Policing of the G20 Summit 2009

Report: 6a
Date: 30 April 2009
By: T/AC Allison on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

Operation Glencoe was the largest security operation mounted by the Metropolitan Police for many years and had to be planned in just a three month period. It encapsulated a number of events including the State Visit of the President of Mexico, the arrival and movement of 48 protected principals, including the first overseas visit of the new President of the United States of America, large-scale demonstrations and the London Summit for Stability, Growth and Jobs. It was a complex operation, planned and deployed against a terrorist threat of Severe and with the potential for large-scale disorder. The potential for attack or disruption by international terrorists, domestic extremists or attention seekers was real and caused concern in the City and within government.

The Summit took place without disruption and the protests were policed with limited damage being caused. Officers and staff worked very long hours, both before the event and during it, often in challenging and difficult circumstances and they rightly received praise for their efforts from a variety of stakeholders.

However, the tragic death of Ian Tomlinson and other images have overshadowed all that good work. It is right and proper that allegations of excessive force are investigated and to that end, the MPS has fully cooperated with the IPCC from the outset.

A. Recommendation

That the report be received.

B. Supporting information

Background to the G20 Summit

1. The MPS were informed of the Summit on 18 December 2008, giving the organisation three months to plan and execute a very complex policing operation. Whilst the ExceL centre (the location of the summit) has many attributes, it has a number of difficulties notably being over seven miles from Central London with only two roads in and out. If asked, the MPS would have advised that a secure Government location would have been preferable.

2. The choice of ExCeL meant that there had to be a contingency for an evacuation of all the principals by water; the building of a ballistic wall; the installation of a ramp for convoys to enter the basement car park, and the searching of the dock and a large disused warehouse opposite. All this added to time and cost for a number of agencies, including the MPS.

3. Although billed as a G20, the number of principals increased during the planning stage peaking at 52 and ending at 48. The scale of the operation required the MPS to seek mutual aid for protection and escort officers. All leave for search officers was cancelled between 28 March and 3 April 2009 to cover the growing number of search requests. A week before the event, the MPS still did not have clarity as to exactly who was coming, where they were landing, where they were staying or what their itineraries were. This made planning extremely difficult and every change increased the resources and so costs went up.

4. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) took the lead on planning for the Summit and held their first logistics meeting at ExCeL on 8 January. As the event developed, so other Government departments became involved and the FCO engaged an events company to plan and build the Summit infrastructure.

Other events

5. On Saturday 28 March 2009, a large TUC march took place in Central London. A well organised and stewarded event, its message was directed at the G20 leaders and the UK Government in particular. Anarchist and other protest groups used this event to advertise their own events the following week.

6. On Monday 30 March 2009, the President of Mexico began a State Visit as a guest of HM The Queen. On Tuesday 31 March 2009, G20 delegates began arriving, including the President of the United States of America making his first overseas visit outside North America as President. The Chinese, Russian, Saudi and Korean delegations also arrived within hours of each other. Each of these events alone would have required a comprehensive policing operation.

7. On Wednesday 1 April 2009, the G20 delegates had official functions at Buckingham Palace, Clarence House, Lancaster House, Downing Street and The Tate Modern. Large-scale demonstrations were planned for Fossil Fools Day and Financial Fools Day in the City of London. A Stop the War march was proposed for Central London and smaller protests directed at individual delegations were planned. In addition, England played the Ukraine in a World Cup qualifier at Wembley.

8. On Thursday 2 April 2009 the London Summit took place. By 4.30pm on Friday 3 April 2009, the last of the delegations had left London.

The policing operation

9. Commander Bob Broadhurst was appointed Gold Commander and drew up the strategy; Chief Superintendent Ian Thomas was Silver Commander and developed the tactics; Chief Inspector Paul Seery was the lead Security Coordinator (SECCO) and drew up the security plan; and Detective Superintendent Phil Jordan managed all the close protection and escort issues.

10. Given the scale and complexity of the operation, and the interdependence of many of the events, it was decided to appoint single Gold and Silver Commanders for the week of 30 March to 3 April 2009. Each event was separately planned, but brought together as a single entity under the name Operation Glencoe.

Intelligence

11. Personal risk assessments were obtained in respect of delegates. The terrorist threat assessment for London remained at Severe throughout, meaning an attack was highly likely. All events related to G20, therefore, had to be planned against this threat level. There was never any specific terrorist threat to the event.

12. Activity in the protest world began to increase as soon as ExCeL was publicly announced as the venue. Intelligence staff in both the Public Order Branch and the Counter Terrorism Command reported unprecedented levels of activity and, in particular, groups whom the police have historically known not to co-operate began talking to each other. Early indication was given of a protest at Heathrow Airport on 1 April but this was quickly dropped in favour of targeting City institutions. Two main protests began to emerge; Financial Fools Day, planned by anarchist groups targeting the Bank of England and other financial premises, and Fossil Fools Day, planned by Climate Camp outside the Carbon Exchange in Bishopsgate.

13. Open source monitoring of protest group websites made it quite clear that their intention was to bring the City to a halt by whatever means possible. Most groups clearly stated that they would be peaceful but they would take part in direct action, openly breaking the law to achieve their ends. Other groups clearly stated they would use force and violence if required. A leader of one of the groups appeared on national television urging people to break windows and occupy buildings.

14. A number of other demonstrations were also notified to police and a full list is shown at Appendix 1.

Strategy

15. Commander Broadhurst set the following strategy for the event:

• Facilitate lawful protest.
• Provide a safe environment for participants, public and staff.
• Minimise disruption to the life of the residential and business community.
• Minimise disruption to air, rail, vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
• Provide a co-ordinated response to incidents.
• Preserve public order and minimise opportunity to commit crime and take proportionate steps to deal appropriately with offenders if crime is committed.
• Protect vulnerable and high profile premises.
• Preserve the dignity of the diplomatic missions and buildings.
• Enforce the Sessional Order of Parliament where appropriate.
• Provide security commensurate to the threat level relating to this series of events.
• Facilitate the arrival and departure of principals and relevant support teams involved in the ‘Mexican State Visit’ and the lead delegates involved with the ‘Conference for Jobs and Growth’.

Tactics

16. The Silver Commander nominated operational Bronze Commanders for each event and principal venue, as well as a number of functional Bronze Commanders for areas such as Crime and Traffic. Each Bronze drew up their own tactical plans assisted by a number of sub-Bronzes where appropriate. In excess of 70 Bronze posts were deployed.

17. The Silver Commander then checked the plans to ensure consistency and ensure they met the strategic aims. In essence, the plans relied on flexibility and the ability to mobilise quickly to wherever problems occurred. Police Support Units (PSU’s) were deployed in Westminster, the City and at ExCeL. Tactics used on the day were the responsibility of individual Bronze Commanders who would make an assessment of the circumstances and deploy officers to deal with the events unfolding in front of them in the most appropriate manner. Silver maintained complete oversight of the tactical operation, and supported and assisted his Bronze Commanders in delivering the plan.

Resources – Operation Benbow

18. As the scale and complexity of the event grew, a decision was made to invoke Operation Benbow – an agreement between the Metropolitan Police (MPS), City of London (CoLP) and British Transport Police (BTP), for their resources to be deployed under one Gold, with costs falling where they lie. This is based on operational learning from the J18 protests in 1999 and Operation Benbow ensured that the three forces were able to work together efficiently and effectively during the operation.

19. As the arrival airports became known, Gold brought Essex Police (Stansted), Sussex Police (Gatwick) and Bedfordshire Police (Luton) into Operation Glencoe. A Memorandum of Understanding was drawn up with each force as they policed the airports, but the MPS retained responsibility for security and escort of the delegations.

20. Officers from several other forces were deployed on mutual aid for specialist functions as follows;

• 36 licensed search officers for 5 days
• 80 special escort group officers (motorcyclists) for 7 days
• 80 protection officers for 6 days
• Firearms recovery dogs and handlers - a total of 12 officer days.

21. Given the difficult situation in the City of London on 1 April 2009, the MPS was able to source an additional 5 Level II PSU’s from Sussex Police following the final Gatwick arrival, comprising: 5 Inspectors, 15 PS’s, 105 PC’s. They also brought 4 PCs as Medics, 2 PCs crewing a support vehicle and were also accompanied by 2 Chief Inspectors.

22. In the MPS, all leave was cancelled for 1 and 2 April 2009. On 16 March 2009, the Commissioner gave authority for Safer Neighbourhood officers to be deployed, either on specialist roles within Glencoe (26 Search and 180 Level II officers), or to backfill on Boroughs. If this authority had not been given, Gold would have had to request much more mutual aid at great cost as the MPS had almost exhausted its capacity for certain skills. A separate paper has been prepared by TP on the impact of the use of SNTs and is shown at Appendix 2. In summary, it is assessed the use of SNTs caused only minimal impact.

23. During the week of Operation Glencoe, over 13,000 officer shifts were deployed. Many officers worked long hours on 1 April 2009 returning at 5.00 a.m. on the 2 April 2009 for the Summit where they worked similarly long hours. The Federation understood the operational need for officers working un-usually long hours and supported the decision of the MPS. Their support was invaluable and has resulted in no complaints being received from anyone deployed on the operation.

Community consultation

24. The MPS appointed a Bronze Community from Newham Borough to engage particularly with the community around ExCeL. The MPS fully engaged with affected communities, providing high-level briefings to stakeholders in Westminster, the City and Newham. The Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team was fully active and also completed a Community Impact Assessment.

25. The MPS met with the organisers of the TUC march held on Saturday 28 March 2009, the Stop the War march and Youth March for Jobs march held on 1 April 2009, as well as the static demonstrations around ExCel on 2 April 2009. These events all passed off without incident.

26. The same cannot however be said for demonstrations connected with Fossil Fools Day and Financial Fools Day. These groups do not have organisers willing to discuss their plans with the police and that makes it very difficult for the MPS to work with them to facilitate lawful protest. Gold and Silver did meet with representatives of Climate Camp on 31 March 2009, but they refused to divulge their plans. They were told quite clearly by Gold that, if they intended to set up camp in a main road in the City, the police would take action.

27. The policing operation generated a lot of interest from those planning events such as the 2010 winter and 2012 Summer Olympics, the 2014 Commonwealth Games, G8 summit in 2013 and the Labour Party conference. To manage this, a structured Observer Programme was put together, funded by the MPS.

28. Visits to the Special Operations Room by the Home Secretary, the Policing Minister, the Minister for London, the Mayor and members of the MPA and GLA were also facilitated. Two members of the MPA were given accompanied access to the protests in the City

Media

29. The communication strategy put in place for the event reflected the operational command structure, and supported the Gold Commander strategic intentions. The British Transport Police, City of London and MPS worked to the same communication strategy with one designated spokesperson representing all three forces.

30. A press officer was appointed to sit on all Gold groups and coordinate activity across partner police forces, relevant Government departments and other agencies. Two inter-agency communication meetings were held ahead of the operation to coordinate communication plans.

31. Given the international public interest, three briefings were given in order to outline policing plans and the scale of the operation. These briefings covered the Crime Reporters Association (CRA), domestic media and international media hosted by the Foreign Press Association. Commander Bob Broadhurst and T/Assistant Commissioner Chris Allison delivered the CRA briefing. Commander Simon O’Brien, who was the appointed spokesperson for the event, delivered further briefings. Transcripts of these briefings are available. A number of one to one interviews were also given to broadcast media.

32. A series of facilities were organised for media to demonstrate police preparations. These were provided on a ‘pooled’ basis and showed searches of the ExCeL centre and the operation control room (SOR).

33. From the 31 March 2009 onwards a dedicated website was available for media to receive updated information about the development of the policing operation.

34. On 1 and 2 April 2009 a dedicated press team was based within SOR. This team provided regular updates to, and liaison with, a range of partner agencies, collated information to respond to reporters’ questions and arranged interviews with the spokesperson.

35. Media were allowed to use the dedicated facilities, built into the design of SOR, as one of their broadcast points. Interviews were given by the spokesperson during the course of the 1 and 2 April 2009 to update the media, including a briefing at 1745 on 1 April 2009.

36. Regular updates were also provided to officers responsible for updating community contacts within the MPS and City of London Police. Updates were also posted on the MPS website.

37. Media monitoring was carried out before, during and after the event.

38. Given the way in which the media were reporting the story in the build up, the MPS sought to ensure that its messages were always measured. The chair of the MPA was briefed on our concerns and made comment about the media hype when interviewed by various broadcasters on Tuesday 31 March 2009.

Protestor action and the policing response

39. Given the exaggeration of the potential violent disorder in the media coverage, Gold ensured that in their briefings officers were provided with the correct intelligence assessment and that they were reminded to remain calm and restrained, reacting professionally to events in front of them. At these briefings, supervisors were required to ensure that officers under their command were correctly dressed and displaying numerals.

Tuesday 31 March

40. Four people were arrested on 31 March 2009, after an incident in Earl Street EC2 when officers were called to reports of around 10 people trying to break in to a building. Three were charged with possession of points and blades and one was charged with assault on police.

Wednesday 1 April

41. At approximately 10.00 am officers in Bishopsgate stopped a renovated armoured personnel carrier. Eleven people travelling in the carrier were arrested for being in possession of police uniform.

42. At approximately 12 noon the ‘Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse’ marches joined together in the area of the Bank of England. Police estimated there to be in the region of between 4,000 and 5,000 people gathered in that area.

43. The demonstrators were initially controlled using filter cordons which were put in place at Princes Street, Queen Victoria Street, Walbrook Street, King William Street, Lombard Street, Cornhill and Threadneedle Street. Missiles began to be thrown at officers and as levels of violence increased and flared at various points as protestors surged at the police cordons, these cordons became absolute.

44. Containment was not a pre-determined decision but a tactical option that was deemed appropriate in the developing circumstances. Given the violence already exhibited, the principal Bronze Commander believed that a sizeable minority in the crowd would seek to commit disorder, damage property or occupy buildings if they could. Due to the geography of the area in which the protestors had gathered of their own accord, it was possible for the police to put in place the cordons. The containment decision was regularly reviewed and whenever possible, people were allowed to leave the cordon. Both the Bronze and Silver Commanders were aware of the inconvenience and distress caused to many in the crowd but recognised that to have allowed a greater number to depart too early could have led to more damage and disorder. Acknowledging the lessons learnt from previous events where this tactic had been used, arrangements were made for portable toilets to be delivered into the area and for water to be supplied.

45. Before 2.00 p.m., a number of protestors broke through police lines and attacked the Royal Bank of Scotland branch in Threadneedle Street. Protestors smashed three windows and also tried to set light to the blinds, presumably with a view to burning down the building. A number of protestors entered and stole computer equipment from inside. At 2.05pm officers entered the Royal Bank of Scotland in support of building security. Officers inside the bank made two arrests for aggravated burglary. Violence continued at various cordon lines over the next few hours, but peaceful protestors were allowed to leave in small numbers.

46. At the same time as the Bank of England demonstration, about 1,000 demonstrators in Bishopsgate set up a Climate Camp in the road, a four lane highway in the heart of the City of London. Police were unable to stop this as most resources were deployed at the Bank of England as it was considered the situation there was a higher risk and therefore was given priority over the Climate Camp, which was a more peaceful protest.

47. At about 7.00 p.m., cordons were put in place around the Climate Camp demonstration to prevent disorderly protestors from the Bank of England joining this protest. However, during this time, Climate Camp protestors were allowed to leave the cordoned area if they wished. Violent protestors did approach the outside of the cordons and were moved away.

48. With the Bank of England protest cleared by 9.00 p.m., the Bronze Commander was able to move more resources to deal with the Climate Camp. The protestors were requested to move under Section 14 Public Order Act 1986 as they were blocking the main A10, Bishopsgate, thus causing serious disruption to the life of the community. At about 10.45pm, Police Support Units started slowly and methodically to remove the demonstrators to allow the roads to be open. Reasonable force had to be used in the early stages as protestors resisted and consequently a number of arrests were made. This prompted many to pack up and leave of their own accord. The Bronze Commander allowed ample time for this to happen, regularly stopping the advance so as to avoid confrontation. By 2.00 a.m. the road had been returned to the City of London Corporation so they could begin the extensive task of clearing the debris left by the protestors.

49. All other events that day including the Stop the War march, protests at delegates’ hotels, Prime Minister’s Questions and the England v Ukraine football match at Wembley, took place peacefully and without the need for police intervention.

50. During the whole day, 86 arrests were made. London Ambulance Service (LAS) were aware of 15 people who had been injured, three of whom were police officers. None of these were serious.

Death of Ian Tomlinson

51. At about 7.30 p.m. on the 1 April 2009, police were alerted to a man, now known to be Ian Tomlinson, who had collapsed on Cornhill in the City of London. Two Police Medics and a small number of officers were deployed through police lines and the crowd to get to Mr Tomlinson. They provided him with first aid and gave CPR until London Ambulance Service (LAS) paramedics took over. He was later pronounced dead in hospital.

52. Although at the time it appeared to be a collapse in the street, it was treated as an unexplained death that would need to properly investigated. Gold immediately asked for the scene to be preserved and dispatched Bronze Crime to attend and begin forensic recovery.  Both MPS and the City of London Police (CoLP) Directorates of Professional Standards (DPS) were informed and the IPCC were informed. The IPCC are now conducting an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr Tomlinson and as a result of filmed footage of an earlier incident involving Mr Tomlinson, an officer came forward and has been suspended. The MPS is fully cooperating with this investigation and it would be inappropriate for the MPS to comment further on the particulars of the case.

53. There have been allegations that MPS sought to mislead the media about this case. The MPS issued one press release about the incident that evening, which was approved by the IPCC. This is shown in full at Appendix 3. This statement outlined the facts that were known to the MPS at that time and did not say that there had been no contact with Mr Tomlinson prior to him being treated by the medics. Nick Hardwick has said that “we have had good cooperation from the City Of London and the Metropolitan Police “

Thursday 2 April

54. During the day a number of protests took place both around the ExCeL Centre and in Central London. The Marine Support Unit boarded a small boat near to Palace of Westminster with three Greenpeace protestors on board. At 11am, around 200 ‘Youth for Jobs’ protestors gathered in Tooley Street, eventually arriving outside the ExCeL Centre in the early evening.

55. At 12 noon, 30 protestors began a Memorial March in relation to the death of Ian Tomlinson the previous day. The route taken was Bishopsgate to Threadneedle St, finishing outside Bank of England. At its peak there were approx 350 demonstrators. Using powers under Section 14 of the Public Order Act, Police only allowed demonstrations within the triangle outside the Bank of England. A small contingent of that crowd began to throw missiles at Police and Mounted Branch Officers were deployed to the location to quell further disorder. By 5.00 p.m. the last of the protestors had left.

56. At 12:20 pm, officers went to two addresses that police believed were being used by some of those people involved in the violent disorder the previous day. An address in E1 contained around 20 people, of who four were arrested; 2 for violent disorder and 2 for possession of an offensive weapon. An address at Earl Street, EC2, had approximately 60 people inside; 2 people were arrested for violent disorder and assault on police the previous day.

57. During the planning phase, many protest groups had talked about descending on ExCeL for the summit having brought the City to a halt the day before. At its peak at 1pm there were 300 – 500 good-humoured protestors outside, none of whom were problematic. It is worth noting that all had applied to police for permission to demonstrate and been fully cooperative.

58. While a number of delegations left the country that evening, some remained in London for a further night.

Friday 3 April

59. The US delegation left in the morning by road as the cloud base was too low for their helicopters. A demonstration by free Tibet protestors took place without incident outside the hotel occupied by the Chinese who were the last delegation to leave at 4.30 p.m. Shortly after, Gold formally closed Operation Glencoe.

Post-event investigation

60. It was agreed that a post-event investigation team would be set up following the event to identify those protestors responsible for crime and disorder in an efforts to bring them to justice. This team is being led by the City of London and is being supported by officers from both the MPS and BTP.

Specialist Operations Room (SOR)

61. This was the largest and most complex operation ever run by the SOR with the demand on radio channels being unprecedented.

62. Airwave radio limitations were matched at an early stage to CO11 deployments and solutions were put in place throughout the planning stage. The option for a ‘Protected network’ was utilised and Airwave Solutions were fully supportive throughout the pre-operational and operational phases. Airwave radio batteries became an issue due to prolonged deployments.

63. Mutual Aid from Sussex was brought in, but as the MPS had no further operational Airwave channels available for communications, a Thames Valley Police channel was borrowed.

64. On 2 April 2009, a partial power-outage occurred that caused Gold to begin putting a contingency in place to enable fall-back to Hendon. However, full power was restored within the hour and the contingency was not required.

Olympic learning

65. ExCeL is a 2012 Olympic venue and this operation gave a valuable insight as to how the security operation might look during the Games. The scale of Operation Glencoe will be very similar to an average day at the Olympics. Other key lessons will be learnt from the scale of the protection operation; the command and control issues; the resilience of Airwave and the capacity of radio channels; the resilience of senior staff; the capacity and availability of specialist officers; the issues of mutual aid; the governance arrangements and relationships with Government and other partners.

Impact

66. Since the event, there has been much media and public comment about the tactics used by the police. As a result of further footage coming to light, a further officer has been suspended and the IPCC is undertaking a full investigation.

67. The Commissioner has also asked Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary to undertake a review of public order tactics.

C. Race and equality impact

During the event, there were a number of demonstrations involving specific community groups. These events all passed off without incident. There are no other known race or equality issues.

D. Financial implications

1. Full costs will not be known for some time, but on 15 April the estimated total cost of policing G20 stood at £7.5m of which £3.6m was opportunity costs and £3.8m as additional costs. These figures are for the MPS alone but include mutual aid costs.

2. On 22 January 2009, an FCO official asked Commander Broadhurst for indicative costs so that they could be passed to Treasury. Commander Broadhurst stated that the MPS/MPA would be seeking full cost recovery for the event but the Home Office later told the MPS that all police forces would be expected to absorb their own costs. Subsequent discussions on cost recovery were held with the Home Office, and on 7 April 2009 the Home Secretary confirmed in a letter to the Commissioner that the Home Office would meet reasonable additional costs arising from the demands placed on the MPS by the Summit. A claim, based on the estimates available, has been submitted and the Home Office is currently considering this.

E. Legal implications

1. The overarching duties of the MPA are to secure an efficient and effective Police force, under section 6 of the Police Act 1996. The MPS in executing a high profile and complex Operation, planned, consulted, cooperated and collaborated with Government officials, key partners, stakeholders and other police authorities to ensure sufficient resources were deployed strategically to minimise risk of harm to the public and property, maintain public order and facilitate lawful protest.

2. The IPCC are conducting two independent investigations in accordance with its powers under the Police Reform Act 2002.

3. There is a risk of compensation claims from demonstrators, other members of the public and police officers in respect of injuries sustained and from property owners in respect of damages to property.

4. There will, of course be the inquest into the tragic death of Ian Tomlinson.

5. If the result of the IPCC investigations should be disciplinary actions, the ‘appropriate authority’ as defined in the Police Reform Act 2002 is the Commissioner (or the MPA if any ACPO officers are involved). In order to avoid any argument of bias, any comment on these aspects by the Commissioner (or MPA) should be very limited.

6. As persons have been arrested and charged, proceedings are ‘active within the meaning on the Contempt of Court Act 1911. Care should be taken to avoid any comment that might impede or prejudice the course of justice. Any such comments may lead to personal or corporate liability for contempt of court.

F. Background papers

None

G. Contact details

Report author(s): T/ Assistant Commissioner Allison, MPS

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 2

Briefing Note to DAC Rod Jarman

Deployment of Safer Neighbourhoods Teams during G20 policing commitments

Following discussions at Management Board level, and in line with the public commitments given by the MPS on the ringfencing of SNT officers, the Commissioner determined that Safer Neighbourhood Team officers could be used to backfill AID requirements on their own boroughs in relation to policing the G20 event on 1/2 April 2009.

This was recognised to be an extremely rare situation, in which the unusually high number of officers required to police this public order commitment necessitated the use of Safer Neighbourhood Team officers. In instances where officers had particular specialist skills, e.g in specialist searching or public order policing, those officers may have been required to police the event itself. In all other cases, SNT officers were still working on their borough, but were available to backfill response team officers required to police the event.

The Chair and the Deputy Chair of the Police Authority were briefed and were supportive of this decision. All borough Commanders were also briefed.

Central Safer Neighbourhoods survey of MPS boroughs

• All Boroughs were requested to provide details of SNT officer abstractions and to identify any discernible effect on performance during the policing of the G20 event 2009.
• Replies were received from 18 Boroughs within the 24-hour window of response across an equitable representation of each Link.

Extent of abstractions

• From the 18 Borough responses, a total of 229 SNT officer days were assigned to backfilling aid requirements on their own Boroughs, or deployment to the event itself, in accordance with the communiqué from AC Rose Fitzpatrick on 19 March 2009.
• The SNT deployments ranged from 62 SNT officer days at Bromley to one at Kensington & Chelsea.
• The mean average SNT officer days deployed for the 18 Boroughs was 12.4 days

Effect on performance

• Six Boroughs (including Bromley, with the largest known deployment of SNT officers) reported no discernible effect on the performance of SNTs and their Borough
• 11 Boroughs reported only minimal effect on the performance of SNTs and their Borough, mostly through a short term slight reduction of visibility
• Westminster reported that the deployment of SNT supervisors and PCs (29 SNT officer days) had a significant impact on the levels and quality of SNT supervision
• There were no reports of any impact on specific performance or on any specific incidents
• There were no reports of community concern from any of the 18 Boroughs

Kevin Hobson, CI, Borough Support & Performance Team, Central Safer Neighbourhoods

Appendix 3

Metropolitan Police press release

A member of the public went to a police officer on a cordon in Birchin Lane, junction with Cornhill to say that there was a man who had collapsed round the corner.

That officer sent two police medics through the cordon line and into St Michaels Alley where they found a man who had stopped breathing. They called for LAS support at about 1930. The officers gave him an initial check and cleared his airway before moving him back behind the cordon line to a clear area outside the Royal Exchange Building where they gave him CPR.

The officers took the decision to move him as during this time a number of missiles - believed to be bottles - were being thrown at them.

LAS took the man to hospital where he was pronounced dead.

The Directorate of Professional Standards at both the MPS and City of London Police have been informed.

The IPCC has been informed.

[Wednesday 1st April 2009]

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