Update report regarding Peter Woodhams investigation

Report: 5
Date: 5 March 2009
By: Chief Executive

Summary

On 29 May 2008, at a meeting of the full Authority, the MPA Chair received representations from members of Peter Woodhams family concerning the standard of the police investigation and outcome of the police discipline procedure, in particular the outcome of the Review conducted by AC Ghaffur.

At that meeting, members supported the proposal from the Chair of the Professional Standards and Complaints Committee (PSCC) that at the next PSCC meeting, members receive a report on matters relating to the MPS investigation, officer disciplinary process and IPCC involvement.

As the PSCC ended in October 2008, the report now falls to be considered by members of the Strategic and Operational Policing Committee (SOP).

The purpose of this report is to set out the background to the murder of Mr Woodhams in August 2006, including the serious assault on him in January 2006; the failings of the subsequent investigation; the discipline process that followed and the outcome of the misconduct hearing. This report is further to inform members of the updated position in terms of response to the concerns raised by the family of Mr Woodhams and their legal representative and the recommendations made by the IPCC.

A. Recommendation

That members note the content of this report.

B. Supporting information

Background to the murder of Peter Woodhams

1. On 21 January 2006 Jane Bowden was driving her fiancé, Peter Woodhams, to their home in Tallis Close, London E16. They were close to their destination when they heard something hit the car. Mr Woodhams jumped out of the car to see what had happened. Miss Bowden could see a gang of youths standing on the corner and she saw Mr Woodhams turn towards the boys and the group run off. Mr Woodhams ran after them. Miss Bowden next saw Mr Woodhams after he had been stabbed. Due to the fact they were close to Tallis Road and at that stage it was not thought that the wound was very serious, Mr Woodhams tried to walk home. However, he collapsed in the road and an ambulance was called.

2. Uniform Response Team Officers attended the scene, rendered first aid and dealt with the initial scene management. One of the uniformed officers accompanied Mr Woodhams to hospital in the ambulance. Despite the attendance of both supervising uniform and CID officers at the scene, the police retrieved no clothing or other items.

3. Mr Woodhams was discharged from hospital just after midnight on 22 January 2006.

4. Mr Woodhams was later to say that it was two of the youths out of the original group who were responsible for his injury. He gave a description of a male who kicked him and a person with a grey top shouting “hold him, hold him, I am going to do him”. The man who had kicked him then hit him in the face. Both men then ran off. Mr Woodhams believed he would recognise both men again.

5. During the first weeks after the stabbing a number of telephone calls were received at Mr Woodhams home in Tallis Close and also at Miss Bowden’s mother’s home. Five named individuals were mentioned including the two already described above. (An anonymous list containing two names and three street names, was handed to police by Mr Woodhams).

6. Detective Constable Suett was appointed as investigating officer and on 31 January 2006 he sent a memo to the officer dealing with the Witness Album Delivery System asking for a viewing to be arranged. This resulted in Mr Woodhams viewing a number of images on 9 February 2006. It did not result in anybody being identified, neither did it contain the pictures of any of those who had been named in the numerous telephone calls nor those later charged with Mr Woodhams murder. Detective Sergeant Darren Case was supervising this investigation.

7. Tragically on 21 August 2006, Mr Woodhams was shot and subsequently died. Two men were subsequently arrested and charged, namely Bradley Tucker and James Taylor.

Subsequent Investigation and Discipline Process

8. Following complaints from Miss Bowden and other members of both her and Mr Woodhams’ families, at the end of August 2006, the IPCC conducted an independent investigation. The allegations centred upon the failures of the investigation involving DC Suett and DS Case, into Mr Woodhams’ stabbing in January 2006.

9. The IPCC investigated the conduct of nine officers in total. The IPCC’s investigation concluded in April 2007, by which time, DC Suett had transferred to Derbyshire Constabulary. The IPCC investigation found a number of failures on his part.

10. DS Case was DC Suett’s line manager with overall responsibility for the supervision of his Team’s enquiries and crime reports. The investigation by the IPCC found that DS Case should also shoulder a degree of the blame for the poor investigation.

11. The Metropolitan Police on considering the IPCC’s report agreed the following disposal: four officers received a written warning for their failings; three officers received management advice and the two remaining officers, namely DS Case and DC Suett should face a misconduct hearing with full powers.

12. On 4 October 2007, DS Case and DC Suett attended a misconduct hearing before Commander Sawyer, Chief Superintendent Smethen from Derbyshire Constabulary and Roger Lucking the lay member whose attendance was required under Regulation 19 of The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004. Representatives of Mr Woodhams family were present at the hearing and following the agreement of DS Case and DC Suett, were also present when the sanction was delivered.

13. Both DS Case and DC Suett admitted a breach of the Code of Conduct in relation to Performance of Duties. The tribunal considered that in respect of both officers the failure was a gross neglect of duty and required them to resign with immediate effect.

Assistant Commissioner’s Review

14. Both officers subsequently requested a Chief Officers Review under Regulation 40 of The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004, (in the Metropolitan Police Service an Assistant Commissioner) against the sanction.

15. On 25 March 2008, Assistant Commissioner Tarique Ghaffur undertook the Review. The IPCC were represented at the Review and members of Mr Woodhams’ family were also present. Both the family and IPCC made submissions to Mr Ghaffur at the Review.

16. In respect of DC Suett, Mr Ghaffur concluded that he should remain accountable for his actions but that the original sanction imposed upon him was too severe in relation to his failings. He concluded that DC Suett’s failings were in relation to this particular investigation and not in regard to his ability to be a police officer. Mr Ghaffur did not consider that DC Suett’s re-instatement would create a loss of public confidence in the police service. As a consequence, Mr Ghaffur varied the sanction from a requirement to resign to a fine of 13 days pay.

17. In respect of DS Case, Mr Ghaffur similarly concluded that while he should remain accountable for his actions, the original sanction imposed on him was too severe. He concluded that DS Case’s failings in this particular case were in relation to supervision, not in regard to his ability to be a detective. Mr Ghaffur did not consider that DS Case’s re-instatement would create a loss of public confidence in the police service. As a consequence, Mr Ghaffur varied the sanction from a requirement to resign to a reduction in rank to Detective Constable.

Post Appeal

18. The MPS regrets its failings in the initial investigation into the stabbing of Mr Woodhams. The Commissioner has offered his personal condolences to Mr Woodhams senior and to the rest of Mr Woodhams’ family and friends.

20. Members of the family were afforded an unprecedented level of access throughout the whole disciplinary process. They were given full access to the hearing, the officers gave their consent for the family members to be present during the sanction process and this was the first time that family members have been permitted to be present during an Chief Officers (Assistant Commissioners) Review. The family have been provided with a record of all the decision making documentation in this case and offered the opportunity to meet with Mr Ghaffur.

Meeting of the full Authority

21. In accordance with the MPA’s Standing Order 2.7, at a meeting on 29 May 2008, the Authority received a question from the father of Mr Woodhams concerning the determination of Assistant Commissioner Ghaffur, to vary the sanctions imposed on DS Case and DC Suett.

22. In addressing the full Authority, Mr Woodhams (senior) re-iterated his disappointment with Mr Ghaffur’s decision and invited the MPA to make interventions on behalf of the Woodhams’ family.

23. Following consideration of both written and oral representations, MPA members resolved that the Professional Standards and Complaints Committee (“PSCC”) should receive a report on the issues relating to the outcome of the investigation into allegations about the failures in the investigation of the serious assault of Mr Woodhams and the officer disciplinary process.

24. As was discussed and acknowledged by members of the full Authority, the MPA’s response to the outcome of Mr Ghaffur’s review was limited. This was because the MPA does not itself have the statutory remit to overturn the decision of an Assistant Commissioner’s Review.

Judicial Review

25. The IPCC obtained legal advice from Counsel as to the prospects of pursuing a claim for Judicial Review of Mr Ghaffur’s Review decision. Counsel’s opinion was that the IPCC did not have grounds to bring a Judicial Review. That advice remains the subject of legal professional privilege and is not therefore available to be shared with members. As a result of this advice, the IPCC decided it would not seek to challenge the outcome of Mr Ghaffur’s Review.

26. Mr Woodhams’ family are represented by Christian Khan Solicitors. On behalf of Mr Woodhams’ family, the Judicial Review process was initiated by Christian Khan in May 2008. In accordance with the Judicial Review pre-action protocol, a letter before claim was sent by Christian Khan, to the Director of legal Services, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 28 May 2008.

27. On 12 June 2008, the MPS provided a response in accordance with the pre-action protocol. In summary, it was not accepted that there were any reviewable errors in Mr Ghaffur’s decision and any proposed claim for Judicial Review would be resisted.

28. On 27 June 2008, a claim for Judicial Review was issued in the Administrative Court, naming the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis as Defendant and AC Ghaffur, DC Suett, DS Case, the IPCC and the MPA as the five Interested Parties. In Judicial Review proceedings permission to apply for Judicial Review must first be granted by the Court. The application for permission to apply for Judicial Review was to be considered on the papers on or after 21 July 2008.

29. On 24 July 2008, permission to apply for Judicial Review was refused. On 29 July 2008, on behalf of Mr Woodhams’ family, Christian Khan issued a Notice of Renewal of claim for permission to apply for Judicial Review. The Renewal of Claim hearing was listed for 18 September 2008. It was suggested on behalf of the Woodhams family and agreed by the MPA that it would be appropriate to postpone members’ consideration of the report requested at the meeting of the full Authority, until after the Renewal of Claim hearing.

30. By Order dated 19 September 2008, the renewed application for permission to apply for Judicial Review was refused. There will therefore be no Judicial Review or further challenge to Mr Ghaffur’s Review decision.

New Disciplinary Process and Update from MPS

31. The MPA has a statutory duty to maintain an efficient and effective police service. In his representations to the full Authority, Mr Woodhams (senior) reminded MPA members of the importance of fulfilling that responsibility.

32. In accordance with the members’ request, the MPA as asked the MPS to provide details of its organisational learning. The MPS will provide a separate update on the progress made against the IPCC recommendations and lessons learned.

33. Following the Taylor recommendations and the passing of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill of 2008, the new disciplinary process, which was introduced on 1 December 2008, has removed the right of appeal by way of Chief Officer (Assistant Commissioner) Review. Any appeal against a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct or the disciplinary action imposed as a consequence of such a finding must now be made to the Police Appeals Tribunal. With the abolition of the PSCC in October 2008, the MPA, via the Strategic and Operational Policing Committee, will continue to support the new disciplinary process.

34. Members of the Strategic and Operational Policies Committee are therefore encouraged to demonstrate their continuing commitment to monitor MPS compliance with recommendations made for organisational learning, whether made in the context of public complaints and conduct investigations or as a result of review and inspection.

C. Race and equality impact

Monitoring the MPS’ response to recommendations for organisational learning increases the lines of accountability to the MPA, which ultimately strengthens the MPA’s capacity to ensure that the MPS acts upon recommendations that contribute to improvements in operational policing to the benefit of London’s diverse communities.

D. Financial implications

There are no financial implications directly arising from this report.

E. Background papers

• MPA Crime Data recording Scrutiny.
• MPS Response to MPA Crime Data Recording Scrutiny.
• Terms of reference-SCIRG
• Terms of reference-CIROG
• Crime and Incident Data quality Improvement Programme (CIDQIP).
• NPIA Baseline Review of NSIR.
• Management Board paper - NSIR Implementation for the MPS.

F. Contact details

Report author: Alix Rejman, Acting Professional Standards & Legal Officer

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

An overview of measures taken by the MPS following organisational learning arising from the death of the late Mr Peter Woodhams and subsequent inquiries

Background

The Serious Violence Team (SVT) was launched on 28 June 2007 in response to the increasing serious violence and homicide amongst young people. A new initiative, under the code name of Operation Curb, was created to effectively police and manage these crimes. The issue of serious youth violence and knife crime still remains at the forefront of policing in the Capital and is now the subject of an updated initiative, Operation Blunt II.

One of the main issues for the MPS to take forward - particularly arising from the murder of the late Mr Peter Woodhams (August 2006) - is the effective investigation of, and leadership provided during, the conduct of most serious violence crime investigations.

Public Protection Groups

In June 2008 the MPS developed Public Protection Groups (PPG), including Public Protection Desks on all 32 London Boroughs, which are led by a Detective Chief Inspector. The aim of the PPG is to effectively manage

1. Dangerous places (private and public);
2.  Dangerous people;
3.  Vulnerable people (adults and children).

There now exists a clear organisational structure with information sharing protocols for the effective management and enforcement of serious violent and sexual offenders, which also involves partnership work with other agencies. The Groups seek to recognise and manage the continuum of physical and sexual violence.

In September 2008 TP Violent Crime Directorate led a review of the Public Protection Groups. The review sought to provide; ‘A proportionate & effective review that provides a realistic view of the MPS' position in relation to Serious Violence, Public Protection and Risk Management (victims and perpetrators) and the systems & processes which drive it’

The ‘Review’ has highlighted that all of the MPS’ boroughs have a measure of leadership, enablers, partnership and systems & processes in place for the effective management of dangerous people and dangerous places.

In addition the review team has identified a number of organisational areas for improvement, which are being considered to further enhance the MPS’ response to the development of Public Protection Groups and the management of Most Serious Violence and risk.

Serious Violence Team

The role of the TP Serious Violence Service Delivery Team is to:

•  Develop, implement and review MPS policy & SOPs regarding primary/secondary investigation and supervision of Serious Violence (i.e. Sec18/20 assaults - excluding domestic violence and hate crime offences, which are monitored elsewhere); and
•  Improve Serious Violence service delivery and performance outcomes at BOCU level.

The Serious Violence Team (SVT) centrally monitor, review and quality assure the investigation of serious assaults in line with the Primary and Secondary Investigation Standard Operating Procedures and the MPS Serious Violence Strategy, which include all offences of Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH) and attempted murder. A similar function is undertaken by other TP Violent Crime Directorate and Specialist Crime Directorate units in relation to domestic violence, hate crime and inter-familial assaults and other serious offences.

Service Delivery

The following control measures and activity have been initiated to improve the MPS’ effectiveness, leadership, risk management and performance in relation to serious violence perpetration:

•  The development of Primary and Secondary Investigation Standard Operating Procedures, which includes a bespoke section (Part 3) on Serious Assault
  •  This SOP was published on 7 May 2008
  •  Compliance with Part III of this SOP is monitored and reviewed by the Territorial Policing (TP) Serious Violence Team (SVT)
  •  TP Violent Crime Directorate Detective Superintendent monitors compliance through a formal National Intelligence Management (NIM) compliant meeting structure where high-risk cases are identified for review and intervention (as necessary). This may involve the provision of tactical advice to the investigating officer.
  •  Risk assessment, identification and management forms a clear part of serious violence crime investigations by front line officers and secondary investigators. TP SVT will monitor all high-risk cases to ensure that this is complied with.
  •  TP VCD has produced a self / peer group inspection template for boroughs to examine their investigative and victim support packages to ensure they meet with corporate standards i.e. Investigation SOP.
  •  Review and follow up of out-standing Serious Violence named suspects. There are corporate performance reports relating to this subject area against which Borough Commanders are held accountable for delivery.
  •  SVT provide strategic and operational tactical advice in the conduct of serious violence investigations, risk management processes and conduct of named suspect ‘man-hunt’ enquiries.
  •  Conduct borough visits and conduct health checks of systems and processes
  •  The SVT provide training inputs and market their services at Crime Control Strategy Meeting (CCSM) Showcase and other events.
  •  SVT manage a 'Case Tracker System', which is used to record and monitor those investigations that require ongoing reviews, and when required direct intervention by the SVT, especially in the more critical and serious cases.
•  There are now three Superintendents performing night duty from three strategic locations covering London. They are accountable for providing strategic support and direction at critical and/or major incidents.

The role of the SVT clearly overlaps with other units within the Violent Crime Directorate, such as the Guns and Gang Delivery Team, Operation Blunt II and the 5 Borough Operation Alliance Team, as well as SCD1 and SCD8 (Operations Trident and Trafalgar) and it is important that these units continue to work in partnership.

Operational Activity

Operation Blunt 2 is driving enforcement activity across business groups and commands to address the continuing risk of serious youth violence and knife crime including youth homicide. It takes account of learning in its focus on targeting ‘dangerous people’ and ‘dangerous places’ and the response to serious incidents of violence.

The operation, which commenced on 19 May 2008, compliments other MPS activity, which is taking place to manage risk. On 5 July 2008, the operation was further enhanced through the addition of a central Task Force comprising uniform and detective officers. The operation has a command structure with the strategic lead at Deputy Assistant Commissioner level.

The Blunt 2 Task Force deploys a mobile capability comprising 50 uniformed officers each day between 3.00pm and 10.30pm. These officers are directed in accordance with intelligence, including the live monitoring of calls relating to youth violence and weaponry. A central control for the Task Force and post-school patrols is established within the Special Operations Room at Central Command Complex (Lambeth). An officer of Chief Inspector rank is deployed daily as Silver commander to monitor and deploy support based upon actual and developing incidents of serious youth violence. This provides local officers dealing with serious assaults and critical incidents additional support to ensure an effective response.

Operation Blunt 2 deploys resources targeting dangerous people and dangerous places using intelligence-led information. The Operation Blunt Task Force and Borough police teams are targeting enforcement activity towards individuals and groups who are known to be involved in serious youth violence.

A number of tactical options are used to target such people including proactive surveillance operations, the use of stop and search powers, knife arches at events and the weapons sweeps of dangerous places.

Training

A number of training initiatives has been developed and/or further enhanced since August 2006 including:

•  All probationary police officers receive on-going training with 5 consecutive days dedicated to public protection matters. This training also impacts on the effective management of crime and critical incidents.
•  In addition risk management processes and critical incident management form part of sergeant and inspector leadership training.
•  All inspectors have been provided with a Duty Officer’s Information Guidance pack, which compliments their leadership / critical incident training. A specific section of this binder is dedicated to the effective management of serious assaults.
•  Further training is provided to Inspecting ranks and above at Firearms and Critical Incident Management courses, which also place a clear emphasis on the Golden Hour Principles, which are applicable to serious assault incidents.
•  A new programme of critical incident training – Operation Almaz – will be rolled out to all front line staff in the coming months, which complements the publication of the Critical Incident Standard Operating Procedures and the emphasis on the Golden Hour Principles.
•  The effective management of incidents / crimes and the Gold Hour Principles permeate all detective officer training at the Crime Academy.

Performance to Date

•  On 7 May 2008 the Primary and Secondary Investigation SOPs were updated to incorporate a standardised guideline for the investigation of serious violent offences. This has been pivotal to the changes and improvement of how the MPS conducts borough investigations.
•  Boroughs are more aware of managing the risk to repeat victims of serious violence by identifying and conducting early risk assessments and implementing appropriate control measures, although this area of police work still needs developing with regards to consistency and ongoing reviews. The Serious Violence Team (SVT) in the meantime has developed a ‘Risk Assessment Guidance’, which is directed at the frontline officer.
•  There has been a notable improvement in the quality and frequency of sergeant and inspector reviews with better action planning and more details investigative strategies being set for the OIC. It should be noted that in the most critical cases, DCI input is often given.
•  The management and welfare of victim has been improved with the creation of Borough ‘Victim Support Units’, which provide a contact point and support network for victims and witnesses during the investigation and judicial process.
•  The SVT continues to review borough practices and provide recommendations for change by conducting borough visits and reviews. As a result of this process boroughs are developing local protocols and guidance for the investigation of serious violent offences and conducting peer reviews with neighbouring boroughs, in order to identify areas of best practice.

GBH Sanction Detection Rates

The table above indicates that between 05/06 and 07/08 that there was an 8% increase in the actual number of Sanction Detections for GBH offences. It is notable that in FY 07/08 whilst GBH offences declined from the previous year, the number of perpetrators being held accountable for their actions increased.

Appendix 2

Review in relation to the investigation of serious crime in Newham borough

First Review - Newham Borough

Following the death of Peter Woodhams, the MPS Critical Incident Advisory Team was commissioned to conduct an urgent review of all Newham Borough investigations of Grievous Bodily Harm Offences reported between January 1st 2006 and October 10th 2006. The review was to rigorously and independently review the effectiveness of investigation on Newham Borough. The Terms of reference were:

•  To assess the police investigation and response to 28 GBH allegations at Newham BOCU identified as incomplete since 01/0/06
•  To ensure the enquiries are compliant with MPS serious crime policy.
•  To identify good practice that was utilised during the investigations identified.
•  To identify areas of concern or organisational learning during this time period

The report made 7 recommendations for Newham Borough and a further 2 for the wider organisation.

Second Review - Newham Borough

In order to provide an assessment of the response to recommendations identified during the first review conducted in October 2006 a second Review of Grievous Bodily Harm Investigations on Newham Borough was conducted during the period from November 2006 to January 2007. This included an assessment of the quality against the set parameters agreed in the first review. The Terms of reference were:

•  To ensure the enquiries are compliant with MPS policy
•  To identify Good practice that was utilised during the investigations identified.
•  To identify areas of concern or organisational learning during this time period.
•  To assess whether the identified supervision and review structure for GBH Investigations, I.E DS review after 28 Days, is being adhered to.
•  To assess the BOCUs response to the recommendations made during the original CIAT review during October 2006.

This review found that Newham had reacted positively to the concerns raised; the police response was to alter investigation and supervision systems to ensure that violent incidents were fully resourced and effectively investigated and managed. The positive response demonstrated that the Borough was committed to ensuring that lessons were learned.

Third Review - MPS

Following this second review of investigation in October 2006 on Newham Borough an assessment was commissioned of GBH investigation across the MPS in January 2007. This caused the standard of GBH investigation to be assessed and to identify the general MPS standard of investigation into incidents of serious violence.

The Terms of reference for this review were:

•  To assess the police investigation and management of GBH allegations occurring across the whole MPS between 01/11/06 and 31/01/07.
•  To ensure the enquiries meet the minimum standards for crime investigation and reporting.
•  Identify whether the supervision and review structures for the GBH investigations, i.e. DS review after 7 days, DI review after 28 days, are being adhered to.

The general standard of investigation was found to be good but it was recognised that there was a need to learn from mistakes, a number of recommendations were made.

MPS Review of Serious Violence and Public Protection

Following the initial phase of work carried out by the Public Protection Project a further Review of each of the 32 London Boroughs policing of Public Protection and Serious Violence was conducted during August and September 2008, Newham Borough was visited on August 19th 2008;

The review scrutinised the standard of primary investigation and primary supervision looking at offences reported in the preceding 24 hours.

Secondary investigation was reviewed by looking at offences reported in the preceding 18 days and examined investigation strategies, secondary supervision, risk assessment and risk management.

Review Officers attended the Daily Intelligence Meeting, the Daily Management Meeting and held meetings with the Detective Superintendent, Superintendent Operations, Crime Manager for Public Protection and the Higher Analyst. The Public Protection Group was also visited.

As a result of this most recent review, some areas of good practice were identified, as well as some areas for improvement, intended to build on significantly improved standards of investigation. Progress in responding to the Action plan is monitored by central service delivery teams and the Public Protection Board.

Send an e-mail linking to this page

Feedback