Operation Safer Streets

Report: 11
Date: 23 May 2002
By: Commissioner

Summary

Operation Safer Streets Phase One was implemented on 4 February 2001 and ran for eight weeks until 31 March 2001. It was highly successful in reducing street crime. Safer Streets Phase Two commenced on 15 April 2002 and will continue until 31 March 2003. It is anticipated that further reductions in street crime will be possible provided that extra resources continue to be committed to the problem. Operation Safer Streets has shown that when police are deployed in sufficient numbers using appropriate tactics, they have a major impact on street crime.

A. Recommendations

Members are asked to:

1. Note the impact that the Operation has had in the reduction of street crime.
2. Support attempts by the MPS to strengthen partnerships working on boroughs to target 'at risk' youths.
3. Endorse co-ordinated partnership activity to reduce risk factors.

B. Supporting information

Background

1. Street crime in London has shown a significant increase since April 2000.

• From April 2000 – April 2001, street crime in London increased by 18% from the previous year.
• From April 2001 – August 2001, the average increase over the same period in 2000 was 29%.
• After the September 11th terrorist attacks in New York however, street crime in London rose at an unprecedented rate.

2. From September 2001 – January 2002 the average increase in street crime over the same period in 2000-2001 was 52%. This demonstrated the distinct correlation between the sharp rise in reported street crime and the re-deployment of borough police officers regarding anti-terrorist measures.

3. The national trend in street crime was also upwards. Prior to 11 September 2001, 17 other forces in England and Wales were recording greater increases in robbery than the MPS.

4. Despite this, the severity of the problem facing the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) was indicated by the fact that 44% of all robberies in England and Wales took place in London.

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) response

5. Prior to September 2001, the MPS relied on Operation Strongbox to tackle street crime alongside local borough activity. Whilst this activity had important success on individual boroughs, it did not impact on the rise in these offences across the MPS.

6. During Operation Strongbox however, a menu of operational tactics was developed that proved effective in dealing with street crime. These have been incorporated into Operation Safer Streets.

7. Following the re-prioritisation and re-deployment of resources after September 11 2001, Operation Safer Streets was set up in January 2002. Phase One of the operation was initially set up to run over an eight-week period from 4 Feb–31 March.

8. The operation was focussed on the nine priority London Boroughs suffering the largest increases in street crime:

• Lambeth
• Southwark
• Hackney
• City of Westminster
• Brent
• Tower Hamlets
• Haringey
• Camden
• Islington

Resources re-deployed to Operation Safer Streets

9. The seriousness of the street crime problem facing London was recognised and extraordinary measures were introduced to combat it. A wide-ranging variety of MPS resources were called upon and officers from specialist units were re-deployed to assist with the Safer Streets Initiative. These included:

• Traffic
• Territorial Support Group (TSG)
• Dogs Section#
• Air Support Unit
• Mounted Branch
• Marine Support Unit
• Territorial Policing Crime Squad

10. In total, 125 TSG officers and 250 traffic officers were re-deployed along with 77 marked rapid response vehicles, 27 covert cars and 93 solo motorcycles.

11. These re-deployments amounted to a total of 500 additional officers tasked in the fight against street crime. Taken with the borough officers, approximately 1100 officers were deployed each day on the nine priority boroughs for the initial eight-week initiative.

Successful tactics

12. Many tactics were developed during Operation Strongbox and these were utilised during Operation Safer Streets:

• fast-time intelligence is developed on borough
• marked 'robbery response' vehicles are deployed and supported by covert cars
• covert 'video sentries' are utilised to cover 'hotspots'
• bail is rigorously opposed in appropriate cases
• curfews are enforced systematically
• pan London Robbery Focus Desk established disseminating strategic and tactical intelligence

Performance

13. Operation Safer Streets resulted in a dramatic reduction in street crime across the Capital over the eight-week period.

14. 866 people were arrested for street crime on the nine boroughs. Of these approximately 45% have been charged to date. 35% have been released on police bail pending identification procedures or further investigation and 20% have been discontinued. After further investigation it is anticipated that many of those on bail will eventually be charged.

15. Across the MPS the average weekly rise in reported street crime for the period April 2001 – January 2002 was 40% over the period April 2000 – March 2001. This was reduced to 10% during Operation Safer Streets Phase One. It is important to note that in the final weeks of this operation, several London Borough Operational Command Units (BOCUs) including Lambeth were recording allegation rates significantly below those for the same period last year.

16. On the nine boroughs the same rates have been reduced from 34% to 5% respectively. March 2002 was the best month for street crime with the lowest number of offences since March 2001.

17. Judicial Disposals have also been increased during Operation Safer Streets. From March 2001 – January 2002 the average Judicial Disposal rate for street crime in the MPS was 7.6%. In February 2002, the MPS recorded a rate of 11.0% and March 9.4%. These were the two best figures for the performance year. Operation Safer Streets therefore recorded a rate of 10.2%, the first time for over a year that the MPS has reached its target of 10%.

18. The performance achieved during Operation Safer Streets Phase One is shown at Appendix 1 (see Supporting material).

Analysis of failings in processes

19. A further element of Operation Safer Streets is the development of a 'Case Tracking System'. Historically the complexities of data collection have meant that anecdotal evidence has driven the debate concerning street crime.

20. Case tracking is designed to demonstrate objectively the effectiveness (or weaknesses) of both the investigative and criminal justice processes. It is vital that the MPS and our partner agencies understand the nature and frequency of process failures. The collation and analysis of case tracking data will be an important step in identifying areas of weakness and taking action to instigate improvements. Urgent work is being pursued by the MPS with partner criminal justice agencies to improve performance.

21. The Case Tracker will document a range of detail regarding all persons arrested for street crime (866 cases) during the eight weeks of phase one. This data will enable a detailed analysis to objectively determine the extent and nature of various weaknesses in the processes from arrest to final disposal. The preliminary results of this analysis have been established. Over the coming weeks as the database continues to be updated, it will enable the Commissioner and the Home Office to inform longer-term action to reduce street crime by all agencies.

The future

22. At the conclusion of Phase One of Operation Safer Streets, the 250 traffic officers were re-assigned back to traffic policing as planned. Also during the same week, significant other assets were re-deployed including BOCU, traffic and TSG officers to policing of Her Majesty the Queen Mother's funeral.

23. It was decided however that the success of Safer Streets had been so significant that it was essential for the operation to continue. In early April 2002 plans were drawn up to continue Operation Safer Streets with a second phase that would last for 12 months until March 31 2003.

Operation Safer Streets Phase Two

Background

24. MPS Management Board directed that street crime was to be the priority crime for the Service.

25. Phase Two of the operation commenced on 15 April 2002. It incorporates the original nine boroughs of

• Lambeth
• Westminster
• Southwark
• Hackney
• Haringey
• Camden
• Tower Hamlets
• Brent
• Islington

26. It also now includes the further six boroughs of

• Newham
• Ealing
• Waltham Forest
• Lewisham
• Wandsworth
• Croydon

27. Although in comparison these new boroughs have a lower level of street crime allegations, they had shown some increase and had historically suffered displacement from the primary boroughs.

Resources

28. Operation Safer Streets Phase Two will continue to deploy officers from specialist units to support officers at BOCUs in combating street crime.

29. 84 traffic officers and 19 traffic vehicles have been seconded to Operation Safer Streets Phase Two and have been attached to specific boroughs. These officers will be rotated with other traffic officers every 15 weeks.

30. Operation Safer Streets will continue to task and deploy TSG officers in large numbers. All TSG will now be tasked routinely by OSS. Each day approximately 140 TSG officers comprising the Borough Reserve are deployed to combat street crime. Approximately 100 TSG officers are now also deployed from the Commissioners Reserve although the abstraction rate for these units is high. Other specialist officers deployed are from the dog section, mounted branch, marine support unit and the air support unit.

31. The total number of officers deployed on the 15 BOCUs therefore is:

• BOCU – 700 (approx.)
• Traffic – 84
• TSG - 240
• Mounted Branch – 25
• Dog Section – 20
• Marine Support Unit – 7
• Air Support Unit - 2

32. Making a daily total of deployed officers on Operation Safer Streets of approximately 1078.

Capacity Building

33. BOCU Commanders on the 15 Boroughs have been tasked to increase the number of officers committed to anti-street crime work. Using demand reduction options from the developing Operational Policing Model (OPM) and growth in Borough Workforce Targets (BWTs), the number of officers directly deployed on Safer Streets will increase during 2002/03.

34. The Government has awarded a grant to the MPS of £13 million to purchase capital equipment including a fleet of robbery response cars and covert anti-robbery vehicles. These and other items of equipment will be delivered to BOCUs as soon as possible. In addition, an overtime allocation of £7 million has been established to sustain OSS for 12 months. A detailed resource plan is now being drawn up and fully costed.

Tactics

35. The successful tactics utilised during Phase One will continue in Phase Two. Strategic intelligence and performance is constantly monitored, evaluated and re-assessed regarding impact and effectiveness.

36. Territorial Policing HQ also continues to inspect boroughs, identify good practice and disseminate effective strategies and tactics.

37. It is anticipated that Operation Seneca (the policing of priority transport crime corridors) and the Transport for London (TfL) Initiative will further impact upon the street crime reduction. Operation Safer Streets will work in partnership with TfL and the new Transport OCU, as there is a high correlation between these transport routes and robbery 'hotspots'.

Tasking

38. Units are tasked every fortnight for a two-week period of deployment. This deployment is decided upon by Gold/Silver based on analysis of recent, previous and projected street crime allegations produced by PIB. Key considerations are street crime volumes, percentage growth and the resources committed locally.

Strategic Intelligence Unit

39. A Strategic Intelligence Unit (SIU) is currently being set up at Westminster HQ that will deal specifically with strategic intelligence and trends in volume crime across London.

COMPSTAT results

40. Operation Safer Streets Phase Two is still in its commissioning stages and difficulties have been encountered with the provision of particular vehicles to run the operation effectively. The new vehicle fleet will not become available for some weeks. Results indicate that the overall number of allegations of street crime rose slightly in the first 3 weeks of April but are now declining. Compared to the corresponding weeks last year in fact there has been a considerable increase. This period however does correspond with a steep drop last year that exacerbates the differential. New results are shown at Appendix 2 (see Supporting material).

Sustainability

MPS

41. The sustainability of Safer Streets is a critical issue for the MPS. The 250 traffic officers deployed for Phase One was a short-term solution and the MPS is not able to deploy this number indefinitely.

42. The tactics so far successfully used to combat street crime are extremely labour intensive and have involved the 'ring fencing' of resources. A particularly effective tactic has been the deployment of marked robbery response cars backed up by two or three covert cars. These sweep the vicinity for suspects on receipt of information from the robbery response crew of the marked vehicle. This has led to numerous street identifications and arrests. The success has been due, in the main, to the fact that these vehicles and officers are deployed only to street crime.

43. Changes in the shift patterns and the deployment of officers from the 15 London Safer Streets Boroughs are also being drawn up to make more officers available at the critical times street crime is taking place.

44. In the absence of new fully trained police officers, or a major new re-deployment on the scale of the 250 traffic officers, overtime is the primary route through which the operation can be sustained. This however has limitations due to attrition and fatigue caused by extended operational activity. Overtime will however be important in the short and medium term to perform the extended and additional tours of duty required. In addition the Home Secretary has recently announced a planned 15% cut in police overtime, over three years from 2003/04, as part of the police reform, with the savings being reinvested in the service.

45. The driving qualification required to drive the robbery response cars is of the highest level and BOCUs do not have sufficient trained staff to carry out this function for Phase Two of Safer Streets. It has been necessary therefore to deploy a reduced number of traffic officers to fulfil this role.

46. Consideration is also being given to lowering the classification level required to drive these specialist vehicles.

47. Arrangements are in place to prioritise the Safer Streets boroughs with regard to driving courses. As BOCU officers receive appropriate training the traffic officers will be returned to their units in a graded process over the next 12 months.

48. Certain of the TSG security functions have been taken on by the Diplomatic Protection Group (DPG) thereby releasing extra officers from the Commissioners Reserve to Safer Streets.

49. BOCUs are tasked to identify and 'ring fence' a dedicated Safer Streets resource capacity. Growth in Budgeted Workforce Targets and demand reduction initiatives coming out of the MPS Policing Model work will support this process.

Further Officers

50. A feasibility study is currently being conducted into deploying officers directly from Training School at the end of their 18-week course onto Operation Safer Streets. These officers would then spend five weeks on OSS before transferring on to their respective boroughs. This will effectively result in 300 further officers available daily to deploy to combat street crime. No decisions have been taken on this issue.

Resourcing of Operation Safer Streets Phase Two

51. This issue is outlined in detail at Financial Implications below.

Impact on other policing areas across London

General

52. The policing demands of Safer Streets has undoubtedly had an impact upon other areas of policing. This is very difficult to fully assess and quantify and much of any impact will likely be long term. In respect of traffic however some information is available.

Traffic Policing

53. Regarding road traffic accidents the following table compares figures recorded during Safer Streets and the same eight-week period last year.

54. As can be seen, the figures remained broadly the same except for personal injury accidents which were reduced during Safer Streets. Intelligence has indicated that the 'hotspots' for street crime correlate very closely with those for accidents. Traffic officers on Safer Streets therefore have been maintaining a high profile at these locations and this may have impacted upon the standards of driving albeit only on the nine priority boroughs. However, the exact reasons for this reduction is not known at this stage and is currently subject of research.

55. Calls from members of the public for police assistance at personal injury and damage only accidents demonstrated a similar trend. (These do not include those on motorways or at Heathrow Airport).

56. Similar figures resulted when the nine priority boroughs were examined alone.

57. Traffic OCU was not able to mount any targeted enforcement activities during Safer Streets in relation to speed or seat belt offences. They also were unable to carry out any auto crime investigations or support operations against overweight vehicles and those with dangerous loads.

58. A number of other agencies such as Customs and Excise and Transport for London have had to curtail or alter their operations due to the traffic unit's inability to offer their normal level of support.

Lessons Learnt

59. The lessons learned during this operation have been considerable. The result is that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) firmly believes that with:

• A continued 'ring fenced' resource approach
• Intelligence-led deployments
• Use of proven tactics
• An investment in police overtime and equipment
• The implementation of planned improvements to the PACE Codes of Practice relating to identification procedures
• Planned new investment in ID video technology
• The pursuance of initiatives with mobile telephone network operators
• Improvements within the Criminal Justice and Diversion systems
• Continued partnership effort and engagement of social and economic partners at every level

Substantial further reductions in Street Crime are achievable.

C. Financial implications

1. The cost of Safer Streets Phase One in police overtime was £2.1m for eight weeks.

2. A detailed bid was submitted to the Home Office seeking funding for Operation Safer Streets Phase Two. This covered overtime, specialist vehicles and information and communications technology (ICT). This totalled £18,786,126.00. This bid was considered against the overall allocation of £31 million for the 10 priority street crime Forces. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has been provisionally allocated just under £13 million of these funds.

3. The shortfall from the original bid is £5,906,000. This is a shortfall in the overtime element of the bid of £3,000,000 and a shortfall in the capital element of the bid of £2,906,000. Clearly, the MPS will have to re-profile its bid to take account of this downward revision.

4. The overtime element of the original bid was based on the overtime expenditure of the first 4 weeks of Operation Safer Streets. Generic costings were used to calculate the costs of purchasing specialist vehicles to sustain the Safer Streets tactic. Similarly generic costings were used to calculate the costs of the provision of ICT equipment. More precise costings are now being developed in partnership with the Directorate of Resources.

D. Background papers

None.

E. Contact details

Report author: Detective Inspector David Manning, MPS.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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