G20 and public order policing

Report: 6c
Date: 30 April 2009

Summary

Written questions submitted by MPA members to the MPS concerning G20 and public order policing.

Questions

Question 1 - Valerie Brasse

"Having just read the front page story in the Guardian's media section I shall expect the Met to reassure us in public and for the record about what they did or did not know at the time they put out the first press release re Mr Tomlinson. Can I assume they will deal with this too in their presentation? "

This is covered in the body of the G20 MPA report from which a extract is shown below:

“There has been much talk in the media about the MPS seeking to mislead the media about this case. The MPS issued one press release about the incident that evening, which was approved by the IPCC. This statement outlined the facts that were known to the MPS at that time and did not say that there had been no contact with Mr Tomlinson prior to him being treated by the medics. Nick Hardwick has said that “we have had good cooperation from the City Of London and the Metropolitan Police “

Question 2 - Valerie Brasse

I have an additional question - namely is there any random drugs testing (including use of steroids) of officers on public order duty, what is the policy on this and what if anything was done 1st/ 2nd April?

The MPS has a policy of randomly testing officers for alcohol and substance misuse. Officers undertaking certain duties are subject to this policy. (The policy and standard operating procedure can be made available to members). Being trained as a public order officer does not fit the criteria for automatic testing per-see although a number of public order officers would be tested because of other skills they have or duties they undertake. There was no specific testing undertaken for G20.

Question 3  - Richard Tracey

I am still interested in a detailed answer to my question about preventative measures which could have been taken/were taken at the RBS branch at Bank. Surely some risk assessment must have been made of all the glass fronted premises near Bank, and I would have thought they would then have been advised to board up - especially an RBS branch in current circumstances. What better target for the protesters? As it was, the images of the RBS windows being smashed and articles being stolen/looted provided a lot of unfortunate and graphic images to go round UK and the world.

Any decision whether or not to board up premises is a matter for the owner of that premises. Extensive briefings were given to the Business Community both in the City of London and the City of Westminster. At these briefings it was made clear that the intelligence suggested that the protestors would attempt to stop the City by occupying the streets and potentially buildings. There was no general intelligence indicating a widespread intent to damage buildings. Some premises made the decision to board up their premises while others chose not to. This was not directed by police and was a matter of individual choice for businesses.

Question 4 - Jenny Jones

Climate Camp in Bishopsgate

The majority of the questions about Climate Camp are covered in the body of the G20 MPA report. An extract of the relevant paragraphs from the report is shown below:

‘At about 7pm, cordons were put in place around the Climate Camp demonstration to prevent disorderly protestors from the Bank of England joining this protest. However, during this time, Climate Camp protestors were allowed to leave the cordoned area if they wished. Violent protestors did approach the outside of the cordons and were moved away.

With the Bank of England protest cleared by 9pm, the Bronze Commander was able to move more resources to deal with the Climate Camp. The protestors were requested to move under Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 as they were blocking the main A10, Bishopsgate, thus causing serious disruption to the life of the community. At about 10.45pm, PSU’s started slowly and methodically to remove the demonstrators to allow the roads to be opened. Reasonable force had to be used in the early stages as protestors resisted and consequently a number of arrests were made. This prompted many to pack up and leave of their own accord. The Bronze Commander allowed ample time for this to happen, regularly stopping the advance so as to avoid confrontation. By 2am the road had been returned to the City of London Corporation so they could begin the extensive task of clearing the debris left by the protestors.’

What final warning was given to the climate camp people that they were about to be contained?

Cordons were put in place to stop other people (most specifically violent protesters from the other demonstration) from joining the Climate Camp. The clearance of the street was done later under Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 as outlined above, with officers informing those in the crowd using PA systems on the carriers and personally on the cordon lines.

Were demonstrators allowed to leave during the containment?

Yes as outlined above.

There were reports of confusion at about 7.30pm in Bishopsgate about what the police were meant to be doing – the TSG began to move in and then stopped – why was this?

The MPS is not aware of any confusion. The serials may have started, then stopped and then started again as part of the slow implementation of the cordon control measures.

What was the rationale for containing and clearing the climate camp?

As stated above, cordons were put in place to stop other people (most specifically violent protesters from the other demonstration) from joining the Climate Camp. The Climate Camp was unlawfully blocking a major highway in the City of London and irrespective of whether the protestors were peaceful or not, such a unlawful demonstration required police intervention. This was done using the powers under Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986.

When did each of these operations take place?

As outlined in the report extract above.

Who made the decisions to contain and clear the climate camp? When were these decisions made?

At a meeting prior to the 1st April 2009 between the Climate Camp and police representatives, the police command team made it clear that any camp unlawfully blocking the highway would be removed. Having concluded the clearance of the area around the Bank of England, the Silver Commander then directed that the Climate Camp, which was unlawfully blocking the road, should be removed as outlined above.

How and where are the decisions taken to confine a protest?

As outlined above.

I have received reports that the police dragged, kicked, punched and hit people in the climate camp with shields to move them away from the area and disperse them.

As described above, the protestors were required to move under Section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986. For those who refuse to move, police are allowed in law to use reasonable force to move them from the area. The MPS fully accepts that excessive force should not be used and that all officers are accountable for their actions. There are significant challenges for the police in moving people under these circumstances, especially those who do not respond to police direction.

Why did the police feel it necessary to use such force against non-violent campaigners?

As outlined above.

Question 5  - Jenny Jones

Police kettling in the Bank area

Were contained protesters left for some time without food, water or the use of a toilet? If so, how long was this period? If not, what facilities were provided and when?

What is the policy on providing food, water, and toilet facilities to confined protesters?

Were protesters who wished to leave the contained area prevented from doing so? If so, why?

When the police cordoned off the area surrounding the RBS in Threadneedle Street there was heightened violence and criminal damage. Was that foreseen?

Before answering this question, it is important to reiterate that the term ‘kettling’ is not one that is used by the Police Service. The tactic is known as ‘containment and controlled dispersal’.

This is covered in the body of the G20 MPA report. An extract of this report is shown below:

‘At approximately 12 noon the ‘Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse’ marches joined together in the area of the Bank of England. Police estimated there to be in the region of between 4,000 and 5,000 people gathered in that area.

The demonstrators were initially controlled using filter cordons [these filter cordons on this occasion allowed people to pass through it in both directions] which were put in place at Princes Street, Queen Victoria Street, Walbrook Street, King William Street, Lombard Street, Cornhill and Threadneedle Street. Missiles began to be thrown at officers as levels of violence increased and flared at various points as protestors surged at the police cordons, these cordons became absolute.

Containment was not a pre-determined decision but a tactical option that was deemed appropriate in the developing circumstances. Given the violence already exhibited, the principal Bronze Commander was of the belief that a sizeable minority in the crowd would seek to commit disorder, damage property or occupy buildings if they could. Due to the geography of the area in which the protestors had gathered of their own accord, it was possible for the police to put in place the cordons. The containment decision was regularly reviewed and whenever possible, people were allowed to leave the cordon. Both Bronze and Silver were aware of the inconvenience and distress caused to many in the crowd but recognised that to allow a greater number to depart too early could have led to more damage and disorder. Acknowledging the lessons learnt from previous events where this tactic had been used, arrangements were made for portable toilets to be delivered into the area and for water to be supplied. [6 toilets were provided at 1445 and were operational by 1530 with running water. In addition five hundred bottles of water were provided specifically for the protestors at a number of locations. Public announcements were made by the police informing the protestors that both toilets and water were available.]

Before 2pm, a number of protestors broke through police lines and attacked the Royal Bank of Scotland branch in Threadneedle Street. Protestors smashed three windows and also tried to set light to the blinds, presumably with a view to burning down the building. A number of protestors entered and stole computer equipment from inside. At 2.05pm officers entered the Royal Bank of Scotland in support of building security. Officers inside the bank made two arrests for aggravated burglary. Violence continued at various cordon lines over the next few hours, but peaceful protestors were allowed to leave in small numbers.’

Question 6  - Jenny Jones

Thursday 2 April protest in City.

Why did the police contain and disperse the further protest in the Bishopsgate and Bank area on Thursday 2nd April?

This is covered in the body of the G20 MPA report. An extract of this report is shown below:

‘At 12 noon, 30 protestors began a Memorial March in relation to the death of Ian Tomlinson the previous day. The route taken was Bishopsgate to Threadneedle St, finishing outside the Bank of England. At its peak there were approx 350 demonstrators. Using powers under Section 14 of the Public Order Act, Police only allowed demonstrations within the triangle outside the Bank of England. A small contingent of that crowd began to throw missiles at Police and Mounted Branch Officers were deployed to the location to quell further disorder. By 5pm the last of the protestors had left.’

Question 7 - Jenny Jones

General

What health and safety risk assessment has been made of the general tactic of “kettling” used to police protests?

What health and safety assessment has been made of the tactic of confining protests?

Was a Health and Safety risk assessment made of the dangers of extended containment of protesters for this occasion?

Before answering this question, it is important to reiterate that the term ‘kettling’ is not one that is used by the Police Service. The tactic is known as ‘containment and controlled dispersal’.

The tactic of containment and controlled dispersal has been scrutinised in detail and found to be lawful. Every use of this tactic differs depending on the circumstances and a generic risk assessment cannot be used. The senior police officer implementing the tactic will make a decision and assessment before implementation to ensure that the risks and threats are considered. This was the case when the tactic of containment and dispersal was used during the G20 demonstrations.

Question 8 - Jenny Jones

Did the police take away cameras and phones? If so, what was the reason for that and under what powers?

Did the police remove the notebook of the climate camp’s police liaison? If so, will they be returning it?

The MPS has no knowledge of this taking place.

Question 9 - Jenny Jones

Did any officers, at any time, cover their numbers?

What checks are made to ensure that all officers are showing their numbers at all times when policing public order events?

In what ways could it be made easier to identify officers at public order events?

At the members’ briefing on Thursday 23rd April 2009, the MPA were shown the various identification flashes worn by officers, which appear to have been misinterpreted by the media as tape. The MPA were also shown the headover which is official equipment and is worn to prevent flash burns when deployed in full public order protective equipment. While it is accepted that a few officers did not have their numerals correctly displayed, the overwhelming majority did. The need for all officers to be correctly dressed (including numerals) was included in the Gold Commanders briefing. The whole issue has identified problems with some of the uniform issued to officers and the MPS Clothing Board will address this as a matter of urgency.

The Commissioner has made it quite plain that officers must wear appropriate identification at all times and this message is being reinforced across the MPS on a daily basis.

Question 10 - Jenny Jones

Is it now a standard part of confining protests to progressively reduce the space given to protesters?

At the start of the containment on the 1st April 2009, the protestors were allowed a very large area in which they could demonstrate. The size of this area was only reduced towards the end of the evening as a part of the final clearance. When implementing the containment tactic, those in command always ensure that there is sufficient space for those within it. Those in command also receive training on crowd dynamics as part of their continued personal development training.

Question 11 - Jenny Jones

How are police tactics communicated to protesters?

Tactics are communicated in a variety of different ways and will depend on the specific circumstances of the event. Some are clearly very visual and so can be seen by the protestors. Some are communicated to the protestors either by individual officers or by loud hailers or PA systems.

Question 12 - Jenny Jones

Is the confinement of protests a tactic of last resort and are there clear guidelines on when it should be used?

Containment is one of many tactical options available to the police service, the choice of which one to use being dependent on the circumstances of each demonstration. Those in command of an event where containment is used have to show that it was necessary and proportionate in the circumstances.

Question 13  - Jenny Jones

Are briefings to officers taped?

While all briefings are not routinely recorded because of the sheer number of them and the variety of locations where they are undertaken, the briefings given by the Gold and Silver Commander for the events on the 1st April 2009 were recorded and have been retained. The briefing notes by Gold and Silver are also fully documented and have also been retained with all the event paperwork.

Question 14  - Jenny Jones

Do the police always try to make contact with protest organisers in advance of an event?

As outlined during the members briefing on Thursday 23rd April 2009, police will always seek dialogue with an event organiser to facilitate their protest. Section 11 of the Public Order Act 1986 requires those organising certain types of marches and processions to provide police with notification of their event and the Serious Organised Police Act 2005 requires those wishing to hold a static demonstration in a defined area around Parliament to get authorisation from the Metropolitan Police Service.

Question 15 - Jenny Jones

What training is given to officers on public order duty? How often is this training refreshed? What techniques of non-violent management of aggressive crowds are taught?

As outlined during the members briefing on Thursday 23rd April 2009, the MPS has a command CADRE of approximately one hundred officers of the rank of Chief Inspector and above. They have undergone ACPO accredited advanced training and to remain accredited they need to attend annual training which comprises of a tactical refresher at Gravesend, a seminar and a Public Order training weekend. In addition they also have to have commanded a minimum of three Public Order events a year. Those who do not fulfil these criteria loose their accreditation and are taken off the CADRE. There are approximately seven hundred and fifty level 1 public order trained officers on the Territorial Support Group who undergo training in a variety of skills every five weeks. There are approximately three thousand level 2 officers who undergo two days training every year. The remaining uniform officers in the Service are level 3 trained having been taught basic public order skills such as cordons. The level 1 and level 2 training includes a variety of tactics to deal with violent crowds.

Question 16 - Jenny Jones

What role is media strategy given in the management of protests – before, during, and after these events?

The MPS fully understands the importance of a media strategy in relation to the policing of public order events.

This is covered in the body of the G20 MPA report. An extract of the report is shown below:

‘The communication strategy put in place for the event reflected the operational command structure, and supported Gold’s strategic intentions. The British Transport Police, City of London and MPS worked to the same communication strategy with one designated spokesperson representing all three forces.

A press officer was appointed to sit on all Gold groups and coordinate activity across partner police forces, relevant Government departments and other agencies. Two inter-agency communication meetings were held ahead of the operation to coordinate communication plans.

Given the international public interest, three briefings were given in order to outline policing plans and the scale of the operation. These briefings covered the Crime Reporters Association (CRA), domestic media and international media hosted by the Foreign Press Association. Commander Bob Broadhurst and T/Assistant Commissioner Chris Allison delivered the CRA briefing. Commander Simon O’Brien, who was the appointed spokesperson for the event, delivered further briefings. Transcripts of these briefings are available. A number of one to one interviews were also given to broadcast media.

A series of facilities were organised for media to demonstrate police preparations. These were provided on a ‘pooled’ basis and showed searches of the ExCeL centre and the operation control room (SOR).

From the 31 March onwards a dedicated website was available for media to receive updated information about the development of the policing operation.

On 1st and 2nd April a dedicated press team were based within SOR. This team provided regular updates to, and liaison with, a range of partner agencies, collated information to respond to reporters’ questions and arranged interviews with the spokesperson.

Media were allowed to use the dedicated facilities, built into the design of SOR, as one of their broadcast points. Interviews were given by the spokesperson during the course of the 1st and 2nd April to update the media, including a briefing at 1745 on 1st April.

Regular updates were also provided to officers responsible for updating community contacts within the MPS and City of London Police. Updates were also posted on the MPS website.

Media monitoring was carried out before, during and after the event.

Given the way in which the media were reporting the story in the build up, the MPS sought to ensure that its messages were always measured. The Chair of the MPA was briefed on our concerns and made comment about the media hype when interviewed by various broadcasters on Tuesday 31st March.’

Question 17 - Jenny Jones

Will the MPS review its own recordings of the G20 protests in order to identify any wrongdoing on the part of police officers?

The Commissioner has already announced that such a review is taking place.

The MPS is working closely with the City of London Police. The City is conducting an investigation where they will be reviewing CCTV and other footage obtained throughout the G20 Summit. The MPS have liased with the CoLP and an agreement is currently being drawn up whereby officers viewing CCTV will be obliged to bring any areas of concern to the attention of a supervisor for referral to the Professional Standards Investigation team.

The MPS has set up a team of 10 officers to investigate all public complaints and conduct matters arising out of G20. They are currently reviewing 233 complaints and 5 conduct matters. Each DPS investigation will be subject to an investigative plan which will include consideration as to the review of CCTV held both inside and outside the MPS.

The DPS has two researchers who have been designated to view You Tube. Over a two week period they have viewed 7 days worth of comments/footage which they are developing to ascertain if any further evidence is available.

Question 18 - Jenny Jones

Will the police review its tactic of removing the recording equipment on protesters, which has proved to be a valuable tool in identifying poor police performance?

The police have no such tactic.

Question 19 - Dee Doocey

You gave an assurance to MPA members at our meeting on 26th March that the police recognised that peaceful demonstrations were a democratic right and would facilitate them. However, having spoken to a number of our official observers who were actually on the scene, and having seen the TV coverage, I gained the clear impression that there was instead a 'presumption of criminality' by the police against the demonstrators.

My particular concerns are:

The police response was disproportionate, almost certainly exacerbated the situation and was unfair to the vast majority of protestors who appeared to be peaceful and law-abiding. As one of our observers, David Howarth MP, put it, “How did the police end up in a situation where they used the same degree of force on the most peaceful demonstration as they did for a violent protest at the Bank of England?”

The tactics of ‘kettling’ (i.e. bottling up demonstrators in a confined area for hours at a time with no food, water or toilets) and aggressive baton charges against non-violent demonstrators were especially disproportionate and of dubious legality.

The police’s media campaign, which hyped up the potential for violence weeks before G20 took place, was inappropriate and may have made violence more likely. This is not an isolated incident and I believe we need to examine who was responsible for comments to journalists and why they were made.

The MPS fully accepts its responsibility to facilitate lawful protest and the rights of those who wish to protest. At a number of protests, the MPS has to deal with those who whilst being peaceful, break the law, the most common example of this being those who wilfully obstruct the highway. Whilst such a protest may be peaceful, it is unlawful and the MPS is required to intervene to uphold the law in a proportionate way.

The MPS strategy for the G20 event reflected the MPS position on protest. It is set out in the MPA G20 report and a number of strands focus specifically on our role of facilitating lawful protest. This strategy underscored all of the policing operation.

While there are individual acts which are currently being investigated, the overall policing response was proportionate and necessary. The reasons for clearing the Climate Camp are fully covered both in the report and the answer to question 4 above.

It is important to reiterate that the term “kettling” is not one that is used by the Police Service. The tactic is known as “containment and controlled dispersal”.

Those in command of the containment regularly reviewed its operation and ensured that toilets and water were provided.

The media strategy for this event is set out in the report and also in the answer to question 16 above.

Question 19 - Lord Toby Harris

What is the role of “Police Medics”?

Police Medics are deployed to ensure that there is effective emergency advanced first aid support, in order to meet any duty of care requirements for both the public and police officers, in support of any policing operations.

The provision of appropriate emergency first aid during the ‘Platinum Ten Minutes’ of medical treatment will assist in reducing the impact of any serious injuries sustained during policing operations. (Source ACPO Public Order Manual of Guidance – this can be made available to MPA Members)

Question 20 - Lord Toby Harris

What were the debriefing arrangements for officers involved in policing the G20 protest?

At the conclusion of all public order events including G20, serial Inspectors are required to debrief their officers and complete an operational record (form 3166) these forms are collated by the CO11 Event Planning Team, reviewed and retained. A full structured debrief of the Command Team will be undertaken by CO11.

Question 21 - Lord Toby Harris

Were any of the earlier incidents involving Mr Tomlinson captured by the Met video feeds in the control room?

The MPS has footage provided by the Air Support Unit of the medics providing assistance to Mr Tomlinson. This footage has been provided to the IPCC. The MPS is not aware of any other footage but this is being looked into as part of the IPCC investigation.

Send an e-mail linking to this page

Feedback