MPS Taser trial - update report

Report: 8
Date: 22 November
By: Assistant Commissioner Central Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides further details of the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) Conflict Management Taser Trial, and the Metropolitan Police Service proposal to participate in the trial using Specially Trained Officers (STOs) from the Territorial Support Group.This report deals with the issues raised by members at the 25 October 2007 meeting of the Full Authority, where two reports were considered by members: 1. Taser Usage and its Diversity Implications and 2. ACPO Conflict Management Taser Trial by Specially Trained Officers.These two reports were presented, following a report titled, Conversion to the X26 Taser, that was considered at the Co-ordination and Policing Committee 27 September 2007. The trial extends the use of Taser to Specially Trained Officers in non-firearms situations. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has been asked to take part in the trial and intends to use selected officers from the Territorial Support Group. The trial will run for 12 months.

A. Recommendation

That members approve the participation of the Metropolitan Police Service in the ACPO Taser trial using specially trained officers from the Territorial Support Group.

B. Supporting information

1. This report deals with the issues raised by members at the 25 October 2007 meeting of the Authority. Members considered two Taser related reports: 1. Taser Usage and its Diversity Implications and 2. ACPO Conflict Management Taser Trial by Specially Trained Officers.

2. These two reports were presented at the Authority meeting following a report titled, Conversion to the X26 Taser, which was considered at the Co-ordination and Policing Committee on 27 September 2007.

Rationale for extending the use of Taser

3. Taser has been safely and effectively used in London since April 2003. The MPA originally approved its use as a less lethal option in firearms incidents and are now, understandably, questioning the rationale for extending its use to non-firearms incidents. The rationale lies in the success of Taser in resolving violent situations with minimum force and reducing injuries and risk to both officers and those they are trying to detain.

4. There is now four and a half years of evidence in London that Taser is safe and the Federation, on behalf of operational officers, have been pushing for its extended use. Taser is the only piece of officer safety equipment we have that offers distance control. It allows officers to restrain subjects without getting too close and putting themselves in range of weapons, but it also allows them to do so without using larger numbers of officers that can cause unintended and unnecessary injuries. There is now an overwhelming body of evidence from London, the rest of the UK and abroad to suggest that Taser can be safely and effectively used in non-firearms situations. The best way to test this hypothesis is to trial Taser in a well-regulated and controlled manner, learn the lessons that the trial presents and then make informed decisions as to future use.

5. Since 2003, the MPS has accounted for approximately one third of all Taser usage in the country. In doing so, it has influenced the development of Taser use on the national stage and has played an important part in the creation of safe and effective working policies. By taking part in the trial to extend the use of Taser, the MPA/MPS will again have the opportunity to shape the future use of Taser. With three months of the trial period already over, the MPS is keen to take part, learn the lessons and help shape the national debate.

Training

6. The following information is provided in response to the MPA question in relation to TSG personnel undertaking Taser training.

TSG Numbers - 733.86 Officers

• 39 Officers from Visible Ethnic Minorities (5.3%)
• 83 Officers are female (11.3%)

Total TASER operators in TSG 390

• 23 Officers are from Visible Ethnic Minorities (6.35%)
• 30 are female (8.2%)

365 Students

• 337 Passed
• 28 Failed (7.61% Failure rate)
• 36 are existing AFOs
• 25 Instructors
• 14 passed national course
• 32 Females - 2 Failed (6.25% fail rate)

The TSG have established a number of briefing days for community groups and IAGs (The Chairs of all IAGs have been informed). This includes presentations and the ability to witness the training given to officers. The presentations explain the rationale of the ACPO trial and a description of the weapon.

Amnesty International Report - additional information

7. The Amnesty International report titled United States of America Excessive and Lethal Force’ was published in 2004. The report details a number of Amnesty International concerns about the use of Taser in the USA.

8. The 150 deaths Amnesty International has attributed to Taser have been categorised into the following areas:

• Police practice,
• Medical issues, and the
• Weapon.

9. The poor police practice can be further enlarged to include:

• Poor use of force judgment,
• Inappropriate restraint,
• Lack of medical care, and
• Poor police discipline.

10. Amnesty International make a number of recommendations at the end of the 2004 report and note that the medical and support structures in place within the UK are beneficial. The issues raised are: -

• Use of force,
• Data capture,
• Vulnerable persons,
• Risk factors, and
• Medical assistance.

11. The Taser training programme has evolved from that originally given to firearms officers and has been added to by conflict management officers. The issues identified by Amnesty International as a requirement to ensure the correct usage of Taser are all incorporated within the Taser training programme. This is taught to all officers who receive the training. Details were captured in the initial report provided for the Full Authority.

12. The use of force issues raised by Amnesty International in their US review of Taser appears to indicate incorrect use of force. However the vast majority of uses have followed their own state / police department guidelines and when judged against UK guidelines those uses may appear excessive. Taser guidelines do differ across the US and this has led to a voluntary code being established by the Police Executive Research Forum and the US Department of Justice who have monitored and been guided by the UK protocols and research.

13. Use of force and tactical options are the foundations of MPS officer safety protocols and the selection of the correct tactical options is paramount to ensure the safety of all involved, be they police or public. These protocols, which are used daily within London and the UK police service, are identical to those controlling Taser deployments.

14. The restraint issues in the US are based on a number of incidents relating to restraint via hogtying and restraint chairs both within the US police service and prison establishments. The UK police service does not utilise hogtying, where the arms and legs are restrained together using one single restraint device. This body position and restraint can lead to positional asphyxia and cases within the Amnesty International report highlight that this has been the direct cause of death in at least 31 of the cases they investigated.

15. The MPS has led on the issue of positional asphyxia within the UK over the years. It has ensured that positional asphyxia is a risk factor highlighted during officer safety training. This is comprehensively covered within the MPS officer safety manual, Standard Operating Procedures together with all relevant use of force and restraint policies.

16. Amnesty International highlight that excited delirium has also led to deaths in the US when confrontation with law enforcement officers has occurred. This term is known in the UK as Acute Behavioural Disorder (ABD).

17. Acute behavioural disorder, also referred to as excited delirium or delirious mania, agitated delirium, cocaine induced psychosis and acute exhaustive mania, is a rare form of severe mania sometimes considered part of the spectrum of manic-depressive psychosis and chronic schizophrenia.

18. Acute behavioural disorder can be caused by psychiatric illness, drugs of which cocaine is the best known, alcohol or a combination of drugs, alcohol and psychiatric illness.

19. A person in a state of acute behavioural disorder is of particular concern as they can die suddenly during, or shortly after, a violent struggle - whilst at hospital or in custody.

20. Death is most likely to occur in two ways:

• The state of acute behavioural disorder causes the suspect to have a cardiac arrest, and
• The efforts to avoid being restrained or arrested make a person suffering from acute behavioural disorder a greater risk from positional asphyxia.

21. The key to a successful intervention in cases of acute behavioural disorder is to seek medical assistance and remove the person to hospital where it is safe to do so.

22. CO11 Officer Safety Unit and Territorial Policing Mental Health Programme Board monitor acute behavioural disorder issues in the MPS. The protocols for dealing with Mental Health issues are reviewed with Health Service Partners and any incidents of concern are reviewed.

23. The medical care of persons arrested or in detention remains a priority for the MPS. Within the officer safety training package the importance of medical care is emphasised throughout in terms of the potential risk areas of the body to the potential damage that can be caused in use of force and restraint.

24. The Amnesty International report highlights that in the some of the cases they reviewed there was a lack of medical care by the police although the emergency medical services were quick to the scene and responded accordingly to medical emergencies.

25. Amnesty International further investigated the use of Taser in cases within vulnerable groups, namely children, pregnancy cases and the mentally ill. All these groups are risk factored into any use of force. Amnesty International agrees that in cases of life and death or those where serious injury may occur force may have to be used and this would include Taser and lethal force.

26. The ACPO Taser training programme includes the potential risk factors that officers will need to assess and these include all the risk factors identified by Amnesty International. These factors are not new and are constantly factored into everyday policing. These risk factors are part of the information that officers would use within the officer safety model to formulate a response to the threat risk posed to them, colleagues and members of the public.

27. The ACPO Taser guidelines state that occasions will arise where it is necessary to use the Taser on a person who is exhibiting violent behaviour and who is also suffering from a mental disorder or illness. Where it is possible to discuss options with mental health professionals this should be considered.

28. In pre-planned operations such discussions could form part of any briefing for the event. Consultation with friends, relatives etc., who are likely to know the person well, may also assist in deciding on the most appropriate use of force response. Consultation with Health Authorities and Social Services in this respect will form part of the implementation plan. The final decision to use the Taser in these circumstances will rest with the officer concerned.

29. Similarly, where it becomes apparent that the subject has an existing medical condition or is under the influence of drugs, assessment of these additional risk factors should be made in determining the appropriate option.

30. Throughout the Amnesty International report there are numerous statements made about individual incidents and their own medical personnel have reviewed these. It should be noted that no death where a Taser has been used has ever been directly attributed to Taser.

31. A recent study from Wake Forest University on 1,000 operational uses of Taser stated that Taser use was safe and suggested that the risk and severity of injuries is low. Most of the injuries within the study were minor scrapes and bruises. Three of the people hit by a Taser required hospital admission; two had head injuries from falls, one patient was admitted with a medical condition that was not clear in its relationship to the subject.

32. Two people died, but neither autopsy identified death as a direct result of the use of Taser. Results of 597 of the subjects studied have been published in the Annals of Emergency Medicine.

33. The project is part of a large National Institute of Justice (NIJ) review of Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs) that includes medical issues such as the condition known as exited delirium.

34. The training and operational use of Taser in the UK follows approved conflict management protocols that ensure that the weapon, as with all less lethal tactical options i.e. CS spray, baton, empty hands tactics etc. is used correctly and any further actions in terms of restraint or medical needs are also applied correctly following the guidelines that have been set and agreed with ACPO and the Home Office.

35. The use of Taser in the UK and the study by DOMILL clearly indicate that the use of Taser within stringent operational guidelines assists in the safe resolution of incidents for police and the subject.

36. The majority of the deaths highlighted in the first and second Amnesty International review highlight areas of concern in subject handling but to date there is no scientific data that attributes any of the deaths that have occurred in North America directly to Taser. There are a number of incidents of Taser use where medical issues have been highlighted as a cause of death after Taser has been deployed.

37. The medical condition of subjects can be ascertained where time allows however in incidents of severe violence that time may not be available. The MPS have had incidents where death in custody has occurred and these have been attributable to a number of the medical issues contained within the Amnesty International report. Confrontation can lead to exertion and this in turn can lead to cardiac issues irrespective of the tactical options that have been deployed.

DOMILL - medical review of Taser

38. DOMILL (Defence scientific advisory councils sub committee On the Medical Implications of Less Lethal weapons) have again reviewed Taser use and data prior to the release of their statement for the Specially Trained Officer (STO) Taser trial. The review of the Taser Evaluation Forms and the available (legible) FME reports show no unexpected injuries in over 200 persons subjected to Taser currents. Most of the injuries reported arose from falls (anticipated from the previous DOMILL statements) or were not directly associated with Taser use.

39. DOMILL has made the following recommendations for this proposed trial:

• Due to the paucity of Taser deployment data against smaller individuals, together with suggestive evidence from limited animal studies, DOMILL recommends that AFOs and STOs should be particularly vigilant for any Taser induced adverse responses in this subset of the population,
•  The guidance should be amended to identify children and adults of small stature as being at potentially greater risk from the cardiac effects of Taser currents than normal adults of average or large stature,
• In view of the uncertainties in the population characteristics of the increased numbers of subjects who are likely to be affected by the extended use of the Taser, it is essential that ACPO, Defence Scientific and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and the Home Office undertake a quarterly review of Taser Evaluations Forms, and
• DOMILL should be advised immediately in the event of any moderate or serious injuries or adverse physiological responses occurring directly or indirectly from firing of a Taser.

MPS officer safety training

40. All MPS officers receive a comprehensive officer safety-training package and this training is an annual mandatory requirement. The core principle of officer safety is the officer safety model (ACPO Conflict Management Model). This allows officers to identify the most appropriate tactical option, best suited for the circumstances confronted.

41. In addition to the selection criteria set by ACPO, Central Operations reviewed additional criteria to ensure that officers who participated in the training programme were fully compliant with officer safety and emergency life saving training.

Deployment Protocols

42. The current Taser training programme being taught to TSG officers encompasses this knowledge and ensures that the use of force model and the use of Taser are clearly understood. The ACPO guidelines are clear that authority to deploy Taser and the use of Taser is not an automatic right. If severe violence is occurring use of force can be used. Operational guidelines for Taser deployments by firearms officers and STOs are now identical at non-firearms incidents.

43. There is no such deployment as a Taser deployment per se. All requests for TSG will be monitored by Central Communications Command to ensure that the deployment is correct and necessary. As with the ACPO guidelines the MPS will not provide a definitive list of incidents where the Taser will be used.

44. The Taser will form part of the tactical options available to TSG officers who will, when authorised, deploy the Taser. The ACPO conflict management model ensures that all personal safety tactical options will be considered.

45. TSG supervisors will authorise the deployment of Taser where the operational guidelines are met. Non-TSG supervisors or managers cannot order the deployment of Taser to an incident.

46. This does not preclude an immediate deployment by an officer under current use of force legislation where the requirement for a use of Force is immediate. However, at all times the use of force will need to be justified and proportionate.

47. The use of force against any vulnerable group, including children, is a serious issue and all risk factors and tactical options must be considered carefully to help ensure a safe conclusion of an event. Such considerations would be based upon the specific impact factors of an incident, which include the level of the threat, the environment and the safety of members of the public, police and the subject.

48. The lawful use of force in any circumstance includes the overriding principle that it must be reasonable and necessary. As such, the exercise of any power for which the use of force is contemplated should also be reasonable and necessary.

Monitoring and learning from deployments

49. As with Taser use by officers within firearms commands Taser discharges are no longer routinely referred to the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS). Only if the discharge results in death or serious injury, or danger to the public, or reveals failings in command, would the matter be referred to the IPCC.

50. After consultation with ACPO the IPCC have requested that any complaints that are made during the STO Taser trial should be notified to them in order to monitor the trial. They will not automatically investigate any of the complaints outside of the current guidelines.

51. The feedback protocols are identical to those agreed within the Firearms OCUs and have been established to ensure that lessons are learned from the deployment of Taser, these include:

• Post operation debriefs by TSG supervisors and teams,
• All uses of Taser are reported by means of an ACPO use of Taser form which includes tactical applications of Taser i.e. drawing of the weapon, arcing the weapon, red dotting the subject, firing the weapon and when the weapon is used in drive stun mode,
• Where injuries occur a Forensic Medical Officer report is required with the form and these are centrally held by the Home Office Scientific Development Board (HOSDB),
• The CO11 Officer Safety Unit on behalf of the MPS and ACPO SDAR (Self Defence and restraint Committee) manages a Taser use database. The database incorporates age, sex, ethnicity, type of discharge, location, reasons for deployment and injury (if any) sustained,
• The TSG capture and record details of all debriefs of Taser use operations, which capture any safety critical issues,
• Defects or suspected defects in Taser or cartridges are forwarded via the CO19 Firearms Policy Unit to HOSDB,
• MPS near-miss forms have been specifically amended to Taser safety critical information. This information is fed back to CO11 and Health and Safety Branch (HR5), and
• All unintentional discharges are reported to the TSG SMT and monitored for the emergence of any safety critical trends.

52. Tasers automatically record all activations when the weapon is used; this data is stored in a Dataport within the weapon. TSG inspectors have been trained to review Taser data ports and this will occur every month or whenever the weapon is activated.

Community Engagement

53. A comprehensive communications package had been prepared with the intention of rolling it out prior to the trial beginning. However, at the request of the MPA, this community engagement will be brought forward to try and gauge the likely feeling of London's public if the TSG were to use Taser in non-firearms situations. TSG chief inspectors have made arrangements to visit their boroughs and speak to community groups and give them as much detail as possible about the trial. Early contact will be made with many of those boroughs the TSG regularly patrol, such as Tower Hamlets, Ealing, Brent, Newham, Haringey and Lambeth. In addition, members of the MPS Independent Advisory Group (IAG) and community contacts have been invited to view Taser training at the Public Order Training Centre at Gravesend on 14 and 26 November. Borough Commanders have been written to and informed of the potential trial and have been invited to a briefing on 14 November.

54. The Chair of the MPS IAG has been kept informed of the proposed trial, and a briefing has been given to the chairs of the IAGs for Race, LGBT, Disability and Youth. They raised many concerns, most of which were resolved during the presentation. They support the trial going ahead, subject to strict control and monitoring, and welcome the opportunity to be involved in the debate about the future of Taser at the end of the trial.

Police Federation and police officer comment

55. The police federation remain supportive of the introduction of Taser to STOs and would wish to see a wider deployment than currently authorised. Their views on Taser are reproduced:

Officers at greater risk

• Almost half of the 47,328 police officers polled have felt that their lives were placed in serious jeopardy on at least one occasion since the last survey was released,
• This equates to approximately 23,000 officers across England and Wales facing extreme levels of violence from members of the public at some point over a two-year period,
• Over 40% have been assaulted whilst arresting suspects by as much as eleven times in some cases in the same period. However, the figures the Home Office use to gauge the dangers officers face are currently unavailable following errors made in the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary’s annual report, and
• Despite the threat of terrorism and increase in gun and knife crime 43% of officers are not confident that armed support would be available should they need it.

56. Frontline operational officers faced with individuals on our streets offering violence with knives and other weapons would not ordinarily have the benefit of assistance from firearms officers. They are left to use conventional open hand fighting techniques, a police baton and incapacitant sprays, all of which offer more risk to the officer and individual. Due to the close quarter techniques used the officers are likely to be more at risk of assault and complaints made against them.

57. During the initial Taser trial reviewed by PricewaterhouseCooper a number of officers and community reviews were sought. This is a practice that will again be utilised during the STO trial.

58. All data coming into the MPS, ACPO Self Defence Arrest and Restraint Committee and Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB) will be utilised using the principles set out for the original Taser trial. This will monitor the type of use, diversity issues, outcomes of the incident, medical issues, officer and public safety issues. Public views will also be sought out.

59. The trial is due to run for 12 months and will be reviewed ACPO, DOMILL and HOSDB. Their findings, including any operational recommendations, will then be reported to the Home Office. The Home Office has already stated that the trial itself is not an automatic approval for the future issue of Taser by non-AFOs.

60. At a previous Authority meeting, members sought comment on Taser from police officers, details of the Federation stance are shown above. The views taken from the original Taser trial in 2004 highlighted that armed officers felt that Taser was as suited to normal front line policing, as it was to firearms operations, this remains the case.

61. The following quotations from firearms officers provide a flavour of the views that we found on the ground in the trial forces:

”It is less harmful than other non-lethal options such as batons and CS Gas.”

“A very effective form of personal safety.”

“Taser often resolves issues by being seen and is therefore personal safety equipment and not exclusively a firearm.”

“It is a good tool to use against violent offenders and has good results when deployed.”

Taser protects life and prevents harm…”

“…excellent equipment”

“Taser defuses situations more easily and quickly than calling firearms deployment, it should be used before the need for firearms arises”

“It reduces injuries to both officers and the public.”

“It was a lot quicker in resolving many situations.”

62. The Metropolitan Police have established informal consultation arrangements with police and community consultation groups, local Borough commanders, local authorities and the Independent Police Complaints Commission. This informal consultation focussed on explaining what Taser was, the guidelines around its use, who in the force could use it and the expected after effects on suspects. The MPS were told that this response to this exercise had been positive and had promoted a greater understanding of why Taser is being used – namely as a less lethal option to a firearms response and to improve officer safety.

63. Police Authority members in London reported that there had been ‘a solid appreciation of the need for police protection’ amongst the wider general public in the Capital. The MPS understand that those consulted did not express concern that Taser represents an escalation of force. Rather, given its ability to resolve situations more readily, Taser was seen as a useful means of discussion ensued-escalating violence in policing situations

Conclusion

64. The MPS as part of the ACPO Self Defence Arrest and Restraint Committee (SDAR) and as the lead on Officer safety in the UK have played an important part in overseeing and developing safe guidelines for the training of its officers, creation of safe policies and deployment protocols.

65. The deployment of non-AFOs with Taser was first discussed in 2005 with DOMILL and their research partners. The use of non-AFOs has been discussed in reports presented to the MPA. The evidence and medical research used by both the Conflict Management Portfolio and armed commands continues to indicate that Taser is safe and it continues to bring safe resolution to incidents.

66. In 118 uses in England and Wales to date utilising the new ACPO Taser guidelines all uses have been resolved without injury to the subject or police. A large number of weapons have been recovered including knives and machetes. The types of incidents range from potential suicides to serious assaults.

67. Armed OCUs deploying with Taser will not be in a position to assist BOCUs with all violence calls due to their primacy in tackling armed criminality and the increasing demands such incidents make of their finite time.

C. Race and equality impact

1. At the conclusion of the trial, a full report and results will be presented to the Equalities and Diversity Board and the Full Authority.

2. Full race and equality issues have been outlined in the three previous Taser related reports.

D. Financial implications

Full financial implications have already been provided in the three previous Taser related reports.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report authors: CO11 Public Order and Operational Support

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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