MPS response to Demonstrations by Far Right Groups such as the English Defence League and Stop Islamisation of England

Report: 5
Date: 9 December 2010
By: Assistant Commissioner Central Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report seeks to clarify the MPS response to the challenges of policing extremist groups, with an emphasis towards the gathering of intelligence and the sharing of good practice throughout the UK’s police services.

A. Recommendation

That members note the MPS processes and procedures in relation to the policing of extremist groups and counter demonstrations.

B. Supporting information

Background, Community impact and intelligence gathering

1. In March 2009, in reaction to a demonstration by Al-Muhajiroun (a small extreme Islamist group led by Anjem Choudary) during a homecoming parade by the Royal Anglian Regiment in Bedfordshire, a group named 'United Peoples of Luton' was formed. This group has evolved into the English Defence League (EDL).

2 The EDL presents itself as an inclusive multi-ethnic organisation and estimates of the size of its membership vary from several hundred to several thousand according to differing sources. Their stated aim is to oppose the spread of Islamism, Sharia Law and Islamic extremism in England. The group's mission statement declares that anyone is welcome so long as they are integrated. Their initial support was drawn predominantly from football risk group supporters who are defined as people who are regarded as posing a possible risk to public order or anti-social behaviour whether planned or spontaneous.

3. However, their numbers have significantly grown over the past 12 months due to the growth of modern communications and social networking sites such as Facebook. It is believed that they are now attracting interest and support from a more diverse group including serving and ex-serving armed forces personnel, some members of the LGBT community, the Jewish communities and individuals from various social and ethnic backgrounds. The forming of self-interested divisions within the EDL umbrella conflicts with the mainstream belief that their membership consists entirely of bigoted and racist football risk groups and activists, who are also aligned to far right extremist groups.

4. The Stop Islamisation of England (SIOE), led by Stephen Gash, came to notice following the recent Harrow Mosque protests, which were also attended by EDL. However, the EDL leadership distanced itself from SIOE and stated that their members should not attend. It is believed that SIOE attracts in the region of 20 supporters and is, therefore, significantly smaller than the EDL.

5. Clearly, the monitoring and intelligence gathering on EDL and ‘Stop Islamisation of Europe’ (SIOE) activity throughout London is central to the MPS ability to police a safer London. Each BOCU gathers local intelligence via various sources including Response Teams, Safer Neighbourhood Teams, Partnerships Units and Local Authorities. This information is then collated locally within the respective Borough Intelligence Units. CO11 Public Order Intelligence Unit gathers the intelligence from each borough and this information is fed into command teams for relevant public order events. Information will continue to be gathered as events progress to build and update the intelligence picture of the inter-relationships between EDL and SIOE to enhance the policing response.

6. The ‘Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team’ (CTSET) also monitors and gathers intelligence from all 32 London boroughs, to provide a pan-London overview. Each borough sends a Community Tension Assessment (CTA) return to CTSET on a weekly basis. The results from the CTAs form the basis of the Community Tensions Report (COMTEN), which, upon completion, is disseminated via a restricted circulation list, which includes Lord Harris. The COMTEN is referred to at Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Special Operations’ fortnightly Security Review Committee (SRC) meeting.

A chronological précis of EDL and other related groups’ activities can be found in Appendix 1.

Details of any learning from elsewhere to inform the MPS response to far right demonstrations by EDL

7. The MPS is the leading force in policing the EDL. This is in part due to the direct engagement that CO11 and CTSET have built-up with the EDL. This has enabled other OCUs within the MPS to facilitate meetings with influential EDL members before, during and post demonstrations. Other police forces such as Greater Manchester, Nottinghamshire, Thames Valley, Lancashire, South Yorkshire, Essex, Hampshire, Northumberland and West Yorkshire have used CO11 and CTSET to forge their own direct links with the EDL and start their own process for short term engagement.

8. An enhanced knowledge of domestic extremist groups such as EDL has informed the MPS policing response. It has also enabled the EDL to establish a point of contact with the MPS which has proven to be valuable for the police service in terms of planning the policing of their events in London and other parts of the country. Feedback from police colleagues to date has indicated that this is an effective method of introduction, which has enabled other police forces to undertake dialogue with EDL representatives. This approach has also ensured that appropriate policing resources are made available, therefore allowing protests to take place more safely.

9. The National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET) provides assistance to Senior Investigating Officers and Custody Teams engaged in extremist investigations. For example, Operation Razorbill has developed a generic ‘Case Summary’ document, a ‘Bail Condition Strategy’ and a ‘Pre-Interview Solicitor Briefing’, which combine to promote a consistent approach to judicial case-disposal throughout the UK. NDET also provide specialist assistance in relation to forensic retrieval and post event investigations.

An outline of the roles and responsibilities of central and borough based units within the MPS in respect of policing far right demonstrations; who leads on this area and how is a consistent MPS response achieved?

10. CO11 Public Order OCU has a central role in the planning and resourcing of significant events in London, including extremist demonstrations where disorder is anticipated. CO11 personnel also lead specialist intelligence and evidence gathering teams, who receive advanced training within their respective fields of expertise. Where possible, these specialist teams will be deployed at local events to help ensure MPS consistency and enhance intelligence flows which will help ensure that these events are seen as being linked rather than being viewed in isolation. It is planned that these deployments will continue after an event has ended as sporadic disorder often occurs once the main event has concluded.

11. The Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA) has dedicated personnel who work in partnership with CO11 and SO15 to help ensure the early preparation of corporate press lines and releases. This approach has proved especially effective in the prompt rebuttal of misinformation that often proliferates throughout the social networking sites and some quarters of the national media.

12. Where there are perceived to be specific legal issues raised by a particular protest, or if an event is likely to be particularly high profile or challenging, CO11 consult with the Directorate of Legal Services, and a lawyer is allocated to the event to review the main command strategy and attend key planning meetings.

13. SO15 gather, assess and disseminate intelligence in relation to Domestic Extremism. SO15 do not monitor far right groups unless there is intelligence to suggest an impact upon disorder or the risk of developing into extremism. SO15 seeks to provide complimentary intelligence and support to CO11’s Public Order OCU.

Details of MPS engagement with local communities and other relevant stakeholders

14. The Senior Management Teams of Tower Hamlets and Harrow have been instrumental in the development of effective communication, shared understanding and mutual trust between the MPS and the communities they serve.

15. For example, Tower Hamlets has received ‘fantastic support’ from the Council of Mosques, the Independent Advisory Group and the Youth Services of the East London Mosque. This was especially evident during the lead-up to the events on the 20th of June where early engagement with each group was central to the combined dispelling of misinformation that was leading towards considerable concern in some quarters of the local community. On numerous occasions, leaders from these groups publicly supported local police officers by calming angry residents following a series of sporadic EDL ‘visits’ to the Whitechapel area.

16. This partnership approach has led to the formation of the ‘Community Mediator Scheme’, which provides a rota of community leaders who can be called upon by the police to aid local communication and reduce community tension at critical times. It is suggested that the recent EDL events that occurred over the summer have served to strengthen relations between the police and the local Muslim community. A recent decision to withdraw police from a Mosque during an incident of high tension and replace the officers with Community and Youth Leaders provides an excellent example of this partnership and the MPS willingness to ‘police differently’.

17. These themes are also evident in the experiences of Harrow, where a number of far right marches and static events have taken place and are planned for the near future. Trust and communication is very much the key to the successes of both boroughs. Local initiatives including a Youth Parliament linked to a vigorous Independent Advisory Group and a Police and Community Blog each combine to provide an efficient, accessible and transparent means of interaction. It is also clear that the relationships between the local police managers and the Community and Youth Leaders have been forged over time and are very much reliant upon the shared understanding, consistency and continuity that only established partnerships, between key individuals, can bring.

18. CTSET is in the process of developing a training package that centres upon the themes of far right and far left extremism. The recipients of this training resource will be the MPS, third sector/faith and local community partners, and other organisations working around the theme of Community Cohesion. It is planned that additional beneficiaries will include local colleges, Youth Offending Teams, Attendance Centres, Pupil Referral Units and Young Offenders Institutions and Her Majesty's Prison Service.

19. CTSET desk officers and community outreach workers consult regularly with Muslim community groups, who are able to offer a strategic perspective in relation to the EDL. The overwhelming view from within the Muslim communities is that the EDL is an Islamophobic, racist organisation whose core membership is predominately white, working class, racist thugs with links to the British National Party and Combat 18. They also believe that the EDL is not just targeting Muslim extremists, as they claim, but the Muslim community in general.

20. They draw reference to various sources including the witnessing of racist and Islamophobic behaviour and chanting at EDL organised marches. These marches are usually planned in areas with high Muslim populations such as Tower Hamlets and Bradford, a tactic that is viewed as being a deliberate and provocative act intended to raise tensions. EDL, however, counter these allegations by stating that such behaviour is the result of a small number of trouble-makers who are intent on sullying their cause. They also state that they have forcibly removed such individuals from their number in the past.

21. Communities also refer to racist and Islamophobic views and videos posted on social networking sites by individuals purporting to be EDL members. Other areas of the media have also been mentioned such as the EDL article by the Guardian newspaper published on 28th May 2010. The National Public Order Intelligence Unit seek to provide a balanced overview of this complex and changing situation and they remain instrumental in the dissemination of intelligence, shared learning and good practice throughout the UK’s police services.

What are the outcomes resulting from the above community engagement and how do these feed into operational policing considerations?

22. As the relationship between CTSET and representatives from the EDL has grown, so, too, has the level of trust and understanding. The information received by CTSET has consistently corroborated other intelligence held by the MPS. This has influenced the decision making process when considering public order events and the impact such events may have on community cohesion.

23 CTSET strategic community outreach workers and desk officers engage in fast time community consultation, which provides useful intelligence in support of the preparation of Community Impact Assessments and Community Tension Assessments. The preparation of these assessments provides senior police managers with key community intelligence that informs their decision making process.

Details of interventions and arrests made post event and how this is communicated.

24 The National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) has distributed a post-event pro forma that invites host forces to provide details of their events and the arrests made. The most common source of post event reporting is the forces own de-brief documents.

25. Post event reporting from the majority of recent Defence League events indicates that a significant number of those arrested are local crime nominals. Subsequent research of this reporting suggests that a vast majority of those arrested have no previously reported link to domestic extremist groups. The response by forces remains event motivated; there are minimal resources dedicated by forces beyond the policing of the event.

26. To date, there have been no CO11 led post-event investigations following EDL or related protests.
Details of any specific guidance and training provided to officers and staff with regards to responding to far right activity and policing affected communities

27. As mentioned, NDET provide assistance to Senior Investigating Officers and Custody Teams engaged in extremist investigations. CO11 provides specialist intelligence and forensic teams, who also receive enhanced Officer Safety Training. CTSET are in the process of initiating an internal awareness programme for future external development.
Evaluation processes

28. This is gauged through monitoring COMTEN returns and in direct response to CTSET requests for intelligence requirements upon specific community issues. For example, incidents with links to Race, Faith and extremism. Where post-event debriefs have taken place the NPOIU and NDET continue to encourage the review of policing tactics and the dissemination of good practice. SO15 participate in CO11’s debriefs to help ensure continuity, good practice and shared learning.
Highlight what elements of the MPS response to the far right demonstrations worked well as well as areas for improvement.

29. The pre-event consultation process between the MPS and the EDL has operated very successfully. The EDL are generally concerned to cooperate with the MPS and appreciate that the MPS maintains an overtly even-handed response to all protests, so long as they are intended to be peaceful. The EDL perceive that on occasions counter-protest groups such as Unite Against Facism and Muslims Against Crusades do not practice such an organised pattern of liaison with police but nonetheless have their events facilitated by the MPS. They continue to be frustrated at the perceived lack of police engagement with counter protestors and concessions being ‘unfairly’ granted. Consequently, they feel there are few positive outcomes and no advantages to be gained in terms of their continued direct engagement with police. This is a complex issue that is currently under consideration for future EDL and counter demonstration events.

30. As mentioned, the local initiatives in the boroughs of Harrow and Tower Hamlets demonstrate the importance of effective communication between the police managers and the communities they serve. The speed and scale of misinformation promulgated through social networking sites has been highlighted as an increasing challenge by local police commanders. For example, spurious rumours of Muslim women being attacked, Imams being assaulted and places of worship being vandalised result in significant numbers of young males attending to ‘defend’ their mosque. Intelligence suggests that such ‘information’ is often in existence prior to the planned event, which is clearly a concern. Representations to revisit the corporate use of Twitter and Facebook to help swiftly dispel community rumour have been made by senior police managers during the completion of this paper.

31. Early engagement with event organisers has enabled the MPS to tailor factors such as the protest venue, points of arrival and anticipated numbers in order to inform the policing response. The MPS has observed the reaction of both event organisers and the general public on a number of occasions over the last year or so to the imposition of protest bans in other areas of the country under s13 of the Public Order Act 1986, approved by the Home Secretary. These have alienated the EDL and so far proved ineffectual in actually preventing the gathering of significant numbers of protestors, as seen most recently in Leicester. The MPS has not to date been in the position of needing to approach the Home Secretary for such a ban, and considers that it is unlikely that it will find itself in a position where it is unable to respond appropriately using other policing powers.

Highlight challenges in respect of planned and future demonstrations and activity by far right groups.

32. The demonstrations by the EDL have heightened tensions and the sense of fear and vulnerability within certain sections of London’s communities. The EDL membership has slowly increased event upon event but interest in their websites is believed to have increased significantly in recent times. There has been evidence to suggest that their demonstrations have also attracted members from extreme right wing groups, although it is assessed that they have attended to ‘observe’ proceedings. More extreme elements of the EDL are intent on further street level confrontations and have become disillusioned with some of the EDL hierarchy, due to their perceived passive stance on certain issues.

33. The potential for violence from EDL and counter-protestors is not to be underestimated and could have serious implications in terms of future protests and community cohesion. These events will attract wide media coverage and extreme elements from the opposing sides will take advantage of this coverage for their own agendas. The police response must reflect the needs of both communities and organisations to protest peacefully. Tensions will remain high despite the efforts of the police, partner agencies and community leaders. However, current National Community Tension Team (NCTT) reporting indicates that community tensions return to pre-event levels shortly after the conclusion of the events.

34. Within these groups there will be splinter factions that have their own agendas and would seek to capitalise upon any advantage to increase tensions. Open and organised dialogue between these groups is non existent, although there are sections within both groups who have previously indicated that they would be willing to participate in meaningful dialogue and engagement to understand, acknowledge and address their respective points of view.

35 .It is believed that a perception is now arising within the EDL that they are being treated less favourably than counter protestors and that opponents are not being required to engage, or indeed cooperate, with police. Being able to apply the necessary policing resources with perceived impartiality to both the EDL and counter protestors is crucial in successfully policing such events. It would also minimise allegations by the EDL that opposing sides are being afforded preferential treatment by the police. There is evidence to suggest that the EDL are now adopting a new strategy which involves 'flash demos' to maintain their visible presence predominantly in areas with high proportions of Muslim or Asian people. This tactic may indicate that the EDL is becoming increasingly frustrated with the police. It is worth noting that the November 2010 student protests, which has prompted a more cautionary response by the MPS, may place additional burdens on the overtime and aid budgets in policing future EDL protests.

C. Other organisational & community implications

Equality and Diversity Impact

1. The policing of extremist groups remains a significant, complex and emotive challenge to the MPS. MPS engagement with groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) has proven productive in planned events. However, the accessibility of modern communication, including social networking sites, has heightened community tensions and misinformation often results in the rapid assembly of angry counter demonstrations to preplanned, sporadic and unplanned events.

2. The necessity for a fair, consistent and transparent police response, at both the tactical and strategic level, is clearly a major and on-going challenge.

Consideration of MET Forward

3. The MPS response to policing extremist groups remains of significant political, media and community interest. Although the arrests associated with EDL activities remain low, their continued engagement with the MPS remains precarious owing to their perception of being treated unfairly when compared to the participants of counter groups, which include the Muslim community.

4. Such perceptions, if left unchecked, may result in disengagement from the MPS and an increase of criminality and community tension.

Financial Implications

5. This report outlines the current policing processes and practices when policing extremist groups. Although the report highlights the potential benefits of effective communication to communities through social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook; and the enhanced availability of CO11 officers at local and national events to help ensure consistency and intelligence flow, the financial implications appear unchanged.

6. However, in light of recent events which has required increased resources to be deployed on policing public order demonstrations additional overtime costs may in future be incurred in policing far right demonstrations to ensure that adequate cautionary cover is in place. This will put additional pressure on the Public Order Aid budget and may prevent further reductions in overtime being achieved.

Legal Implications

7. The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of existing MPS processes and practices, which are proven and tested in relation to the law. For these reasons, the legal implications, although significant, are believed to remain unchanged.

Environmental Implications
8. The environmental implications of this report appear to be minimal.

Risk Implications

9. The corporate risk associated with policing extremist groups remain significantly high. However, there is no change to existing processes and procedures.

D. Background papers

None

E. Contact details

Report author: Inspector Nicholas Sutcliffe, CO11, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

A chronological précis of the key activities of EDL and other related groups:

• The EDL supported two protests organized by another group, the ‘Stop Islamisation of Europe’ (SIOE), against Harrow Central Mosque on 11 September 2009 and another on 13 December 2009. CO11 Public Order Branch policed the event.
•  On 5 March 2010 the ‘Unite Against Fascism’ (UAF) opposed EDL outside Parliament, as far right Dutch MEP Geert Wilders visited London to screen his controversial anti Islam film ‘Fitna’. CO11 Public Order Branch policed the event. Elements of the UAF were subsequently arrested. No arrests were made on the EDL side.
• On 15 June 2010, elements of EDL opposed the ‘Muslims Against Crusades’ (MAC) during the 1st Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment march through Barking and Dagenham borough, having been granted the freedom of the borough.
  The clashes came little over a year after Muslim extremists screamed 'baby killers' and 'rapists' at soldiers from 2nd Battalion Royal Anglian Regiment paraded through Luton after a tour of duty in Iraq. Barking and Dagenham borough policed the event. Due to MAC activity they were escorted by police from the scene for their own safety.
• On 20 June 2010 the EDL announced plans to attend the London borough of Tower Hamlets in protest against a Muslim organised event, 'The Book that Shook the World' which was due to be hosted at the Troxy, 490 Commercial Road, London E1, by the UK-IC (UK Islamic Conference).
  ‘Unite Against Fascism’ (UAF) and ‘East End United’ organised a national counter demonstration with backing from local activists, the council, campaigners and mosques to increase local awareness of the intimidating tactics of the EDL and expose their hate of Islam and Muslims. This event was subsequently cancelled by the organisers and rescheduled to take place at the Hilton Metropole, Edgware.
  CO11 Public Order Branch policed the event. Despite the EDL efforts to disrupt this event there was no disorder. However, disorder occurred in Tower Hamlets between police and anti-EDL protestors and local Asian youths.
•  On 9 September 2010 the EDL held a wreath laying ceremony followed by a 2 minutes silence outside the US embassy in London, held in memory of those killed in the World Trade Towers in 2001. The EDL then marched to the Saudi Arabian Embassy to protest against Islamist terrorism. Anjem Choudary former head of Al Muhajiroun addressed protestors from MAC who had congregated outside the US Embassy, which resulted in scuffles and low level violence between the opposing groups.
• On the 11 September 2010, EDL conducted a counter-protest against MAC who were demonstrating near the Royal Albert Hall at the time of the two minute silence.
• The EDL has also congregated in the Grave Maurice public house, Whitechapel, on several occasions which has resulted in heightened tensions between the EDL and local Asian youths. Tower Hamlets police has dealt with events locally.

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