MPS response to ‘IPCC report Stockwell 2’

Report: 7a
Date: 6 September 2007
By: AC Operational Services Directorate on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report outlines the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) response to the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s (IPCC) Stockwell 2 investigation into the handling of public statements following the shooting of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005. It sets out progress already made in the direction of the IPCC’s six recommendations. In particular, it highlights how the MPS has improved the way it manages corporate knowledge and organisational learning. All of this must be put in the context of the tragic death of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes for which the MPS continues to express its regret.

A. Recommendation

That members receive the report and be invited to comment.

B. Supporting information

Background information

1. July 2005 was a period of extraordinary policing activity for the MPS. The capital was confronting the reality of suicide bombers operating in London who demonstrated that they were prepared to murder innocent people.

• 7 July – four explosions on the transport network resulted in the death of 52 innocent people and injury to over 700. The four suicide bombers all died. This resulted in one of the largest criminal investigations undertaken by the MPS.
• 21 July – four devices failed to explode on the transport network. A second major enquiry started to track down those responsible.
• 22 July – the shooting at Stockwell Underground Station of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes.

2. Following the shooting at Stockwell Underground Station, the IPCC launched two separate investigations. The first (referred to as ‘Stockwell 1’) inquired into the circumstances of the shooting itself and the second (referred to as ‘Stockwell 2’) followed complaints made on behalf of the de Menezes family about comments reported in the media after Mr Jean Charles de Menezes had been shot.

Stockwell 1

3. The IPCC Stockwell 1 investigation was referred to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in March 2006. In July 2006, the CPS announced that although no individual officer would face individual prosecution, the MPS would be charged under section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. The trial is scheduled to start on 1 October 2007.

4. This report does not deal with the Stockwell 1 investigation but limits itself to detailing the MPS response to Stockwell 2.

5. In February 2006, the Commissioner presented a report to the Authority outlining how the MPS had responded to the unprecedented challenges of July 2005. By then, significant steps had already been taken to identify areas of learning, including an almost immediate review of the events and operations of July 2005; this was followed by the establishment of Operation Erini in November 2005, to provide an effective response to the IPCC investigation; and the inception of a Kratos Review Group (KRG) to take forward the MPS response to the threat of suicide terrorism.

6. Under the auspice of the KRG, the MPS has continued to take a national lead in the development of tactical options for responding to suicide terrorism. In September this year, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) will be conducting an inspection within the MPS to establish progress.

7. In May 2006, the Commissioner formed a team (July Review Group) to co-ordinate organisational change around the many areas of learning emanating from the events of July 2005 and the many consequent reviews. A key aspect of this work was the development and subsequent operation of the Knowledge Management Centre (KMC).

Stockwell 2

8. The IPCC Stockwell 2 investigation commenced on 14 October 2005 when the MPA referred a complaint made on behalf of the de Menezes family to the IPCC. On Thursday 2 August 2007, the IPCC published its findings. Four preliminary points need to be made. First, as the Commissioner made clear in his press conference on the day Stockwell 2 was published the MPS entirely accepts its internal and external communication processes failed under the pressure of events on 22 and 23 July 2005. He further accepts that these failures increased the distress caused to the de Menezes family and damaged public confidence in policing in London.

9. Second, however, while the IPCC were duty bound to investigate the complaints made by the family, it is appropriate to make clear that that the MPS has reservations about some aspects of the investigation and the conclusions of the IPCC’s report and will wish to discuss these later in more detail with the MPA. Nevertheless the report will deal with the recommendations as they stand.

10. The third point is that one of the MPS concerns about Stockwell 2 is the length of time it took. The MPS could not wait for publication to learn from the events and therefore most of this report details changes made before the recommendations were published.

11. However, the fourth and most important point lies beyond individual recommendations. The MPS is a very different organisation than it was in July 2005. The events of that month have been followed by Operation Overt, Operation Whimbrel, Operation Gamble and Operation Seagram – see glossary for details. Nothing like these had ever occurred before. Both the organisation and individuals within it have learned from the experience. The shortcomings shown up in Stockwell 2 will not re-occur.

Recommendation one

The investigation has identified serious weaknesses in the MPS in relation to the handling of critical information including within the senior management team. The MPA should consider what management action is required to resolve this and, in view of the serious nature of the failings, the Home Office and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) should also consider what action they need to take to address the issues raised.

12. The experiences of July 2005 demonstrated the need for the MPS to construct a more systematic approach to information handling. However, in this particular case, the IPCC assumption that it was incorrect for the Commissioner to be kept uninformed of key information is one perspective: there is another interpretation, as set out below.

13. In his interview with the IPCC, the Commissioner accepted that, with hindsight, there was information of which he could have been made aware as the situation developed. Nevertheless, identification can be complex, as it was in this case. The use, by terrorists, of false identity is a well known tactic. There will always be a number of avenues to explore and these will generate speculation. It is vital that confirmation of identification is only given when it can be guaranteed, in most cases this will necessitate DNA comparison, a process that will take time. Early mistaken identification can lead to investigative errors and, more significantly, unnecessary grief.

14. He reiterated that what he was told was a matter of judgement for those senior colleagues and he did not, and will not, criticise those who have to make difficult decisions in exceptional times. It should be noted that the IPCC’s Stockwell 2 report details Assistant Commissioner (AC) Alan Brown’s clear rationale for the timescale of his disclosure of information to the Commissioner, given all the circumstances and the wealth of experience on which AC Brown was able to draw. Appendix 1 fully details AC Brown’s response to the IPCC regarding this matter and provides an extract from his statement to reinforce this.

15. Nevertheless, the Commissioner accepted that these unprecedented events made clear the systems in place needed revision. The Griffith’s review – see glossary, identified the concept of a Crisis Management Team (CMT) supported by a Knowledge Management Centre and the Commissioner, and Management Board, fully endorsed this concept. As noted below the HMIC has already done the same.

Knowledge Management Centre [1]

16. The KMC is a unit that provides a system of analysis and structured briefings to Management Board, acting as a Crisis Management Team (CMT), with an analysis of what is known, believed or possible in the face of a fast evolving critical incident. It is not a full time unit but rather staffed by volunteers and called into existence when required.

17. The KMC has been activated five times since its inception. Of particular note was Operation Linchpin, an exercise to test our readiness in response to a suicide terrorist threat. This provided an opportunity for community representatives including members of the MPA, to observe and comment on the progress made in relation to both the MPS response to suicide terrorism and the management of knowledge. More recently, the Litvinenko investigation, the attempted car bomb attacks in London and Glasgow and the Climate Camp at Heathrow provided other opportunities to put our systems to the test. It worked extremely well on each occasion.

18. A working group is steering the KMC’s development by addressing issues such as staff induction, training, equipment, accommodation, call out protocols and governance. In August 2007, over one hundred volunteers from the MPS attended New Scotland Yard for a briefing on the KMC and will now bring their skills to it during future incidents. Some have already been involved in Operation Hargood. The MPS hopes that Members have benefited from briefings produced by the KMC during this particularly challenging operation. Positive feedback on the briefing material has been received both from the Home Office and the Mayor’s office. There is an open invitation to all MPA members to visit the KMC whenever it is in action.

19. Every opportunity has been taken to develop the KMC as a positive way to handle critical information and to enable the CMT to make effective organisational decisions during a crisis. The KMC has recently been reviewed by HMIC including whilst it was in operation during Operation Hargood. The conclusion of this inspection states, “ that there can be little doubt that the KMC meets the need to ensure that the strategic command of the MPS is effectively briefed to manage organisational risk arising from critical events, and is tackling the issues raised by recommendations 1, 3 and 4 within the IPCC report.” A full copy of their findings is attached at Appendix 2.

Recommendation two

The MPA recognises that the issues identified by Operation Erini are areas of concern within the MPS and that they are fully addressed and systems are implemented to prevent a re-occurrence.

20. Operation Erini was set up by the MPS in September 2005 specifically to gather the corporate memory and immediate opportunities for learning from Stockwell 1. In the main this addressed issues prior to the shooting and was not an investigation into the facts surrounding the events. Operation Erini did not have access to all relevant statements of witnesses, due to the on going IPCC investigation.

21. The Erini report was completed in December 2005. The issues it identified in relation to planned operations, which may involve a suicide terrorist threat, were adopted under the governance of the KRG. The issues that the Erini report identified with regard to how and what we communicated to the public after Mr. Jean Charles de Menezes had been shot were addressed by the inception of the KMC. The MPS is confident that the thorough and timely work of the Erini team in 2005 has helped us to develop the systems and processes to handle information far more effectively than we did in July 2005.

22. Operation Erini co-operated fully with the IPCC investigation throughout, with all requests being properly audited. We strongly repudiate any allegation that the MPS caused any delay in the Stockwell 2 investigation. The particular issue of concern for the IPCC was their access to the Operation Erini report. This early report set out the facts as they were then known and gave views and opinions about potential vulnerabilities and set these alongside some recommendations. Our concerns about supplying this document were properly set out in a formal letter to the IPCC at the relevant time.

23. These concerns centred on the fact that the Operation Erini report was based on incomplete facts. The Erini team did not, for example, have access to all relevant statements and other documentary evidence. The report was created at a ‘point in time’ and therefore could not be relied upon to be factually accurate as matters developed and/or new evidence came to light. We therefore had significant concerns about how this document could be used or could be viewed. There was also a concern that releasing the document could set a precedent, which would restrict the MPS’s ability to respond to an event of this nature in a self-critical way and properly record the difficult issues that needed to be faced by the organisation.

24. We considered then and still do that such documents should be subject to Legal Professional Privilege. The IPCC take a different view. However, the fact that we chose, on this occasion, to waive this privilege is indicative of our desire to be as transparent and as helpful as possible. The issue took some time to resolve, however, the MPS dispute that this would have held up the investigation, as it was only one among many strands being considered by the IPCC.

25. Attached is a copy of a memorandum acknowledging the co-operation of Erini signed by both the Erini team leader and the IPCC Senior Investigating Officer. Two significant extracts from this memo are produced below;

‘The vast majority of the documents are already in the possession of the IPCC.’

The memo adds, ‘The vast majority of the documentation has little or no direct relevance to Stockwell 2.’

A copy of the full memo is attached at Appendix 3.

Recommendation three

The Commissioner sets out to his personal staff his expectations in relation to keeping him informed of events occurring within the MPS area.

26. As HMIC note, this recommendation and recommendation four are now partly fulfilled by the inception of the KMC (see Recommendation one). Much more significantly, the experiences of the last two years have settled into a particular pattern of information sharing between the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and personal staff that ensures that the senior leadership of the organisation is fully aware of events, media comment and developing scenarios. Nevertheless, it does remain vital that very senior officers are not overburdened with a plethora of unconfirmed information and filtering such information remains a key task of personal staff.

27. When an event is of a level that requires the formation of the KMC, the Commissioner will rely on this body to test the veracity and authentication of any information he is given.

Recommendation four

The responsibility for keeping the Commissioner and other key staff informed of critical information is made clear to the MPS senior management team.

28. As identified in recommendation one, the primary responsibility for keeping the Commissioner and other key staff informed of critical information lies with the KMC. At critical times, the Management Board forms as the Crisis Management Team and this provides a more systematic approach to dealing with crisis incidents. The CMT model more clearly defines the role of each member of Management Board and their responsibility for communicating with their colleagues, thereby ensuring that all Business Groups within the service can work effectively.

29. To support what is communicated by the CMT the KMC will give regular updates to them drawing information from all available sources. The Department for Public Affairs (DPA) will add to and draw from this communication to ensure accurate briefing.

Recommendation five

The MPS reviews the purpose of the CRA briefings, including the potential for the MPS to be compromised if they are briefed outside an agreed media strategy.

30. This recommendation relates to the relationship between the MPS and the Crime Reporters’ Association (CRA) and the place of on-the-record and off-the-record briefings within an agreed media strategy.

31. The CRA membership represents the majority of mainstream national and London regional news media who specialise in crime reporting. It is independent from the police, it governs itself and is neither run nor overseen by the MPS. As such, the association has regular contact and a recognised long established relationship with the MPS and other police forces across the country. The MPS provides the association with regular briefings as a means of sharing information with the public through a trusted and informed section of the media, in order to promote a better understanding of what the MPS is doing to make London safer.

32. All on the record briefings organised by the DPA with CRA members form part of agreed media strategies and are delivered by a well-informed officer who has an insight into the investigation or the incident. They are facilitated by a DPA press officer who makes a record of what is presented to and discussed at these briefings. This record is available, if necessary, to the Department of Professional Standards (DPS) or the IPCC as happened in the Stockwell 2 investigation.

33. The existing MPS Media Relations Policy details clear guidance to all officers providing off-the-record briefing to all journalists and states:

‘In order to build better understanding and closer working relationships with journalists, there may be occasions when police officers wish to provide guidance. This is commonly known as speaking 'off the record' - dealing with matters that are not for public disclosure, explaining reasons for maintaining confidentiality and specifying what might be published. When doing so, officers must adhere to the facts of the case and should not speculate or let their own personal views or prejudices influence the discussions.
Misunderstandings can sometimes occur about what 'off the record' means. Some journalists interpret it as being completely non-reportable, whilst others believe that they can report what is said but not attribute it to the individual who said it. It is therefore advisable that before giving guidance of this sort, the officer/police staff member clarifies the basis on which it is being provided.

It will be for OCU commanders and heads of branches to decide at what levels within their own areas of responsibility such discretion may be exercised. If there is any doubt about offering off the record guidance, advice should be sought from the DPA or enquiries referred direct to them.’

34. The DPA is currently reviewing the policy in order to reflect the findings of the MPA scrutiny of MPS Media and Communications in April 2007. The new version will reinforce the purpose and best practice in managing the important police-press relationship, especially with the CRA and its members.

35. The DPA made a significant contribution to the development of the KMC to ensure they interact effectively during a crisis. This has resulted in the DPA’s forward information co-ordination point ‘Pivot’ being integrated within the KMC. As a result this has been tested and refined during three recent KMC operations.

Recommendation six

All strategic meetings convened to discuss critical incidents are appropriately minuted in order that decisions can be later identified and justified.

36. A number of Management Board personal staff have now received training to accurately capture key points during meetings. When the Crisis Management Team forms, the KMC will provide dedicated secretarial support to minute those meetings.

The way forward

37. There will be much more to learn from the legal processes the MPS are still facing, including the Health and Safety trial scheduled for October 2007, and the Inquest anticipated in 2008. The MPS can prepare to respond effectively to situations by learning from experience.

C. Race and equality impact

1. In September 2006, Authority Members responded from an equality and diversity perspective to the DPA’s report on how the MPS communicates with London’s diverse communities. This has been heeded and the race and equality impact of this report will be considered under the themes of access, consultation and monitoring.

Access

2. The experience of Stockwell highlights the importance of public access to accurate information, and conversely, the potential for harm to our relationships with communities when inaccurate information is released. At key stages of the Stockwell investigation, MPS briefings have been translated and made available in Portuguese by the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate (DCFD).

3. The DPA have also facilitated media briefings between Ibero-American media representatives and the Deputy Commissioner to debate the issues from Stockwell and make sure questions are heard. At a Borough level, messages about Stockwell have been taken into communities through Safer Neighbourhood Teams. In areas with a high Iberio-American population, the July Review Group has liaised with the Borough Senior Management Team to provide accurate information about the Stockwell investigations.

4. Steps have been taken to ensure that information is shared between the Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team (CTSET) in DCFD and the KMC during a crisis to ensure that timely and accurate information is shared with community leaders.

Consultation

5. The Community Impact Assessments prepared by CTSET for Gold (who is a senior officer responsible for the strategic intentions of an operation) are provided to the KMC and form an important and integral part of the briefing for the CMT. During a crisis, a member of the CMT will have specific responsibility for community engagement, to ensure that the views from the community can be taken into account in making organisational decisions. During its development, the concept of the KMC has been presented to a July Challenge Panel, including representatives from police staff associations and IAG members to ensure their views.

Monitoring

6. The Community Impact Assessment on Stockwell 2, which draws upon many sources of intelligence from different sections of the community, has been regularly reviewed and updated by DCFD.

D. Financial implications

1. The KMC has been developed at no cost, utilising current MPS systems.

2. There are modest operating costs. Ultimately, the operating costs of the KMC will depend on when and how often it is needed. Staff are drawn from around the MPS in proportion to the exigencies of the situation, and every effort is made to avoid this impacting upon the operational needs of the service. The KMC currently has an annual £10,000 budget for equipment and its staffing costs are absorbed across the business groups. It builds upon existing projects such as CRIMINT+, our next generation intelligence system, and the Metropolitan Police Intelligence Bureau (MIB) to maximise efficiency.

E. Background papers

• IPCC Report Stockwell Two
• MPA Reports 8 of 23 February 2006, ‘Events of July 2005 – MPS response suicide terrorism – update’
• MPA Report 7 of 7 September 2006, ‘How the MPS communicates – concurrent report’
• Report 5 of 5 April 2007 ‘MPS Media’; MPA Report Agenda Item 10 of 14 June 2007 (Professional Standards and Complaints Committee).

F. Contact details

Report author: AC Yates for the Commissioner, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Glossary

Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR)

COBR acts as a strategic operational response centre and secure meeting place for senior decision makers. It co-ordinates the Government’s response to major emergencies or crises in any incident involving British interests and usually has a senior police representative present.

Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team (CTSET)

CTSET is part of the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate (DCFD). It has produced community impact assessments for the IPCC Stockwell 2 report to look at the pan-London impact.

Crisis Management Team (CMT)

The name of the Management Board during a crisis. The decision to form the CMT is made by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.

Designated Senior Officer (DSO)

In the context of suicide terrorist tactics, the DSO has a specific role to make a decision on the use of critical shots based on the intelligence picture. In the MPS, the DSO will be an officer of ACPO rank.

Erini

The Operation Erini report was prepared for the MPS Diamond Group, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner, on events leading to the shooting of Mr. Jean Charles de Menezes. Its initial terms of reference were:

• To lead and co-ordinate the MPS response to matters arising from the fatal shooting of Mr. Jean Charles De Menezes.
• To ensure that all relevant information is captured and preserved.
• To ensure that appropriate legal advice is accessed as appropriate.
• With the assistance of DPA, to advise around media issues.
• To update Management Board colleagues as appropriate.
• To ensure appropriate lessons are identified and learned.

In May 2006 the terms of reference of Erini were revised to:

• Provide the “corporate memory” for Stockwell.
• Lead any legal proceedings including the public inquest.
• Supports the legal team for the defence of the Health and Safety prosecution.
• Carry out actions on behalf of the Health and Safety defence team and Diamond Group.

Griffiths report

Reviews by DAC Bill Griffiths of command and control and tasking arrangements that were commissioned immediately after 7 July.

Hargood

The MPS operation for the demonstrations against climate change outside Heathrow.

July Review Group (JRG)

In May 2006, the July Review Group formed under Commander Moir Stewart. The terms of reference of the July Review Group (JRG) included:

• Coordinating the MPS response to the publication of Stockwell One and Stockwell Two.
• Support the Stockwell Gold Group in ensuring that the officers and their families who are directly affected by the report are properly supported, treated fairly and kept informed.
• Taking the MPS forward with an implementation plan arising from adopted recommendations.
• Identifying further risks and opportunities for the organisation from events in July 2005.
• Disseminating best practice from the adopted recommendations across departments.
• Communicating effectively to share learning from Stockwell across all areas of policing.
• Ensuring that all the adopted recommendations from events in July are auditable and accountable.
• Checking that the adopted recommendations are being implemented and sustained.
• Leading and developing the Knowledge Management Centre (KMC).
• Researching best practice, both internally and externally, into how organisations learn.
• Contributing towards the MPS’s value of learning through experience, by developing protocols for the commissioning of reviews.
• Inspecting key areas of business within the organisation in relation to July 2005, to ensure that learning is implemented and embedded.
• Supporting the management of issues from July 2005 at a strategic level, through the Kratos Review Group, Gold Groups and Diamond Groups.
• To share MPS learning from July 2005 with HMIC and ACPO, to ensure a consistent application of best practice throughout England and Wales.

JRG Challenge Panel: terms of reference

The purpose of the July Challenge Panel is to scrutinise the progress made by the July Review Group (JRG) in responding to events of July 2005 and to contribute to setting and reviewing the direction of the JRG’s work. Its membership includes members of the IAG, Police Staff Associations and other key stakeholders.

Knowledge Management Centre (KMC)

A team that forms to gather and audit information and provide accurate and timely situation reports to the Crisis Management Team during a crisis.

Kratos

The code name for a range of tactical options to respond to the threat of suicide terrorism. This policy is now overseen by the Kratos Review Group chaired by Commander Jo Kaye. Its terms of reference are “With significant community and stakeholder engagement, to support the ongoing development of tactics, weapons, equipment and training to ensure that the MPS can respond effectively to the threat posed by suspected suicide bombers through Command and Control and threat-based tactics.”

Linchpin

The MPS exercise to simulate a suicide terrorist attack and test police Kratos tactics.

Metropolitan Police Ibero American Association (MPIAA)

The MPIAA is an official staff association that provides police surgeries in the community, participates in recruitment events, community carnivals and workshops with young people around policing issues that affect them.

Seagram

The name of the MPS operation to respond to the attempted car bomb attacks in June 2007.

Theseus Review

Bill Griffiths’ internal review to assess the capability of the MPS to respond to future incidents following the terrorist attacks of July 2005. The review identified strengths and limitations of the command and control from July, and recommended a new way to manage crises, including a CMT and KMC.

Whimbrel

The MPS investigation into the death of Mr. Alexander Litvinenko.

Appendix 1

Footnote 25, page 49, IPCC Stockwell 2 report

25 “In response to the extracts disclosed during the Salmon process AC Brown made a further witness statement in which he clarified the extent to which he had briefed the Commissioner on the morning of 23 July. He states that he briefed the Commissioner fully regarding the sequence of events in the identification of the deceased and the rationale behind his decision making. He states he (AC Brown) had been aware of the recovery of the mobile phone, wallet and bank statement the previous day but that address checks were precluded due to the continuing operation at Scotia Road and the opportunity to obtain comparative data for DNA, fingerprint and odontology testing to confirm identity was not available. He states that he made the Commissioner aware that he (AC Brown) had not been certain of the deceased’s identity on the 22 July and had only become certain of it upon receipt of information from the DPS at 09:30hrs that morning (23 July). He confirms that he told the Commissioner about the finding of the documents near to the deceased on the 22 July at the same briefing on the 23 July.”

Exert from AC Alan Brown’s statement dated 12 July 2007

“ I did not tell the Commissioner about the findings of documents on 22 July 2005 until the morning of 23 July when I was certain of the identification. I had been tasked as Gold for London which meant that I had ultimate responsibility for that part of the investigation. The Commissioner has ultimate responsibility for the MPS and I therefore did not need to advise the Commissioner until the identification was certain or as certain as it could be and became an issue for the service. As soon as it did so I advised the Commissioner.”

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