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Report 8 of the 29 May 03 meeting of the MPA Committee and details how the new Major Investigation Team (MIT) Model will be structured to form the basis for the investigation of serious crime.

Warning: This is archived material and may be out of date. The Metropolitan Police Authority has been replaced by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC).

See the MOPC website for further information.

Murder Investigation Team Model 2002

Report: 8
Date: 29 May 2003
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report details how the new Major Investigation Team (MIT) Model will be structured to form the basis for the investigation of serious crime.

A. Recommendation

That the Authority notes the proposed MPS structure of teams to investigate serious crime.

B. Supporting information

1. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary’s recommendations in “Winning the Race”, a report that followed up the Stephen Lawrence enquiry chaired by Sir William Macpherson, recommended that more staff are needed in the MPS to investigate homicides. The business case for an overall growth figure of 400 posts for homicide investigations has been accepted.

2. The MPA and Commissioner have successfully negotiated additional staff but to date these resources have been diverted to Borough Operational Command Units BOCUs) and counter terrorism demands.

3. Due to the numbers not being made available, the Serious Crime Group (SCG) Senior Management Team commissioned some work to look at the structure of the MITs with view to aligning personnel in the best format to meet the unique demands of homicide investigations. The review team was led by Detective Superintendent Peter Ship, who was assisted by colleagues from across the SCG. The work was conducted within the context of Best Value. The team looked at what was in place, what the existing and new threats were, and what skills were required. They visited other forces and made recommendations to the SCG senior management team. Their recommendations were accepted with some minor adjustments.

4. Prior to the review, the SCG homicide investigation teams were divided into three geographical OCUs (West, East and South). Each team had 27 police staff and seven civil staff. Additionally Operation Trident had two slightly larger teams, one North and one South, to meet the demands within their terms of reference. Each team had a mixture of skills and experience. There was no quota for officers with certain skills or training and it was not unknown for officers to go from one case to the next performing the same type of role, e.g. family liaison. The team structure also required the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) to be of one rank – Detective Chief Inspectors - and that he/she deployed most of the team on the one enquiry at any one time.

5. Quite often SIOs found they had a number of cases to investigate simultaneously with the direction being on dealing with the most recently taken case or as felt appropriate to the officers on the team. This could cause confusion and demanded more of the staff in the incident room to ensure they allocated reports, statements and papers to the correct accounts on Holmes (the system used for homicide investigations). The high caseload and multi tasking of staff (particularly in the Holmes suite) were two aspects the HMIC report “Winning The Race” recommended should be attended to.

6. The MIT model 2002 addresses these issues as well as allowing for growth within the competing demands of other policing needs. It will require additional staff and will also need a new training programme to meet the skill requirements on the teams.

7. At Appendix 1 is an organisational chart of the MIT Model 2002 (this has been made subject of MPS copyright). It is based on a team number of 39 staff, being 32 police and seven members of the civil staff. For the homicide teams the additional staff requirements are for 135 police officers (see section D for breakdown and costings). There are plans to align a crime scene manager to each team from within Forensic Services to provide in-house forensic advice and expertise.

8. The homicide profile in London demonstrates a complexity which is unique in the UK. The diverse make up of London is one cause of this complex picture. The homicide figures for the last three years, using categories defined by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) are as follows:

  • Category A – a murder of high public interest
    2000/01 – 7; 2001/02 – 8; 2002/03 - 9
  • Category B – where the offender is not known
    2000/01 – 59; 2001/02 – 98; 2002/03 – 94
  • Category C – where the offender is known
    2000/01 – 122; 2001/02 – 98; 2002/03 – 83

9. These categories do not fully do justice to the complex nature of homicide investigations in London in particular. There is a closer working relationship with families and communities, together with their respective expectations; the need for risk management, properly considered and recorded, to meet the demands of investigations; the media attention and spotlight; and the demands of the judicial system – needs of disclosure, and the role of defence lawyers seeking a doubt rather than a search for the truth. All of the above, together the new procedures in the post Lawrence era, require intrusive management, keen leadership and strong supervision.

10. The MIT Model 2002 provides this together with flexibility and scalability in approach. The team is made up of three core teams, a major investigation room team and an intelligence team. Investigations can then allocate resources in the following manner:

  • On a Category C investigation, which appears to be one not requiring extensive enquiries - one core team can be assigned to the task. On the core team are all the required skills required for that investigation. The Detective Inspector will oversee the investigations, with the Detective Sergeant being the case officer. The SIO on the team – the Detective Chief Inspector - will manage the team, giving direction and allocating resources and support from the MIR and intelligence team. The MIR and intelligence team have all the required skills for their roles. The SIO can provide additional staff to aid the core team on a needs basis.
  • On a Category B investigation, a core team will still be responsible for the case but additional core teams can be ‘bolted’ on as directed by the SIO. Once again, the SIO will direct and record the level of support from the MIR and intelligence team. If the Cat B inquiry is even more demanding, additional core teams and MIR staff or intelligence operatives can be loaned to the inquiry on a needs basis with the OCU’s Detective Chief Superintendent and Detective Superintendents reviewing the needs across all the teams under their command.
  • On a Category A investigation, the whole team will work on the case but with one core team still being the case team. If the inquiry is such that a more senior rank is required as SIO, then one can be appointed and, if need be, two MIT teams can come together to work with him or her. Additional needs can be further met, e.g. a senior officer managing the media requirements, thus allowing the SIO to concentrate on the case and not be deflected.

Thus the model is flexible and scalable. It very much depends on sponsoring staff above the SIOs continuously monitoring the caseloads and needs across the commands. The MPS plans to implement the model on homicide commands. There are plans for a similar structure in the child protection MIT teams and on Operation Trident – these have already formed part of an agreed bid.

11. The MIT model 2002 may meet the demands of homicides in London providing preventative work continues and the number of murder and unexplained deaths does not rise – the same as elsewhere in the UK. The inquiry into the investigation of Damilola Taylor and the HMIC report 2002/3 further highlighted the need for additional resources to investigate murders. The model will need to be reviewed at six monthly intervals to ensure it meets the demands and is working. The new training programme must also be reviewed to ensure these demands are met.

12. The MPS Management Board approved the model on the 26 March 2003 and other forces are showing interest in it. It may well be that some BOCUs could at the very least set up their own core teams to bring the skills in a team basis for crimes they deal with e.g. rape and serious assault.

C. Equality and diversity implications

1. Selection for the positions at grades and in the specific areas will be open and fair for the best person to meet the requirements. It is accepted that some training programmes will be needed to ensure base skills are provided to junior and inexperienced staff joining the department.

2. There is a positive requirement to recruit staff (both police and civil) from visible ethnic groups and females. This will be a further aspect of the selection criteria.

3. Due to the demands on experienced police staff throughout the Service, the MIT model 2002 will be revisited to consider where roles can be performed by either police or civil staff with the necessary skills. This will enable recruitment of retiring officers with the skills and know how. It is intended to retain a variable position in these roles so that police or civil staff can perform them to allow for a mix and match and ensure sufficient staff are available across the teams.

D. Financial implications

1. To meet the MIT model 2002 additional staff will be required for homicide command:

  • Detective Inspectors - 27 at £57,754
  • Detective Sergeants - 54 at £52,908 (includes overtime)
  • Detective Constables - 54 at £48,588 (includes overtime)

These are already part of an agreed growth bid in the current year.

2. This will be additional staff of 135 at £7,040,142

3. Accommodation requirements have already been included in any accommodation plan that is underway.

4. Furnishing, training, consumables and support costs have not been costed.

E. Background papers

None.

F. Contact details

Report author: André Baker, Head of Homicide Investigation, MPS.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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