Police Driving

Report: 17
Date: 7 July 2011
By: Assistant Commissioner Central Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides an update on the report submitted to the Corporate Governance Committee in June 2006, relating to police collisions and the Safe Driving Two initiative. It provides police collision data and gives an overview of the MPS Safe Driving Three programme. The report includes:

• Basic data / trends over the last three years
• The nature and severity of the collisions
• An update on the MPS Safe Driving policy and any subsequent changes
• An update on the four themes of education, police driving, processes and police collision investigation and lessons learnt
• The action taken in respect of police officers involved in police collisions.

A. Recommendation

That members note the report.

B. Supporting information

1. All collisions involving police vehicles are reported and categorised. Only those that are collisions which occur on a road or public place and directly involve the police vehicle, are included in category A. The severity of collisions can range from a clash of wing mirrors with very minor damage to a fatal collision.

2. Other collisions on a road or public place where the police vehicle was present, but not directly involved are included in category B. These are termed ‘Vicinity Only’ collisions - an example would be where one member of the public stops to allow a police vehicle to pass and their vehicle is struck by another member of the public.

3. All other incidents are recorded in separate categories. These include minor collisions in police station yards, supervisor interventions and damage found as a result of daily vehicle inspections.

4. All reported incidents are assessed for blameworthiness on the part of the police driver. The Police Driving Standards Unit (PDSU) considers all the facts presented by the investigating officer to determine whether the incident should be held to count against the police driver or not. Where the incident is assessed as ‘to count’ (blameworthy), a range of sanctions are available. In the most serious cases, the police driver may have their police driving qualifications removed entirely. The standard used to determine whether something is blameworthy or not is on the balance of probabilities.

5. The PDSU assessment is conducted solely in relation to MPS policies and procedures. This is completely separate from any investigation under the Road Traffic Act. Irrespective of the PDSU assessment, the police driver may still face the prospect of prosecution, dependent on the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service.

Table 1 - Police Collision Data

Data extracted from MPS Police Collisions database on 3 February 2011.

6. The table above gives overall police collision data for each of the calendar years 2008, 2009 and 2010.

7. Overall the data shows an encouraging reduction year on year and collisions involving police vehicles (Category A) have also declined. However, incidents that have been classed as “to count” have shown a slight rise as a percentage of the overall.

8. A number of initiatives have been developed under the leadership of Commander roads policing (currently Jerry Savill.) These have been badged as the Safer Driving 3 initiative and approved by Management Board.

9. The current police collision recording database does not allow for analysis of the nature or causation of collisions and is one of the areas that a new database will address, as part of the Safer Driving 3 programme.

10. In the last financial year (2009/2010), MPS drivers were involved in 10 fatal collisions. The average number of fatal collisions involving the MPS since 2001/2002 period is 6 per annum. Of the 16 fatal collisions (17 fatalities) over the last two years, 13 were as the result of pursuits, with 2 being as the result of emergency response driving and 1 as the result of surveillance driving. Of those 16, 8 have been assessed with 1 to count and 7 not to count. The other 8 have not been assessed at this time due to ongoing investigations (coroners, IPCC, DPS etc).

11. In the financial year 2009 / 2010, serious injuries to both police and public totalled 51, an increase of 5 over the year. The 51 injuries occurred as the result of 40 separate collisions. These injuries break down into 11 injuries during emergency calls, 14 during pursuits and 15 in normal driving.

12. The total cost of third party claims against the MPS in 2009/10 as the result of collisions was £4.2m. These costs include vehicle repairs, medical treatment, vehicle hire and damages for personal injury. In addition, repair costs for MPS vehicles were £2.3m for 2009/2010, giving a total outlay of £6.5m.

13. The MPS safe driving policy is incorporated in an overarching MPS Policy (Police Driver and Vehicle Policy), along with associated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).

Like all SOPs, this is a living document and changes are made regularly from identified learning, both internally (user groups, Gold Groups, evaluation of polcolls and other incidents etc) and externally (e.g. IPCC, Coroners etc). Such changes are authorised and signed off by the Commander Roads Policing within the MPS.

Some examples since the last MPA report include:

• Use of hired vehicle in response mode prohibited - safety and management issues as no IDR fitted and uncertainty over maintenance (Feb 2007).
• Revised guidance around prescribed medication and driving in response mode (Mar 2007).
• Requirements introduced for MPS cyclists around clothing, maintenance and first aid kits (Jul 2007).
• Instruction over use of 4x4 vehicles in pursuits following IPCC recommendations (Sept 2007).
• Enhanced motorcycle pursuit instructions for MPS motorcyclists (Oct 2007).
• Response use of blue light and two tones when approaching tram crossings, following police collisions and driving school learning (Dec 2007).
• Driver and vehicle training requirements for towing of trailers (May 2009).
• Change of driver level required for surveillance driving following a Gold group decision as the result of a fatal collision (Jan 2011).

14. The MPS is currently in the implementation and planning stage of a range of projects under the programme banner “Safe Driving Three - Driving Professionalism” (SD3) with a business case recently approved by Management Board.

15. Whilst the overall reduction in police collisions is encouraging it is acknowledged that high profile incidents expose the MPS to reputational risk and impact on public confidence. The SD3 program was instigated as a strategic response.

16. The user group for SD3 identified a range of options and solutions that would assist the MPS develop a strategic response, seeking to identify options to improve public safety, as well as for our officers and staff. It would also mitigate reputational risk to the MPS in further improving driving standards, whilst enabling the MPS to comply with the ACPO 2008 guidance on vehicle pursuits.

17. A number of options have already been implemented and include:

• A DVD was issued highlighting the need for the correct use of speed (for the circumstances), safe negotiation of red lights and the wearing of seat belts in police vehicles. (B)OCU Commanders were asked to ensure all officers viewed this video.
• The Traffic OCU Police Driving Standards Unit (PDSU) has had an increase in staff to allow additional proactivity and support to OCUs. PDSU officers now review potentially dangerous camera activations (speed and red ATS), carry out site visits to assess the circumstances of activations and intervene in those where driving is deemed dangerously in excess of training parameters.
• The Traffic OCU carries out police vehicle inspections on all TP boroughs and there are plans to extend this across all business groups.
• Changes have been implemented to post course driving assessments (for Level 3 drivers), tightening time frames and relieving officers from driving for non-compliance.
• Local misconduct. Professional Standards Champions have been informed of potential misconduct matters arising from driving incidents and allowing for appropriate action to be considered separately from PDSU decisions.
• A pursuit mnemonic has been devised (idea from focus group) to provide clear guidance to vehicle occupants and Central Command Complex (CCC) staff over initial required information for pursuits. This includes adhesive aide memoires for each MPS vehicle and CCC operator positions.
• The MPS driver policy has been reviewed and adapted where required, to support single patrolling in consultation with TP. An example is the change to Mobile Data Terminal (MDT) instructions to direct that the terminal is not to be used whilst the vehicle is in motion and that the screen is to be in a dimmed mode, to avoid driver distractions.
• Introducing a small section on the Supervising Safely L3 course which is delivered to all newly promoted sergeants, promoting professionalism in the supervision of driving standards.
• CCC has instigated a number of measures to improve pursuit management, including:
  • all CCC staff to complete the NCALT pursuit package
  • a Pan London pursuit lead appointed
  • better and more accurate use of appropriate CAD type codes
• DPS Organisational Learning and Prevention team led focus groups at practitioner level concerning the management of police pursuits. 15 key points were identified, including:
  • A need for more early tactical options to stop suspect vehicles
  • Issues relating to motorcycle pursuits
  • Untrained, inexperienced vehicle operators seen by all as the ‘weakest link’ in the risk picture

18. Management Board have recently approved 9 further Safe Driving initiatives:

1. To give a mandatory direction for all officers to view the ‘Searles DVD’ and engage in a senior manager led group discussion about its content.
2. To introduce strengthened policy concerning activations of traffic cameras by police officers.
3. To equip Incident Response Vehicles with tyre deflation devices.
4. To introduce tactical contact to terminate pursuits.
5. The MPS to re introduce RT operator.
6. MB considered a proposal to implement the tactic of ‘door cracking’ to enable Authorised Firearms Officers to alight from vehicles rapidly to meet operational need. The Board agreed that risk assessments should be undertaken for each operational task for which the door cracking tactic might be considered, complying with the guidance in the Health and Safety Executive document “Striking the balance between operational and health and safety duties in the Police Service”. The risk assessments should be produced in accordance with the MPS Health & Safety Manual volume 1 Chapter 5 and submitted for endorsement by the MPS Strategic Health and Safety Committee. The board delegated to Assistance Commissioner Central Operations the consideration of the risk assessments and in the light of their content, the decision whether to authorize ‘door cracking’ for specified tasks and any risk mitigation measures, and the provision of training for those officers undertaking any such authorised tasks.
7. To invest in a comprehensive driver database.
8. To ‘future proof’ in-car technology to support driver investigations. Subject to business case to Governance Board regarding “future proofing” in car technology.
9. To introduce in car video recording for area cars to improve accountability and provide evidence in support of decision making. Subject to business case to Governance Board regarding “future proofing” in car technology.

19. The ‘Searles’ DVD was produced by the DPS Organisational Learning, Prevention and Reduction Unit. An officer was convicted at court and is currently serving a jail sentence for causing death by dangerous driving. This powerful DVD shows the impact on the family of a member of the public who was killed in a fatal collision and on the ex officer, demonstrating the human consequences. In negotiating the production of this DVD it was agreed with all participants that it would only be shown for the purposes of police training and awareness.

20. The introduced and proposed options under SD3 broadly fall under the four themes (education, police driving, processes, and polcoll investigation) of SD2. The SD3 program focuses on six strands;

• Driver training and selection
• Driver standards and policy
• Management information
• Command and control
• Fleet and transport technology
• Prevention and organisational learning

Some of these strands will correspond and link into more than one of the four areas from SD2.

21. The MPS Traffic Criminal Justice Unit (CO16) has provided data on the number of MPS drivers prosecuted as the result of being involved in a police collision for the last 4 calendar years.

• 2007 - 7
• 2008 - 9
• 2009 - 17
• 2010 - 20

Of the 53, 89% of the offences prosecuted were for “without due care”. In 90% of the cases prosecuted the drivers were police officers, with police staff (including PCSO’s) accounting for the remaining 10%.

22. The MPS Department of Professional Standards (DPS) has provided data, extracted from the MPS internal complaints and discipline system (Tribune), detailing the number of officer allegations relating to police collisions.

23. Between 2006 and 2010, 159 officer allegations were made;

• unsubstantiated - 107
• substantiated - 22
• discontinued - 2
• officer not informed - 5
• ongoing - 23

Outcomes for those allegations are;

• no action - 108
• formal action - 3
• discussion - 1
• retired / resigned 1
• management action - 7
• words of advice - 10
• written warning - 6
• ongoing 23

It should be noted that the above periods cover both pre and post Taylor misconduct procedures.

C. Other organisational and community implications

Equality and Diversity Impact

1 Police Driver & Vehicle Policy is monitored annually and was recently the subject of a major review, (Sept 2010) as part of a 3 yearly cycle. The overarching intention of Safer Driving 3 is to reduce the total amount of polcols by 25%. This figure will not disproportionately impact on any particular group or community. Data available from the current polcol database is not able to determine any disproportionality regarding victims of polcols (unlike RTC data capture performed by CO16). A new database has been approved by Management Board and this will address this issue and enable trends, which affect any particular group or community, to be easily identified.

2 An Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) will be produced and maintained. Adverse impacts arising from the implementation of SD3 will be incorporated into any new SOPs and the EIA. Diversity issues are considered by including all aspects of MPS diversity strands. By making reasonable adjustments, as identified by the EIA, issues which may affect officers and staff undergoing training or selection, will be addressed thereby removing barriers to aid recruitment and retention.

3 This paper is an information report, commenting on historical activity, statistics and future options. Any changes brought about by the SD3 project will, themselves, be subject to an EIA before implementation.

Consideration of Met Forward

4 SD3 does not implicitly link into a specific strand of Met Forward but by aiming to reduce costs and increase confidence, it supports corporate objectives.

Financial implications

5 There are no financial implications specific to this paper as this is for information purposes. The Safer Driving Three paper contains financial information relating to the options suggested.

Legal implications

6 There are no specific legal issues arising from this report which is for information only. DLS has previously advised on the use of Mobile Data Terminals and the measures taken to mitigate the risk of distraction are sensible to reduce of accidents and legal claims arising from collisions.

Environmental Implications

7 There are no environmental implications apparent.

Risk (including Health and Safety) implications

8 The risks around police driving include injury and death to members of the public and MPS employees along with financial risk to the MPS budget. There are also reputational risks for the organisation.

D. Background papers

• Management Board paper Safer Driving 3 - Driving Professionalism was approved by Management Board on Wednesday 11th May 2011.
• The Safer Driving 2 paper referred to in the summary box is already within the MPA domain.

E. Contact details

Report author: Chief Superintendent David Snelling - OCU Commander CO15. On behalf of Commander Jerry Savill - Commander Roads Policing

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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