MPA
Metropolitan Police Authority

Counter-Terrorism:
The London Debate

Contents

THE PRIME MINISTER

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Terrorism and violent extremism can only be defeated by all our communities both working together, and closely with the police. I therefore welcome the vital contribution made by the Metropolitan Police Authority to this joint effort. The Government will, of course, look closely and constructively at the report and its recommendations and I am confident that it will significantly inform our strategy as it is developed further.

Tony Blair

March 2007

Foreword

Keeping Londoners and others safe from terrorism is not a job solely for governments, security services or police. If we are to make London the safest major city in the world, we must mobilise against terrorism not only the resources of the state, but also the active support of the millions of people who live and work in the capital. We must all work together if we are to detect terrorist activity, and, even more importantly, deter people from within our own communities from becoming terrorists. Only then can we hope to prevent a repetition of what happened here in London on 7 July 2005, or worse.

To achieve this we must build trust between police and the communities they serve. We can do this only if we understand fully the concerns of every section of our society. This is why we engaged directly over 1,000 London residents and workers in 'Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate', a wide-ranging inquiry into the causes and effects of terrorism amongst our diverse communities. This is the report of our findings.

Two messages stand out amidst all that we heard. Firstly, there is profound support, across all communities, for the police's counter-terrorist effort. Secondly, there is a real fragility to public trust in the authorities. If the Metroplitan Police Service (MPS) is to tackle terrorism effectively, it must harness this support and recognise this fragility.

We would like to thank, on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), Professor Tariq Ramadan of the University of Oxford for offering his insight and expertise as our guest panellist throughout the hearings we held. Our thanks also go to all the many members of London's diverse communities who participated in this programme. We thank the many officers and staff of the MPS, whatever their ranks and roles, who contributed to this process. Finally, we wish to thank Andy Hull, Sally Benton and colleagues at the MPA for delivering this programme and writing this report.

The most meaningful way for us to express our appreciation of all of these contributions is for us to ensure that this work brings about concrete, positive change in the way terrorism is prevented and policed here in London, and to share what we have learnt from Londoners with colleagues around this country and the world.

Reshard Auladin
Deputy Chair
MPA

Lord Toby Harris
Home Secretary's appointee
MPA

Cindy Butts
Deputy Chair
MPA

Executive summary

The MPA has sought the views on terrorism and counter-terrorism of a diverse selection of over 1,000 people who live and work in London. Our analysis of these views leads us to the following findings.

■ The terms in which terrorism is discussed can influence levels of public support for the counter-terrorist effort.

■ There are significant similarities between previous terrorist threats which London has faced and the threat of international terrorism which it faces now.

■ Hate crime seriously damages both community relations and counter-terrorist efforts.

■ Police counter-terrorist tactics will only command public confidence if they are – and are seen to be – appropriate, proportionate and fair.

■ Community policing has a critical role to play in countering terrorism and reassuring the public.

■ Communications in a counter-terrorist context are vitally important, and must be improved.

■ The public need more accurate information, more quickly, if they are to put their trust in the police's and other agencies' counter-terrorist work.

■ Londoners do fear future terrorist attack and seek reassurance that they are as safe as possible.

■ The media are perceived as irresponsible, counter-productive and unaccountable in their coverage of terrorism and counter-terrorism.

■ The media are partly responsible for – and can do much to undo – the prevailing climate of Islamophobia.

■ Women and young people have been inadequately involved by the police in their counter-terrorist community engagement to date.

■ Current community engagement on counter-terrorism by the police is sporadic, disjointed and unmeasured.

■ Anti-terrorism stop and search is doing untold damage to certain communities' confidence in the police, and its effectiveness in countering terrorism is in serious doubt.

- The police service does not reflect in its personnel the full diversity of London. This has ramifications for its counter-terrorist work.

- The public do not understand what intelligence is. They therefore have difficulty providing or believing it.

- There is much talk but little activity about counter-terrorist deradicalisation.

- British imams are largely distant and disconnected from young British Muslims.

- The public are largely ignorant as to what plans are in place for the event of a future terrorist attack and do not know what to expect or what to do if one occurs.

- Big business could do more for small business in terms of preparedness for terrorist attack.

- Police authorities need to assume their responsibilities for overseeing and scrutinising police counter-terrorist activity in their areas. This, in turn, may raise their currently low public profile.

- Local government needs more support from central government to build its counter-terrorism capacity and capabilities.

- The law and the legal system as they stand cannot accommodate the need for information on the country's counter-terrorist effort to be shared with the public in a timely fashion.

- Londoners see an interpretation of United Kingdom foreign policy, including the war in Iraq, being used to drive the growth of international terrorism in this country.

- Insufficient space is made for open discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the public sphere.

- The prevention of terrorism is preferable to the pursuit of terrorists.

- Police enforcement and police engagement are both necessary to counter terrorism.

In response to these findings, the MPA makes recommendations for the MPS, and offers advice to other bodies.

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

For ease of reference, the recommendations and advice appear here grouped thematically rather than in the order in which they appear in the body of the report.

Counter-terrorism police tactics

1. Present an urgent review of the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stop and search to the full MPA. Include in this review a clear rationale explaining why a given individual is stopped and searched rather than another. If unable to demonstrate to the MPA's satisfaction through this review that the power is sufficiently effective in countering terrorism to outweigh the damage it does to community relations, stop using it, other than in exceptional circumstances, such as where there is a specific threat to a particular location. **[page 53]**

2. Publish an explanation of Operation Kratos (the generic title for a series of Association of Chief Police Officers policies and MPS standard operating procedures detailing tactical responses to the threat posed by suicide terrorism), setting out clearly the learning that has taken place since 22 July 2005. **[page 29]**

Learning from history

3. Accept and apply to current counter-terrorist activity the learning from previous terrorist campaigns. **[page 19]**

Radicalisation

4. Work with partners to initiate more counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation initiatives. **[page 62]**

Community intelligence

5. Provide the public, the business community and those working in other public services with more guidance as to what activity might reasonably be considered suspicious in a terrorism context. **[page 58]**

6. Explain to the public what to do with information of use in countering terrorism. **[page 58]**

7. Train parking attendants, traffic wardens, parks staff, neighbourhood wardens and city guardians in counter-terrorist awareness. **[page 44]**

8. Find better ways for council employees to feed to the police 'soft' intelligence which they come across in the communities in which they work. **[page 58]**

The MPS should consider what it can say when it comes to counter-terrorism, not what it cannot: a different approach is needed

Communications

9. Consider what it can say when it comes to counter-terrorism, not what it cannot: a different approach is needed. **[page 35]**

10. Explain counter-terrorist terminology, such as 'intelligence' and 'disruption', to the public. **[page 35]**

11. During and after counter-terrorist operations, move quickly to issue accurate, safe information to local residents and business people. **[page 35]**

12. In the event of a future attack, give clear and consistent messages to schools as to what to do with schoolchildren; provide clarity to employers as to whether to send their employees home; and appreciate the importance of the single 'top cop' giving clear information and advice to the nation on television. **[page 35]**

13. Challenge misinformation in the public domain about terrorism and counter-terrorism. **[page 35]**

14. Enhance public confidence in counter-terrorist policing by being open and transparent about mistakes and by more proactively publicising successes. **[page 35]**

15. Strengthen information management systems so that senior officers have up-to-date, accurate information on terrorist and counter-terrorist incidents. **[page 35]**

16. Enhance and publicise its anti-leak measures. **[page 35]**

17. Communicate directly with Londoners, for example with Ringmaster, by Police Message Broadcast System or in person: do not rely upon the media. **[page 35]**

18. Use community radio as an effective way to reach into the homes of black and minority ethnic Londoners and to reach relevant communities nationally and internationally. **[page 38]**

Hate crime

19. Emphasise that the MPS takes hate crime – including persistent 'low-level' hate crime – seriously by investigating hate crimes, including incitement to hatred, as rigorously as possible, by further developing third party reporting schemes, and by publicising more heavily successes in hate crime investigations. **[page 23]**

20. Improve data collection by flagging religious hate crime by religion more accurately and consistently. **[page 23]**

Reassurance

21. Demonstrate an appreciation of the level of fear amongst Londoners of both terrorist and counter-terrorist activity, and continue to seek to satisfy people that they are as safe as can be. **[page 30]**

22. After high-profile terrorist incidents or operations, give reassurance talks in schools and colleges, deploy high-visibility policing, but keep deployment of armed police to a minimum. **[page 30]**

23. Redouble efforts to explain to the public the role of Police Community Support Officers, including in regard to the counter-terrorist effort. **[page 30]**

Local police

24. Strengthen links between Specialist Operations and Borough Operational Command Units when it comes to counter-terrorism by:

■ sharing more information on terrorism and counter-terrorism with frontline, borough-based officers, especially Safer Neighbourhoods officers and Police Community Support Officers;

■ ensuring that designated counter-terrorism leads on borough senior management teams are fully trained and competent to play that role;

■ increasing awareness of and compliance with Operation Delphinus (which provides structured guidance to borough police on counter-terrorism matters); and

■ increasing awareness of and compliance with Operation Rainbow (which provides tactical options for a uniformed counter-terrorist response). **[page 29]**

25. Use local police, as opposed to central specialists, to perform public-facing roles in counter-terrorist operations wherever possible. **[page 29]**

26. Empower local borough police to comment as MPS spokespeople about counter-terrorist operations in their area. **[page 38]**

Community engagement

27. A Community Impact Assessment to be performed on every counter-terrorist operation and an Equality Impact Assessment to be performed on every counter-terrorist policy. **[page 44]**

28. Explain to the MPA the MPS's proposal to brief and share intelligence with vetted community members prior to counter-terrorism operations. Include an update on progress made towards the realisation of this idea. **[page 44]**

29. Work with the MPA to establish a clear strategy and policy framework for police community engagement to counter terrorism. **[page 44]**

30. Work with the MPA to develop a performance measurement framework for counter-terrorism community engagement. **[page 44]**

31. Provide evidence that the MPS is engaging young people more in counter-terrorist efforts. **[page 44]**

32. Provide evidence that the MPS is engaging women more in counter-terrorist efforts, for example through women's sector second-tier organisations and umbrella bodies as well as groups that deal directly with female service users. **[page 44]**

33. Ensure a diversity amongst the Muslims with whom the police engage in counter-terrorist efforts, eg. women, non-Asians, Ahmadis, Ismailies etc. **[page 44]**

34. Involve local councillors in police counter-terrorism work. **[page 44]**

35. Support community activists in organising their own engagement events on counter-terrorism. **[page 44]**

36. Replicate successful local models of community engagement. **[page 44]**

37. Provide feedback to consultees on all consultation exercises. **[page 44]**

38. Ensure that local Safer Neighbourhoods teams build relationships with places of worship in their areas. **[page 44]**

Police personnel

39. Redouble efforts to recruit more Muslim police officers and officers from other minority ethnic and faith groups. **[page 56]**

40. Continue to seek to recruit more Londoners as police officers. **[page 56]**

41. Diversify the workforce in Specialist Operations and particularly in the Counter-Terrorism Command. **[page 56]**

42. Expand and enhance the diversity training which police officers and Police Community Support Officers receive to ensure it is relevant to new and emerging challenges. **[page 56]**

Language

43. Draft and disseminate guidance for all MPS staff on appropriate terminology concerning terrorism and counter-terrorism. **[page 15]**

Preparedness

44. Put more information into the public domain about what to do in the event of terrorist attack. **[page 68]**

45. Improve business preparedness for terrorist attack by:
■ publicising the 'London Prepared' website to businesses;
■ Safer Neighbourhoods teams issuing small businesses with counter-terrorism guidance; and
■ convening local business fora to draw up integrated private sector contingency plans. **[page 68]**

Related criminality

46. Explore how criminal gangs use discontent at counter-terrorism activity to recruit new members. **[page 62]**

47. Government: Facilitate open discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism at all levels and locations in society. **[page 72]**

48. Government: Continue publicly to recognise the widely held view that an interpretation of United Kingdom foreign policy, including the war in Iraq, is being used to drive international terrorism in this country. **[page 72]**

49. Government: Ensure that counter-terrorism activity in the United Kingdom remains rooted in communities, led by police and held publicly accountable. **[page 70]**

50. Government: Amend legislation regarding sub judice (matters under trial or being considered by a judge or court) to allow the police to provide the public with more information on the country's counter-terrorism effort without jeopardising fair trials. **[page 70]**

51. Government: Enable the criminal justice system and the courts to ensure that terrorism trials are brought forward in a timely and speedy fashion without long delays during which cynicism about the strength of the case against those accused may grow. **[page 70]**

52. Government: Law Officers to remind the media of the importance of the principle of 'innocent until proven guilty' and the law on contempt of court. **[page 38]**

53. Government: Enhance accountability arrangements for the media by strengthening the Office of Communications and the Press Complaints Commission. **[page 38]**

54. Government: Give Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships a public protection priority target to ensure the dedication of adequate resources to this area of business. **[page 70]**

55. Government: Provide more resources to local authorities for contingency and continuity planning. **[page 68]**

56. Government: Educate people as to the contributions Islam has made to United Kingdom and global society. **[page 65]**

57. Government: Display sensitivity to considerations that some Muslim organisations will not bid for community grants from National Lottery Fund monies, considering them to be the prohibited proceeds of gambling. **[page 65]**

58. Government: Bring faith groups together to discuss theological approaches to deradicalisation. **[page 62]**

59. Government: Ensure urgently that all emergency services' telecommunications are rendered compatible and fully functional in all environments. **[page 68]**

60. Political parties: Recognise the importance of cross-party consensus in approaching counter-terrorism work. **[page 72]**

61. Security Service: Explain how the public, including businesses, should adapt their behaviour, if at all, in accordance with published terrorist threat levels, or what accompanying change in policing and security they can expect to observe. **[page 45]**

62. Independent Police Complaints Commission: Continue to review its working practices and resources to find ways to speed up its high-profile investigations. Continue to improve its protocols on keeping the public aware of the progress and findings of its investigations. **[page 29]**

63. Police authorities: Perform consultative exercises in their areas with the public on terrorism and counter-terrorism. **[page 45]**

64. Police authorities: Must raise the profile of their work to scrutinise and hold the police to account in the field of counter-terrorism. **[page 70]**

65. Local government: Local authorities to publicise local emergency plans more widely. **[page 68]**

66. Local government: Increase capacity to provide co-ordinated family assistance and counselling in the event of a terrorist attack. **[page 68]**

67. Media: The media need to give more coverage to mainstream opinions within the community, rather than publicising sensational, extreme minority opinions and using the excuse of 'balanced reporting'. **[page 38]**

68. Media: Beware the pitfalls of using ex-police officers with out-of-date skills and knowledge as so-called expert commentators on counter-terrorism matters. **[page 38]**

69. Business: Big businesses to give contingency and continuity advice to smaller businesses. **[page 68]**

70. Business: Mobile phone providers to recognise their ability to contribute to London's resilience by making their networks more robust so that people can communicate at times of emergency. **[page 68]**

71. Communities: Encourage reporting of all instances of hate crime to the police, in order to see offenders brought to justice and other potential victims spared. **[page 23]**

72. Communities: Recognise that there are some parallels between different communities' experiences of terrorism and its fallout, and encourage inter-community dialogue to see what lessons can be shared. **[page 19]**

73. Muslim communities: Equip Islamic clergy to bolster their contribution to the counter-terrorist effort by:
- certification of imams to guarantee that they can relate to young British Muslims on their issues in their language;
- training more imams in this country;
- mosque management committees finding positive ways to challenge extremist propaganda; and
- mobilising Islamic scholarship to articulate theological challenges to terrorism. **[page 62]**

The MPA intends to advocate and pursue the implementation of these recommendations and this advice. London's communities must be fully engaged in the counter-terrorist efforts of the authorities on their behalf. This report signposts the way towards a regional and national response to international terrorism which is informed by the reality of communities' experience, in concert with their aspirations, and in command of their confidence. Terrorism will struggle to survive in the face of such a united front.

Introduction

Through this report, the MPA seeks to give Londoners a voice in influencing the United Kingdom's response to the threat of international terrorism. It is undeniable that the international terrorist threat to the United Kingdom is real. The events of 7 July 2005 testify to this. However, in tackling the threat we face, this country must not sacrifice any of the fundamental principles on which British society is founded – liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law. To do so would grant partial victory to a terrorism which seeks to undermine and overturn the way we live in a free Britain today.

The MPA has a statutory duty to ensure that the MPS discharges its national and international functions efficiently and effectively. One such function is to respond to the threat of international terrorism.

This report is based on the findings of a year-long programme of community engagement to counter terrorism which was devised and delivered by the MPA in 2005-6. It also contains, on the basis of an analysis of these findings, recommendations for change in the way the MPS and others do their business in the field of counter-terrorism.

The outcomes of community engagement in this arena are critical. The outcome most frequently cited in police documentation is that of an increase in the flow of intelligence to the police and Security Service from the public. This is an important outcome, but not the only one. Community engagement to counter terrorism also serves to:

- increase the amount of information publicly available regarding the terrorist threat and responses to it;
- sustain and widen informed, factual debate on how our society should respond to the terrorist threat;
- provide an opportunity for the police to explain what they do in this field, and why, and to dispel any misconceptions or misinformation;
- enable better management of public expectations when it comes to police counter-terrorist activity;
- heighten public understanding of the national and international dimensions of MPS counter-terrorism functions and roles;
- enable the community to inform the police of their issues, considerations and tensions, leading to better-informed police decision-making;
- seek policy direction and strategic steer on counter-terrorism for the police from the public;
- elicit from members of the community ideas for new ways of working;
- foster a sense of public ownership of the problems, and their solutions; and
- build social capital – and therefore resilience – in London.

This is to say that community engagement to counter terrorism is a hard-edged enterprise, reducing the likelihood of future terrorist attack.

The rooting of this report in the real life experience of over 1,000 ordinary Londoners sets it apart from the mass of other material produced by practitioners, commentators and experts in the field.

Consultative process

The MPA's programme of community
engagement to counter terrorism, entitled
'Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate', had the
following four elements:

- a pan-London conference;
- six pan-London hearings with identified sub-sections of London society: young people, local government, business, tourism, faith groups, women, Asian men, police and government;
- 31 local consultations conducted through the MPA-funded community police engagement group (or equivalent) in each London borough (except Redbridge); and
- three focus groups with students in London universities.

Over 1,000 diverse Londoners from 164
different organisations and groups participated
in the programme over the course of 50 hours of
face-to-face consultation.

For a full list of those organisations and groups
that participated in the programme, see the
Annex (page 74).

Context

Definition of terrorism

Terrorism is defined in United Kingdom law by the Terrorism Act 2000 as:
'The threat or use of action designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, and involving serious violence against a person or involving serious damage to property or endangering a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, or creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system'.

There are, however, difficulties in definition. Pinning down precisely what terrorism means to the British people is not simple. Lord Carlile, the government's independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has recently completed and submitted to the Home Office a consultation exercise conducted across the United Kingdom trying to determine what Britons think terrorism is. The publication of his report is awaited with interest.

Types of terrorism

It is possible to distinguish between three different types of terrorism which pose a threat to the United Kingdom: single issue fanatical terrorism, such as that of the Animal Liberation Front; nationalist terrorism, such as that of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Real Irish Republican Army; and international terrorism, such as that of terrorists linked to or influenced by Al-Qaeda. This work has focused on the third of these three categories.

Pinning down precisely what terrorism means to the British people is not simple

Terminology of terrorism

Discussion about terrorism and counter-terrorism calls for careful use of language at all times to ensure clarity, accuracy and equity. Much of the emotive language used in the news media and elsewhere on this topic has been far from careful or precise.

Londoners explain that imprecise use of terms such as 'extremist', 'fundamentalist' and 'radical' fuels confusion and prejudice. The misguided 'War on Terror' metaphor enables a terrorist to call himself or herself a 'soldier', thereby seeking to legitimise his or her illegitimate terrorist act. Mohammad Sidique Khan, the ringleader of the 7 July 2005 London bombers, called himself a 'soldier' in his video-taped last will and testament. Whilst there is a respectable academic argument that seeking to distinguish terrorism from 'ordinary' criminality is a mistake, Londoners disagree: they do not think terrorists should be called mere 'criminals', as they think that to do this is wilfully to ignore the essential political dimension of terrorism. The terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 were not simply criminal acts of mass murder; they were also ideologically driven attempts to subvert British politics and our way of life.

Many Londoners object strongly to use of the term 'Islamic terrorist'. As one young woman from east London observed, "*putting 'Islam' and 'terrorism' side by side turns the meaning of Islam upside down... manipulating the truth of Islam*". The Irish Republican Army are rarely talked of as 'Catholic terrorists', particularly in the post-ceasefire era (although one might well argue that 'Irish Republican terrorism' as a phrase is no less pejorative). To avoid such potentially demonising phraseology, which risks rendering 'Muslim' as shorthand for 'terrorist', the Home Office recommend the term 'international terrorism', which we use in this report.

When religion is discussed in a terrorism context, it is important to be specific. Terms such as 'Sufi' (a Muslim mystic), 'Salafism' (an orthodox movement in Sunni Islam), 'Wahhabi' (a member of the Islamic movement dominant in Saudi Arabia), 'fatwa' (an Islamic legal pronouncement) and 'jihad' (Islamic struggle in the way of God) should not be used unless apt and properly understood. The term 'moderate' is too often used ambiguously, leaving the reader or listener uncertain as to whether it refers to religious observance or politics. Some feel too that the term 'Asian' is insufficiently specific, encouraging an unhelpful lack of distinction between different peoples whose heritage lies in the Indian sub-continent.

Terminology of terrorism: Recommendations and advice

Recommendation for the Metropolitan Police Service:
43. Draft and disseminate guidance for all MPS staff on appropriate terminology concerning terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Reality of terrorism

On 7 July 2005 Shehzad Tanweer, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Hasib Hussain and Jermaine Lindsay – four home-grown British citizens – killed 52 innocent people and themselves in suicide bomb attacks on the transport system in London. No-one has been charged in connection with this atrocity.

On 21 July 2005, allegedly, would-be suicide bombers sought but failed to kill many more innocent people, again on London's transport system. Muktar Ibrahim, Manfo Asiedu, Hussein Osman, Yassin Omar, Ramzi Mohammed and Adel Yahya have all been charged with their alleged involvement in this attempted attack. Their trial is progressing at the time of writing.

On 9 November 2006 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of the Security Service, said that five major terrorist conspiracies have been thwarted in the United Kingdom since 21 July 2005, saving many hundreds (possibly even thousands) of lives. The following limited detail can legally and safely be provided on these five plots.

- **October 2005.** Five arrests under the Terrorism Act 2000. The five were released into the custody of the Immigration Services.
- **October 2005.** Three men arrested. Two have been charged with offences including conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to cause an explosion and one with conspiracy to

obtain money by deception and Terrorism Act offences relating to the possession of money for terrorist purposes and fundraising. The trial is listed for April 2007.
- **November 2005.** One man arrested and charged with attempting to possess property intended for use for the purposes of terrorism.
- **August 2006.** Suspected airline plot. 15 people charged with offences including conspiracy to murder and preparing an act of terrorism.
- **September 2006.** Suspected attendance at terrorist training camps. 11 people awaiting trial on charges including solicitation to murder and providing and receiving terrorist training.

As with all cases, there is the possibility that charges are reviewed or amended when defendants come to trial.

Further expounding the scale of the threat, Dame Eliza said that over 1,600 individuals have been identified as actively engaged in plotting or facilitating terrorist acts here or overseas, in 200 groupings or networks, responsible for approximately 30 plots to kill people and damage our economy.

In October 2006 Lord Falconer, Lord Chancellor, said that there were in the United Kingdom approximately 100 defendants awaiting trial in 34 cases for terrorism-related offences.

The consensus amongst counter-terrorism professionals is that the current threat to the United Kingdom from international terrorism is both real and enduring, and is likely to last at least a generation.

London is considered to be the prime target in the United Kingdom for international terrorist attack. By way of partial explanation, Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the MPS, said on 29 June 2006, "*London is more dominant as a capital city in relation to the rest of the economy of this country than any other capital city of any developed country in the world*".

Likely targets for terrorist attack in London include:
- iconic or symbolic sites and tourist attractions;
- transport systems, termini and hubs;
- crowded events such as concerts or major sports fixtures; and
- government, security services and police premises, and embassies.

Terrorist attacks are low-frequency but high impact. The fact remains that one is more likely, for instance, to get killed in a traffic accident than murdered in a terrorist outrage. There is therefore some disagreement as to what constitutes a proportionate response.

Whilst there is an acceptance amongst

Londoners that the threat from international terrorism is serious and persistent, and a resignation to the possibility of future attacks, there is also a marked reluctance to allow the threat to be exaggerated in order to justify curtailment of civil liberties such as excessive use of anti-terrorism stop and search, an extension of the maximum period of detention without charge for those suspected of terrorism offences to 90 days, or abrogation of elements of the Human Rights Act 1998. In a similar vein, Londoners are unprepared to see terrorism used as a justification for political interference in legal due process.

People living in outer London boroughs perceive the threat to be against central London and not against the area where they live. This perception is to be challenged: every London borough contains potential terrorist targets, and every part of London will be affected by any terrorist attack on the city. In those outer London boroughs where high-profile counter-terrorist operations have taken place and arrests have been made on suspicion of terrorism-related offences residents have come to realise that there is a local dimension to the threat too. The location regarding which concern about future terrorist attack is most pronounced is Canary Wharf, where workers and nearby residents feel the threat most acutely. Some Londoners have deliberately avoided this area as a result.

A new normality?

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. London has faced terrorist threats before, most notably in the form of Irish Republican terrorism. There is controversy over the extent to which the threat London faces from modern international terrorism differs from that which it faced during the Irish Republican Army bombing campaigns of the late 20th century. If one compares and contrasts the two predicaments, without romanticising the inhumane killers of the Irish Republican Army, the following general differences can be observed.

- International terrorism now operates on the basis of martyrdom, using suicide as a tactic; the Irish Republican Army, who were interested in personal survival, never did this (although some Irish Republican Army terrorists did die accidentally, they did use proxies who died, and some hunger strikers died but directly endangered no lives other than their own).

- International terrorists today give no warning of their attacks; the Irish Republican Army usually did provide a warning.

- International terrorism causes indiscriminate murder; the Irish Republican Army tended to target military or political targets.

- International terrorism now seeks to inflict maximum casualties; the Irish Republican Army was more targeted in its approach.

- International terrorism now seems to be semi-autonomous, franchised and fragmented; Irish Republican Army terrorism was generally centrally directed.

- International terrorism has unclear, complex ends; Irish Republican Army aims were relatively clear and simple.

- International terrorism is not heavily penetrated by British intelligence services; the Irish Republican Army was.

The police response to the current threat, correspondingly, has been unprecedented. The arrival of suicide bombing as a terrorist tactic in the United Kingdom now necessitates earlier police intervention in suspected terrorist plots than was previously necessary. The investigation into the 7 July 2005 bombings in London is the biggest investigation that the MPS has ever conducted and has, according to Steve House, Assistant Commissioner (Specialist Crime) MPS, reached a total expenditure so far of over £100,000,000. The period immediately after the 7 July 2005 bombings was the first time the MPS had to call upon other United Kingdom police forces to supply support in the form of 'mutual aid'.

Whilst this brief analysis illustrates those aspects of the current terrorist threat which are novel, to ignore the similarities would disallow essential learning from past experience and the avoidance of past mistakes. It is not difficult to imagine, for instance, entrenching the isolation of some Muslim communities through miscarriages of justice similar to the 'Birmingham Six', the 'Guildford Four' or the Maguire family, all of which did untold damage to intercommunity relations. Nor is it impossible to see Belmarsh Prison coming to be viewed as 'the Maze' was during the time of 'the Troubles'. The danger of such negative developments is to an extent mitigated by significant changes in legislation and criminal justice policy and practice since those times.

Londoners feel that when it comes to communities responding to the threat of international terrorism, Muslim communities in particular could profitably learn from the Irish Catholic community. Notable aspects of the two communities' shared experience include:

- suffering at the hands of prejudicial stereo-typing;
- media portrayal only of extremists' viewpoints to the extent that the majority voice goes unheard;
- clergy's condemnation of terrorism going unreported;
- column inches and air time being afforded only to those who appear equivocal or ambiguous about such condemnation;

- agreement with terrorists' ends misrepresented as agreement with their means; and
- insufficient recognition of community members themselves working to support a fragile peace process.

The question posed by one Catholic priest was therefore, "*is the Muslim community prepared to listen to the stories of others?*".

A new normality?: Recommendations and advice

Recommendation for the Metropolitan Police Service

3. Accept and apply to current counter-terrorist activity the learning from previous terrorist campaigns.

Advice for other bodies

72. Communities: Recognise that there are some parallels between different communities' experiences of terrorism and its fallout, and encourage inter-community dialogue to see what lessons can be shared.

Effects of terrorism

The immediate effect of the terrorist attacks on London on 7 July 2005 was the tragic loss of 52 innocent lives, ongoing heartache, distress and trauma for the survivors and for the families and friends of the victims, and the consternation and apprehension it wrought upon the rest of the population. The impact of the bombings themselves on the day of the attacks and immediately thereafter is well documented in other reports. This report focuses on the longer-term impact on Londoners.

Fear

An overriding aspect of this impact has been a general increase in anxiety levels amongst Londoners. As one consultee commented, "*everybody looks at each other differently, and sometimes now with suspicion*". An example we heard of this new, wary consciousness of the possibility of terrorist attack was when a bus in Hackney collided with a tree and it was reported to the authorities as having exploded. General vigilance has increased following 7 July 2005. Unattended baggage has come to be considered unacceptable and reported more quickly. Concerns were, however, raised in some quarters for those who may act strangely or suspiciously not because they are terrorists, but on account of factors such as mental heath problems or phobias.

One of the most commonly cited effects upon Londoners of the bombings and attempted bombings of 2005 is a new-found fear of using public transport. Commuters became apprehensive about travelling to central London. We heard many tales of people ceasing to use tubes, trains and buses altogether. Others echoed the sentiments of one consultee that, "*sitting near people with backpacks made me nervous*". Some people told us that they now

avoid certain carriages on tube trains. Others preferred no longer to wear rucksacks or puffa jackets for fear of being mistaken for a terrorist.

Nevertheless, many feel that they had no option but to return to public transport to go about their daily lives. The message for Londoners from Sir Ian Blair is that, "*certainly my children use public transport. I urge everybody to use London public transport because the last thing that we can have is the terrorists winning and changing not only our way of life, but our hopes for the future*". The fact that an alleged terrorist plot was foiled in the summer of 2006, this time involving the attempted bombing of transatlantic airliners mid-flight, with memories of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York still fresh, has put people off air travel too.

Notwithstanding this widespread fear in the wake of the London bombings, Londoners also told us proudly of a sense of solidarity and unity which was felt at the time, and which, to a limited extent, persists today. Some compared this unity with the Blitz mentality during World War Two, but recognised that the domestic nature of the threat now is a significant difference. A female Muslim student told us in tears of how, as she walked the long route home wearing her hijab (headscarf) on 7 July 2005, people looked out for her, wanting to check she was all right and protect her from any prejudice she might encounter. The Mayor's powerful 'One London' message was seen as a good example of community leadership, binding people together at a time of great tension and strain. The ex-head of the Spanish police on a visit to Brussels told us that this same sense of solidarity was the key to Madrid's recovery after the terrorist bombings there on 11 March 2004.

Some Londoners seem unconcerned by the threat. Others appear determined not to be cowed by it. Many of them told us how they got

on the tube on 8 July 2005 out of sheer bloody mindedness. Of those who believe that international terrorism poses a real and present danger, many have nonetheless not changed their daily behaviour. It was repeatedly observed that those who travel to central London least were most scared of doing so. Visitors to London were more scared of terrorist attack than Londoners themselves. This was particularly true of domestic visitors, rather than those from overseas. This disinclination to travel to London was strongest for families with children.

Hatred

At almost every consultation we heard graphic tales of negative reactions against Muslims after 7 July 2005, which many perceived as a direct backlash. It is clear that the London bombers did nothing for the cause of Muslims in the United Kingdom. In direct terms, the bombers who detonated their explosive devices on tube trains all did so in areas with a high concentration of Muslim residents, and Muslims were amongst those who were killed. Indirectly, according to those we consulted, their atrocious acts fuelled a pernicious Islamophobia which persists in the capital and the country as a whole.

One schoolgirl told us how her old friends had called her a *"Paki terrorist"* in the playground. A Muslim family in Newham woke up on 8 July 2005 to find their house daubed with Islamophobic graffiti. A young Muslim man commented, *"when I grow a beard and walk at Oxford Circus, people look at me funny"*. Staff from a community radio project in west London said that, *"on 7 July 2005 we were running a course in Acton. The rest of that week the Muslim women did not come to the course, because they were frightened, not of bombs, but by being ostracised on account of their dress"*.

Non-Muslim women have encountered problems trying to travel overseas because of their husbands' Muslim names. A woman from an Asian women's project told us that, *"since 7 July 2005 Muslim women whom we had empowered to come out of their homes and to learn English were pushed back into their houses"*. Women wearing the hijab (headscarf) have been harassed in shopping centres and spat at in the street. Some community centres began running self-defence classes for women who wear Islamic dress. We heard many times of Muslim women voluntarily withdrawing from general social contact as a result of increased tensions following 7 July 2005, choosing to stay at home, especially at night, rather than to risk Islamophobic attack. Somali women in Hammersmith and Fulham told us that they felt they were being 'watched'. A Muslim teenager explained to his mother, "*I don't want to wear the jilbab and the hat to mosque because, if I wear that, everybody will know that I'm a Muslim*". A Muslim student's housemate in the months that followed 7 July 2005 would not let him go into central London unless he had shaved. Another felt, in July 2005 and for months thereafter, that he had to take his possessions into London in a transparent plastic bag, as he didn't want to be treated with suspicion. A bearded Muslim man carrying a bag on a bus made fellow passengers feel so uncomfortable that he felt that he had to alight at the next stop. Muslim men have frequently found people unwilling to sit next to them on tubes and buses. African-Caribbean Londoners have been saying to them, "*welcome to our world. Everybody assumes we're predisposed to mugging and raping*". In Sutton we heard of children abusing Muslim bus drivers. Anecdotes were told of buses not stopping for Muslim would-be passengers. Some people are distancing themselves from Muslim acquaintances in order to avoid being associated with them. Islamophobic graffiti has gone up in

the toilets in a London student union building. Islamic students told us that they felt that association with university Islamic societies was now viewed with suspicion and even hostility. A Muslim student said to us, "*we feel isolated because of what we believe in*".

This fear of Muslims is not confined to non-Muslims: one Muslim's brother will now walk away from other Muslim men with a rucksack, beard and headphones on a train. Muslims are forced to develop coping mechanisms to deal with this burgeoning prejudice. Some have taken in private to making wry jokes to one another about what they are carrying in their bags. A Muslim outreach worker informed us that she, *"practically imposed a curfew on my children because I don't want them to go out and get attacked"*.

An imam gave us his interpretation of the reasons for the development of the current Islamophobic climate: *"I am referring to the consequences of the 'War on Terror': the victimisation and the demonisation of one community and one community only, the Muslims... Bush's 'crusade' was explained in 'us and them' terms – an ideological war against 'Islamo-fascism' – giving rise to the widespread perception that the 'War on Terror' is a 'War on Islam'... Some Muslims feel that their mosques, their faith schools, wherever they gather, is monitored. Are they the enemy within? Are they the fifth column? Their faith is vilified. Their sacred and profane is questioned and mocked"*. On the subject of the infamous Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed as a terrorist, he added, *"nothing to do with freedom of speech. Danish intellectuals deliberately provoking and pushing already marginalised and fragile Muslim communities living in Denmark. Don't forget, some of the calamities in Europe did start with caricaturing, mocking and belittling a community, and Muslims are afraid*

that in some quarters this is the beginning of just that... 7,000 Bosnian Muslims were killed under United Nations supervision. Serbs came and killed them in a few nights of killing. So the fear is genuine".

Some Muslims have reacted to this backlash by reasserting their faith. One young Muslim man from Brixton told us, *"Islamic clothing makes you feel more of a Muslim... gives you more empowerment, 'cause like you want everybody to know that you're a Muslim and that you're happy with being a Muslim... And how come you don't have the call to prayer outside Brixton Mosque? I find it strange, hearing church bells"*. There has been a noticeable increase in the rates of conversion of young men to Islam. Not all of this has been for positive reasons, as one streetwise young man from south London made clear, *"in Lambeth we have two major gangs – one of them's called SMS and one of them's called PDC – they don't call themselves a 'gang'; they call themselves a 'street family' or a 'crew' – and in the beginning these gangs were just gangs, but now they're like on the whole Islamic fundamentalist terrorist bandwagon... The crews used the events of the summer of 2005 as an excuse to recruit young people – their intention was to make people become more Muslim, so they would have bigger issues to deal with"*.

This backlash has not, however, been felt by Muslims alone. Asians of other faiths and no faith have also been subjected to abuse and attack. Sikh men have been identified with Usama bin Laden because of their turbans. The first person in the United States fatally shot in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 was Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh. One Sikh woman resignedly said, *"it doesn't matter whether we're Muslim or Hindu or Sikh: to a racist, we're all the same"*. A 17 year-old woman from Southwark complained that, *"since 7 July 2005*

discrimination has increased, and it saddens me to think that society has formed an image of the so-called terrorist. I wasn't born here. I'm obviously foreign. Does that make me a suspect?". Jewish groups feel disproportionately targeted by international terrorists. The centrality of anti-Semitism in Islamist rhetoric (such as that of Abu Qatada) and a litany of terrorist attacks on Jewish people and premises around the world validate Jewish unease at the current threat. This is aggravated by the deliberate conflation and confusion of Americans, Britons, Israelis and Jews by the likes of extremists such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. The existence of Jewish organisations such as the Community Security Trust is partly in response to the terrorist threat. Eighty Jewish schools in the United Kingdom have physical security measures to protect them against terrorist or anti-Semitic attacks.

All of this places heavy emphasis on the importance of a robust police response to racist and religious hate crime. Sir Ian Blair said that,

"after July 2005 there was only the slightest tremor in the recorded statistics around Islamophobic and other racist attacks and then London returned pretty much to normal". Any suggestion that the racist and Islamophobic backlash after 7 July 2005 was low-level or short-lived, however, does not tally with the experience of Londoners articulated to us throughout this programme of consultation. This suggests, in turn, that much hate crime is going unreported. A council employee from Southwark told us, "in the days after 7 July 2005, although the actual reports of hate crime to the police didn't go up, the reports to Victim Support doubled in the first month". Third party reporting schemes are vitally important if a truer picture of levels of hate crime in the city is to be painted. In Sutton, residents observed that, with time, the seriousness with which racially motivated crimes were pursued after 7 July 2005 decreased. It is essential that the police understand that any lack of rigour in their response to racist crime will be perceived as evidence of police racism.

Hatred: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

19. Emphasise that the MPS takes hate crime – including persistent 'low-level' hate crime – seriously by investigating hate crimes, including incitement to hatred, as rigorously as possible, by further developing third party reporting schemes, and by publicising more heavily successes in hate crime investigations.

20. Improve data collection by flagging religious hate crime by religion more accurately and consistently.

Advice for other bodies

71. Communities: Encourage reporting of all instances of hate crime to the police, in order to see offenders brought to justice and other potential victims spared.

The counter-terrorist response

The police's emergency response to the bombings in London on 7 July 2005 is universally commended by Londoners. Many brave police officers and staff worked long hours to save lives and keep Londoners safe. The 'blue light' functions of the MPS were seen at their best during that difficult period.

Subsequent police counter-terrorist investigations and operations have received a more mixed public reception. There is general recognition that the MPS's overriding responsibility is for public safety. However, there is also a demand that counter-terrorist policing be appropriate, proportionate and evidence-based.

There are four main modes of counter-terrorist policing activity:
- intelligence gathering;
- conventional investigation;
- manhunts; and
- presenting case files to prosecutors.

Given the global nature of modern international terrorism, and the proper insistence that terrorist investigations go wherever the intelligence and evidence lead them, Andy Hayman, Assistant Commissioner (Specialist Operations) MPS, admits that counter-terrorist policing can sometimes feel like, *"chasing your tail around the world"*.

The following statistics, which cover the period 11 September 2001 – 31 December 2006, describe the results of counter-terrorism policing and prosecution in the United Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland) since the Al Qaeda-inspired attacks on New York.
- Arrested under terrorism legislation (or arrested under other legislation where the investigation was conducted as a terrorist investigation): 1,166
- Released without charge: 652 (56%)

- Charged with offences under the Terrorism Act 2000: 221 (19%)
- Charged under non-terrorism legislation: 186 (16%)
- Handed over to immigration authorities: 74 (6%)
- Otherwise disposed (eg cautioned, dealt with under mental health legislation, dealt with under youth offending procedures, transferred to Police Service Northern Ireland custody, or remanded in custody under United States extradition warrant): 33 (3%)
- Convicted under the Terrorism Act 2000: 40
- Convicted under other legislation: 180
- At or awaiting trial for terrorism-related offences: 98

[Source: Counter-Terrorism Command, MPS, January 2007]

The 'arrest : charge' rate above can be compared with the MPS's generic 'arrest : charge' rate across all types of offence, which, for 2005-2006, was approximately 43%.
[Source: Performance Directorate, MPS, February 2007]

It should be borne in mind that in some cases those who come to police attention during anti-terrorism operations but are then charged under non-terrorism legislation are charged with offences, such as fraud or identity theft, which the police suspect to be connected with terrorism but have insufficient substantiating evidence to prove that connection in a court of law. It should also be noted that some of the terrorism-related arrests counted above, especially those conducted in order to counter terrorist reconnaissance, were merely precautionary arrests, eg for videoing iconic sites, and will have resulted in release a matter of hours after arrest. In order to rebut accusations that the police go on unfocused 'fishing expeditions', needlessly arresting swathes of innocents, it would be advisable for them to

collate and publish currently unavailable statistics which demonstrate how many of the above arrests were merely precautionary.

The instances of police counter-terrorist activity that have registered most with Londoners are:
- the pursuit and arrest of the alleged 21 July 2005 would-be suicide bombers;
- the shooting dead of innocent Brazilian, Jean Charles de Menezes, at Stockwell tube station on 22 July 2005;
- the raid on Number 46 and Number 48 Lansdowne Road in Forest Gate on 2 June 2006, resulting in the arrest of brothers Abul Koyair and Mohammed Abdulkahar, who was accidentally shot and injured by police in the raid;
- the search of the Jameah Islamiya Islamic School in Marks Cross, East Sussex, from 1 September 2006;
- the arrests of 24 people in connection with an alleged plot to use liquid bombs to blow up transatlantic flights in August 2006;
- multiple arrests made in relation to alleged terrorist offences in Waltham Forest from 10 August 2006; and
- a series of co-ordinated arrests across Birmingham on 31 January 2007 in connection with an alleged plot to kidnap and behead a serving British Muslim soldier.

These examples of high-profile counter-terrorism operations divide Londoners in terms of the confidence they command. One young person summed up a particular body of opinion by saying that the tactics employed have been heavy-handed: *"To a man with a hammer, every problem looks like a nail"*. Others have argued that, *"it is better to be cautious than dead"*. Certainly this activity has left certain sections of the community – Muslims in particular – feeling vulnerable and afraid. Comments from Muslims who spoke to us include, *"in the United Kingdom, Muslims can be arrested at will, it seems. No crime needs to be committed"*, *"anti-terror raids have a criminalising effect on the Muslim community. The whole community is viewed with suspicion"*, *"the community in Waltham Forest saw itself as being under siege"*, and *"my community was shaken into a state of panic"*.

The fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes by police officers on 22 July 2005 polarised community opinion. One young South American woman asked, *"I don't understand why, if the stop and search law was already in force, why they didn't stop him… many times I've been out with my friends and we see police coming over to teenagers, stopping them and searching them… If they suspect a terrorist, out in public, why didn't they stop and search him?… Wouldn't it be more valuable to ask him questions, not to kill him, but to get information from him… if he was one of them, obviously there's more terrorists who helped him, so that way, instead of killing him, they could have got more information or seen if there were any other planned attacks"*. An Asian family in Merton would not allow their teenage children onto the tube after this incident for fear of them getting shot by police.

Other Londoners felt that Mr de Menezes's death, whilst tragic, probably did serve to put off potential terrorists. It reassured some people that the police are able to act decisively in their primary responsibility of protecting the public. In Barnet, Londoners contended that police use of lethal force is necessary in extreme situations, and that tragic mistakes such as this were sadly inevitable. Steve House told an audience of Londoners that levels of interest in what went wrong that day in Stockwell diminished in concentric circles: within about one square mile of New Scotland Yard, that is including Westminster and Whitehall, there was still huge interest;

Londoners outside of that area were concerned, but less so; interest in the rest of the United Kingdom was significantly less; and the rest of the world was largely unconcerned by this mistake. It is important to note that all of the senior police officers addressing Londoners during this programme expressed sorrow and sadness for this tragic loss of innocent life at police hands, stating that they will work resolutely to prevent its repeat. It was generally accepted by Londoners throughout this consultation that, in order to protect the public, police use of lethal force had to remain an option.

The aspect of the episode of Jean Charles de Menezes's tragic death which seems to have undermined public trust and confidence in the police most is not the shooting itself, but rather the police communications about it after the event. This is the subject of a still ongoing Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) investigation. The MPA by law is therefore not permitted to pass its own comment on these matters. However, it would be disingenuous of us not to represent here the strong views Londoners expressed to us on this topic. A perceived lack of ownership on the part of the Commissioner was considered 'troubling' and was thought to demonstrate a sense of disorderly confusion at New Scotland Yard. Inaccurate eye-witness testimony from Stockwell tube station, attributed by the media at the time to 'bystanders', was widely assumed to be unofficial police commentary. This inaccurate testimony, suggesting that Jean Charles was wearing an unseasonably thick jacket, jumped over ticket gates and so on, created something of a sense that, 'he deserved it', which for a time tarnished the name of a perfectly innocent man, 'summarily executed' by the state. Whilst the IPCC 'drags its heels', the widely held view of those whom we consulted, which may or may not be

validated by the IPCC's investigation report when it is finally published, is that misleading statements were made, and that nothing has been done about it. The length of time taken to complete such IPCC investigations prevents police officers from putting their side of the story to the public for far too long. This imposed official silence does real damage to community confidence in policing.

The police raid at Forest Gate in search of an alleged dirty bomb on 2 June 2006, in which an innocent man was accidentally shot and, along with another man, arrested and then released without charge, also roused strong feelings in Londoners. The most commonly held view was that, *"the Forest Gate incident caused anger and loss of confidence in the approach that is being used"*. A councillor from the area where the raid took place commented that, *"mainstream Muslim representatives were under tremendous pressure after the Forest Gate raid for not taking a more militant line"*. Andy Hayman admitted, "*what I wouldn't do again is underestimate the degree to which that had an impact on the community and some of the things that we were asking officers to do when actually we hadn't asked them to do that operationally and probably hadn't even asked them to do it in a training environment before then"*.

The police, whilst conceding certain errors in the way that this operation and its community impact was handled, do not apologise for performing the raid. Sir Ian Blair stated the police case: *"If we had credible intelligence which is specific and we didn't do something about it, I wouldn't have a job after that, and I wouldn't deserve a job after that… You're damned if you do, but you'll be completely damned if you don't… We need to be very grateful that there are people brave enough to go into that house at 4 o'clock in the morning, because if the intelligence had been right,*

they'd be going in after a terrible weapon. They would have had in their heads the memory of Madrid, where police officers went into the house, and half of them came back out of it in boxes. That's a very significant threat to face, and it's a very courageous thing to do". One Newham councillor added that, *"most of the residents actually appreciated the police had a job to do there... a couple of residents said they had never seen so many police officers and they wished there were the same police presence throughout the year"*. Some people suggested to us that, *"there's no smoke without fire"*.

It should be noted that the IPCC has now published two reports relating to the raid in Forest Gate. The first, on 3 August 2006, concluded that the shooting of Mr Abdulkahar by a police officer during the raid was accidental. In the second, on 13 February 2007, Deborah Glass, a Commissioner of the IPCC, concluded that, *'we do not criticise the police for carrying out the operation, which had, at its heart, public safety. Nor do we doubt that an operation of that scale, with armed officers in protective clothing, would have been a terrifying ordeal for everyone involved. But while the police are right to take no chances with public safety, they must also plan more realistically for the possibility that their intelligence is wrong'*. The IPCC has also made a number of recommendations for the MPS following its investigations into this incident. Many of these recommendations, such as *'The MPS should publicly explain the process by which they evaluate and act on intelligence, to respond to some public perceptions that it can be misused'*, corroborate the MPA's own recommendations in this report.

Rose Fitzpatrick, Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Territorial Policing) MPS, says that the MPS understands the public's reservations about counter-terrorism operations,

and acknowledges that its reputation and credibility in this arena rely upon its tactics commanding public support: *"If people had a greater understanding of why we do what we do and we had explained more about our tactics, I think there would have been a much better understanding and a much greater trust and confidence in what we were doing"*. She recognises the need for the police to display cultural sensitivity in the way they conduct their operations. For example: *"If an officer who may not previously have ever had cause to go into a particular faith building, religious premises, may need to go in there, may very much want to do that sensitively and to try to understand... the best way to do that. At 3 o'clock in the morning, I want to make sure that they have access to that information"*. In keeping with Rose Fitzpatrick's observations, members of the public stressed to us the necessity, for instance, that Muslim women in raided homes be afforded dignity and allowed to protect their modesty and that women held for long periods in police custody may have particular considerations in terms, for instance, of childcare. The police represent the sharp, visible end of authority – where the public interfaces with the state – and the attitudes of the state as a whole are judged by their actions.

One consequence of the police counter-terrorism response since 7 July 2005 is that the Muslim community feels under scrutiny. A man from Walthamstow who lives near those arrested in Waltham Forest in late 2006 told us, "*as I went to go to Tesco for my weekly shopping, I'd leave later and later, to avoid those stares from police officers outside my door... When questioned, as a neighbour, I felt like a wanted man, or certainly they wanted more from this man... I can't even face my neighbour, whose children were arrested, because I'm pretty sure the road is under 24-*

hour surveillance now". Large numbers of Muslims arrested on suspicion of involvement in terrorism and then released without charge not only damages the reputation of those individuals, whom the media may irresponsibly portray as guilty until proven innocent, but also undermines the credibility of the police. The police now appreciate this and are beginning to apply this learning where operationally practicable. A good example of consequent improvement is the operation in September 2006 in connection with people attending suspected terrorist training camps, where the majority of the arrests were made by unarmed police officers in a Chinese restaurant in London Bridge, rather than by armed officers storming people's homes in residential areas in the middle of the night, and where, of the 14 people arrested, only two were later released without charge.

Londoners expressed certain clear expectations as to how the police do their counter-terrorism operational work. They told us that:

■ it must be proportionate;
■ deployments must be commensurate with the threat;
■ armed police are feared and that the majority of police should remain unarmed (some quoted theories of escalation, according to which if one arms one's police one arms one's criminals);
■ they trust local officers more than officers from the centre of the MPS;
■ a Community Impact Assessment should be performed on each counter-terrorist operation;
■ an Equality Impact Assessment should be performed on each counter-terrorist policy; and
■ the police should be held accountable for their actions.

The counter-terrorist response: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

2. Publish an explanation of Operation Kratos (the generic title for a series of Association of Chief Police Officers policies and MPS standard operating procedures detailing tactical responses to the threat posed by suicide terrorism), setting out clearly the learning that has taken place since 22 July 2005.

24. Strengthen links between Specialist Operations and Borough Operational Command Units when it comes to counter-terrorism by:
- sharing more information on terrorism and counter-terrorism with frontline, borough-based officers, especially Safer Neighbourhoods officers and Police Community Support Officers;
- ensuring that designated counter-terrorism leads on borough senior management teams are fully trained and competent to play that role;
- increasing awareness of and compliance with Operation Delphinus (which provides structured guidance to borough police on counter-terrorism matters); and
- increasing awareness of and compliance with Operation Rainbow (which provides tactical options for a uniformed counter-terrorist response).

25. Use local police, as opposed to central specialists, to perform public-facing roles in counter-terrorist operations wherever possible.

Advice for other bodies

62. Independent Police Complaints Commission: Continue to review its working practices and resources to find ways to speed up its high-profile investigations. Continue to improve its protocols on keeping the public aware of the progress and findings of its investigations.

Reassurance

In the charged environment of terrorism and counter-terrorism a key role of the police is to reassure the public that they are protected and as safe as can be. How this is best achieved was a recurrent theme throughout our consultations. It was in this context that the onset of the Safer Neighbourhoods initiative was most welcomed. One consultee spoke for many when she said, "*Safer Neighbourhoods teams are really effective and provide reassurance and a sense of comfort for the people on the streets*". Safer Neighbourhoods teams co-located with other public facilities, such as at hospitals or on university campuses, seem to be particularly well received. The public have confidence in the reassuring role that Safer Neighbourhoods teams will play post-incident if another terrorist attack occurs. The majority of Londoners support the advent of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), considering reducing the fear of crime to be a valid and important police role. PCSOs are widely considered to be visible, accessible and approachable. Specialist police, or police from another force, do not have the relationships with the community that local police have, and are not trusted in the same way.

In July 2005 the vast increase in police presence on the streets of London did offer comfort and reassurance. High-visibility policing enjoys universal support. Londoners told us that a simple uniformed presence is the key to effective reassurance. In Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth and Greenwich the deployment of uniformed police officers on foot outside mosques in the few weeks after 7 July 2005 was appreciated. We heard that, had these officers been in plain clothes, worshippers would have thought they were under surveillance, and that, had they been in vans, people would have thought a riot was expected. On the other hand, the sight of police officers with guns does not reassure: "*I hate seeing cops with guns – it frightens my children*". Body armour and weaponry are considered intimidating and should only be deployed when strictly necessary. They are deemed to breed a negative view of the police. A similar dislike was shown for the presence of police helicopters overhead, such as that deployed at Forest Gate. Much higher levels of support were expressed for the deployment of bomb sniffer dogs.

Reassurance: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

21. Demonstrate an appreciation of the level of fear amongst Londoners of both terrorist and counter-terrorist activity, and continue to seek to satisfy people that they are as safe as can be.

22. After high-profile terrorist incidents or operations, give reassurance talks in schools and colleges, deploy high-visibility policing, but keep deployment of armed police to a minimum.

23. Redouble efforts to explain to the public the role of Police Community Support Officers, including in regard to the counter-terrorist effort.

Trust and confidence

Pivotal to the success of counter-terrorist policing in the United Kingdom is public trust and confidence in the motives the police act upon and the tactics they employ. Police in Britain, unlike police forces elsewhere in the world, are widely regarded as, in the words of one Londoner, *"cool, calm and collected; not gung ho"*. This reputation needs to be preserved. There is a general sense that, on the whole, the police are competent to deal with any future terrorist attacks. There is also some recognition that, in such a complex operating environment, with such an elusive enemy, innocent people will unavoidably get arrested and released, or, as one student enigmatically put it, *"we're trying to catch ants with a fish net; and all you ever really catch with a fish net is fish"*. 'Normal' policing commands more confidence than 'secret' policing. The mystique around the old MPS Special Branch and Anti-Terrorism Branch, now combined in its Counter-Terrorism Command, bred fear and suspicion. Thus for students to hear that Special Branch officers have been talking to university vice-chancellors behind closed doors about extremist activity on campus was troubling, rather than reassuring. Those we asked said that they trusted the police more than politicians, and that they trusted both police and politicians more than they trusted the press.

In some sections of the London community – notably young people, students and Muslims – levels of trust and confidence in policing are significantly lower. One young Muslim in Whitechapel spoke of, *"a fundamental lack of trust that needs to be addressed"*. Another in Brixton said, "*the reason that I don't have any confidence in the Metropolitan Police is because I was attacked for no entire reason on the weekend. How would I be able to regain my confidence in talking to the police? Having a*

police officer that respects and understands my culture and where I'm coming from". Cynicism towards the police on the part of London Student Unions is similarly pronounced. One student told us he would not go to the authorities no matter what a neighbour was doing or planning, as he doesn't trust the police to, *"do the right thing"* with that information. The independence of independent bodies such as the IPCC is not believed in all quarters. Some consultees told us that they see the IPCC and the MPS in cahoots.

Sir Ian Blair has rightly observed that when it comes to policing, *"there are no competitors here. We're a monopoly. A monopoly had better get its service right"*. It is absolutely vital that the police understand that the quality of service by which its counter-terrorism work will be judged is not just the quality of service it demonstrates in its counter-terrorist activities, but rather the quality of service it provides across the board in respect of all of its functions. As Rose Fitzpatrick notes, "*in gaining the trust and confidence of communities in our counter-terrorism work, their daily experience counts"*. The public see the police as a single, seamless service. The professionalism shown in every police encounter, however routine, every day in London therefore has the potential to affect the willingness of Londoners to support or collaborate with the MPS in its counter-terrorist work. A consultee in Sutton commented, "*if a call to the police on an 'ordinary' crime is not taken seriously, then the caller is less likely to report suspected terrorist activity in the future*". Every police officer in London should therefore understand that, in performing his or her daily duties, he or she can help or hinder the counter-terrorist cause.

Communications

It is in the area of communications around counter-terrorism that the MPS is perceived to have been weakest since 7 July 2005. Whilst Londoners are prepared to countenance the necessity of certain police actions, including those using controversial tactics, they do demand improved communication of information to the community surrounding these matters.

There was no shortage of criticism from Londoners regarding specific instances of poor communication by the MPS in the counter-terrorism environment. One Londoner told us, *"there was a clear gap in communication after the Forest Gate raid; the Muslim community felt that basic information was being withheld"*. We heard of local politicians' frustration that for two days after the Forest Gate raid, the MPS centrally did not give local police officers the permission or authority to put out explanatory leaflets answering basic questions such as *"Why is there a helicopter?"*, *"Why so many police?"* and *"When will the streets be reopened?"*. We were informed that local police officers were denied the opportunity to go on BBC London after the Forest Gate raid by the MPS centrally. This was seen as a misguided policy. Andy Hayman indeed concedes that over Forest Gate, *"we got caught in the headlights and were frightened to say anything"*. There was also concern that there had been a lack of communication at the top of the MPS regarding the incident at Stockwell on 22 July 2005, and that non-comment by the police after that tragic incident looked like a cover-up. Businesses felt they received mixed messages as to whether they should send employees home on 7 July 2005, and whether to require them to come back to work the next day. The same complaint was heard from schools, who were unsure whether to let children go home or keep them on site. Commuters said that they thought the

provision of basic travel advice on 7 July 2005 was poor. Residents in Dalgarno Gardens in Kensington and Chelsea, where some of the suspects for the 21 July 2005 alleged attempted London bombings were arrested, were asked to leave their homes on very short notice and did not receive sufficient informed advice as the situation unfolded that day and thereafter. Lastly, there is a complaint that successful counter-terrorist operations have not been well communicated or publicised.

The MPS cites a number of reasons for any lack of communication around its counter-terrorism work:
- current IPCC investigations;
- matters sub judice (under trial or being considered by a judge or court);
- inter-related criminal trials;
- the danger of exposing informants;
- endangering live police operations;
- providing information which may be of use to terrorists;
- revealing police techniques; and
- uncertainty about the facts at hand.

In the Forest Gate case, for example, the arrested pair's account of what happened there was in the public domain for weeks before the police account became available because of the IPCC investigation. Andy Hayman assessed this as follows: *"What we saw was the lawyers for the two people who were arrested come out onto the steps of the police station and give a press conference about what they thought was going on. Now we feel that there is an inequality here: I don't have too much of a problem with them saying what they think, but I think we need a little more leeway and latitude to say what we think is going on"*. Londoners are not altogether unaware of these legitimate reservations, but they maintain that

there are ways and means by which the MPS should attempt to satisfy reasonable public demand for information – and stand up for itself in the face of criticism – whilst operating within the confines laid out above. William Nye, Home Office Director of Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence, told us that, *"the Attorney General, under whose responsibility this comes, [also] wants to make sure that although nothing is done to prejudice fair trials… nonetheless communities aren't left completely uncertain and completely unaware of what's happening"*. The current state of affairs results in a biased view of events, with only one of two possible accounts available. This can unduly exacerbate public distrust in the police and open up divisions between the community and the state.

The public think that the MPS leaks like a sieve. Sir Ian Blair himself said to an audience of young Londoners, *"I am sometimes appalled by what some of my colleagues allegedly discuss with the media"*. When asked why he has not done something about it, he replied, *"we do carry out leak enquiries. They're very rarely successful because, understandably, journalists protect their sources, and that's one of the rules of the game"*. The strength of negative feeling about the impropriety of police leaks concerning the death of Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005 may be reason enough to think creatively about how they might be more effectively addressed.

Whilst clearly for the police themselves to lie about a counter-terrorism incident is unacceptable, the public are not much more forgiving of an unwillingness, or an inability, on the part of the police to correct information which they know to be incorrect when it is in the public domain. Any sense that the MPS should knowingly allow a false impression of a situation or an individual to develop is greeted with fierce disapproval. The public feels that there is an onus on the police to correct misinformation in circulation, whatever its source. In Enfield we were told that, *"police mistakes should be corrected more quickly to prevent the appearance of a cover-up"*.

The MPS has, however, communicated well on counter-terrorism matters on a number of occasions, and shown some evidence of active learning from some of its ill communication so far. Examples of good practice in this regard include:

- Ali Dizaei, Hounslow Borough Commander for the MPS, drafting a joint letter of reassurance with partnership agencies, which was published in the local press;
- Martin Bridger, Lambeth Borough Commander for the MPS, spearheading community cohesion efforts in the borough;
- Peter Clarke, Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Counter-Terrorism Command) MPS, and Susan Hemming, Head of Counter-Terrorism Prosecutions at the Crown Prosecution Service, giving an authoritative press conference together regarding the arrests for the alleged transatlantic airline bomb plot;
- Sir Ian Blair's television appearances on 7 July 2005 – *"the feeling that 'someone is in charge' is a powerful factor in reassuring Londoners and making sure their decisions are made on the best possible advice"*;
- Brian Paddick, Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Directorate of Information) MPS, dissociating Islam and terrorism in a televised press conference on 7 July 2005; and
- the message that 'London is open for business' which the business community and tourism industry were then able to use to great effect.

It is critically important that the MPS continues in relation to its counter-terrorist work to find innovative ways to communicate important factual information to the public before an incident, as an incident unfolds, and afterwards. In the absence of official information, rumour will always thrive. Maximum safe information must therefore be communicated by the police to scotch such rumour, and thereby to limit misunderstanding. Only in possession of the key facts can the public make up its own mind in an informed way as to whether a particular police action is appropriate and proportionate.

Improved arrangements for the disclosure of information on counter-terrorism matters by the police to the public through the press are urgently required. Current legal constraints around pre-trial reporting prevent the police from issuing information at their disposal, thereby creating an information vacuum, which is invariably filled by unsubstantiated public accounts, resulting in damaging scepticism of counter-terrorism operations within communities. It is therefore time to revisit the law on sub judice (matters under trial or being considered by a judge or court). Whilst the legal system must protect the rights of all individuals to a fair trial, the police need to command

public confidence in order to do their difficult counter-terrorist work, and this is made much more difficult by restrictions imposed upon their ability to share information with the public about that work.

Finally, the MPS must make all of its communications as accessible as possible. It must appreciate that not everybody has internet access. It must make the most of the proliferation of mobile phones. It must produce literature in different languages. It must meet the needs of disabled Londoners who also need to access this information. In this regard it must appreciate the importance of involving disabled people, with their valuable expertise and lived experience, in making improvements and identifying solutions. To this end, the outputs of 'The Resilience Conference' – a London emergency planning seminar sponsored by the MPA and Transport for London, which was held with disabled Londoners on 17 March 2006 and discussed at the MPA's Equal Opportunities and Diversity Board on 7 September 2006 – must not be wasted. It must ensure that the expertise in accessible communications housed in its Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate is translated into the quick-time environment of counter-terrorism operations.

Communications: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

9. Consider what it can say when it comes to counter-terrorism, not what it cannot: a different approach is needed.

10. Explain counter-terrorist terminology, such as 'intelligence' and 'disruption', to the public.

11. During and after counter-terrorist operations, move quickly to issue accurate, safe information to local residents and business people.

12. In the event of a future attack, give clear and consistent messages to schools as to whether to send schoolchildren home; provide clarity to employers as to whether to send their employees home; and appreciate the importance of the single 'top cop' giving clear information and advice to the nation on television.

13. Challenge misinformation in the public domain about terrorism and counter-terrorism.

14. Enhance public confidence in counter-terrorist policing by being open and transparent about mistakes and by more proactively publicising successes.

15. Strengthen information management systems so that senior officers have up-to-date, accurate information on terrorist and counter-terrorist incidents.

16. Enhance and publicise its anti-leak measures.

17. Communicate directly with Londoners, for example with Ringmaster, by Police Message Broadcast System or in person: do not rely upon the media.

Media

We have a 24-hour media which needs constant feeding. People hunger for information. There are very many news hours to fill. This presents a significant challenge for the police, who find themselves under increasingly heavy demand to provide authoritative comment around the clock on counter-terrorism matters. This means the police have to be able to find enough spokespeople to cover all the 'talking head' slots requested of them across television and radio. And yet, in a working environment where it is of paramount importance that the wrong information is not aired, the MPS has a limited pool of staff whom it trusts to perform this role. This becomes a problem when, with the police unable to satisfy the demand for spokespeople, the media enlist long-since-retired ex-police officers to pass ill-informed comment on the basis of their own now out-dated experience or resort to journalists interviewing journalists about their inexpert views on highly specialised matters.

The profound influence of the media over the public psyche cannot be overestimated. These are the words of one young African-Caribbean man in Lambeth: *"My brother was going to Brixton Mosque. I'm thinking, well, hold on, the American Shoe Bomber was going to Brixton Mosque as well, so there is a kind of fundamentalism there… I later realised that was stupid because not every Muslim was a terrorist, but it's the way the media filters through your brain"*. This is an observation by a man in east London: *"The lives of many of those arrested under terrorism laws and later released without charge are ruined, as are their families', due to the intense media coverage"*. We had people repeatedly tell us that they thought the MPS had coined the term 'Islamic terrorist', because some media insist upon using it, and they had

presumed that the media use the terms with which the police provide them. As Visit London told us, "*if you lived in the United Kingdom outside of London you were being bombarded daily for months with relentless media images of the suffering in London, and yet you were not there to witness its recovery"*. Further afield too the media exerted its influence: the image of the MPS globally altered after 7 July 2005, as flak jackets and machine guns replaced the familiar British Bobby's tunic and hard hat. For better or worse, the media shapes to a great extent the way terrorism and counter-terrorism is viewed in this country and abroad.

Given its vast influence, it is therefore highly regrettable that the Londoners we asked almost universally condemned the media for its sensationalist, scaremongering and divisive coverage of this topic over the past two years. We heard from outraged students at two different London universities, one of which The London Paper claimed on its front page was 'breeding terrorists' and the other where The Evening Standard claimed extremists were running the 3,000-strong Islamic Society. One wrote, '*the allegations that are made do upset me and many Muslims like me who want to express to everyone in Britain that we are normal people who eat, sleep, laugh, cry like any other person. We go to universities to get a decent job and live a normal life'*. We heard of despair at the way the newspapers act as judge and jury all at once, presuming and portraying as guilty anyone suspected of involvement in terrorism, thereby subverting a fundamental principle of British justice. We were told how inflammatory media reporting bordered on incitement to racial hatred, driving a wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims in this country. Londoners complained bitterly about the media's casual and dangerous conflation of disparate issues, such as terrorism

and the wearing of the niqab (veil). Above all, we heard of deep-seated distrust and disdain for the free British press, some of which is seen to be abusing that same freedom and fostering a sense of fearful division in our cosmopolitan city.

The police stance on this aspect of the media was commendably expressed by John McDowall, Commander (Counter-Terrorism Command) MPS: *"I think there's a sensationalism of the issues which I don't think encourages mature, thoughtful debate, which is what we need"*. The MPS recognises the need for a considered debate about terrorism and how to report it. It seeks greater dialogue between editors, government and police to this end. Prior to any media briefing on counter-terrorism, the MPS reminds journalists of their responsibilities and the need for them to use appropriate language. As Tarique Ghaffur, Assistant Commissioner (Central Operations) MPS, stated, "*editors are repeatedly urged by us to avoid such speculation and use of language which links terrorism to particular faiths... Reporters are asked to pay particular attention to the requirements of the Contempt of Court Act and media are advised that the use of terms such as 'Islamic terrorist' may contribute to inflaming community tensions"*.

The MPS is also coming to recognise the importance in a counter-terrorism context of speaking to Londoners through non-mainstream media. Community radio was identified as a particularly useful medium. We heard that, *"there are 103 community radio stations (mostly black and minority ethnic) – this presents an opportunity on FM and AM licences to speak directly into specific communities"*. Talking through community radio would also enable the MPS to reach communities overseas in Londoners' countries of heritage or origin:

"Because of the internet, and because radio is a technology-led industry, anything that is said on a community station in London is now picked up by corresponding communities in different parts of the world". The less combative, more consensual style of community radio would allow for the more considered debate which complex issues of terrorism and counter-terrorism deserve: *"Community radio offers a partnership approach, not a hatchet job... It won't be a shock-horror exposé; it's going to be more giving people the chance to talk to you"*. And yet, as a magistrate and community radio broadcaster from Harrow observed, "*the police have never approached us to address the community – 135,000 people are listening to our station across six boroughs of west London. If the police want to give information to the community, want to talk to the Punjabi community, we will be delighted"*. The police may need to make this initial approach to community radio stations, rather than waiting to be approached.

Media: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

18. Use community radio as an effective way to reach into the homes of black and minority ethnic Londoners and to reach relevant communities nationally and internationally.

26. Empower local borough police to comment as MPS spokespeople about counter-terrorist operations in their area.

Advice for other bodies

52. Government: Law Officers to remind the media of the importance of the principle of 'innocent until proven guilty' and the law on contempt of court.

53. Government: Enhance accountability arrangements for the media by strengthening the Office of Communications and the Press Complaints Commission.

67. Media: The media need to give more coverage to mainstream opinions within the community, rather than publicising sensational, extreme minority opinions and using the excuse of 'balanced reporting'.

68. Media: Beware the pitfalls of using ex-police officers with out-of-date skills and knowledge as so-called expert commentators on counter-terrorism matters.

Community engagement

Community engagement by the police is essential if they are to police with Londoners – together – rather than at or for them. If the police are to play their proper role in tackling not just the symptoms of terrorism but also its underlying causes, then effective community engagement is a necessity. Paul Stephenson, Deputy Commissioner of the MPS, has stated, "*if we're not doing community engagement on counter-terrorism, then we're failing*". Through engaging with London's diverse communities the MPS can help to build the capacity and capability of the public to challenge extremism, dry up any support for terrorists, police themselves and create a climate in the city which is hostile to terrorists. The Londoners we listened to wholeheartedly endorsed this approach as legitimate police work, not inappropriate social engineering.

It is critical that the police realise that community engagement to counter terrorism is about much more than intelligence-gathering, as valid an outcome as that is. Community engagement is a vehicle for the police to communicate to Londoners, as well as to hear from them. As Andy Hayman has rightly observed, "*key to success is greater transparency and openness so the community understand what we're doing and why*". A 21st century MPS must adopt a citizen-focused approach to its work. Community engagement is central to such an approach. It must be seen as core business, not peripheral. Community engagement must be an integral part of all modern policing, including – indeed especially – in the field of counter-terrorism.

The best tool in the MPS's kit for community engagement is its Safer Neighbourhoods teams. Time and again we heard from Londoners that whilst they would not feel comfortable talking with officers from the Counter-Terrorism Command, they would be prepared to discuss contentious and sensitive matters with their local officers whom they see on the streets around them each day. We were told there is a certain, "*honesty in a local copper in uniform wanting to talk to you*".

In the area of community engagement a topic which recurred often was that of representation: who can legitimately speak for whom? Young Somalis on the Uxbridge Road told us that the police only talk to self-appointed 'community leaders' who have no real influence in their community. Others complained that there is no democratic process by which Muslim leadership in this country has been set up. We heard that in Newham, "*groups that were talking after the Forest Gate raid were not recognised as being spokespeople for the communities*". Too many Independent Advisory Group members do not communicate the information they receive from the police to anyone else. Police tend to ignore democratically elected councillors in their community engagement, even though they are usually the only people locally with an objective mandate, however low the electoral turn-out or however slim their majority. These problems constitute a democratic deficit in communities of geography, identity and interest which the police can only go so far towards addressing. In the meantime, we should not rubbish 'the usual suspects' – often those self-appointed, older, male, 'community leaders': their contribution should be recognised, but we should supplement and enhance it.

It is clear that certain subsections of London society have been underrepresented in MPS community engagement on counter-terrorism to date. This must be redressed. One large such group is young people. A young Muslim in Tower Hamlets castigated the police for its, "*total*

failure of engagement with young people who are the most vulnerable to being influenced by extremists" and recommended that the *"police need to come face to face with the local youth… our experience with the police is mostly confrontational"*. The engagement of young people is seen by Londoners as key to tackling the terrorist threat. It means going to where young people are, in youth clubs, in colleges, in universities, on street corners, on football pitches, in pool halls. The MPS already does much good engagement of pupils in schools. It should now expand its Safer Schools programme to encompass also young people who are not at school, or who have left school. It means piggy-backing onto local authority youth provision to access young people. It means being able to abandon formality in favour of a more dynamic form of engagement with this group. It means police investment in sustainable, long-term relationship-building with young people on their terms. As Andy Hayman admitted, this has not always been the case: *"We're impatient because of the severity and immediacy of the threat, so we get ahead of ourselves"*. Whatever else it means, Londoners consider youth engagement to be mission-critical to counter-terrorist success.

Clearly there is a particular case for the police to engage Muslims in this area of business, given it has been incontrovertibly established that they are disproportionately affected by the current terrorist threat, dying in the bombings like everybody else, bearing the brunt of the police response, and being the primary victim of the public backlash. This can be difficult, as a number of Muslims told us that those Muslims who do engage with the police or enter into dialogue with them are too often perceived by their Muslim brothers and sisters as working for the police, not with them. Against this kind of social pressure, it is evident that, as Andy Hayman said, *"we've got to build a relationship up before we start reaping any rewards"*.

The sort of thing that helps build a relationship up is the tale we were told by an observant Muslim of two Muslim police officers showing up at a mosque to pray in uniform during the middle of the day: after prayers a large gathering of worshippers formed around them and 150 minutes of productive conversation about police-community relations followed. In order for doors to be opened to the MPS by the Muslim communities of London, it will be important that the police continue to stress their determination to target the criminality and not the community. There is a definite willingness on the part of many Muslims to be engaged in this way. Our hearing with young people was oversubscribed by Muslim youth groups eager to attend and have their say. There was fury at Queen Mary University when Professor Peter Hennessy's Mile End Group invited Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller to speak on the terrorist threat and no-one from the university's Islamic Society was invited. Finally, it is worth noting that non-Asian Muslim community members told us that they are feeling left out of current community engagement by the police.

A third demographic which we have heard has been inadequately engaged by the police in its counter-terrorist work to date is women. A police officer commented, *" 'What can women contribute to this debate?' is the wrong question to ask – women are 51% of our population! It's as though, if a woman comes in, we might have missed something as the men, so what can women point out that we've missed? It's the wrong way to approach it"*. Another woman angrily pointed out that, *"marginalising more than half of our population is counter-productive"*. On and above this, there is a particular case for consulting women not only because of their gender, but because of the roles they predominantly play in society: mother, carer, home-keeper, and educator – *"the home is the first school"*. Women are often at the hub

of family life, or, as one woman observed, "*everything comes back to women in the house, so we are best placed to comment*". That said, women, from the testimony we heard, do not appreciate being invited to participate in this discourse solely as the guardians of tomorrow's potential terrorists. They should not be included just because they may have useful information about or influence over their sons: "*A police officer who asked an audience of women how they were going to deal with their angry young men soon had an audience of angry women!*". It should not be ignored that some women in the United Kingdom have now been charged with aiding and assisting alleged international terrorist plots.

Women's frustration at being excluded from the public discourse on terrorism was a recurrent theme: "*I find myself without a voice sometimes when I see so-called community leaders, predominantly men, being asked about the issues, being interviewed on TV, and nothing annoyed me more than seeing this whole line of men going into Downing Street to be consulted by Tony Blair in the aftermath of the bombings… if you are serious about the voices of women, then you've got to engage with women, which does not necessarily mean having those discussions with 'community leaders'. Many of our communities are dominated by men. We live in a patriarchal society. .. When you go to those communities and you talk only to those individuals, then a whole range of women's voices are negated*". An even higher premium was put on proactively including in this dialogue women from Asian communities, in which men, we were told, often actively try to obstruct women's involvement and engagement.

If the will exists to engage women on this issue, then we were assured that, "*there are masses of women's groups up and down this country that can give you a range of input that would be beneficial to your discussions and debates*". We heard that the mode of engagement used in engaging women should be given careful consideration: "*Womens' groups won't come to meetings. Well, I understand that: it's a problem finding someone to look after the children, the travel, the expense*". Feedback to female consultees was considered especially important: "*A lot of criticism that womens' groups have expressed to me about engaging with the statutory sector is that you never know what's happened to the points that they make*". One might also reasonably expect the tone of discourse with women to differ from that held predominantly with men: "*Women are good communicators, tending to employ a more consensus-building approach, about finding common ground, not going at loggerheads*".

The mechanisms through which communities are engaged in the counter-terrorist effort must be appropriate and credible. We heard the complaint that, "*with government and with the police you have to play the victim to try to get attention… Sikhs don't like playing victims… we're a very proud community… so you're excluded from policy-making*". On various occasions we heard that the government's 'Preventing Extremism Together' Task Force was thought to have run into the ground – a public perception that William Nye recognised as widely held. The MPS's 'Communities Together' consultative drive following 7 July 2005 was well received, but feedback on progress towards the implementation of recommendations arising from the public through that process had been lacking, potentially undoing some of the good work done at the time. The Security Service was commended for the openness it has demonstrated in launching a website. However, there was plentiful confusion as to the point of publishing on it the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre's assessment of the current level of the international terrorist threat to the United

Kingdom (low; moderate; substantial; severe; or critical), if no information was then provided as to how this should affect the website visitor's behaviour, or how the visitor might expect it to affect the behaviour of the police.

Other examples of good practice in the field of community engagement to counter terrorism also came up in discussion. In Hammersmith and Fulham the Community Gold Group which was convened after 7 July 2005 was thought to have worked well, and, whilst it has recently been stood down, could be reconvened at any time, if the need should arise. The police in Harrow, we were told, hold a quarterly Counter-Terrorism Forum with the public, which enables people to contribute to the counter-terrorist effort in which they have a vested interest. In Havering we heard how the borough's Independent Advisory Group members have been usefully consulted prior to counter-terrorist operations locally. Hounslow police were commended on their setting up of an internet chat room where terrorism and counter-terrorism were discussed. We heard too of the beneficial side-effects of such community engagement:

one community centre where police posted information regarding terrorism on notice boards now enjoys an increased membership of people who initially came through its doors to read the police notices but now attend regularly as members to use the facilities there.

Equity in community engagement may not always mean simply equality. As Rose Fitzpatrick explained, "*sometimes it is not about sharing our efforts out in little parcels which come out equally to each of the communities we define; we have to take a brave stance sometimes and say, we have a resource here and we have to direct it towards a particular community, because that's where the need currently resides*". Thus, in relation to the current threat posed by international terrorism, there is a strong case for otherwise disproportionate engagement of Muslim communities, given the Islamist streak to the terrorism we face. Within British Islam, furthermore, it may make sense for the police to expend particular effort engaging certain subgroups, such as young converts to literalist denominations of the faith.

The will is there at the top of the MPS to take trusted community contacts further into confidence in a joint effort to counter the terrorist threat

The MPS has mooted the idea of giving certain highly security-vetted, and predominantly Muslim, members of the community privileged access to relevant intelligence and plans in advance of some police counter-terrorist operations so that they can advise on the likely community impact of the operation in question and draw to the police's attention any particular considerations concerned with culture or community dynamics which may otherwise be overlooked. The possibility of such a 'Counter-Terrorism Independent Advisory Group', for want of a better term, is currently being explored by the MPS nationally. It has met some opposition within the Security Service, who 'own' the intelligence in question. There is also some concern that those invited to sit on any such group may rapidly become perceived to be part of the MPS rather than part of the community. These and other obstacles may yet prove surmountable. The will is there at the top of the MPS to take trusted community contacts further into confidence in a joint effort to counter the terrorist threat.

Community engagement: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

7. Train parking attendants, traffic wardens, parks staff, neighbourhood wardens and city guardians in counter-terrorist awareness.

27. A Community Impact Assessment to be performed on every counter-terrorist operation and an Equality Impact Assessment to be performed on every counter-terrorist policy.

28. Explain to the MPA the MPS's proposal to brief and share intelligence with vetted community members prior to counter-terrorism operations. Include an update on progress made towards the realisation of this idea.

29. Work with the MPA to establish a clear strategy and policy framework for police community engagement to counter terrorism.

30. Work with the MPA to develop a performance measurement framework for counter-terrorism community engagement.

31. Provide evidence that the MPS is engaging young people more in counter-terrorist efforts.

32. Provide evidence that the MPS is engaging women more in counter-terrorist efforts, for example through women's sector second-tier organisations and umbrella bodies as well as groups that deal directly with female service users.

33. Ensure a diversity amongst the Muslims with whom the police engage in counter-terrorist efforts, eg. women, non-Asians, Ahmadis, Ismailies etc.

34. Involve local councillors in police counter-terrorism work.

35. Support community activists in organising their own engagement events on counter-terrorism.

36. Replicate successful local models of community engagement.

37. Provide feedback to consultees on all consultation exercises.

38. Ensure that local Safer Neighbourhoods teams build relationships with places of worship in their areas.

Community engagement: Recommendations and advice

Advice for other bodies

61. Security Service: Explain how the public, including businesses, should adapt their behaviour, if at all, in accordance with published terrorist threat levels, or what accompanying change in policing and security they can expect to observe.

63. Police authorities: Perform consultative exercises in their areas with the public on terrorism and counter-terrorism.

Stop and search

Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 empowers an MPS officer of at least the rank of Commander to authorise, provided the person giving the authorisation considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism, that, within a specified area or place which is the whole or part of the Metropolitan Police District, and for a maximum period of 28 days per authorisation, any police constable in uniform can stop and search a vehicle (including driver, passengers and contents) or a pedestrian (and anything carried by that pedestrian) for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism, whether or not the constable has grounds for suspecting the presence of articles of that kind. A constable may seize and retain an article which he or she discovers in the course of such a search which he or she reasonably suspects is intended to be used in connection with terrorism. The officer giving the authorisation must inform the Home Secretary as soon as is reasonably practical. The same power is available to other police forces, including the City of London Police and the British Transport Police.

Code A of the accompanying Codes of Practice reads as follows: *'The selection of persons stopped under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 should reflect an objective assessment of the threat posed by the various terrorist groups active in Great Britain. The powers must not be used to stop and search for reasons unconnected with terrorism. Officers must take particular care not to discriminate against members of ethnic minority groups in the exercise of these powers. There may be circumstances, however, where it is appropriate for officers to take account of a person's ethnic origin in selecting persons to be stopped in response to a specific terrorist threat (for* *example, some international terrorist groups are associated with particular ethnic identities)'.*

The following are selections from the MPS Standard Operating Procedures for Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000: *'MPS corporate wide data on stops and searches conducted under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 will be shared with community groups... The MPS is keen to be open and transparent. This data can be shared in a similar method to other stops and searches information, including data on ethnicity... Searches must not be random: although the power to stop and search does not require the officer to have reasonable grounds for suspicion before exercising it, it is not random because the power has to be used for the purposes that the authorisation was sought... Officers who use Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 powers for reasons unconnected with terrorism may be subject to disciplinary proceedings... Never stereotype: terrorists may come from a wide variety of backgrounds and may attempt to change their behaviour to disguise their criminal intentions and blend into their surroundings. Officers should never use stereotypical images of 'terrorists' when deciding to use their powers of stop and search, as to do so could lead to: targeting of certain communities or groups; disproportionality; discrimination; and terrorists avoiding detection whilst carrying out their objective... There is no requirement for the officer to provide grounds for search under this power. However, consideration should always be given to informing the person of any specific factors which influenced their decision to stop/search that particular person... It is important to be mindful of other's needs and perceptions and that further explanations could be helpful... Where a person/vehicle is stopped and searched under Section 44 Terrorism Act*

2000, the person or driver will be entitled to obtain a written statement that they or their vehicle was stopped and searched under this power... The Form 5090 should be provided to the person searched at the time unless exceptional circumstances make it wholly impractical to do so... There is public concern that there has been use of the power for non-anti-terrorist purposes... Senior officers are being required to provide justification for the use of anti-terrorism stop and search powers'.

The Asian, black and minority ethnic populations of London, expressed as a percentage of the capital's total population, are:
London Asian population - 12%
London black population - 11%
London black and minority ethnic population - 42%

The following statistics relate to police use of anti-terrorism stop and search powers in London (which is the area in the country where these stop and search powers are used most):

[Sources: Data Management and Analysis Group, Greater London Authority, December 2006, and, Experimental Mid-Year Estimates 2004, Office of National Statistics, 2006, State of Equality in London Report, Greater London Authority, January 2007]

Metropolitan Police Service (October 2005 – September 2006)
22,672 Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stops conducted (accounting for 8% of all stops).
These resulted in 27 arrests for terrorism-related offences and 242 arrests for other offences.
None of these arrests resulted in terrorism-related charges.
The self-defined ethnicity of those stopped was:
White – 52%
Asian – 16%
Black – 9%
Mixed – 3%
Any other group – 4%
Not stated – 16%

[Source: Performance Directorate, MPS, December 2006]

Metropolitan Police Service (October 2005 – September 2006)
114 Section 43 Terrorism Act 2000 stops conducted (this power requires reasonable suspicion).
These resulted in 13 arrests, none of which were for terrorism-related offences.

[Source: Performance Directorate, MPS, December 2006]

**City of London Police
(7 July 2005 – 10 January 2007)**
8,216 Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stops conducted.
The self-defined ethnicity of those stopped was:
White – 56%
Asian – 17%
Black – 9%
Mixed – 2%
Any other group – 2%
Not stated – 14%

[Source: Counter Terrorism Section, City of London Police, January 2007]

**British Transport Police
(January 2006 – December 2006)**
20,255 Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stops conducted in London.
The self-defined ethnicity of those stopped was:
London south:
White – 42%
Asian – 21%
Black – 10%
Mixed – 4%
Any other group – 2%
Not stated – 21%

London north:
White – 51%
Asian – 16%
Black – 7%
Mixed – 3%
Any other group – 3%
Not stated – 20%

London underground:
White – 50%
Asian – 18%
Black – 6%
Mixed – 3%
Any other group – 3%
Not stated – 20%

[Source: Operations Department, Force Headquarters, British Transport Police, January 2007]

These figures demonstrate limited disproportionality in terms of the ethnicity of those stopped: Asians are slightly over-represented and black people are slightly under-represented. This disproportionality is slightly more marked in British Transport Police's figures. The over-representation of Asians stopped under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 is nonetheless less pronounced than that of black people stopped under Section 1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The figures also reveal significant levels of the stopped person's self-defined ethnicity recorded as 'not stated', potentially masking further disproportionality. In these cases, the officer is required to record the ethnicity of the person stopped as the officer perceives it. This practice is bound to be less accurate than allowing the individual stopped to define his or her own ethnicity. Explanations given for self-defined ethnicity not being recorded include: that the individual stopped declined to define his or her ethnicity; that the individual stopped did not understand what was meant when asked to define his or her ethnicity; or that the officer was called away to another incident. Often, however, there is no such explanation offered. All the available data does show huge over-representation of men amongst those stopped, as opposed to women, perhaps reflecting a gender-profiled approach to the power's use. This may be unwise, given the growing body of academic argument predicting that international terrorists will increasingly recruit and deploy female co-conspirators.

Just as with the police's exercise of stop and search powers outside of a counter-terrorism context (under Section 1 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Section 60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, and other such legislation), recording of stops and monitoring of the statistics they generate is crucially important for the maintenance of public confidence in the police's use of the powers. The MPS now, after protracted negotiation, whilst it still will not release Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 data broken down geographically by borough for fear of providing terrorists with useful information, does make publicly available recent and historical pan-London figures. These allow members of the public in the MPA-instigated Stop and Search Community Monitoring Network and members of the MPA's own Stop and Search Review Board to assess critically the power's use by police in the community, querying trends and anomalies, challenging disproportionality of application, questioning inconsistencies and analysing results, in order to help enhance the efficacy and equity with which the power is exercised in the name of public safety. For this lay monitoring regime to prove effective, the data provided must truly reflect practice on the ground. On this point some controversy exists. Anecdotal evidence from members of the public – both those who have been stopped under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 and advocates on their behalf – and from serving police officers suggests that by no means are all Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stops and searches recorded. Evidencing this claim is difficult. If it is true, it renders any monitoring process ineffective. Furthermore, there is again ample anecdotal evidence of misrecording of information after a Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stop and search, whether in terms of the stoppee never being asked to self-define their ethnicity, or no officer-perception of ethnicity being supplied, or inaccurate physical descriptions being recorded. This permits any hidden disproportionality to go unchecked. The non-compliance of officers in this regard is unacceptable – complaints about bureaucratic over-administration are not good enough – and yet little seems to be available, or applied, in the way of sanction or training to redress this identified deficiency. The vital importance of

accurate recording of stop and search data in terms of enabling effective monitoring and therefore oversight and scrutiny of its use cannot be overstated.

Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stop and search does not require any reasonable grounds other than its own authorisation by an officer of Commander rank within a given geographical area. As Sir Ian Blair confirms, "*stop and search under the Terrorism Act does not require any reason, other than a decision to try and hang a sign around London to say it is too difficult a place for terrorism to survive*". He has added by way of explanation that the 7 July 2005 terrorists did reconnoitre London – they came down a few days beforehand to go through their paces – and that, had they been stopped under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 whilst in London on their reconnaissance mission, many lives might have been saved. He also remarked that there is a pattern across the world of terrorist atrocities being preceded by such reconnaissance. Indeed the MPS Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 Standard Operating Procedures state that: '*Prior to any attack terrorists will ALWAYS conduct hostile terrorist reconnaissance on their intended target*'. Londoners objected that the existence and use

of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 powers did not deter the 7 July 2005 bombers from their reconnoitring. They told us that they are unhappy to accept the existence and use of a police power which requires no reasonable grounds other than its own authorisation. As one person commented, "*police should always have to give a reason as to why they've chosen to stop you rather than someone else*". The expectation that a given individual be furnished with a reason as to why he or she (it is, inequitably, much more likely to be the former) has been stopped and searched under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 is considered to be legitimate by the community at large.

This raises the question as to what acceptable reasons for the selection of stoppees under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 might look like. The grounds on which many of the Londoners we heard from think the power is being used are grounds of race, skin colour or ethnicity, and age, which are seen as far from reasonable. The following comments on the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 are from teenagers and young adults from across the capital: "*Stop and search is being targeted at young Muslim men*"; "*Stop and search is only used against immigrants or foreigners*"; "*Police seem to*

Londoners told us that they are unhappy to accept the existence and use of a police power which requires no reasonable grounds other than its own authorisation

abuse the search laws under Terrorism Act 2000. They just make searches on ethnic minority groups, which are mainly Muslims"; *"I was stopped under the Terrorism Act 2000 for wearing Islamic clothes with a rucksack near Stockwell tube station… I was supposed to attend a meeting held by the United Kingdom Youth Parliament and I thought it was quite funny, 'cause it just gave me like a topic to speak about once I got there"*; *"Me and my brother was walking in Brixton – Atlantic Road – last weekend, and we was stopped by a police officer just because he was wearing a top that said 'Soldier of Allah' on it. It makes me feel like: where's the justice?"*; *"Yeah, coming from like African kind of Caribbean community… I was kind of happy that like young black guys were stopped getting searched 'cause like police were focussing on Muslims"*. Even though the statistics quoted above may show only slight disproportionality in terms of the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 to stop individuals of different ethnicities, this is clearly not the public perception. There is a widespread conviction that use of the power is targeted at Asian men, and genuine public anger that this should be the case. Some Londoners indeed suspect that a practice of 'compensatory stops' is in operation, whereby police officers stop and search whole groups of white men in order to make the ethnicity figures seem more reasonable.

The comparison between the sense of persecution on the part of Asian men now feeling targeted by police use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 and that felt by African-Caribbean men with regard to 'ordinary' stop and search was often drawn. We were left in no doubt that Muslim Londoners are looking for a normalisation process in terms of the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000, and that their patience with what they deem disproportionate use against them of the power will not prove

interminable. One Asian student even commented, ruefully, that he almost likes being stopped and searched under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 – he had been on more than one occasion – because it allowed him to prove the stereotype of the Muslim terrorist wrong. It must be emphasised that, whilst the available data does not suggest heavily disproportionate use of the power to stop Asians as opposed to other ethnic groups, this does not correspond with the public perception. It is on the basis of this perception (not the data) that, when it comes to anti-terrorism stop and search, people's trust and confidence in the police service stands or falls.

The MPS denies it uses profiling – terrorist, criminal or racial – in its use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stop and search. A minority of our consultees wish it did employ profiling, arguing that the police are too afraid to appear 'politically incorrect' and that they therefore pander excessively to concerns of equality and diversity. As one man put it, *"there is no point in stopping elderly white women"*. The MPS, however, rightly recognises that terrorist profiling would draw its generalisations from too small a sample of previous terrorists, and would rely upon a homogenous pool of terrorist recruits, rendering it dangerously assumptive. Racial profiling would suggest the use of race as a proxy for terrorist intent, and would clearly be illegal. Yet the MPS also states that its application of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 is not genuinely random: it is not the case, for instance, that one in every ten passers-by is stopped. This begs the question: on what grounds are officers making their selections as to whom to stop and search under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000, if not on the basis of any profile, and if not randomly? Andy Hayman answered this question candidly: *"This is a bit where it's very, very flaky and I won't be at all convincing, I know that, but it would be around*

professional judgement, what they see around the circumstances: the behaviour of the individual and the circumstances all fall together, lead them to make a judgement. That is so flaky, you know, even I feel embarrassed saying that. But that is the truth as to what they do". This arbitrary and discretionary practice can only leave the door wide open for officers to base their selection of whom to stop on prejudice, unconscious or otherwise.

Londoners told us, often from first-hand experience, of the impact on the individual of being stopped and searched under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000. We heard of embarrassment and humiliation. We heard of stigmatisation, worse than that associated with being stopped under normal police powers, because the signal given out to onlookers under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 is not 'this person is a robber' but 'this person is a terrorist'. One young man observed, "*police do abuse stop and search powers: for a person going about their daily life, for it to be interrupted by a police officer, you know, going on the off chance that he might just catch himself a terrorist today, is kind of wrong, you know?*". Senior officers are not unaware of this impact. Rose Fitzpatrick acknowledged that, *"stop and search is a routine encounter on the streets of London for us as a police service, but it is an encounter which has a tremendous impact upon the individual who is stopped and searched"*. Andy Hayman reiterated this line: *"When you're doing that day-in, day-out, as a police officer you don't fully, or you forget, you don't fully appreciate the impact of either being stopped in a car or being stopped in person, on foot, and for me, as a profession, we should keep reminding ourselves about that…life moves on for the cop; life doesn't move on as quickly for the person who's been stopped"*. Whether this enlightened perspective has cascaded down to frontline officers on the streets of London is another matter.

It is important that those who are stopped under Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 know the rights to which they are entitled. Ignorance in this area is widespread amongst young people. We heard one young man say that, *"I looked at a police 'How to complain' booklet, but I wasn't allowed to take it out of the police station"*. Occasions such as that make it more difficult for the police to obtain the 'public mandate for stop and search' which Tarique Ghaffur told us was imperative. Worse, they play into the hands of extremists, as noted by one young consultee: *"If I'm not an extremist or if I'm not a terrorist, and I'm going to get searched anyway, it's just a breeding ground for people with extreme views to approach us to say 'Well, they stop and search you anyway; they think you're a criminal anyway; why not join us?'"*.

Even if we put to one side patently inappropriate use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 – such as it being used by Sussex Police to stop veteran peace campaigner, Walter Wolfgang, at the Labour Party Annual Conference 2005 in Brighton – which demonstrably erodes public support for the power, it is clearly high time to assess critically the efficacy or otherwise of the power in countering terrorism. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this young man deems it ineffective: *"I don't believe stop and search works because I've been stopped and searched countless number of times and they haven't found anything, and they still isn't getting the message"*. It comes as more of a surprise – albeit a welcome one – to hear Andy Hayman say, "*it's a power that's well intended: it's there to try and prevent, deter and disrupt terrorist activity. So, the test is: to what extent does it achieve that aim? And I have to say, it doesn't… There's a big price to pay for probably a very small benefit"*. He is better aware than most people of international terrorists' modes of operation, not least on account of his familiarity with covert surveillance of suspected

international terrorists, and admits readily that they are highly unlikely to carry their terrorist trappings around on the street, where they might be stopped. Therefore the damage to community relations is significant, and the deterrent effect is dubious.

There are times when use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 does seem appropriate, for instance when intelligence suggests a terrorist threat to a specific location or area. An example of this might have been the unsubstantiated story in 2004 that Manchester United Football Club was to be the target of a terrorist attack. There may be a case, in such circumstances, for limited simultaneous use of the power elsewhere in London, 'fogging' this police activity to conceal what intelligence is possessed. It is not altogether clear, however, that such use of the power, in order to conceal the police's hand, is in keeping with the spirit, if not the letter, of the legal definition of this power. Outside of these circumstances, the community's case is clear: the cons of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 outweigh its pros, and its use should be curtailed.

Stop and search: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

1. Present an urgent review of the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stop and search to the full MPA. Include in this review a clear rationale explaining why a given individual is stopped and searched rather than another. If unable to demonstrate to the MPA's satisfaction through this review that the power is sufficiently effective in countering terrorism to outweigh the damage it does to community relations, stop using it, other than in exceptional circumstances, such as where there is a specific threat to a particular location.

Police personnel

The MPS is a massive organisation: it is the largest single employer in London, and, with over 45,000 employees, larger than the Royal Navy (at 39,000). A question Londoners asked us was how many of these staff come from London. The perception on the street is that few frontline officers come from the communities they police. One man told us, "*I don't believe that the police in Brixton come from Brixton. The way they treat me says that they're not from a multi-cultural environment… they just show impatience and aggression*". Another commented, "*too many police come from the countryside*". This touches upon an important issue: to what extent the MPS reflects and understands the communities it serves.

42% of Londoners are black and minority ethnic individuals [Source: Experimental Mid-Year Estimates 2004, Office of National Statistics, 2006, State of Equality in London Report, Greater London Authority, January 2007]. In the MPS, black and minority ethnic employees make up 8% of police officers, 35% of PCSOs and 23% of police staff [Source: Performance Management Information, Equal Opportunities and Diversity Board, MPA, November 2006]. Sir Ian Blair told us proudly that, "*last year nearly

20% of the police officers that we recruited were from minority communities" and that just over 50% of the applications to join the MPS now come from black and minority ethnic individuals. In ethnic terms, the MPS is an increasingly diverse organisation, but still some way off fully reflecting the capital's diverse populace.

The Islamist element to the current international terrorist threat leads some Londoners to contend that the MPS needs to ensure it has more Muslim staff: "*They should become part and parcel of the police force, so that their sensitivities, the community understanding and connectivity is already present*". As Rose Fitzpatrick observed, "*people don't leave their own individual faith or other background behind when they put on a uniform like this*". This is a principle realised in the existence of the MPS's Cultural and Community Resources Unit, which seeks to make the life skills and experience of MPS staff available to the organisation, should they be required. Tarique Ghaffur appealed, "*what I would like the Met to do more often is actually appreciate the life skills their own staff bring*". Currently there are estimated to be only around 300 Muslim police officers in the MPS

The Islamist element to the current international terrorist threat leads some Londoners to contend that the MPS needs to ensure it has more Muslim staff

(1% of total police officer numbers), and yet Muslims constitute 9% of London's population [Source: Census 2001]. In Ealing and elsewhere the opinion was expressed that not only did the MPS need to recruit more Muslim officers, but it needed in particular to ensure a substantial presence of Muslims in its specialist Counter-Terrorism Command, where their life experience and cultural knowledge could be put to significant use. The MPS could not confirm how many Muslims there are in the Counter-Terrorism Command, as this information cannot by law be required and therefore is not held.

Relevant comments were made with regard to two other strands of diversity. We were informed that an American expert claims that 98% of professionals working in the field of counter-terrorism are male. Some of our consultees felt this lent this area of business a deleterious machismo feel. We were also told by Andy Hayman that, with the average age of a new MPS recruit currently standing at 27, he wanted *"to get some Wayne Rooneys into the counter-terrorism team"*. By this he meant energetic, young officers, who, despite their inexperience, may have a lot to offer the Counter-Terrorism Command, and may bring a valuable alternative perspective to some of its work.

Considerations of diversity in London policing, such as those touched upon above, have been the object of some criticism in recent years. There is a body of opinion that suggests that the MPS should be unconcerned by such matters, and should, as one Londoner told us, *"just get on with the job of policing"*. In response to this charge of 'political correctness', Steve House had the following to say: *"I'm sorry, I don't believe that the Met is 'politically correct'; I think we're trying to be a good employer to everybody who wants to join*

us in London, regardless of who they are or where they come from, and we try to give a fair police service to all the people of London… The Commissioner is constantly attacked for being politically correct. I don't think he is that. I think he's aware of how diverse London is, and I think anyone who needs any lessons in that needs to look at the faces of those who died on 7 July".

In terms of other aspects of MPS human resources, on and above issues of recruitment, whilst retention and progression were not topics Londoners raised, training of police officers, particularly in the field of equality and diversity, was. Londoners recognise that in some sense police officers are ordinary people just like them, with the same prejudices and stereotypes as the rest of society. Yet Londoners also appreciate that police officers have certain powers to deprive people of their liberty and to intrude upon their daily lives in a way that ordinary citizens do not, which means that any prejudices they may carry around with them are more damaging. A police officer who trains new recruits at Hendon Police Training College told us that MPS officers get four days of diversity training, covering racism, discrimination and prejudice, but shared her experience that, *"some people embrace it with their hearts and some people embrace it with their heads, and when they go outside and they're under pressure and they haven't got anyone looking over their shoulder to check they're doing it right, and the adrenalin is pumping through them, they make mistakes"*. One member of the public commented that, *"we've all been on four days' diversity training, and clearly that isn't enough"*. Another said that, *"they might get trained in how to deal with people from diverse backgrounds but the actual implementation of it is non-existent"*.

Police personnel: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

39. Redouble efforts to recruit more Muslim police officers and officers from other minority ethnic and faith groups.

40. Continue to seek to recruit more Londoners as police officers.

41. Diversify the workforce in Specialist Operations and particularly in the Counter-Terrorism Command.

42. Expand and enhance the diversity training which police officers and Police Community Support Officers receive to ensure it is relevant to new and emerging challenges.

Intelligence

Londoners do not understand what the term 'intelligence' means in a counter-terrorism context. This makes participation in meaningful debate more difficult. The Security Service, who 'own' intelligence in this arena, could do much more to foster public understanding of the concept of intelligence, and thereby build public confidence in the state's use of intelligence to tackle terrorism. The Security Service does intelligence collection and assessment. The MPS does evidential acquisition. The public comprehend the notion of evidence. One member of the public asked, "*isn't evidence more important than intelligence?*". Another observed that the Forest Gate debacle came in part as a result of MPS activity based on intelligence supplied by the Security Service rather than on evidence police had gathered. People prefer what they understand.

Community intelligence – that is, intelligence offered up to the authorities by members of the public – could be the difference between a terrorist plot being foiled and a bomber getting through. The majority of the public would want to supply such intelligence, were they to possess it. In order to do that they would need to know what such intelligence might look like in the first place. It was apparent from the Londoners we heard from that ignorance is commonplace as to what constitutes relevant suspicious activity. They feel that there has been insufficient publicity and guidance to raise awareness of what to look out for day-to-day in order to play a part in the counter-terrorist effort. An MPS presentation for community members, whilst itemising suspicious behaviours (such as unusual sales or transactions; purchase of large amounts of hydrogen peroxide, batteries, anti-freeze, fertilisers, face-masks, respirators, fans, cool packs, latex gloves, and coffee grinders; unusual movements by groups or individuals; noticeable

fumes; and unusual security measures such as fencing, Closed Circuit Television, and reinforced doors), goes on to state that, '*aide memoirs are no substitute for intuition*'. Londoners tell us that they do want memory aids, and that they cannot intuit effectively in the unfamiliar environs of counter-terrorism.

If members of the public do detect something suspicious, the question then arises as to what they do with that information. In order to come forward to the MPS or to the Security Service with the information, they need to trust and have confidence that those agencies will act responsibly on the basis of it. One community member said, "*people will not provide intelligence if they think they are providing it for an invading force*". Another said, "*there is a distrust for the police and there's a nervousness about how the police could react*". A third asked, "*how can we rely on the Security Service, because they were the ones who handed the police the wrong information on Forest Gate?*". That episode in particular seems to have undermined the credibility of the Security Service and the police when it comes to the appropriate handling of and response to intelligence, which does nothing to persuade members of the public to perform what may be perceived by them to be high risk action in confiding intelligence in the authorities. A further reason why people may not choose, for example, to call the Anti-Terrorist Hotline (0800 789 321) to report suspicious activity, when perhaps they would be prepared to report a suspected 'ordinary' crime, is the fear of being considered a 'grass', and an associated fear of discovery and retribution. Two consultees memorably told us that they would not report suspicious activity to the Security Service or the MPS under any circumstances on these grounds. It is to be hoped that Sir Ian Blair is right when

he says that, *"I don't take the view that, in relation to terror, many people regard providing information to the police as some kind of informing or grassing"*. Certainly, from our consultations, there are some in London who regard it in just this way.

Not only is there a degree of wariness on the part of the public as to whether they should trust the agencies charged with counter-terrorism with information to which they are privy, but there is also a doubt regarding intelligence supplied to those agencies by others. Many Londoners as a default doubt the quality, integrity and objectivity of sources of intelligence. Furthermore, the public are alert to the possibility of the Security Service and the MPS deliberately being given false intelligence by terrorists' associates in order to mislead them. To this, John McDowall responded, *"we're alive to the fact that intelligence can be supplied for a variety of reasons, and we are always trying to do our best to assess it"*.

Something we were told many times by Londoners was that they would be much more forthcoming with any intelligence they may

possess to Safer Neighbourhoods officers, known to the local community, than to any other officers or agents. In recognition of this fact, Hounslow police, we were informed, held a Community Intelligence Seminar for almost 100 Safer Neighbourhoods officers, partly to ensure that they knew how to make themselves most accessible and approachable to members of the community who may have information on suspicious activity which they may wish to share. Indeed, members of the public expect police officers, including their local Safer Neighbourhoods teams, to be highly trained when it comes to the receipt and handling of potentially vital intelligence. In universities too we heard students explain that they would much rather go to a local, uniformed officer whom they knew with any information they may have than have what they still refer to as 'Special Branch' or 'secret police' active on campus, thought to be scheming with their vice-chancellors and colluding with their lecturers to spy on them. Some limited concern was expressed, however, as to whether, if a Safer Neighbourhoods officer is given intelligence by a member of the community, it can be guaranteed that it will indeed reach officers in the Counter-Terrorism Command.

Intelligence: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

5. Provide the public, the business community and those working in other public services with more guidance as to what activity might reasonably be considered suspicious in a terrorism context.

6. Explain to the public what to do with information of use in countering terrorism.

8. Find better ways for council employees to feed to the police 'soft' intelligence which they come across in the communities in which they work.

Radicalisation and deradicalisation

Radicalism is a necessary but insufficient precondition for terrorism. Religious radicalism is not confined to Islam. The process of radicalisation, and how to prevent, halt and reverse it, is something which rightly exercises counter-terrorist professionals. We heard from Londoners about their perception of levels and locations of radicalisation in the capital, and their advice on what to do about it. Four key locations for radicalisation and terrorist recruitment have been posited in recent debate in the United Kingdom: mosques; universities and colleges; prisons; and the internet. As part of this research we were able to make some inroads into learning about the first two of these.

A clear message coming back from Muslim Londoners in particular was that imams radicalise not by what they do say – with notable exceptions such as Abu Hamza al-Masri in Finsbury Park, now in jail convicted of soliciting murder, incitement to racial hatred and possession of a document which could be useful to terrorists – but rather by what they do not say. By this, they meant that by refusing to engage with young Muslims on contentious issues of concern to those young people, they were forcing hungry young minds out onto the street for answers, where members of organisations such as The Saviour Sect and Al-Ghurabaa, both offshoots of Al-Muhajiroun proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2006 for the glorification of terrorism, are (often literally) just waiting outside, propagandist leaflets in hand, to offer them time and attention, and to pump them full of extremist ideas.

We heard how too often imams, many originating from overseas and having been educated at seminaries abroad, barely speak English and so are unable to communicate effectively with young members of their congregations. Those who can speak English are not necessarily prepared to listen and talk with young people about their current issues, preferring instead to ignore them and to focus upon history in their khutbas (sermons delivered before Friday prayers). Even those imams who would wish to engage with young congregants on these issues are sometimes forbidden to do so by the mosque management committees who employ them. As an imam himself explained to us, "*the majority of mosques are not run by imams; they're run by management committees, who are more of a problem than the imams. Some of those management committee members are hardly interested in anything except a name and a title; it's almost run tribally*". These factors, compounded by commonplace problems of intergenerational misunderstanding, can render imams largely unapproachable to young people in their religious communities. One of the imams who spoke to us criticised this state of affairs, enthusing that, *"our job is to educate; our job is to inspire; our job is to lead by example; and our job is to counsel and mentor; and that's all we can do"*.

We approached six university student unions, each representing a student body with a markedly different student demography in terms of proportions of domestic/overseas, school-leaver/mature, white/black and minority ethnic, Muslim/non-Muslim, and home-based/residential, to seek permission to hold a focus group with a small number of their students on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Upon making these approaches it quickly became clear that this was a highly sensitive and emotive topic for these student unions. Many of them had tales to tell of damaging public comment made in the past connecting their institution to terrorism, whether Lord

Carlile writing about 'impressionable young men' at London School of Economics, The London Paper alleging that Brunel University was 'breeding terrorists', Queen Mary University's Islamic Society feeling maligned by Andrew Gilligan in the Evening Standard, or negative media coverage of the ex-President of the Islamic Society at London Metropolitan University being arrested and charged with terrorism-related offences. Reputational considerations were clearly of concern to all of the educational establishments we approached. For some, those concerns, supplemented by a disquieting suspicion of the MPA's motives in wanting to hear from their students, meant that they rejected our proposal and denied us access to their members.

The three focus groups with students in London universities which we were able to hold shed some light on claims that terrorist recruitment and radicalisation is happening on campuses. We were reminded that radicalism in students can be a good thing, and that it is important again to distinguish rigorously between students on the one hand getting politicised, organised and mobilised, and, on the other, being recruited into terrorism. Students are, by their own admission, especially vulnerable to radicalisation and possible terrorist recruitment by virtue of their often being away from home for the first time, possessing eager young minds thirsty for conviction and certainty, and because some of the pastoral and support structures which they may have relied upon whilst growing up are now absent.

Outside speakers attending universities to give talks are frequently mentioned as a possible vehicle for terrorist recruitment and radicalisation. Soon after the 7 July 2005 bombings one London university introduced a 'Freedom of Speech Form' for completion by student societies intending to invite outside speakers, so that the university could vet those invited. This was considered highly reactionary by the student body. Some student unions have a practice not of banning groups from speaking but instead of terminating individual speeches if what the speaker actually says contravenes the student union's agreed policies on what is acceptable, and what is not, to say at their events. A 'No Platform' approach to radical but legal organisations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir United Kingdom is constantly being debated in universities and at the National Union of Students. Some examples were given by students of extreme speakers making speeches

Students are, by their own admission, especially vulnerable to radicalisation and possible terrorist recruitment

at student societies' events. In all cases they explained that those speakers were challenged on their extreme views by the students present and made to look incoherent or foolish, and therefore unattractive as recruiters to their respective movements or groups. One university's students described how counter-productive it was for a senior member of the university hierarchy to hector the Islamic Society after Friday prayers about harbouring terrorists. A number of students indeed told us that they thought that the Islamic Society at a university was likely to be the authorities' best ally in counter-terrorist terms, understanding the dynamics of the Muslim cohort on the student roll and able to pose theological challenge to any extremists on campus.

We heard from students of literature disseminated on campus which incited racial hatred – mostly virulently anti-Semitic propaganda – but none which overtly solicited terrorism. Most students seemed to deem the security arrangements on campus risible, explaining how easy it would be for terrorist recruiters to get on site should they wish to. The view was expressed that single-subject specialist universities, such as medical schools, were less likely to be infiltrated by extremists.

Much of what we heard in the context of terrorist recruitment and radicalisation was concerned with the issues upon which extremist discourse focuses. Foremost amongst these was United Kingdom foreign policy. William Nye acknowledged, "*I'm not denying that foreign policy is used as a motivating factor*". A Community Outreach Worker, thinking of the war in Iraq, said that the young people she works with cry foul at, "*double standards when we see a life is worth more here than there*". She was adamant that, "*politicians need to give some answers to young people who are born and brought up here*". Another Londoner urged,

"*Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya – discontented young people need explanations other than Usama bin Laden's single narrative [of the oppression throughout history of the Islamic ummah by Western infidels]*". A third demanded that, "*we need some strong, logical answers to feed frustrated young minds*". A fourth spoke of terrorist literature and videos depicting the sufferings of Muslims in the Middle East being used to generate a flow of young Somalis from west London to extremist training camps in Somalia. A fifth concluded that, "*inequalities or grievances can be a fertile ground for terrorist recruiters*".

Londoners had some ideas as to how to address these problems. The Home Secretary's proposition that Muslim mothers be enjoined to keep a closer eye on their sons, on the other hand, was not considered helpful: "*We don't want mums to turn into spies because then we'd have a complete breakdown of communications between children and mothers*". There was the suggestion that specialist support be provided to those already on the path to radicalisation, similar to that offered to cultist addicts. A Muslim man was of the opinion that Muslims are insufficiently proactive in ostracising extremists in their midst: "*We need to isolate the extremists, make them outside of Islam*". Some admonished the police for indirect radicalisation of young people by their ill treatment of them. A number endorsed London local authorities' work to prevent the alienation and disengagement of young people. By far the most common suggestion, however, was the filling of a perceived vacuum in terms of safe spaces for proper debate of the pertinent issues by young people. Only by allowing young people to challenge one another, test radical views, argue and dissent, may we equip the young generation with the confidence to challenge extremists' theses: "*Through open*

dialogue, the fanatics' arguments can be exposed, debunked, shown to be contradictory, out-argued".

With regard to specific deradicalisation initiatives, it seems that there is much talk and little action. The Chair of Brixton Mosque has started some innovative work to counter the radicalisation of young men in Lambeth, whether it results in their entering a terrorist world or entering criminal gangs such as The Muslim Boys who use Islam as a means by which to convince young men to perpetrate often heinous crime. We are aware of a small number of initiatives employing credible Islamic scholars to deprogramme theologically inmates in United Kingdom prisons. The Luqman Institute of Education and Development is delivering some counter-radicalisation work in universities. Beyond this, it seems there is room for a significant increase in dedicated deradicalisation activity in London.

Radicalisation and deradicalisation: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service
4. Work with partners to initiate more counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation initiatives.

46. Explore how criminal gangs use discontent at counter-terrorism activity to recruit new members.

Advice for other bodies
58. Government: Bring faith groups together to discuss theological approaches to deradicalisation.

73. Muslim communities: Equip Islamic clergy to bolster their contribution to the counter-terrorist effort by:
- certification of imams to guarantee that they can relate to young British Muslims on their issues in their language;
- training more imams in this country;
- mosque management committees finding positive ways to challenge extremist propaganda; and
- mobilising Islamic scholarship to articulate theological challenges to terrorism.

Community cohesion

A cohesive society will be less vulnerable to terrorist attack. Terrorist recruiters thrive on division and discord within a community. The face of London is forever changing, with waves of immigration and emigration, internal migration, new communities establishing themselves, and immigrant communities becoming indigenous over the generations. In the metropolis's multicultural mix, rich in its cosmopolitan diversity, if inevitable differences are not to give rise to fissures and rifts ideal for terrorist exploitation, then genuine integration, but not assimilation, is a necessity. This integration will need to accommodate many identities. It is against the backdrop of this human geography that the counter-terrorism debate in London must take place.

One unfortunate development as a consequence of the terrorist attacks on Manhattan and elsewhere in the United States on 11 September 2001 is a heightened focus upon religion as determinant of identity. In terms of people's identity, their faith has in this new millennium come to be afforded a new primacy. People are now seen as Muslim or Jewish, for example, first, above and before other aspects of what makes them the person they are. Faith has become a label. This puts especial emphasis on the need for faith communities to cohere within themselves and between one another.

To the extent that the current international terrorist problem has a religious element, we heard from theologians and lay people alike of possible solutions. A Hindu who asserted that, *"problems arising in the name of religion must be addressed in religious terms"* told us that, *"discontent in the Abrahamic family requires an outside input: the religious pluralism of Hinduism: there are many different paths to make spiritual progress... As soon as you hear* *this idea of monotheism and an exclusivist strand, a monopoly on spirituality, you have created a division... Religious pluralism and proselytising evangelism are mutually exclusive... Religions, which should be a cohesive force, are currently divisive"*.

A Christian Reverend Canon told us of her church's 'conflict and change' project, which offered family mediation to east Londoners after 7 July 2005. She spoke gratefully of being invited to speak at a mosque on the anniversary of the London bombings. The Mayor of Lewisham urged that, *"the sanctity of life is beyond debate and nobody should be blamed for these events through undue association"*. There clearly are in London examples of positive interfaith dialogue and endeavour.

Efforts within Islamic communities to reach out across religious divides and foster tolerance and understanding were described. Members of Islamic Societies in London universities told us of their attempts to open themselves up to non-Muslims to explain what their faith means to them and how it affects the way they conduct their lives and view the world. Young Muslims told us of their striving to deal with the duality of being both a Muslim and a United Kingdom citizen, feeling affinity and affiliation to both their faith and their country, and utterly resenting any attempts to force them to choose between these two fundamental aspects of their identity. One colourfully explained that his generation of young Muslims, *"are at Spaghetti Junction identity-wise"*. He and others expect, reasonably, that modern Britain should be able to handle their multiple, compatible identities. They reject any suggestion that fulsome integration into United Kingdom society must mean their abandonment of their religious principles and practices. They condemned the

carnage caused by their Muslim brothers on 7 July 2005, yet they explained that excommunication from the faith is neither permitted nor precedented in Islam and they felt they should not have to apologise for actions for which they were not themselves responsible: *"Asking all Muslims to apologise for the 7 July bombers is like asking all white Britons to apologise for the British National Party"*. They appealed to their fellow citizens to judge Muslims by the Qu'ran, rather than to judge the Qu'ran by Muslims. Islam is perfect, they said, Muslims are not. Dismay was expressed at the centrality of alcohol to British social life, making it difficult for Muslims who wish to integrate socially to do so when so much social activity takes place in pubs. We heard of the need for the Muslim communities of the United Kingdom to put aside some of the sectarian wranglings which divide them and unite around issues such as the controversy sparked by Jack Straw MP over the wearing of the niqab (veil). Some of the obstacles to building this social capital and coherence were also outlined. We were told that too much community grant money comes through the National Lottery Fund, which many Muslim organisations will not touch because it is money made by gambling. There was a sense too that grant-givers often frown upon funding religious organisations.

Despite the progressive aspirations expressed above, we heard too of segregation in London society. Hindus and Sikhs told us of their bitter resentment of being *"tarred with the same brush"* as British Muslims and lamented the general lack of education regarding different Asians' beliefs. One organisation wrote to us to explain that it could, *'contribute very little to any counter-terrorism effort since its members are Hindus'*. Another Hindu, who told us he, *"has Muslim friends as well"*, felt that distinctions on grounds of religion were important: *"The general public should be educated properly to make a distinction between the two: who are culprits and who are not. It is the responsibility of the Muslim community to stop it, if they want to…The Muslim community is being checked all the time. Whose fault is that? …I'm surprised you want the Hindu community to come over to the Muslim community and tell them not to be radicalised – that is their job, their responsibility. We cannot tell them what to do… Hindus can't help Muslims isolate terrorists in their midst"*.

A teacher told us of segregation in schools: *"Young people are concerned about conflicts that are arising between cultures, because as children they hadn't known that"*. In universities we were painted a picture of different unintegrated 'crowds' drawn along ethnic lines: *"There are three communities on campus: the Asian, the African-Caribbean and the White… You can literally see the bar change colour sometimes"*. At one university we heard of people burning national flags outside the bar when India lost to Pakistan at cricket. In another we heard that the Jewish Society had had their posters ripped down. Finally we were told to consider the potential paradox implicit in trying both to keep communities together and simultaneously asking community members to report to the authorities one another's suspicious behaviour.

Community cohesion: Recommendations and advice

Advice for other bodies

56. Government: Educate people as to the contributions Islam has made to United Kingdom and global society.

57. Government: Display sensitivity to considerations that some Muslim organisations will not bid for community grants from National Lottery Fund monies, considering them to be the prohibited proceeds of gambling.

Preparedness

Londoners expect the statutory authorities to be properly prepared for the eventuality of another terrorist attack on the city. They expect emergency services, local, regional and national government all to have well-rehearsed, up-to-date emergency plans in place. They expect these plans to take into account a wide range of possible scenarios, including bombings but also covering, for example, floods, crashed aeroplanes, or assaults on the Critical National Infrastructure, such as sabotage of the electricity grid. Some awareness was also evident of the horrific possibility of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorist attack. The potential for such an attack to be both more insidious and more dangerous than one using more conventional means was acknowledged.

The public in general feel they lack information from local authorities and others regarding what they should do in case of such emergencies. We did hear, however, of limited examples of better practice, for instance where table-top exercises simulating terrorist attacks were conducted by the police and council with local community partners. An MPS officer rightly observed that, *"just as we issue crime prevention advice about theft or burglary, so we should help communities to protect themselves against terrorism"*.

In order that London be as resilient to terrorism as possible and that it not be subjected to an unnecessarily protracted period of emergency should a terrorist attack occur, contingency and continuity planning across all sectors is vital. Some serious concerns in this regard were aired by our consultees. First amongst these was a demand that emergency services' telecommunications function perfectly whatever the conditions. There was major dissatisfaction at the apparent dysfunctionality of police radios underground on 7 July 2005 and at the reportedly imperfect interoperability of ambulance, fire service and police radios on that day. In Bexley, Lambeth and Southwark there was anger that these glitches had been highlighted as long ago as the King's Cross fire of 1987, and yet, despite the passage of two decades, and despite the highest of stakes, they still had not been resolved. Some frustration was directed too at mobile telephone operators, given the network incapacity and overload problems which prevented many people that day from contacting colleagues and loved ones. Others were concerned that the closure of local fire stations would diminish readiness in some parts of London to respond to terrorist attack. One of London's most experienced Community Safety Managers testified that, *"if people need skilled advice, guidance and counselling after experiencing a bombing, or racism or hate crime as a direct result of terrorism, we actually don't have an adequate resource, either London-wide or locally, to be able to support them effectively"*.

London local government has a significant role to play in the counter-terrorism piece. Its relevant functions include disaster management,

The public in general feel they lack information from local authorities and others regarding what they should do in case of such emergencies

emergency planning, community cohesion and reassurance. Local authorities are involved with the police in bronze, silver and gold groups for critical incidents such as terrorist attacks. Councillors have a useful local knowledge base and connections in their wards. This can be harnessed to facilitate local dialogue and partnership working when circumstances demand. Local authorities, through their service provision, have direct contact with all of London's communities. However, the vast majority of London's Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs), the structures through which local authorities together with emergency services and other statutory and third sector partners formulate their local community safety strategies, have no counter-terrorism targets by which they are measured, and so can find it difficult to allocate the money and resources to prioritise emergency planning and other work relevant to countering terrorism. If CDRPs were to be given targets in the area of public protection – encompassing, but not restricted to counter-terrorism work – then they might find it easier to make available the attention and money required to bolster the city's preparedness for terrorist attack.

London's private sector is the engine room of the United Kingdom economy. The resilience of London's businesses to terrorist attack is therefore crucial. Big companies with real estate or operations in London have for some time been attuned to the importance of effective contingency and succession planning. Business continuity indeed has become something of an industry in the City. However, 59% of London-based companies still do not have any such plans in place, and almost all of these are small to medium sized enterprises, who are too busy trying to make a living to spend time thinking about what to do if another bomb goes off

[Source: 'One year on from 7/7', London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, July 2006]. If big businesses could help small businesses with their continuity planning, then if those smaller enterprises had a fire overnight, they might not go out of business; they might actually be able to open up again. It has been noted that some big businesses are offering such support to their suppliers, but not to other small businesses outside of their supply chain. We did hear, however, of business fora in some parts of London working on integrated local private sector contingency plans, and of 'Security Zones' being set up by local businesses with police support in Kensington and Chelsea and around London Bridge.

Tourism is also essential to London's status as a leading world capital and a global city. The loss to London's visitor economy in the year following 7 July 2005 was £536,000,000, most of which was accounted for by a pronounced downturn in the domestic market. HMS Belfast, moored in the Thames, for instance, relies on a United Kingdom family market – the hardest hit – and suffered significantly in terms of takings following the attacks. Foreign tourists were less hesitant about visiting London. As someone in Dallas insisted, "*it will take more than a few bombs to make me cower. If you worry and change your travel plans then the terrorists win*". This resilience of overseas visitors contributed to a remarkably swift recovery for London's visitor economy after that summer's atrocities. In August 2005 the London Visitor Index, the number of visits to London attractions, retail takings and tube passenger figures were all down on previous years. However, by the end of that calendar year, against all four of those same indicators, London had bounced back, was looking healthy, and was even breaking new records.

Preparedness: Recommendations and advice

Recommendations for the Metropolitan Police Service

44. Put more information into the public domain about what to do in the event of terrorist attack.

45. Improve business preparedness for terrorist attack by:
- publicising the 'London Prepared' website to businesses;
- Safer Neighbourhoods teams issuing small businesses with counter-terrorism guidance; and
- convening local business fora to draw up integrated private sector contingency plans.

Advice for other bodies

55. Government: Provide more resources to local authorities for contingency and continuity planning.

59. Government: Ensure urgently that all emergency services' telecommunications are rendered compatible and fully functional in all environments.

65. Local government: Local authorities to publicise local emergency plans more widely.

66. Local government: Increase capacity to provide co-ordinated family assistance and counselling in the event of a terrorist attack.

69. Business: Big businesses to give contingency and continuity advice to smaller businesses.

70. Business: Mobile phone providers to recognise their ability to contribute to London's resilience by making their networks more robust so that people can communicate at times of emergency.

Government

Her Majesty's Government, according to William Nye, plays three key roles in the national counter-terrorism effort: it provides political leadership; it sets the national strategy; and it provides the tools and capabilities to enable public services to do their counter-terrorist work. The government's national counter-terrorist strategy, CONTEST, was published in July 2006 (although it had been in existence, but not made public, for some time prior to that). CONTEST has four strands: Prevent; Pursue; Protect; and Prepare. The Prevent strand is concerned with tackling the causes and drivers of international terrorism, such as political disaffection, and challenging terrorist ideologies. The Pursue strand is about tracking and bringing to justice suspected terrorists and includes the passing of laws to enable this, such as the legislation outlawing the glorification of terrorism and attendance at terrorist training camps in the Terrorism Act 2006, and the commissioning of police to deliver it. The Protect strand looks at defending the country's Critical National Infrastructure against terrorist attack, including transport systems, energy supplies, telecommunications and so on. The Prepare strand is concerned with preparation for the eventuality of a terrorist attack, including joined-up emergency response and contingencies. All four strands require concerted cross-departmental working within the civil service, with departments such as the Home Office, Cabinet Office, Department of Communities and Local Government, Treasury, Department of Education and Skills and Department of Transport most involved, but involving all government departments in one way or another.

In the area of legal and judicial process, Londoners have suggestions for government. In Barking and Dagenham residents criticised the length of time terrorism trials take. They and others complained that the protraction of these cases, however complex and interlinked, overemphasises the legal rights of the defendant above the legitimate demands of the public to know more about the police's success or failure in arresting attempts at international terrorism. If these trials could be expedited, then the public would hear about successful prosecution of terrorists in a timely fashion, giving them much more current information on which to base their assessment of the country's counter-terrorism response. Others argued that the sub judice (matters under trial or being considered by a judge or court) laws need to be revisited in order to consider a new approach to releasing information into the public domain pre-trial. The public's plea was that the state treat jurors as intelligent adults capable of exercising their common sense in not letting extraneous considerations cloud their judgement in criminal trials. The current state of affairs, according to which very little information about alleged terrorism can be released often until years after charges are brought, undermines faith in the police and the criminal justice system.

Londoners also have a strong message for government about who should be responsible for counter-terrorism activity in the United Kingdom. One young man summed up the consensus admirably: *"I think police should be in control of counter-terrorism, 'cause they're kind of like the grass roots people – they're the guys on the streets"*. This sentiment was echoed wherever we went: Londoners insist that counter-terrorism work needs to remain rooted in communities, and that the police are the only agency with people out working in those communities day-in, day-out. No wish was expressed for any new executive agency to be set up to do counter-terrorist work. One lady put

it pithily, "*we don't want some other agency swanning in to do counter-terrorism operations and then leaving the community, including the police, to pick up the pieces*".

Governance and accountability arrangements for counter-terrorist activity were discussed. Provided the executive functions remain with the police, there was not strong feeling either way as regards the prospect of the creation of a Department of Homeland Security within Whitehall to oversee counter-terrorism nationally. Any such department would presumably need to bring together all those many parts of the civil service currently sharing the counter-terrorism brief. It is Londoners' view that clear lines of answerability and accountability are key to the essential maintenance of public confidence in the nation's counter-terrorist efforts. Police authorities, we were told, need to be more visible in order to play this role effectively. The Security Service is seen to be largely unaccountable for its work in this field. Enhanced performance monitoring and oversight of the security services by Parliament – such that the Director General of the Security Service cannot simply refuse to appear before relevant Select Committees of MPs – was thought to be desirable.

Government: Recommendations and advice

Advice for other bodies

49. Government: Ensure that counter-terrorism activity in the United Kingdom remains rooted in communities, led by police and held publicly accountable.

50. Government: Amend legislation regarding sub judice (matters under trial or being considered by a judge or court) to allow the police to provide the public with more information on the country's counter-terrorism effort without jeopardising fair trials.

51. Government: Enable the criminal justice system and the courts to ensure that terrorism trials are brought forward in a timely and speedy fashion without long delays during which cynicism about the strength of the case against those accused may grow.

54. Government: Give Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships a public protection priority target to ensure the dedication of adequate resources to this area of business.

64. Police authorities: Must raise the profile of their work to scrutinise and hold the police to account in the field of counter-terrorism.

Politics

Sir Ian Blair is right to take pride in the following statement: *"The great claim of British policing is its operational independence. In all of my 32 years in this job, despite conversations with Home Secretaries and Prime Ministers and so on, I have never, ever felt the pressure to act in one way rather than another"*. Apolitical policing is uncommon globally. Yet this distancing of policing and politics perhaps leaves United Kingdom policing too far 'downstream' to provide lasting answers to international terrorism. The questions being asked are inextricably political, and the answers may need to be too. We must therefore look to the country's executive and legislature to establish the framework within which society can seek to dissuade and disarm the terrorists who seek to overthrow it.

Some of the Londoners we consulted felt that the glut of anti-terrorism legislation passed by Parliament in recent years was evidence of a knee-jerk hastiness in lawmaking, giving rise to unworkable legislation which the police service then has the thankless task of enforcing. Londoners were also clear that, *"terrorism can't be dealt with by laws and law enforcement alone"*.

There is no doubt in most Londoners' minds that an interpretation of United Kingdom foreign policy, in particular the United Kingdom's participation in the United States-led invasion of Iraq, has been used as an instrumental driver for international terrorism in this country. There is palpable rage at what some consider a disingenuous stance adopted by politicians who deny this link. One consultee spoke angrily of, *"the hellhole of Guantanamo Bay, which, according to our Prime Minister, is only an 'anomaly'"*. Another said, "*When people ask for more

condemnation, we cry 'hypocrisy': we cannot mention 7 July without also mentioning Abu Ghraib"*. Whilst Londoners generally accept that perceived foreign policy is not the sole driver of extremism in this country, we heard a continued plea that politicians and government officials should *"treat people like grown-ups"* when it comes to discussing any relationship between the military action of the United Kingdom and its allies overseas, and bombs going off in London. The government's position is that terrorists misrepresent the intent of British military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in their attempts to radicalise a small minority - in the United Kingdom and elsewhere - to become involved in terrorism, and that extremists ignore the fact that Al-Qaeda was attacking and murdering innocent people, and plotting to do so in the United Kingdom, long before the intervention in Iraq.

Recent contributions to the counter-terrorism debate by leading politicians, as reported in the media, were received with angry cynicism in some quarters. The perception amongst students was that Ruth Kelly MP had asked university lecturers to 'keep an eye' on them, which they saw as crass and underhand. Her purportedly offering funding exclusively to 'moderate' Muslim groups also went down badly in some parts of the community. Jack Straw MP was seen by many as irresponsible for his comments on the niqab (veil). Extreme resentment of his intervention was evident amongst Muslim women who argued that the woman whose wearing of the niqab (veil) he found problematic had actually been brave enough to attend his surgery, thereby demonstrating a willingness to participate in the democratic process which many would do well to emulate. John Reid MP's speech to Muslim mothers and fathers on civically-minded

parenting in Whitechapel was decried as insensitive and unfair: *"All citizens are equal, but some are more equal than others"*, said one aggrieved parent.

Londoners were able to unite around one solution to the terrorism problem we face: they argued for a revival of the democratic process, political participation, open debate on equal footings, active citizenship and an end to stifling taboos. We heard from a young Muslim that, *"we need a platform where we can stand up and make our voices heard and know that we've been acknowledged"*. Another urged, "*organise events to let people express their views and opinions and not let them get shoved underground"*. A third was certain that, *"the way forward for us is to engage in genuine, honest debate and discussion"*. An imam went on: *"Muslims need to feel like equal citizens of this country. Equal in every way possible. Equal in accessing services. Equal in proposing and changing policies. Equal in the political sphere. Once they are confident about equality, then, I believe, we can talk more freely about*

responsibility". The notion of the ummah – a global Islamic familial bond, heedless of territory or borders – energises young Muslims.

Nevertheless, the politicisation of young people is to be applauded. A generation of young Muslims, born in this country, are growing up free of the sense of being guests with no right to challenge the powers that be, which was the norm for their parents or grandparents who first came to this country. This political awakening and rediscovered confidence is to be celebrated: all citizens of the United Kingdom should be encouraged to debate peacefully the issues of our times. Young people of all backgrounds need to be allowed to explore these emotive topics with passion in safety. Genuine grievances must be tabled. Every Briton, irrespective of background, should be given the space to articulate their views without fear, and granted personal influence over British politics, including the country's foreign policy. This equal right is a fundamental tenet of British democracy, which we must now defend against the malignant menace of international terrorism.

Politics: Recommendations and advice

Advice for other bodies

47. Government: Facilitate open discussion of terrorism and counter-terrorism at all levels and locations in society.

48. Government: Continue publicly to recognise the widely held view that an interpretation of United Kingdom foreign policy, including the war in Iraq, is being used to drive international terrorism in this country.

60. Political parties: Recognise the importance of cross-party consensus in approaching counter-terrorism work.

Conclusion

The recommendations and advice put forward in this report provide a public mandate for those responsible for the United Kingdom's response to the threat posed by international terrorism.

By implementing these recommendations and following this advice, the authorities can more closely align their counter-terrorist efforts with the needs of the communities they are charged to protect. In a liberal democracy, the people should be given this power to shape the services that exist to serve them. In no area of public service is this principle more relevant than in the field of counter-terrorism, where public trust and confidence in the actions of the state are so essential to success.

Londoners insist that counter-terrorism work needs to remain rooted in communities, and that the police are the only agency with people out working in those communities day-in, day-out

Annex:

Organisations and groups that participated in 'Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate'

Aasra Group
African and Caribbean Evangelical Alliance
Ahmadiyya Muslim Association
Al-Khoei Foundation
Amal Trust
Association of Blind Asians
Association of Chief Police Officers
Association of Muslims with Disabilities
Association of Police Authorities
Australian Federal Police
Barking and Dagenham Police Community
    Consultative Group
Barnet Community Police Consultative Group
Bexley Police Community Consultative Group
Blessed Sacrament Church
Board of Deputies of British Jews
Brent Community Safety Board
British Broadcasting Corporation
British Humanist Association
Brunel University
Business Design Centre
Cable News Network
Camden Community Police Consultative Group
Channel 4
Churches Together in England
Citigroup
City of Westminster Police Community
    Consultative Group
Clapham and Stockwell Faith Forum
Clarke Bond
Community Security Trust
Confederation of Indian Organisations
Corporation of London
Croydon Community Police Consultative Group
Croydon Council
Daily Mail
Davenant Centre
Defending Da Hood
Department for Communities and Local
    Government
Desi Radio
Diocese of Southwark
Ealing Community Police Consultative Group

Ealing Council
East London Business Alliance
East London Mosque
EC1 New Deal for Communities
Enfield Community Police Consultative Group
Eritrean Muslim Community Association
Ernst and Young
Evening Standard
Faithworks
Financial Times
Fitzrovia Youth Action
Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism
Geo Television Network
Greater London Authority
Greenwich Borough Residents Association
Guardian
Hackney Council
Hackney Safer Communities
Hammersmith and Fulham Community Safety
    Board
Haringey Community Police Consultative Group
Harrow Police Community Consultative Group
Havering Community Police Consultative Group
Hillingdon Community Police Consultative Group
Hindu Council United Kingdom
HMS Belfast
Home Office
Hounslow Community Police Consultative Group
Hounslow Muslim Women's Association
Indian Institute of Technology London Chapter
Independent
Independent Police Complaints Commission
Investec
Islam Channel
Islamic Society of Britain
Islington Community Safety Board
Jain Community
Jewish Chronicle
Karrot Project
Kensington and Chelsea Police Community
    Consultative Group
Kids Company
Kingston Street Pastors
Kingston-upon-Thames Community Police
    Consultative Group
Lambeth Community Police Consultative Group

League of British Muslims
Lewisham Council
Lewisham Police Community Consultative Group
London Churches Group for Social Action
London Council of Jain Organisations
London Development Agency
London First
London Link Radio
Masjid-e-Umer Trust
Merton Community Police Consultative Group
Merton Council
Metropolitan Police Chinese and South East
    Asian Staff Association
Metropolitan Police Hindu Association
Metropolitan Police Muslim Staff Association
Metropolitan Police Race Independent Advisory
    Group
Metropolitan Police Service
Muslim Council of Britain
Muslim Safety Forum
Muslim Welfare House
Muslim Women's Helpline
Muslim Youth Helpline
Muslimaat United Kingdom
National Broadcasting Company
National Community Tension Team
National Secular Society
Newham Community and Police Forum
Newham Council
Newham Deanery
North London Mosque
North West London Newspapers
Oxford University
Pax Christi
Press Association
Progressive British Muslims
Q News
Queen Mary University
Richmond-upon-Thames Police Community
    Consultative Group
Rights Of Women
Safer Bromley Forum
Safer London Panel
Sainsbury's
Shree Swaminarayan Temple
Sikh Community Care Project

Sikh Gurdwara South London
Sikh Human Rights Group
Sikh Messenger
Sikh Women's Alliance
South London Interfaith Group
Southwark Council
Southwark Latin American Community
Southwark Muslim Women's Association
Southwark Police Community Consultative Group
St Anne and All Saints Church
St George's Medical School
St Mary's Youth Centre
St Paul's Travellers
Sunday Times
Sutton Police Consultative Group
Tate Modern
The East London Somali Youth and Welfare
    Centre
Thistle Hotels
Times
Tower Hamlets Borough Policing Forum
Transport for London
United Kingdom Youth Parliament
United States Tax and Financial Services
University of Central Lancashire
Visit London
Waltham Forest Police Community Consultative
    Group
Wandsworth Policing Consultative Committee
Westminster Abbey
Westminster Cathedral
Westminster Council
Westminster Ecuadorian Community
Wiltshire Police
Withers and Rogers
Women's International League For Peace And
    Freedom
Women's Radio Group
Women's Resource Centre
World Council of Hindus
Zoroastrian Centre for Europe

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