MPS response to Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents

Report: 9
Date: 23 February 2006
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report outlines the current response to a Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) or suspected CBRN incident within the Metropolitan Police District. It identifies the initial response to carry out an assessment and the capabilities to manage that incident. The report will also outline the CBRN contingency for pre-planned events.

A. Recommendation

That Members receive the report.

B. Supporting information

1. Since ‘9/11’ the Metropolitan Police Service has been developing an operational response to a deliberate release of a chemical, biological or radioactive material. Working within the framework of the Police National CBRN Centre the MPS now has a significant response that is able to deploy officers, in a of range of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), including anti gas suits, with breathing apparatus. Officers are also equipped with a range of Home Office approved specialist equipment to assess the release of powder, liquid or vapour. In addition, the MPS has taken delivery of five purpose built CBRN vehicles, including one specially designed for the extraction and decontamination of Significant Important Persons (SIP’s).

2. The MPS operational response falls into two categories:

• 24/7 response to spontaneous incidents or events.
• A multi agency CBRN dedicated contingency for larger higher profile pre planned events.

3. Staff undertake three main core functions:

• Operational response.
• Event planning and response.
• Training.

Operational response

4. Following the deluge of ‘white or coloured powder’ incidents the MPS formed a Dedicated CBRN Unit (DCU) from the Territorial Support Group. These officers had limited kit and training but as a result of the operational exposure their capabilities and equipment have developed significantly.

5. In June 2004 a Home Office sponsored pilot brought together the MPS, City of London Police, London Fire Brigade, London Ambulance Service and the National Health Service to form a Multi Agency Initial Assessment Team (MAIAT). The MAIAT provided an operational response on a 24/7 basis. Although originally intended to be a 12-month pilot, it was extended until November 2005.

6. Recommendations were presented to the Home Office and Ministers in that due to the limited number of ‘CBRN’ or coloured powder’ calls the pilot should stop and in November 2005 officers returned to their respective services. Valuable lessons were learnt during this period and these have contributed to enhancing the current operational response of today.

7. The current 24/7 response for the MPS includes the police MAIAT officers as well as TSG officers. These officers work in conjunction with Anti Terrorist Branch Explosive officers, bringing together for the first time two existing capabilities into one response.

Event planning and response

8. CBRN is one of the contingencies that are considered when planning the police response to events in London. The decision to deploy CBRN assets sits at Gold level and can be tailored to the nature of the event, the threat level and any specific intelligence.

9. There are a range of options available from a small discreet assessment team to a full dedicated multi agency response with the ability to undertake assessment, extract VIPs, cordons, scene preservation, decontamination provided by the London Ambulance Service and emergency or mass decontamination provided by the London Fire Brigade.

10. This dedicated response to events has been developed over a number of years and is seen nationally and internationally as best practice.

Training

11. Two officers from the DCU provide specialist CBRN training to all the MPS departments who have a CBRN capability. This training has been approved and agreed with the Police National CBRN Centre. To date this has included training the entire TSG in respect of their specific roles and responsibilities which includes cordon and containment, disrobing and re robing, property bagging and tagging, Video capture and evidence gathering.

12. The DCU also attend Boroughs to provide CBRN awareness briefings across the MPS.

13. To provide some resilience within the DCU further officers from the TSG have been trained to a higher level to support both the 24/7 operational response and the event specific response as required.

Detection and identification monitoring equipment (DIM) and funding

14. Additional costs are incurred where suppliers are not prepared to include servicing or maintenance costs within the initial price and training has to be purchased from the manufacturer to ensure staff are trained and capable to use the equipment within the manufacturers specifications.

15. This training is in addition to the training referred to above.

C. Race and equality impact

There are no equality or diversity issues arising from this report.

D. Financial implications

Short, medium and long term funding needs

1. Providing a CBRN response for London is a significant expense. The MPS have developed a capability and operational response, which is probably the best in the United Kingdom and Europe, if not the World. However, in order to maintain this standard, and keep up with ongoing developments and improvements within the CBRN arena a significant funding stream is required. Except for the single Counter Terrorism grant no funding exists within the MPS and no funding has been set aside for future needs.

Short term

2. A bid was made to the Home Office Counter Terrorism fund for money to replace used parts of the CR1 suit as well as the development of a surge capacity to enable the MPS to respond to an ongoing CBRN incident should it occur. In addition the l funds would have been used to purchase consumables and the provision for servicing and maintenance of specialist DIM equipment. The bid for monies from the Home Office Counter Terrorism fund was unsuccessful. Funding for CBRN related activity was allocated nationally to ACPO TAM. The MPS are currently finalising their bid to ACPO TAM to obtain the necessary funding.

Medium term

3. The Home Office are currently managing a project to identify a manufacturer to develop a bespoke item of Detection and Identification equipment, which meets the standards of the Home Office Scientific Development Branch, Porton Down and the front line operational users. The MPS would wish to purchase this equipment once it is fully developed.

4. Other on going considerations are a capability to deploy with firearms officers and covert operations teams to monitor the air in a terrorist stronghold situation. This would require the deployment of CBRN trained staff with specialist equipment.

5. The bid submitted to the Counter Terrorism fund included ongoing yearly costs, as the bid was unsuccessful funds are still required to cover these requirements.

Long term

6. Should terrorists use chemical, biological or radioactive materials anywhere in the world the impact on London and the MPS would be significant as the white powder incidents proved after 9/11. The current operational response would need to be increased beyond the team now available within the DCU/TSG OCU. The MPS has to continue to develop its capabilities, embracing new developments in technology and equipment that will be made. If this is not achieved then the MPS’s ability to keep ahead of Terrorist activity and provide an appropriate CBRN response will be found wanting.

7. The National CBRN Centre at Winterbourne Gunner is developing an escape hood, which will be capable of issue to all patrolling officers. Funding for this project has not been agreed between the Home Office and ACPO TAM.

Biological developments

8. Superintendent Read has briefed the MPA in respect of Operation Cyclamen, the joint Home Office and Customs and Excise radiological detection system. The MPS will be involved in the trials of the mobile radiological detection capability and the use of a pedestrian portal. Radiological detection has been/is being installed in major ports and transport hubs. Waterloo International Station and Heathrow Airport have fixed detection capabilities.

9. The Home Office, subject to the outcome of the trails will purchase an additional ten vehicles equipped with radiological detection equipment. The MPS can access this equipment if required. Members of the DCU have been trained at the Atomic Weapons Establishment and further courses for staff to be trained to Radiological Protection Supervisor standard will delivered at the end of January 2006.

E. Background papers

None provided

F. Contact details

Report author: Commander Messinger.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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