is intended to portray which part of the UK UMs went to as their final destination. It does not relate to SSD areas, as the geographical boundaries differ.

**Figure 14: UM per county**




Figure 14 above shows that the geographical distribution is UK wide with a concentration in the London and Greater London areas.

## Risk Assessment Profile

**Table 3: Risk assessed UM Profile of the top twenty countries**

<b>NATIONALITY</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>MALE</b>	<b>FEMALE</b>	<b>AGE 0 - 5</b>	<b>AGE 6-11</b>	<b>AGE 12-16</b>	<b>AGE 17-18</b>	<b>NOT KNOWN</b>
<b>NIGERIA</b>	46	16	30	3	20	22	1	
<b>SOUTH AFRICA</b>	38	17	21	2	17	19		
<b>GHANA</b>	36	17	19	4	10	18		
<b>ZIMBABWE</b>	28	11	17	4	11	11	2	
<b>MALAYSIA</b>	25	10	14	6	9	8	2	1
JAMAICA	24	10	14		14	10		
RUSSIA	17	7	10	1	7	7	2	
INDIA	15	10	5	2	4	8		
USA	15	5	10	1	7	7		
ZAMBIA	12	4	7		3	9		1
BRAZIL	11	4	7	1	5	5		
POLAND	11	4	7	2	4	5		
AUSTRALIA	10	5	5					
BRITISH	10	8	2	1	4	4		
MAURITIUS	10	4	6	1	4	5		
AFGHANISTAN	9	6	3	2	5	2		
MALAWI	9	5	4	1	4	4		
PAKISTAN	9	5	4	1	3	5		
THAILAND	9	3	6	1	4	4		
KOREA-SOUTH	8	2	6		4	4		1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>352</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>

### Top 5 nationalities of Risk Assessed UMs

The top five nationalities (Table 3) accounted for a third (173) of the total number of risk assessed minors (551) that had follow up enquiries conducted by SSD.

**Table 4: UM Age and Gender Profile of the top five nationalities of risk assessed**


<b>TOP 5 COUNTRIES</b>										
	<b>0-5</b>		<b>6-11</b>		<b>12-16</b>		<b>17-18</b>		<b>Unknown</b>	
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>
<b>Nigeria (46)</b>	3	0	13	7	14	8	0	1	0	0
<b>South Africa (38)</b>	2	0	5	12	14	5	0	0	0	0
<b>Ghana (36)</b>	4	0	3	7	9	9	3	1	0	0
<b>Zimbabwe (28)</b>	0	4	7	4	9	2	1	1	0	0
<b>Malaysia (25)</b>	3	2	5	4	5	3	1	1	1	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>



## Category of 'untraced' minor

Figure 15 divides minors into three categories – UM/UASC arrivals, Paladin UM Arrivals, Risk Assessed, and 'Untraced' minors. 1738 represents the total number of UM arrivals to the UK between 26<sup>th</sup> August and 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2003. 551 constitutes the total number of follow up enquiries with SSD. Of that number, 1.6% (28) was classified as 'untraced' minors when the three month scoping study response period concluded on 30<sup>th</sup> January 2004.


**Figure 15: 'Untraced' Minors**



## Age of 'Untraced' UM

The majority of 'untraced' children were between the ages of 12-16 years.

**Figure 16: Age of 'Untraced' UM**



0-5:11, 6-11:18, 12-16:61, Unknown:10


## Gender of 'Untraced' UM

A higher proportion of the 'untraced' minors were female. **Male-10 (39%), Female-18 (61%).**

## Gender and Nationality of 'Untraced' Minor

Nigeria and USA had the highest number of 'untraced' children recorded. Two American citizens had African sounding names, believed Nigerian.

**Figure 17: Gender and Nationality of 'Untraced' UM**



Male only – Somalia, Thailand, Tonga, Turkey


Female only – Ghana, Jamaica, Malawi, Mauritius, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, USA

Male and Female – Malaysia, Nigeria, South Africa

## Region of 'Untraced' Minor

Half the number (14) of 'untraced' children are of African origin.


**Figure 18: Region of 'Untraced' UM**



### African 'Untraced' UM

14 'untraced' UM came from Africa. The majority were female and from the West African region.

**Figure 19: African 'Untraced' UM**




Horn of Africa-1, Indian Ocean-3, Southern Africa-2, West Africa-8

### Regions (Asylum Seeking Minor)


5 in 10 Asylum seekers were from South Asia (Afghanistan).

**Figure 20: Region of Asylum Seeking UM**



## Nationality

Figure 21: Nationality of Asylum Seeking UM



## Child Protection Officer for LHR – Metropolitan Police

Table 4: The work of CP Officer at LHR

<b>CHILD PROTECTION OFFICER (LHR)</b>	<b>NO.OF CASES</b>
Arrival Risk Assessment	182
Embarkation Checks	93
Interview of Minor and Sponsor	49
Checks at nominated UK Address	42
Police interviews (Adults accompanying minors)	37
High Risk Assessment leading to removals (non-landing)	36
Referrals to Social Services involving one or more minors	28
Interview of minor and Sponsor and further enquiries	27
Monitoring of arriving High Risk Registered Sex Offenders	25
Strategy Meetings with Social Services	18
Monitoring of embarking High Risk Registered Sex Offenders	18
Ongoing Police Investigations	13
Returned to Country of Origin	8
Reception of British Child Sex Offenders	7
Embarking Interception cases as a result o enquiries	2
Positive Source recruit	1

### Child Protection and related matters at LHR

The work of the Child Protection Officer was in the main single-handed. Table 4 shows the level of disruption of trafficking and related matters and more could be achieved with a larger police presence at LHR.

## **SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **RECOMMENDATION 1**

*The learning from the Paladin Project should be shared as widely as possible across the four statutory agencies involved through briefings and seminars.*

### **RECOMMENDATION 2**

*Bespoke joint training for professionals working at ports and the Visa Agency in this field is required to educate staff on the different roles and responsibilities of each agency.*

### **RECOMMENDATION 3**

*More generic training for police and social service child protection officers is necessary to raise awareness of immigration legislation and risk indicators to identify trafficked children, and those migrating or in transit where there are safeguarding concerns.*

### **RECOMMENDATION 4**

*Any UKIS dedicated ‘minors’ officers or teams should consider undergoing, where appropriate, the same pre-selection screening as child protection colleagues and will require training in safeguarding principles.*

### **RECOMMENDATION 5**

*All airlines bringing unaccompanied minors to the UK should have in place safeguarding policies for children in transit. This should include pre-screening procedures for employees and training in risk identification.*

### **RECOMMENDATION 6**

*UKIS, MPS, Hillingdon Social Services and the NSPCC should consider creating a permanent multi-agency partnership team based at Heathrow to address the specific safeguarding needs of UMs. The needs are greater than just exploitation.*

### **RECOMMENDATION 7**

*A Government working group is formed to develop the learning from the Paladin experience for application to other significant ports of entry to the UK.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 8**

*The Government ensures that the Paladin data is assimilated into a wider national system for tracking children and to allow information sharing across agencies involved in safeguarding children. This should be connected to any national developments in Information Sharing and national databases of children.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 9**

*An independent specialist researcher is tasked to explore the feasibility of a set of risk indicators using the Paladin data for use by UKIS staff at the control desks.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 10**

*An independent specialist researcher is tasked with exploring the feasibility of a more detailed risk assessment process for use once UKIS have identified a child may be at risk.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 11**

*The Paladin process be adapted for a more focussed group of children that matches the profile of those we have not been able to trace.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 12**

*The Paladin form be redesigned to be more focussed to assist in the identification of a child.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 13**

*An analyst is appointed to the MPS Ports Safeguarding Team to cross reference the data captured with that held on other UKIS systems and with data at Lunar House to identify patterns and trends. This will assist in the development of intelligence on potential trafficking operations.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 14**

*The multi agency team be given access to existing child protection databases managed by the MPS e.g. Merlin, CRIS and CRIMINT to allow for more thorough and timely risk assessments.*



## **RECOMMENDATION 15**

*The DFES lead on IRT must liaise with the Government to ensure UKIS are involved in the IRT process.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 16**

*The Government formalise procedures for the central recording on police databases, details of children who are unaccounted for as part of either the Paladin or asylum process.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 17**

*Advanced passenger information on UMs be made available to the Ports Safeguarding Team to allow for pre-arrival risk assessment and to focus operational deployments.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 18**

*UK Visa Agency and UKIS control point staff be given access to established 'quick address' databases to validate information provided, whether by child or receiving adult.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 19**

*The government to research the feasibility of providing electronic access to visa application details.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 20**

*UKIS staff should be provided with the technology to capture biometric data from passports of minors meeting the Paladin criteria.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 21**

*The government to examine the feasibility of empowering the Ports Safeguarding teams to take a fingerprint of each UAM within set criteria to aid future identification.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 22**

*All UMs awaiting risk assessment process should be provided with a suitable private environment under the supervision of an appropriately selected and trained guardian, for example an NSPCC officer.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 23**

*The UK Government identify a project lead to create the Heathrow Safeguarding Team and identify funding streams to finance this initiative.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 24**

*The Association of Directors of Social Services considers the implications of the Paladin scoping study for their departments.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 25**

*The Government considers the initiative to make available on arrival a card with dedicated helpline numbers for NSPCC and Childline at all UK ports.*

## **RECOMMENDATION 26**

*DFES and ADSS jointly review current private fostering arrangements, the terminology used and examine the effectiveness of their enforcement across the UK.*