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MPS BALANCED SCORECARD - PERFORMANCE 2001/2002

Performance Results		Standard or Target for 2001/2002	Actual Performance (Financial Year to date)
1	Street Crime	2% reduction, 10% judicial disposals	38.3% increase, 8.0% JDs
2	Criminal use of firearms	2% reduction in gun related violent crimes	33.9% increase
3	Criminal use of knives	10% increase in JDs for possession of offensive weapons or bladed instruments	19.0% JD increase
4	Burglary	2% reduction, 12% judicial disposals	3.2% increase, 10.0% JDs
5	Drug-related Crime	10% increase for supply & pos of class A, refer 3,000 persons into treatment	21.3% increase, 3588 offenders referred
6	Race and Hate Crime	Race crime 17% JDs, Homophobic crime 13% JDs, Domestic violence 14% JDs	17.0%(race), 15.3% (homophobic), 15.0% (domestic violence)
7	Rape	25% JDs	22.5% JDs
8	Child Abuse	Child sex abuse 35% JDs, 60% of boroughs to run prevention initiatives	26.0% JDs
9	Homicide	90% clear-up rate	72.8%
10	Road Casualties	0.74 HSTs collisions per 1000 population	0.75 per 1000 population
11	Autocrime	5% reduction, 5% judicial disposal	3.0% increase, 4.3% JDs
<b>Resources</b>			
1	Current Expenditure: Outturn -> Budget		Forecast position shows an underspend of £7.366m (including costs and funding for counter terrorism). As at 28th February 2002.
2	Capital Expenditure: Outturn -> Budget		Spend £71,360k against a revised budget of £94,238k. An underspend of £22,898k or 24.3% of budget. CS will be carrying forward £9,847k.
3	Efficiency Targets on course		Financial efficiency gains are demonstrable, however it is not yet clear that performance has been maintained
4	MPS Strength	Police BWT: 26,650, Civil Staff BWT: 11,481.08, Traffic Wardens BWT: 959	26,788.40 (Police), 10,547.87 (Civil Staff), 937.90 (TWs) as of March 2002
<b>Processes</b>			
1	Young Offenders	PYO arrest to charge 2 days, to court listing 7 days (70%), and youth case disposal 28 days (80%), PNC results in 10 days (80%)	67.2% (2 days), 71.4% (7 days), 81.5% (28 days), 64.7% (PNC 10 days)
2a	Stop & Search	Increase arrest rates and achieve parity with arrest rates between white and non-white persons.	March 02 data unavailable (April-February 2002: 15.66% (white), 16.57% (non-white), diff= 0.91%)
2b	Stop & Search	Number of complaints from those stopped/searched (white and non-white) to be monitored.	93 (White), 221 (non-white)
3	Emergency Calls	Answer 999 calls within 15 secs & Arrive within 12 mins, 80% of the time	999 calls 73.6% & Immediate incidents 72.5%
4	Terrorism	Management of scenes involving improvised explosive devices scored as 100% effective	98.5%
<b>Corporate Health: Values</b>			
1	Sickness	9 days p.a. (Police), 10 days p.a. (Civil Staff), 20 days p.a. (TWs)	10.5 (police) 10.9 (civil) 19.4 (traffic wardens) March 2001 - February 2002
2	Recruitment	2,475 police recruits, 2,640 civil staff recruits	Since April 2001: 2748 police recruited, 1469.89 civil staff recruited
3	Retention	Turnover 6.5% (voluntary police leavers in first 5yrs), 2.8% (voluntary police leavers 5-30 yrs), 13% (civil staff incl TWs)	7.59% (Police < 5 yrs), 2.38% (Police 5-30 yrs), 10.60% (Civil staff incl TWs)
4a	Representative Police Service	5% Ethnic Minority Officers	4.84% (as of March 2002)
4b	Representative Police Service	10% reduction in difference in length of service of VEM officers compared to other officers	March 2002 4.76 (target 3.73 years)
4c	Representative Police Service	6.6% reduction in difference in length of service of female officers compared to male officers	March 2002 3.72 (target 3.74 years)
4d	Representative Police Service	10% reduction in difference between % VEM civil grades 10 upwards, and % VEM staff in all civil grades	March 2002 9.25% (target 7.6%)
4e	Representative Police Service	No difference between % VEM officers 5-10 years sergeant +, and other officers 5-10 years sergeant +	March 2002 3.56% (target 0% (ie no difference))
5	CRR Training	Provide training for 75% of identified staff by 31 March 2002	76% of identified staff, 64% of all staff
<b>Corporate Health: Customer Focus</b>			
1	Customer Satisfaction	90% 999 callers, 90% violent crime victims, 90% burglary victims, 90% accident victims	Standard achieved in 1 out 4 categories
2	Hate crime victim satisfaction	No difference in satisfaction levels for victims of race crime and victims of all crime	7.7% difference
3a	High quality professional service	Number of complaints per 1000 officers and % complaints substantiated to be monitored.	184 per 1000 officers, 3.4% substantiated
3b	High quality professional service	Levels of corruption related offences and service confidence procedures to be monitored.	9 (number of new officers subject to service confidence procedures) 11 (Number of MPS staff charged or convicted with a corruption related offence)
<p><b>Current Information:</b> based on performance 2001/2002 or other if specified.</p>		<p><b>Key</b></p> <p>Performing above target</p> <p>Performing below target</p> <p>No target set</p> <p>* Data Shown as annual equivalent</p> <p>Red text Data relates to previous time period</p>	
<p><b>Information from previous period:</b> based on April 2001-February 2002 or previous period shown if relevant data unavailable</p>			

## MAKING LONDON'S STREETS SAFER

### Street crime

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 Apr 01 – Mar 02 (compared with 2000/01 where applicable)	FY 2000/01 Apr 00 – Mar 01 (compared with 1999/00 where applicable)
To reduce street crime offences by 2%	<b>+38.3%</b>	+18.0%
To achieve a JD rate of 10%	<b>8.0%</b>	8.2%

Street crime is the subject of a separate performance briefing to the Performance Review Committee; this is attached at Annex A.


In line with the Governments' five year reduction targets, the MPS set a reduction target for robbery (personal and business property) of 15% by 2004/05 (based on the level in 1999/00). Between 1999/00 and 2001/02 there has been a 63% increase in street crime and a 49% increase in robbery. The 2002/03 policing plan target is to prevent any increase in street crime. The five year target would now appear to be unachievable.

### Criminal use of firearms and knives

#### **Gun related violent crime**

The MPS set a target in 2001/02 to reduce gun related violent crime by 2%. 2001/02 saw a 33.9% increase in gun related violent crimes compared with the level in 2000/01. There were 3446 offences – in numerical terms, an increase of 872 offences.

The following chart shows that the most common firearm involved in these violent crimes is handgun (69% of the total in 2001/02). The number of handguns carried/fired increased by a higher rate (52%) than that for all firearms.



Of the total number of firearms involved in gun related violent crimes, one quarter were fired. Airweapons accounted for 40% of those fired. The increase in 2001/02 in number of firearms fired during violent crime (25%) occurred at a slower rate than that for firearms carried (37%).

A breakdown of the type of violent crime where firearms are involved shows that robbery of personal property and robbery of business property take up the greatest proportion of the total by far (35% and 30% respectively). Use of firearms in personal robbery has in fact increased by 74% between 2000/01 and 2001/02. The proportion fired during robbery of personal property has remained broadly consistent between the years (6.3% and 6.5% respectively). Firearms related homicides have increased by 59%, with 43 in 2001/02 compared with 27 the year before.

Whilst the biggest monthly rises in gun related violent crime occurred from Oct to Nov 2001 and from Dec to Jan 2002, firearms related CAD incidents rose considerably in Oct 2001, and then fell back to a level lower than previous months, possibly indicating a post Sept 11 rise.

Boroughs with the highest proportion of gun related crime are Lambeth (9% of total), Hackney (7%), and Southwark (7%). The largest year on year increase was however in Waltham Forest (138% - an increase of 91 offences), followed by Southwark (97% - increase of 121 offences). Three boroughs saw reductions in gun related violent crime - Hounslow, Bromley and Merton. It is believed that a large proportion of incidents on Waltham Forest can be attributed to a particular gang of armed robbers on the boroughs whose activities have been curtailed through an operation by SO7. This is supported by the fact that monthly offences over Dec/Jan 2001/02 averaged 25.5, and had reduced to an average of 12.5 over Feb/Mar 2002, compared to a year average of 13.1.

Borough figures fluctuate considerably from month to month, for example, the number of gun related violent crimes in Lambeth was 40 in Jan 2002, and 24 in Mar 2002. The number in Southwark was 37 in Jan 2002 and 15 in Mar 2002.

#### **Judicial disposals for offensive weapons**

The MPS set a target to increase the number of judicial disposals for possession of offensive weapons or bladed instruments by 10%. This target was achieved, with a 19% increase in the number of judicial disposals in 2001/02 compared with the previous year.

All bar three boroughs (Hackney, Merton, Sutton) achieved the target increase in JDs.

## Processing young offenders quickly

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 (Apr 01 – Mar 02)	FY 2000/01 (Apr 00 – Mar 01)
Percentage of persistent young offenders dealt with from arrest to charge within 2 days (70% target)	67.2%	55.2%
Percentage of PYOs dealt with from charge to first court listing within 7 days (70% target)	71.4%	67.8%
Percentage of young offenders dealt with from arrest to case disposal within 28 days (80% target)	81.5%	81.5%
Percentage of young offender results notified to the Police National Computer (PNC) within 10 days (80% target)	64.7%	69.2% (within 14 days)

### **PYO targets and young offenders target**

Whilst the percentage of PYOs dealt with from arrest to charge in 2 days remained below the 70% target, this target was met in respect of PYOs dealt with from charge to first court listing within 7 days. In both cases performance had improved from 2000/01 – in the former case by 12 percentage points.

The average number of days from arrest to sentence for PYOs has reduced steadily in the MPS, from 111 days for the quarter Oct – Dec 2000 to 94 days for the quarter Apr – Dec 2001. This however is well outside both the national average of 70 days and the Government's pledge to reduce the average time to 71 days. (Averages taken from sample data – source PA Consulting Group).

The processing of young offenders from arrest to case disposal has remained stable over the past two years, with the target being met in both years.

It should be noted that each of the three targets above takes data from the Crime Recording and Investigation System (CRIS) and therefore achievement of the targets is also a measure of the time taken to update CRIS.

Note that ten boroughs achieved all three of these targets (Bexley, Brent, Bromley, Croydon, Enfield, Haringey, Havering, Hounslow, Merton, Sutton) whilst seven boroughs did not meet any of the three (Camden, Ealing, Harrow, Islington, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest).

### **Young offenders results notified to PNC**

The timescale for processing results onto PNC was reduced in 2001/02 from 14 days to 10 days. During 2000/01 the 80% target for notifying results within 14 days was not met, and in 2001/02 performance against the shorter 10 day timescale fell 15 percentage points below the target level.

A breakdown of the type of young offender results shows that those results relating to reprimands and warnings were processed at a much faster rate than court results. Around 94% of reprimands and warnings were notified to PNC within 10 days, whilst only 39% of court results were notified within this timescale. Of the 61% of court results that did not meet the timescale, around 11% could be attributed to delays in results reaching the MPS whilst around 34% could be directly attributed to delays in processing within the MPS.

**Impending prosecutions**

It should be noted that during this time the MPS undertook to clear the backlog of all outstanding prosecutions on PNC. At the end of this planning year, the number of impending prosecutions had reduced from around 101,000 in April 2001, to around 55,000 in March 2002 – however note that this number will have included a substantial number of cases not yet dealt with at court. The number of cases more than twelve months old had reduced to around 14,000 by March, of which 28% related to ongoing cases or warrants.


**Stop and search**

*Note: At present data is provisional – March 2002 data is incomplete on some boroughs and will therefore be subject to upward revision.*

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 (Apr 01 – Mar 02)	FY 2000/01 (Apr 00 – Mar 01)
To increase the arrest rate relating to stop/searches of ethnic minority people	16.5%	17.3%
To increase the arrest rate relating to stop/searches of white people	15.5%	15.9%
To achieve parity between arrest rates	1.0% difference	1.3% difference
Number (and %) of complaints from ethnic minority people involved in stop and search	221 (0.24%)	272 (0.38%)
Number (and %) of complaints from white people involved in stop and search	93 (0.09%)	186 (0.20%)

The 2001/02 target was to increase arrest rates and at the same time achieve parity between arrest rates for ethnic minority and white people. Whilst there was a slight improvement in the difference between arrest rates, moving from a 1.3% difference in 2000/01 to a 1.0% difference in 2001/02, arrest rates in general declined slightly between the years. The arrest rate for ethnic minority people fell by 0.8%, and the rate for white people fell by 0.5%.

The proportion of stop/searches by reason code is shown below:



During 2001/02 one half of all PACE stop/searches were relating to drugs. 2001/02 saw a considerable growth in the number of stop/searches, increasing by 16% on 2000/01. In line with the 2001/02 priorities, some of the most significant increases were in the areas of stop/searches for firearms (23%), drugs (23%) and offensive weapons (21%).

Stop/searches for going equipped however reduced by 8% during the year. These also seem less targeted, with only 4% of the stop/searches resulting in an arrest also for going equipped. (Compared with, for example, 11% of stop/searches for drugs also resulting in an arrest relating to drugs.)

The number of stop/searches relating to ethnic minority people grew at a faster rate than the rate for white people, as shown in the table below:

	% increase in stop/searches between 2000/01 and 2001/02	
	Ethnic minority	White
Firearms	28%	18%
Drugs	36%	13%
Offensive weapon	31%	13%
Stolen property	30%	3%
Going equipped	5%	-14%
Other	24%	23%

A large proportion of this increase has occurred in Feb/Mar 02 ie during safer streets. Searches of ethnic minority people averaged 232 per day over the first ten months of the year, and 354 per day in Feb/Mar (an increase of 52%). Searches of white people increased by 43%. Note that the increase in use of stop/search in recent months may be understated at present, since this is based on incomplete data from some boroughs.

In line with the increase in stop/searches, the number of arrests relating to stop/searches also increased, but at a slightly slower rate. Arrests relating to stop/searches for firearms increased by 19%, drugs by 16%, and offensive weapon by 14%.

In most cases this has resulted in a slight deterioration in arrest rates, the exceptions being the ethnic minority arrest rates for stop/searches relating to going equipped (increasing from 13.7% to 14.6%) and for firearms (increasing marginally from 18.8% to 19.0%).

At the same time as the increase in the number of stop/searches in Feb/Mar there was a noticeable drop in the arrest rate. This fell relatively evenly across ethnic groups, with the arrest rate for ethnic minority people moving from 16.9% (Apr 01 – Jan 02) to 15.0% (Feb/Mar 02) and the arrest rate for white people moving from 15.9% to 14.1%.

**Stop and search relating S44 of the Terrorism Act 2000\* and S60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act**

Although not included in the figures above, stop/searches for terrorism and for public order also increased during 2001/02. Stop/searches of individuals relating to terrorism increased by over 400%, whilst those for public order increased by over 100%.

*\*previously S13 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act*

## Burglary

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 Apr 01 – Mar 02 (compared with 2000/01 where applicable)	FY 2000/01 (Apr 00 – Mar 01) (compared with 1999/00 where applicable)
To reduce burglary offences by 2%	+3.2%	-9.5%
To achieve a JD rate of 12%	10.0%	9.8%

There was an overall increase in burglaries across the MPS of 3.2% in 2001/02. This compares with a reduction in 2000/01 of 9.5%.

Splitting burglary into its component parts, residential burglary increased by 5%, representing an additional 3762 offences; non-residential burglary decreased by 0.3%, representing 111 offences.

Performance across the individual boroughs varied enormously. The top five boroughs in terms of burglary increases accounted for nearly all of the increase in offences. The highest increase was in Waltham Forest with a 28% increase (889 offences), the majority of which occurred following a noticeable jump in Jul 01. Waltham Forest also had the highest increase in residential burglaries 46% (810 offences), although seven boroughs have higher rates of residential burglary per 1000 households.

The best performing boroughs were Kensington & Chelsea and Kingston. Kensington & Chelsea reduced burglaries by 21% (729 offences), Kingston by 13% (169 offences). Kingston also had the lowest rate of residential burglary per 1000 households (10.3). Hillingdon had the best level of reduction across both burglary categories. A total of 13 boroughs achieved the MPS burglary reduction target of 2%.

With regards to judicial disposals, nine boroughs achieved the MPS target of a 12% judicial disposal rate. Of these Lewisham was the best performing borough with a judicial disposal rate of 14%.

In line with the Government' five year reduction targets, the MPS set a reduction target for burglary of 10% by 2004/05 (based on the level in 1999/00). Between 1999/00 and 2001/02 there has been a 6.5% reduction in burglary. Assuming achievement of the 2002/03 policing plan target of a 1% reduction, a further reduction of 2.7% will then be required over the two years 2003/04 and 2004/05. **This target remains achievable.**



## REDUCING DAMAGE TO LONDON'S COMMUNITIES CAUSED BY DRUG DEALING

### Class A Drugs Supply

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 (Apr 01 – Mar 02) <small>(compared with Apr 00 -Mar 01)</small>	FY 2000/01 (Apr 00 – Mar 01) <small>(compared with Apr 99 – Mar 00)</small>
To increase the number of Judicial Disposals for supply and PWI of Class A drugs by 10%, with particular focus on cocaine, crack and heroin		
Class A drugs	+21.3%	+41.9%
Cocaine	+32.7%	+41.1%
Crack	+62.3%	+47.5%
Heroin	-12.2%	+53.4%

There were 2414 judicial disposals for supply and possession with intent to supply Class A drugs last year. This compares with 1990 during 2000/01. The 10% target increase over the 2000/01 level was met comfortably for Class A drugs in general, and also for cocaine and crack. Heroin remained the only drug category where the target was not met, however this followed an increase in JDs in 2000/01 of 53%.

### Arrest referrals

The target to refer 3000 persons into specialist drug treatment service via arrest referral schemes was achieved with 3568 offenders referred. March figures are, however, incomplete and this figure is likely to rise once data has been received from all boroughs.

## PROTECTING LONDONERS FROM HATE CRIME

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 (Apr 01 – Mar 02)	FY 2000/01 (Apr 00 – Mar 01)
To achieve a JD rate for race crime of 17%	17.0%	16.8%
To achieve a JD rate for homophobic crime of 13%	15.3%	11.2%
To achieve a JD rate for domestic violence of 14%	15.0%	13.7%
To achieve a JD rate for rape offences of 25%	22.5%	18.6%
To achieve a JD rate for child sex abuse offences of 35%	26.0%	29.8%
No difference in the level of satisfaction expressed by victims of racist crime and the level of satisfaction expressed by victims of all crime (data for eight months Apr – Oct 01 and Mar 02)	7.7% (70.7%)	6.7% (73.0%)

### Race crime

Actual performance against the 17% JD target was 16.99% (17.0% rounded). Since November 2001 the JD target has been achieved every month. Fourteen boroughs achieved the target, with JD rates of over 25% being achieved at Kensington and Chelsea, Hammersmith and Fulham and Richmond upon Thames.

### Homophobic crime

The number of homophobic offences in 2001/02 was 1239. The JD rate for homophobic crime increased by around four percentage points between 2000/01 and 2001/02 to achieve the target rate.

### Domestic Violence

The JD rate in the MPS has risen steadily during 2001/02, from 13.9% for the first quarter (Apr – Jun 01) to 16.9% for the last quarter (Jan – Mar 02). The highest JD rate was obtained at Harrow (29.1%) – the next highest rate being 21.1% at Hammersmith and Fulham.

Good practice from Harrow CSU has been outlined in a previous performance report and included:

- Liaison with community based domestic violence forum and a racial crime sub group; the racial crime sub group monitors all racist incidents.
- A positive arrest and prosecution policy regularly communicated to uniform officers.
- An aide memoire on CRIS completion and initial actions, based upon Special Notice 15/00 (minimum standards for the investigation of racist, domestic violence and homophobic incidents)
- A relatively well resourced CSU, with 13 officers.

### **Hate crime (cont)**

Three of the five hate crime JD targets were achieved during 2001/02, and four of the indicators saw an improvement in performance between 2000/01 and 2001/02. Nine boroughs met the JD targets for race crime, homophobic crime and domestic violence (Kensington & Chelsea, Harrow, Hackney, Hammersmith & Fulham, Richmond upon Thames, Haringey, Lewisham, Southwark and Croydon).

It is noteworthy that these boroughs also have higher victim satisfaction levels for race crime (on average 73.7% satisfied compared with 65.6% for the rest of the MPS over the period Apr – Sep 2001) and a smaller gap between this level, and the level of victim satisfaction for all types of offences (7.2% compared with 8.9% for the MPS as a whole over this time span.) 2001/02 however saw the gap in satisfaction levels between victims of all crime and victims of racist crime widen slightly.

The MPS' commitment to tackling racist crime is seen through the establishment of borough based Community Safety Units and the continued strength of the Corporate Racial and Violent Crime Task Force under the Diversity Directorate.

Accompanying these corporate changes was the implementation of Community Race Relations training. The target to provide training for 75% of identified staff by 31 March 2002 was achieved, with 76% being trained by that date. A second target, to deliver CRR training to all MPS staff by December 2003 is on course to be met with 64% already trained as at the end of March 2002.

### **Rape**

The JD target for 2001/02 was not met, however the rate has improved by around four percentage points compared with 2000/01 and was achieved in Dec 01, Feb 02 and Mar 02. Note that the rape JD target was set assuming that there would be Haven funding, which in the event was not found.

Project Sapphire commenced in January 2001 following extensive consultation both within and outside the service and in response to the objectives contained in the Policing Plan. The project focuses on improving the MPS's performance on rape investigation and significantly enhancing the care given to victims across London. Project Sapphire will enhance public confidence in the MPS's ability to care for victims and investigate rape and a measure of this will be increased reporting of rape.

In 2001/02 there were 2,498 rape offences recorded compared with 2,189 in 2000/01, a 14.1% increase. This rise does not suggest rape is becoming more prevalent but could instead be because victims are now more prepared to report incidents. In 2001/02, boroughs using the Haven (Bexley, Bromley, Croydon, Greenwich, Lambeth, Southwark, Sutton and Wandsworth), saw a higher increase in reported rape (18.1%).

In total ten boroughs across the MPS achieved the JD rate of 25%. The JD rate for Haven boroughs improved by around three percentage points (20.3% for 2001/02 compared with 17.4% in 2000/01).

Currently, eighteen of the thirty-two boroughs now have dedicated teams of specialised officers. Also of note is use of the Haven has increased during 2001/02, with 67 victims of sexual offences visiting compared to 38 in 2000/01.

The recent joint report by HMIC and HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate on the investigation and prosecution of rape offences highlights good practice in the MPS. Indeed, the HMIC lead inspector has said in Police Review that the MPS is the only force in the country to make rape a force priority and our SOIT (sexual offences investigative techniques) trained officers have been identified as best practice.

### **Child sex abuse**

The 35% judicial disposal target for 2001/02 was not reached. It was acknowledged early in the planning year that errors had occurred in the target setting process.

Looking at judicial disposal performance, there was a 7.7% reduction in the actual number of JDs and the JD rate was lower in 2001/02 compared to 2000/01. There has been a gradual increase (5.7%) in the number of child sex abuse offences recorded in the last two planning years. However, when looking more closely at the judicial disposal rate in 2001/02 there has been an upward trend particularly since November 2001, which gives grounds for optimism.

There is a clear understanding that the intrinsic link between child abuse and domestic violence need to be promoted to all those working in either specialised field. Child Protection Teams hold a wealth of information on children and families that are rarely accessed by those investigating domestic violence and vice versa. Both parties realise that closer links will ensure that all information and intelligence is widely available. SO5 have established an MIU that will aid this process.

## SUSTAINED ACTIVITIES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY

### Emergency response

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 (Apr 01 – Mar 02)	FY 2000/01 (April 00 – Mar 01)
Percentage of public satisfied with police action in response to 999 calls (90% target)	80.9%	78.9%
Percentage of 999 calls answered within 15 seconds (80% target)	73.6%	83.6%
Percentage of urgent incidents attended within 12 minutes (80% target)	72.5%	76.4%

#### **999 calls**

The percentage of 999 calls answered within 15 seconds dropped by ten percentage points between 2000/01 and 2001/02, missing the 80% target. Individual months' performance showed wide variation, fluctuating between 47% in May 01 and 93% in Jan 02. May 01 also experienced the highest number of calls over the two years. Performance was considerably better in the second half of the year, with 83.2% of calls answered in time (up with the target) compared with only 65.7% over the first half of the year. There were also 19% fewer calls in the second half of the year compared with the first six months.

Reasons for improved performance in the latter half of the year included introduction of the automatic call distribution for silent mobile calls (the automatic attendant) in mid-July. This diverted silent mobile calls to a message, asking the caller to press '5' if there was an emergency.

#### **Urgent incidents**

There was a continuation of the gradual reduction in the percentage of urgent incidents attended within 12 minutes, and the year's performance was 7.5 percentage points below the target. Oct 01 saw the lowest performance in the year, with 69.5%.

It is of note that the number of incidents has reduced in recent months, being 13% lower in the second half of the year compared with the first six months. This reduction follows the reduction seen for 999 calls.

Performance ranged between 62.1% at Hillingdon to 84.2% at Hammersmith and Fulham. In total, however, only four boroughs achieved the 80% target. All but three boroughs (Brent, Greenwich, Hackney) saw a deterioration in performance against target in 2001/02. It is interesting to note that the greatest deterioration in performance occurred in outer London boroughs (Hillingdon, Enfield, Barking and Dagenham, Barnet, Hounslow, Redbridge).

#### **Public satisfaction with police response to 999 calls**

It is of note that, while performance levels dropped in relation to answering 999 calls and attending urgent incidents within a fixed timescale, public satisfaction with police response in relation to 999 calls did not fall (survey results are on page 19)

**Homicide**

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 (Apr 01 – Mar 02)	FY 2000/01 (April 00 – Mar 01)
To achieve a JD rate for homicide of 90%	72.6%	89.9%


Homicide is the subject of a separate performance briefing to both the Performance Review Committee and the MPA's Professional Standards and Performance Monitoring Committee.

**Reducing road casualties**

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 (Apr 01 – Mar 02)	FY 2000/01 (April 00 – Mar 01)
The number of collisions resulting in death or serious injury	5499	5570
The number of collisions resulting in death or serious injury per 1000 population	0.75	0.76
The number of police collisions (POLCOLS)	5305	6240

2001/02 recorded 0.75 collisions resulting in death or serious injury per 1000 population. The target for 2001/02 to keep the level below 0.74 collisions per 1000 population was just missed. There was, however, an actual decrease of 1.3% in the number of collisions resulting in death or serious injury compared to 2000/01.

The graph below shows the long-term trend from 1997 to 2002 and shows that there has been a gradual reduction in the level of collisions that have resulted in death or serious injury.



## Terrorism

The MPS target in 2000/02 was for 100% of scenes involving suspect improvised explosive devices to be assessed as effective (satisfactory, good, very good) by SO13 explosives officers.


98.5% of scenes were assessed as effective by SO13 explosives officers as compared with 99.6% in 2000/01. In numerical terms, the management of eight scenes were assessed as poor or very poor, compared with two in 2000/01. A greater number of scenes were however assessed to a “very good” standard – 76.2% against 71.2% in 2000/01. The number of scenes not judged to be managed to an effective standard fell relatively evenly throughout the year, with three post Sept 11.

## Autocrime performance

	Achievement	
	FY 2001/02 Apr 01 – Mar 02 (compared with 2000/01 where applicable)	FY 2000/01 (Apr 00 – Mar 01) (compared with 1999/00 where applicable)
To reduce autocrime offences by 5%	+3.0%	-0.2%
To achieve a JD rate of 5%	4.3%	4.4%

Whilst autocrime has increased by 3.0%, a breakdown shows that the largest increase was in theft from vehicles, which increased by 6.1%. Criminal damage to motor vehicles increased by 1.5%, whilst theft of motor vehicles in fact reduced by 0.5% compared with the previous year.

The MPS recorded a total of 245,688 autocrime offences in 2001/02, making up 23% of total notifiable offences. The following chart shows the proportion of autocrime offences relating to the different categories – theft of motor vehicles accounts for a quarter of all autocrime, whilst theft from motor vehicles accounts for nearly a half:



Using the narrower definition of vehicle crime (Home Office Best Value Performance Indicator definition includes theft of and from motor vehicles), there has been a 3.6% increase in vehicle crimes year on year.

In 2001/02 an increase in theft of airbag emerged, although numbers are negligible compared with other forms of autocrime. Last year there were around 160 thefts of airbags, compared with around 60 in 2000/01 (an increase of 157%). Three boroughs (Camden, Islington and Haringey) accounted for 73% of these thefts.

In line with the Governments' five year reduction targets, the MPS set a reduction target for autocrime of 31% by 2004/05 (based on the level in 1998/99). Between 1998/99 and 2001/02 there has been a growth in autocrime offences of 11%. Assuming achievement of the 2002/03 policing plan target to halt any growth in autocrime, a reduction of 38% would now be required over the two years 2003/04 and 2004/05. This target would now appear to be unachievable.

The 2001/2002 judicial disposal rate was 4.3%, and was relatively constant throughout the whole year. At no month in the year was the judicial disposal target of 5% met.

In total six boroughs achieved the autocrime reduction target, and six boroughs the JD target. Two boroughs (Kingston upon Thames and Newham) achieved both targets.

### **Sickness**

	<b>Achievement</b>	
	<b>FY 2001/02 (Mar 01 – Feb 02)*</b>	<b>FY 2000/01 (April 00 – Mar 01)</b>
The number of working days lost per police officer (target 9 days)	10.5	10.5
The number of working days lost per civil staff (target 10 days)	10.9	10.4
The number of working days lost per TW (target 20 days)	19.4	22.3

\*At present sickness figures are only available up to Feb 02. Figures for 2001/02 therefore reflect the year Mar 01 to Feb 02.

Performance against sickness targets is to be the subject of a paper to a subsequent PRC meeting.

### **Recruitment and retention**

	<b>Achievement</b>
	<b>FY 2001/02 (Apr 01 – Mar 02)</b>
The number of police officers recruited compared to the target (2475)	2748
The number of civil staff recruited compared to the target (2640)	1470
% voluntary police leavers – First 5 yrs of service (target 6.5%)	7.6%
% voluntary police leavers – 5 – 30 yrs of service (target 2.8%)	2.3%
% civil staff turnover (inc. TWs) (target 13%)	10.6%

Three out of five targets were achieved.

The number of civil staff recruited was 44% below target, resulting in part from the restrictions on civil staff recruitment in the latter half of 2001/02 in order to manage the 2001/02 budget. Recruitment over the first eight months of the year averaged



140 per month, compared with a monthly average of 88 over the last four months of the year. Recruitment would however have needed to average 220 per month for the target to have been achieved, a level that was not met in any month.


Whilst the monthly percentage of voluntary police leavers with 5 – 30 years service remained relatively stable throughout the year, there was a gradual increase over the latter half of the year in the monthly percentage of voluntary police leavers in the first five years of service.

**Diversity**

**To increase the number of female officers in the police**


The MPS narrowly achieved the target to reduce the difference in the length of service of female officers and length of service of male officers (reduction target of 6.6 ie to reduce the gap to below 3.74 years). At the end of March 2002, the MPS had reduced the difference in length of service to 3.72 years, just below the target of 3.74 years.

There was steady progress against this target during the year, reducing from 3.92 in April 2001, as shown in the chart below. The reduction was achieved against a 95% increase in female recruitment (542 female officers were recruited in 2001/02), however recruitment of female officers was at a slightly lower level than overall recruitment, which increased by 104%.



**To increase the strength of visible ethnic minorities (VEM) in the police**

The number of VEM officers as a percentage of police strength was 4.84% against a target of 5%. (This equates to missing the target by 42 VEM officers). Whilst this target was not reached, the percentage of VEM officers has increased steadily over the time period from 4.17% in April 2001, and is shown below. The number of VEM recruits in 2001/02 increased by 214% compared to 2000/01 (283 officers were recruited last year). In contrast, the wastage level was 64 VEM officers (5.5% of VEM officers, compared with wastage level of 6.4% for all police officers.)



**Difference in length of service of VEM officers compared to length of service of other officers**

The target to reduce the difference in length of service VEM officers compared to length of service of other officers was not achieved (target of 10% reduction ie to reduce the gap to below 3.73 years). At the end of March 2002, the difference in length of service was 4.76 years. This difference has, in fact, increased over the time period, from 4.17 in April 2001. The main reason for the growth in the gap in length of service is due to the increase in recruitment of VEM officers in 2001/02, at a rate greater than that for other officers. As stated above, there was a 214% increase in VEM recruitment in 2001/02 compared to an increase in overall recruitment of 104%.

An earlier study looking at this issue showed that, if all officers with less than one year's service were omitted from the comparison, the gap in length of service had reduced marginally, from 4.1 years in March 2001, to 3.9 years in December 2002.

**Visible ethnic minority civil staff at grades 10 and above**

The target of a 10% reduction in the difference between the percentage of VEM civil staff in grades 10 upwards and percentage of VEM staff throughout all civil staff grades was not met. The gap was 9.25% against the target of 7.56% and had widened during the year, from 8.30% in April 2001.


**Visible ethnic minority officers at sergeant level and above**

The target to reduce the difference between the percentage of VEM officers with 5 to 10 years service at sergeant and above, and other officers with 5 to 10 years service at sergeant level and above was not met. The gap by the end of March 2002 was 3.55%, against a target of 0% (ie no difference) and had slowly increased during the year, from 1.60% in April 2001. Due to the restriction in the comparison group, this target was, however, dependent on a very small number of individual promotions or resignations (there were 21 VEM officers at sergeant level and above with between 5 – 10 years service).

## Customer Satisfaction

Only one out of the four customer satisfaction targets was met in 2001/02. Performance remained relatively stable between 2000/01 and 2001/02, increasing by two percentage points in relation to police action in response to 999 calls and declining by about one percentage point in the remaining three areas.

Survey methods changed in 2000/01 with the move from paper based surveys to telephone surveys and the introduction of a box for those with “mixed feelings” about the level of service received. At the same time customer satisfaction levels dropped. The stability in levels of satisfaction between 2000/01 and 2001/02 would seem to suggest that the earlier drop in satisfaction levels is at least in part related to the change in survey methods. Targets however remained at the old standard of 90%, and have now been reassessed for 2002/03.



Please note that, due to changes in the research company providing this data, quarters 3 and 4 contain only one month of data each (Oct 01 in Q3 and Mar 02 in Q4). The only PI that contains a full year’s worth of data is the percentage of victims of RTAs satisfied with police at the scene of the collision, as data is collected using a different system.

Lesley Nichols  
 Corporate Performance Analysis Unit  
 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2002


## ANNEX A: STREET CRIME – PERFORMANCE BRIEFING

### Introduction

- Now that the end of year consolidated crime tables have been produced, it is possible to provide a more complete picture of the trends in relation to street crime and the effect of Operation Safer Streets. This report has been produced using the consolidated end of year crime tables and considers performance to the end of March only. It looks at the information in respect of street crime, draws some comparisons with other crime categories and Total Notifiable Crime. This report also looks at the links with drugs, low level disorder, demographics and the effects of mobile phones in the increased level of street crime.

### Background


- The rise in street crime can be viewed as far back as 1998, when the last Home Office counting rule change came into effect. The following chart shows the trend to date:



- Street Crime has risen steadily over the past four years with a noticeable increase between September and October 2001. A similar decrease is also evident in December 2001, followed by another significant increase in January 2002. The reasons for these escalations in offences are unclear; however the transfer of a large number of officers to central London on security duties following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York has been cited as a possible cause.
- Between January and February 2002, a significant fall in the number of offences can also be identified. This coincides with the implementation of

Operation Safer Streets on the nine boroughs contributing the highest percentage of street crime offences. The fall in the number of offences continues between February and March 2002, albeit to a lesser degree.

- The next chart illustrates the trends in street crime year by year over the past four years:




- The chart demonstrates that whilst street crime has been rising for the past four years, the increases have been similar year-on-year. The exception, however, was 2001/02, again illustrating the change that occurred in September 2001 compared to the previous years.

**MPS Performance**

- The year end figures show that street crime increased by 38% during 2001/02 as compared to the previous year (MPS Target 2001/2002 – 2% reduction in offences).
- However, this hides the increases when compared to previous years. Starting from a base year of 1998/99, street crime increased by 36% in the first year (99/00), 61% in year two (00/01) and 122% in year three (01/02). This equates to 86 offences per day in 1998/99, 117 offences per day in 1999/00, 139 offences per day in 2000/01 and 192 offences per day in 2001/02.
- It has to be remembered that these are only those offences that have been classified and confirmed as street crime offences. Street crime, according to the British Crime Survey is under reported; with between only 35% – 54% being reported to police.
- The end of year judicial disposal rate for street crime was 8.0%. (MPS Target 2001/2002 – 10%)


## Comparisons between crime categories

11. Whilst the headline figures of street crime increasing by 38% are newsworthy, the fact that total notifiable crime only increased by 6% appears less so. The following chart shows the monthly comparisons between street crime and total notifiable offences and the year end comparison:




12. The reduction in the number of offences in December seems to follow a seasonal pattern albeit with more dramatic results this year. An explanation for this could be the effect of the return to ordinary duties of the officers previously deployed on central London security.
13. Similarly, it is difficult to offer an explanation as to why total notifiable offences decreased in May 2001.
14. The next chart illustrates the comparison between the different crime categories. They have been ranked according to their proportion of the total MPS crime. It can be seen that both "Autocrime" and the "Street Crime" categories are in the top nine categories contributing over 80% of the total MPS crime.

MPS Crime Categories - Pareto Chart



15. In the next chart each borough is ranked according to its contribution to the total MPS street crime figure. It can be seen that 80% of the total MPS street crime offences are committed on around half the boroughs. The boroughs of Haringey, Newham, Croydon and most notably Islington have moved down the chart since last year, with Southwark, Camden, Tower hamlets, Ealing Waltham Forest, Wandsworth and Hammersmith and Fulham moving up the chart - contributing a greater percentage.


Street Crime Offences by Borough - 01/02 Pareto Chart




## Judicial Disposals

16. The next two charts illustrate the comparison between street crime offences and street crime judicial disposals. What can be seen is the effect that Operation Safer Streets had on both offences and Judicial Disposals. This seems to support that notion that an improved detection rate will also result in an improved performance against this crime category.

Street Crime Offences v Judicial Disposal Rates - MPS



Street Crime Offences v Judicial Disposal Rates - Safer Streets (9)





## How successful was Operation Safer Streets in reducing street crime?

17. Operation Safer Streets was directed at tackling street crime. At the time the operation started, the planning year to date (April 2001 – January 2002) street crime figures compared to the same period the previous year stood at:

Across the whole of the MPS increase	45%
Across the nine Operation Safer Streets (OSS) boroughs increase	42%
Across the remaining boroughs (MPS-OSS) increase	49%

18. After the 8 week duration of Operation Safer Streets the change in street crime figures for February and March 2002 compared to the same period last year stood at:

Across the whole of the MPS increase	9%
Across the nine Operation Safer Streets (OSS) boroughs increase	3%
Across the remaining boroughs (MPS-OSS) increase	16%

19. However, as Easter fell early this year, an adjustment needs to be made to the percentages to take into account that the Easter holidays usually results in a fall in street crime figures. Comparing March 2002 with April 2001 gives the following:

Across the whole of the MPS increase	11%
Across the nine Operation Safer Streets (OSS) boroughs increase	4%
Across the remaining boroughs (MPS-OSS) increase	20%

20. It can be seen that during the 8 week initiative, street crime increases were dramatically reduced. Even taking Easter into account, the fall was from 42% to 4%. As was anticipated this had a knock-on effect on the MPS figures reducing the increase from 45% down to 11%. However, the operation also appears to have benefited the non-OSS boroughs where the increase in street crime was pegged from 49% down to 20%.

21. There are a number of reasons why the whole of the MPS appears to have benefited from Operation Safer Streets:

- the increased publicity raising people's awareness of the crime,
- the effects of the mobile phone marking campaign, or
- the publicity being given to the courts being prepared to jail offenders for committing these offences (Tuesday 29<sup>th</sup> January 2002).

22. Interestingly, the effect on total notifiable offences was less marked.

Across the whole of the MPS increase	6%
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Across the nine Operation Safer Streets (OSS) boroughs increase	6%
Across the remaining boroughs (MPS-OSS) increase	6%

This illustrates the fact that whilst street crime is of concern due to the increases in the level of offences over recent years, it still makes up for less than 7% of the total number of notifiable offences.

<b>Autocrime Total</b>	23.24%
Violence Against the Person Total	15.26%
Other Theft	14.95%
Criminal Damage Total	13.98%
Burglary Total	10.97%
Theft From M/V	10.61%
Fraud or Forgery Total	8.31%
Fraud or Forgery Counted per Victim	8.10%
Common Assault	7.29%
Burglary in a Dwelling	6.99%
<b>Street Crime Total</b>	6.62%

23. It would also be expected that having more officers in the streets would produce two results. Firstly, a lower level of offending generally – this appears to be so in that the increase in total notifiable offences fell from 6.7% (April 01 to Jan 01) to 4.3% (Feb – Mar 02). However, at the same time additional officers on the streets should also generate offences from stopping and searching suspects. Again this appears also to be true, in the months from April 2001 to January 2002, the number of “police generated” offences, possession of offensive weapons and possession of drugs increased by 2% across the nine OSS boroughs. In February and March 2002 this went up to 60%.

### What our effects did Operation Safer Streets have?

24. **Victim Satisfaction**  
The data from the victim satisfaction survey is incomplete due to problems with the company responsible for collecting the information. However, data is available for October 2001 and March 2002. In these months victim satisfaction for robbery – personal property offences fell from 92% to 81% respectively<sup>1</sup>.
25. **Demand levels**  
There was a 13% reduction in the overall number of calls to police during Operation Safer Streets when compared to the same period last year. However, if calls to robberies are looked at in isolation, these rose by about 5%. The largest increase was in February when the number of calls relating to robberies rose by 15% compared to February last year, this reduced to a 4% reduction in March 2002.
26. **Response times**  
Given the additional resources made available to the Operation Safer Streets boroughs, it could be expected that response times to “Immediate” calls would improve. Again, looking at all call types, there was actually a decrease

<sup>1</sup> Sample size – October 2001 149 out of 1117 and March 2002 162 out of 1147

in the percentage of calls reached within the Charter time during February compared to last year but an increase in March 2002. If calls to robberies only are examined this picture changes and there was quite a marked improvement during both months. However, the Charter Response target of responding to 80% of urgent incidents within 12 minutes was only met for robbery calls in March 2002 (81%).

27. **Complaints**

Unfortunately, due to the manner in which complaints are recorded, full details of complaints made against police are not yet available. However, from the information so far collected, it is unlikely that complaints will show an increase during the period of Operation Safer Streets.

28. **Stop and Search**

Comparing February 2002 with the same month last year gives the following increases in the percentage of people stopped and searched:

Month-Year	Total persons searched	Searches where ethnicity is unknown	Searches of non-white people	Searches of white people
Feb	55%	6%	81%	37%

29. **Arrested as a result of Stop and Search**

Comparing February 2002 with the same month last year gives the following increases in the percentage of people arrested as a result of being stopped and searched:

Month-Year	Total persons arrested	Arrests where ethnicity is unknown	Non-white people arrested	White people arrested
Feb	38%	-6%	53%	27%

30. **Proportions of persons arrested as a result of Stop and Search**

Over the past six years, the proportions of persons arrested as a result of being stopped and searched have altered very little. They stood at 11% in April 1997, rising to a high of 18% in spring 2000 and falling back to 15% in February 2002. There is only between 1 and 2 percentage points difference between the different ethnic groupings shown. During February 2002 the proportions of persons arrested as a result of being stopped and searched stood at:

Month-Year	Total	Where ethnicity is unknown	Non-white people	White people
Feb 2002	15%	13%	15%	14%

31. **Traffic**  
 It has been difficult to quantify the impact of redeploying 250 traffic officers away from their normal duties, however, there have clearly been a number of issues arising from this. A number of outside agencies have had to curtail or alter their operations due to the traffic unit's inability to offer their normal support. A number of initiatives in support of the Mayor's programme for traffic in London have had to be postponed. The normal support provided to boroughs in dealing with road traffic incidents has had to be withdrawn and boroughs have had to bear the responsibility for meeting this demand.



**Tactics Used**

32. A recent Home Office report<sup>2</sup> looking at local problem solving approaches supports the tactics deployed under Operation Safer Streets. The identification of crime "Hotspots", of "hot victims" (repeat victims), of "hot people" (repeat offenders) and "hot products" (the property being stolen).
33. The report also gives weight to the notion that ignoring "low-level" disorder encourages crime.
34. The experience in New York is currently being cited as support for the idea that if the police tackle low-level disorder this will have a knock-on effect on more serious crime. Whether there is a casual relationship between the two is unclear, when other factors such as race and low-levels of income are factored in, the relationships largely disappear. However, the report does suggest an indirect relationship whereby low-level disorder does undermine community stability.
35. The report points out that tackling the issues that effect crime in the community is not just the work of the police. However, it also goes on to point out some of the dangers associated with some crime prevention techniques such as target hardening and its possible detrimental impact on the perceptions of a safe community to live in.
36. The additional publicity given to Operation Safer Streets, whilst possibly having a positive impact on the levels of offending and similar effects on the public's perception of the police trying to do something about rising crime may also raise the fear of crime in the community on which this operation is targeted.

<sup>2</sup> "Working out what to do: Evidence-based crime reduction" Crime Reduction Series Paper 11 (2002)

### Mobile Phones

37. Plotting mobile phones as an item listed as stolen as a result of a street crime produces the following results:



38. It can be seen that the volume of offences not including the theft of a mobile phone remains relatively static when compared to those where a mobile phone is taken during the commission of a street crime offence.

39. Over the past three years, the percentage of offences where a mobile phone is amongst the items stolen has risen from 25% in 1999/00 to 50% in

2001/02. Offences where only a mobile phone has been stolen have the lowest judicial disposal rate in this category (6%) as against offences where no mobile phone was involved (10%). This may reflect the difficulty in linking offenders with the theft of this type of property or indicate that many losses or damage to mobile phones are being reported as “robberies” for insurance purposes.

40. The reasons behind this increase have been the subject of a number of studies, most recently that published by the Home Office<sup>3</sup>. This suggests that the number of mobile phone thefts is unknown but probably in the order of at least twice the level of recorded crime involving mobile phones. Whilst there is evidence of substantial growth in mobile phone thefts, the report suggests it is difficult to determine whether it is because mobile phones are being specifically targeted or simply that phone are just “stealable” items, and their increasing appearance in thefts reflects greater ownership.
41. Greater ownership will also lead to their theft in greater numbers and as the level of ownership has grown amongst younger persons, this by implication indicates that a phone will be a valuable item to them, leading to a higher level of reported incidents of theft.
42. the report indicates that phones are stolen for a number of reasons:
  - to sell on
  - to use
  - to “tax” the owner
43. A small piece of research conducted in the MPD indicated that about 25% re-appeared on a network being used by someone else. The ready market for second-hand mobile phones fuelling this demand.
44. Some phones are stolen and the remaining calls allowable on the phone used up and the phone then discarded. Some phones were simply regarded as too “tatty” to sell on and again were discarded giving weight to the notion of “taxing” – showing other youths who is in charge by taking their phones from them.
45. Technical solutions making the mobile phone useless once stolen are an option available to phone companies, however, other schemes such as property marking are considered to have only marginal effects, mainly due to the high extent of customisation mobile phones are exposed too.
46. The report writers point to the issue of whether phone thefts have peaked due to the almost universal levels of ownership now being reached. This will depend on the release of new and more desirable models and the efforts of phone companies to employ technical solutions.
47. The Government has recently (3<sup>rd</sup> May 2002) announced their intention to publish a Bill which aims to make stolen mobile phones of little use or value. The Mobile Telephones (Re-programming) Bill contains proposals that would make it an offence to change the unique identifying characteristic of a mobile

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<sup>3</sup> Home Office Research Study 235 (December 2001)

phone, the IMEI number, and to own or supply the necessary equipment with the intent to use it for re-programming mobile phones.

### The link to Drugs

48. Two recent reports<sup>4</sup> produced by the SO11 Service Intelligence Unit – Drugs Desk point out the well documented link between drug users and acquisitive crime. There are various studies cited as supporting the fact that many drug users resort to crime to fund their drug habits.
49. However, the link between drug users and street crime is less clear. Many of the studies focus on the link between drug users and theft in its widest sense. The statistics quoted fail to breakdown the various categories of theft sufficiently to allow any conclusions to be drawn about the role street crime plays in funding drug habits.
50. Only the data made available by the Drugs Workers in Custody breaks down the various offences committed by the drugs users they come into contact with including a street crime category. This information suggests that shoplifting is the main criminal source of funding for drug habits with street crime featuring in less than 3% of cases.
51. The recent government announcement that:

"drug-fuelled street robbers" in the 10 street crime hotspots would be sent on treatment programmes within 24 hours of release from the police station. ‘

has provoked allegations that drug addicts seeking treatment would go out and commit street crime in order to ‘queue jump’. However, the Probation Service has stated that, in their experience, “few street robbers are chronic drug addicts”.

### Victim and suspect profiles

52. Victims are typically EA1 (over 60%) aged between 12 years and 30 years old. The peak age for a victim is 15 years (6%). This profile has remained essentially the same since last year. The only noticeable variations are that in 2000/01, there was a second peak age of 25 years when looking at just the nine Operation Safer Streets boroughs. This has altered this year to show a second peak spanning the age group 20 – 27 years. Also, in 2001/02 Dark Skinned Europeans (EA4) began to feature more prominently as victims (9%) behind Indian/Pakistani (EA2) (11%) and African/Caribbean (EA3) (13%).
53. Suspects are typically described as EA3 (66%) aged 20 (12%). The age group 15 – 20 years accounts for over half of all suspects described. This is at odds with the data from those accused of these offences. The typical accused person is EA3 (61%) aged 15 years old (16%). However this situation varies considerably from borough to borough. Lambeth – EA3 (82%), EA1 (14%); Camden – EA3 (45%), EA1 (42%). In Tower Hamlets, there is a three-way split – EA3 (41%), EA1 (18%) and EA4 (40%). Hackney has an increasing number of EA2’s appearing as accused persons for this offence.

<sup>4</sup> SO 11 Strategic Report – Herion (April 2002) and SO 11 Strategic Report – Cocaine (April 2002)

54. **The Future**
55. Operation Safer Streets has been extended to cover an additional six high volume street crime boroughs. However, the additional manpower made available to the original nine boroughs is being cut back. It remains to be seen how effective this second phase can be.
56. The Prime Minister is being briefed on the progress in tackling street crime in his weekly COBRA meetings. Other meetings of the Government's Street Crime Action Team (SCAT) are drawing together all the agencies involved in the fight against street crime. The SCAT Tracker scheme has been deployed across the 15 Phase II Safer Streets boroughs to trace the outcomes of offenders arrested for street crime and other offences.
57. AC Ghaffur is leading the MPS Street Crime Co-ordinating Group (SCCG) also with weekly meetings to consider and monitor the MPS approach to tackling street crime.
58. Other tactics are also being explored and more recently, Kingston University have claimed to be able to predict street crime using CCTV. This process involves monitoring patterns of behaviour using CCTV with computers being able to spot when the behaviour is likely to lead to a crime being committed.
59. Kent Police have also been working with their local authority to add value to existing crime information. By adding data such as demographic information, information concerning the numbers of single parent families, school truancy, unemployment, etc. they consider it is possible to identify where such factors lead to crime being committed.
60. Having made this link, it is then possible to anticipate where other areas are heading in the same direction and intervene to stem the demographic issues that are felt to lead to people in that area either committing crime or becoming the victims of crime.

## Conclusions

61. Street crime continues to show a year on year rise, however, Operation Safer Streets has shown that, given the resources, the MPS has the ability to impact on this rise and reduce the number of offences being committed.
62. There is little doubt that mobile phones are contributing towards the rise in street crime and the detection of those offences where only a mobile phone has been stolen is proving more difficult than in other cases.
63. Changes in legislation, changes to mobile phone technology, a more "joined up approach involving other agencies and the possible "topping out" of the level of mobile phone ownership may all contribute to calling a halt to this rise in crime.
64. It is anticipated that the National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) introduced in the MPS in April 2002, will have an impact on recorded street crime levels. The first assessment of the level of impact is due in July 2002.



## Recommendations

65. It may be appropriate to conduct further research to investigate the possibilities of utilising the approach being developed by Kent police and to monitor the development of the work being carried out at Kingston University.
66. Further analysis is also required to better understand the impact of the additional police officers in New York and the change in policing style that has also been implemented in that city.

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