Performance update - Protect

Report: 4
Date: 7 September 2009
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

Protect is one of the four strands of the MPS counter-terrorist strategy which deals with stopping terrorist attacks. The last year has seen continuing improvement of its organisation and capability, and outstanding operational success with the G20 summit.

A. Recommendation

That the committee note the information provided on the Protect strand of the MPS counterterrorist strategy.

B. Supporting information

1. The Protect strand is led by a DAC of Specialist Operations. There is overlap with other strands but these are fully integrated through a series of meetings culminating in their accountability to MPS CT Strategic Delivery board.

CT strategy and performance management

2. Counter-terrorism policing activities are often sensitive and high profile. Success will ultimately be measured by an absence of terrorist incidents and/or the safety of the public and protected persons. This kind of performance does not lend itself to volumetric & quantitative measurement as do offences such as serious or volume crime. We also strive to achieve the right balance between transparency and the ensuring that security and operational capability are not compromised.

3. CT performance measures will tend to be more qualitative or reflective of the operational activity that prevents the terrorist incident or ensures safety. Work is being undertaken with the Specialist Crime Directorate and an academic institution to develop performance measures based on harm reduction.

4. The current threat from international terrorism has recently been reduced and is now assessed as substantial, formally defined as “an attack is a strong possibility” and Northern Ireland-related terrorism in Great Britain is assessed as moderate, defined as “an attack is possible but not likely.” The Irish-related threat level in London has not changed despite murders in Northern Ireland in March. The MPS continually monitors the relevant threat levels.

5. The MPS Counter Terrorism & Domestic Extremism (CT&DE) strategy supports the national CONTEST 2 strategy, and its delivery is overseen by two strategic boards, both chaired by ACSO. Internally the CT Strategic Delivery Board oversees the MPS structure and resourcing to deliver our strategy, and holds internal stakeholders to account for their performance. Each strand of CONTEST including PROTECT is represented at ACPO level. Externally the London CONTEST Board includes our statutory partners and facilitates engagement at a senior level to ensure organisations are held to account by our PROTECT partners, including City of London Police, British Transport Police, Ministry of Defence Police, and the Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI).

6. The Security Review PROTECT Committee continues to coordinate protection intelligence and information, and the SO PROTECT strand develop the tasking and information from the SRC and Guardian Partners meeting.

7. A revised use of Section 44 Terrorism Act powers to protect vulnerable sites and sectors is being rolled out across the MPS. The review was approved by the MPA, most recently in May 2009 and recognises that there have been community and independent concerns about the tactical application of the section 44 power. This new use will involve focusing on identified geographic areas across London, and includes a localised rather than pan-London Section 44 Authority. The ongoing review of the model will monitor of the community impact.

8. The building of CT capacity and capability for the Olympics is an MPS partnership responsibility within the multi-agency Olympic Security Directorate. This team provides a framework in which all agencies work and is a single point of contact for stakeholders.

Specialist Protection SO1

9. SO1 Specialist Protection has responsibility for protecting the Prime Minister, other high level members of the Government, visiting heads of state and others in need of armed protection. Protection decisions are made on the basis of threat, managed by the Committee for the Protection of Royalty and VIPs (RAVEC) and the Risk Management Board (RMB), and informed by the Vienna Convention, national interest and relevant regulatory obligations.

10. 2008/9 has seen considerable improvements in performance. Less than 1% budget overspend (0.5%); and workforce planning targets met, so the OCU is at full police establishment. The rising workload has been mitigated by improved duties and resource management. A diversity forum and work strands following best MPS practice have been established, for example changing the type of firearm used to accommodate smaller hands, changes in recruit advertising, female only insight days, mentoring underrepresented groups expressing an interest in SO1. The move to new purpose-built Operations Suite enhanced the unit’s capacity. Work continues to improve links between PURSUE and PROTECT to ensure the best possible intelligence links with SO15 on current and emerging commitments.

11. Operational challenges included the immense protection task associated with the G20, which took place with three months rather than the usual two year’s notice, and the addition of new ‘principals’ to be protected. In 2008, over 170 overseas operations and 180 inbound visitors were covered. The Prime Minister travelled through three continents in six days, former PM Blair spent over 200 days overseas in 2008, the Foreign Secretary over 150 days. Deployments to places with high operational challenges (Somalia, Gaza, Afghanistan, Iraq) have increased. These trends are expected to continue. In the medium term the Olympics will be a major commitment.

12. A major challenge is the unpredictable and turbulent demands, resulting in high levels of overtime or cancelled rest days to manage workloads. Officers work on average 20 hours overtime per week, highest earners accrue over £40K overtime per year; but extended working hours affect work/life balance. It is estimated that to substitute 2008 overtime with staff we will need an additional 100 officers. Protection requirements vary with Home Office/RAVEC wishes but the funding and staffing available remain fixed, meaning decisions on levels of protection are taken without responsibility for the financial implications. The MPS and MPA are actively engaged in discussions with the Home Office on this issue.

13. There is a structural funding shortfall (e.g. revenue costs, costs of vehicles, equipment, secure IT and communications) caused by the current DSP process (see Section D). SO1 considers the Designated Security Posts mechanism does not currently fully fit police regulations and requirements of the Working time Directive. The MPS and MPA are actively working to review this situation with the Home Office.

Royalty Protection SO14

14. SO performance in relation to protection of the Royal Family and their residences is currently measured by effectiveness in preventing intrusion to protected areas and how well we respond to incidents that require an urgent police response. In relation to intrusions our aim is to prevent any intrusion into the most secure areas of a protected Royal residence. During the 2008/9 Financial Year there were zero intrusions. There have also been no intrusions into the zone immediately adjoining these areas.

Diplomatic Protection Group SO6

15. An independent review of working arrangements within the DPG was requested and the Cambridgeshire Constabulary Quality Assurance Team released a detailed report in February 2009. A Cambridgeshire Review Change Management Programme was formed to take forward the 14 recommendations presented. It aims to prepare the command for changes to the way protection is managed, supported and delivered across the DPG footprint. The SO6 Chief Superintendent is the programme’s Senior Responsible Officer. The programme will work towards:

• Increased community engagement and public satisfaction
• Enhanced security and public protection
• Increased efficiency in workforce planning
• Increased effective use of DPG capability and professionalism
• Greater internal transparency at all levels.

16. The programme has eleven projects with their own deliverables and SMT leads and is expected to take in the order of 18 months to be completed.

17. The project for the new DPG base is delayed, attributable to planning problems. Construction may start in September 2009 with a completion range of June-August 2010.

Aviation security SO18

18. Heathrow and London City Airports are key parts of the UK international transport infrastructure and provide a substantial contribution to the UK economy. Airports are iconic, high profile sites daily used by large numbers of passengers, visitors and staff. A wide range of protective security policing complements partner activity to provide an integrated security response to ensure the safety of all airport users.

19. SO18 works in partnership with airport operator, airlines, government, security and policing agencies to deliver an integrated approach to airport security. Through partnership links SO18 assesses vulnerabilities and risk to inform security priorities. Security review and operational tasking meetings are held fortnightly.

20. An Airport Community Website is an innovative communication medium to share information with the airport community, surrounding Boroughs and the airport security specialists. A novel ‘aviation enthusiast’ scheme attracted over 300 members and is a way of engaging this informed airport community as extended “eyes and ears” for police.

Palace of Westminster SO17

21. SO17’s work is focused on security related matters at the Palace of Westminster. There is some input into security vetting. In view of incidents and attacks overseas in the last year, the perimeter security and the response plans are being reviewed. This may change the policing commitment, which would continue to be externally funded.

22. SO 17 is fully funded by Parliament. The contract expires at the end of this financial year and is being re-negotiated on a five-year, full-cost recovery basis. Static armed protection is supplied by officers from SO6 (DPG) which are also fully paid for by Parliament. There are currently no Key Performance Indicators for Protect for SO17. They are being developed under the contract renewal negotiations.

Security Coordinators SO2

23. A new protection command under the PROTECT strand, has been created to harness the expert skills of Security Co-ordinators SecCos, Specialist Search Teams (POLSA) and Counter Terrorist Support Advisors (CTSAs). This now provides the capacity to support the MPS at various different levels from event planning and coordination to tactical advice relating to protective security.

24. The SecCo unit centrally employs a small number of coordinators, and also directs some 60 SecCos based across the MPS. Security SecCos advise the police “Gold Commander” for events, and advise on and coordinate all aspects of operational security for any particular event, including planning and initiation of counter measures. SecCos also provide advice to external partners, event organisers, sub-contractors and venue hosts to ensure a cohesive security regime throughout the event.

25. The biggest success of the unit this year was the G20 Conference Summit at Excel on 2nd April 2009. This was attended by in excess of 50 protected people, including the President of the USA, and was the largest gathering of world leaders since the end of the Second World War. This included an immense liaison task, across the MPS and externally with partner Forces, government departments, local authorities, contractors, and Security Services.

26. Protective security tasks - some 500 a year - range from Royal events to private industry events such as the DSEI. It also includes public events such as the Notting Hill Carnival and the Autumn Festivals, the religious season notable in London’s diverse community, with advice on safety around High Holy Days, Eid, and other celebrations.

Counter Terrorist Security Advisers SO15

27. Advice and guidance in relation to protective security measures in the built environment is provided by Counter Terrorist Security Advisers (CTSAs) within SO15. The guidance is provided to the business community and other partners. SO15 are actively involved in advising on the Olympic build.

Public satisfaction

28. Data from the MPS Public Attitude Survey (PAS) consistently indicates that the public believe our counter-terrorism policing activity is important. Work is continuing to further develop the relevant survey methodology to ensure that analysis of the public’s responses accurately reflects all aspects of our counter-terrorism activity.

Terrorism hostage exercise

29. Exercise “Wooden Pride” took place in November 2008. Part of an ongoing exercise programme, this saw a number of MPS units work alongside the military in practicing terrorist hostage negotiation and rescue situations.

C. Race and equality impact

These are addressed in the main body of the report. There currently exists a SO Diversity Strategy which is addressing the issues of community engagement, recruitment, selection, promotion, and retention of staff, in addition to undertaking staff and leadership surveys.

D. Financial implications

The MPS faces a number of challenges with the funding mechanism for Dedicated Security Posts in Royalty, Diplomatic, and VIP Protection OCUs. Simply, the grant provided to the MPS, based on a number of designated protection posts, does not fully fund the number of mandated posts, and creates a number of operational risks that the MPS has to manage. The MPS has noted these risks and funding concerns to the Home Office in reviews of DSP funding, in 2007/8 and in 2008/9, with however little change to the funding arrangements. This is the subject of ongoing dialogue between the Commissioner and the Home Secretary, and the Deputy Mayor for Policing and the Home Secretary. A meeting occurred in mid-August with the Home Office at which the MPS and MPA aired our concerns and considered ways forward. A full briefing is being prepared on the DSP funding issues for the Commissioner, and this will be shared with the MPA.

E. Legal implications

1. The MPS as a Police Force is a key agency, which is required to deliver on all aspects of the CONTEST 2 strategy, which includes the Protect strand.

2. The police powers are primarily contained within the Terrorism Act 2000. In terms of the exercise of these powers, the MPS strives to strike a delicate balance between protecting individuals and preventing terrorism, whilst ensuring civil liberties are not unnecessarily infringed.

F. Environment impact

There are no environmental impact issues arising from this report.

G Background papers

None

H. Contact details

Report author(s): John Bunn QPM – SO2, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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