Suicide terrorism

Report: 13
Date: 27 October 2005
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report is brought forward to inform and update members on how the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) developed its response to the threat of suicide terrorism.

A. Recommendation

That Members note the contents of this report.

B. Supporting information

Operation Kratos – a range of tactics

1. Operation Kratos is the name given to a range of tactics used to defend against the threat from suicide bombers. There are three separate plans under the generic title of Operation Kratos:

• Operation Andromeda is designed to deal with the spontaneous sighting by a member of the public of a suspected suicide bomber.
• Operation Beach is where there is an intelligence-led covert operation to locate and arrest persons suspected of involvement in acts of terrorism.
• Operation Clydesdale is where intelligence has been received about a suicide attack on a pre-planned event.

2. The options for all three operations range from an unarmed stop of the suspect by uniformed officers, through to the deployment of armed police officers. These options involve a range of tactics that members will appreciate cannot be discussed publicly.

Background to the development of Kratos

3. In the last few years there has been a significant increase worldwide in the number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by suicide bombers, whether on foot, in a vehicle, or by air or sea. The three predominant areas in the world where such attacks have been witnessed are Israel, Sri Lanka and Russia. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack in New York on the 11 September 2001, an MPS team was sent to these countries to investigate the phenomenon of suicide terrorism and what tactics were available that the police in the UK could deploy to counter this threat.

4. Some valuable lessons were learned with regard to identifying potential suicide bombers, how common types of devices are made and worn, and intelligence gathering practices. However, the tactics to deal with suicide bombers in all three countries are wholly unsuitable for adoption by the UK. There is no Human Rights legislation in these countries and the tactics deployed are not consistent with the UK policing philosophy.

5. The most prevalent type of explosive used by suicide terrorists in the Middle East is extremely sensitive to impact, shock and electrostatic discharge. HM Government scientists state that the use of baton guns, Taser, or firearms that impact on this material will cause it to detonate. These materials are so sensitive that the heat from a camera flash bulb or torch bulb will cause them to detonate. Therefore, tactics have to be available that will not impact on the explosive.

6. Secondly, there is clear evidence that suicide bombers will spontaneously detonate their devices if they believe they have been identified. This is true in all three countries that were visited. Therefore, any tactics deployed have to involve officers acting covertly to retain the element of surprise. Also, the tactics had to ensure immediate incapacitation to eradicate any opportunity for the bomber to cause the device to function.

Development of the tactics

7. The work to research and develop suitable tactics, which became Operation Kratos, was undertaken by Sir David Veness and then Deputy Assistant Commissioner Barbara Wilding.

8. In March 2002, Operation Tavistock, a tabletop exercise, was held. This explored the issues and assisted in the development of the police tactics. The following organisations (amongst others) were represented – Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA); media companies; HM Coroner; Crown Prosecution Service: Police Staff Associations.

9. Following this communication exercise a policy to defend against the threat of suicide terrorism in the UK was drawn up – Operation Kratos.

10. It is essential that the MPS have tactics available for the defence and protection of officers and the public in proximity to the threat. This is not a ‘shoot to kill’ policy. The tactics are wholly consistent with Section 3 Criminal Law Act, which says ‘A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in the effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large’. This is well articulated in the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms.

11. It should be noted that there is no legal requirement for an officer to give a verbal challenge before firing and the ACPO Police Use of Firearms manual acknowledges that there are occasions when it is not appropriate or practical to do so.

12. Owing to the extreme nature of the risk to the public, a very robust command structure has been designed and implemented. Specially trained ACPO officers, acting as the ‘Designated Senior Officer’, (DSO) will command these operations. It is the DSO who will give the order to a firearms officer to shoot. Legal advice to support this stance has been obtained. There is a DSO on call 24 hours per day, seven days per week to deal with suspected suicide terrorist incidents.

On the basis of the work done by the then Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO), Operation Kratos was adopted as national policy and promulgated through the ‘Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee’ of the Association of Chief Police Officers to all Forces around the UK in January 2003. This policy has been reviewed regularly since its adoption. Following the inquest verdict of the Stanley shooting, further legal advice was sought in January 2005 and a review of the policy was undertaken. The police operation was found to be still fit for purpose. However there is a constant review of the threat and intelligence to ensure tactics are appropriate and proportionate.

13. Regular contact is maintained with law enforcement agencies around the world to establish if any organisation has developed a more appropriate set of tactics. Globally there is no agency with a more carefully researched and proportionate policy.

Frequency of incidents

14. The following table outlines the number of spontaneous incidents resulting from calls from members of the public about suspected suicide bombers.

15. To date, the number of calls [now running at a much reduced daily rate] is over 1000. All have been resolved safely.

16. Following the tragic events of the 22 July 2005, the MPS has commenced a review led by Assistant Commissioner Steve House, which is working in close conjunction with a national review led by Deputy Chief Constable Edwards of Sussex Police.

17. As a result of the recent review the tactical options have been widened to cover a greater range of operational circumstances. There has also been a change to the terminology used in order to improve clarity around tactical selection. There is imminent training to update DSOs in these developments.

18. The significant work in progress is the preparation of a Community Strategy to inform Londoners of the context for Operation Kratos and the rationale behind the tactics.

19. The lead for Operation Kratos both in the MPS and nationally has now moved from Specialist Operations to Central Operations as part of the re-structuring of commands in the MPS earlier this year.

20. The nature of the terrorist threat changes continually and it is therefore likely that our tactics will also develop. In light of this the MPS acknowledges the importance of maintaining lines of communication with governance bodies and communities about any further development of these tactics.

C. Race and equality impact

Police operations in respect of suicide terrorism are either in response to a call from a member of the public or arising out of received intelligence. From the research into incidents of suicide terrorism globally, it is clear that there is no profile of a suicide terrorist. However, it is acknowledged that some groups may feel more vulnerable owing to public perceptions of suicide terrorists and their ethnic origins or religious beliefs. Therefore, as part of Assistant Commissioner House's review of Operation Kratos currently underway, The MPS Diversity Directorate has been tasked with developing a community communications strategy. This is designed not only to improve the information channels with the groups who feel vulnerable, but also to involve them in the review process where appropriate.

D. Financial implications

A budget has been allocated to fund tactical and equipment requirements for suicide terrorist counter measures.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Detective Superintendent Steve Swain

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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