Contents
Report 10 of the 5 March 2009 meeting of the Strategic and Operational Policing Committee and gives a summary of Specialist Operations Command performance against its objectives from June 2008 to January 2009
Warning: This is archived material and may be out of date. The Metropolitan Police Authority has been replaced by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC).
See the MOPC website for further information.
Specialist Operations management information
Report: 10
Date: 5 March 2009
By: AC Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner
Summary
This report gives a summary of Specialist Operations Command performance against its objectives from June 2008 to January 2009. It contains an explanation of how the MPS responds to CONTEST including its component parts and explains how Specialist Operations (SO) fulfils the requirements of those component parts including those strands where other business groups take the lead.
A. Recommendation
That the report be received.
B. Supporting information
1. This report provides an overview of the performance of MPS Specialist Operations (SO) during the period June 2008 to January 2009 and an overview of the Financial Year To Date. It includes a review of significant events during this period and where appropriate makes comment on any issues affecting the achievement of targets. A summary of relevant performance measures is attached at Appendix 1.
2. As well as reporting to the newly formed Strategic and Operational Policing Committee (SOPC) SO also reports to the Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub Committee. The members are the Home Office representative on the MPA, Lord Toby Harris, Reshard Auladin (MPA Deputy Chair), James Cleverly and Neil Johnson. The committee receives regular reports from SO on its performance with regard to terrorism related matters. This meeting provides an opportunity to discuss counter-terrorism and other covert policing measures in greater detail, including those classified as ‘Secret’. This meeting was last held on 29 January 2009.
Background
3. The SO business group comprises three separate commands - Counter Terrorism (SO15), Protection (Specialist Protection (SO1) and Royalty Protection (SO14)) and Protective Security/Headquarters Support (SO2). There is shortly to be a major change to the structure with the additional units, the Diplomatic Protection Group (SO16), the Palace of Westminster (SO17) and Aviation Security OCU (SO18) being transferred under the command of Specialist Operations.
4. In supporting the MPS overarching mission of ‘Working Together for a Safer London’ the primary focus of SO activity is towards the strategic priority of Counter-Terrorism, Security and Protection. For the 2008/9 performance year this activity is being directed towards three operational objectives:
- To create a safer environment in the London boroughs through Counter-Terrorism, Security and Protection work.
- To increase advanced identification of threats from, and opportunities for, countering terrorism.
- To enhance the security of key locations and protected persons.
5. SO activity is also focused towards supporting the Government counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST. A more detailed explanation of CONTEST follows in this report.
6. The public reporting of SO operational performance is complex – not least because some of the relevant data will be either classified or sensitive. Therefore, it is necessary to strike the right balance between the need for transparency and a duty to ensure that security and operational capability are not compromised.
7. In addition, the policing activities undertaken within SO are in the main sensitive and high profile. Success will ultimately be measured by an absence of terrorist incidents and/or the safety of the public and protected persons not being compromised. This kind of performance does not lend itself to volumetric/quantative measurement in quite the same way as other fields i.e. serious or volume crime. Whilst a reduction in homicide to just a single offence would be regarded as a significant success for the MPS the occurrence of just one major terrorist incident is unlikely to be regarded in the same way. Clearly it would not be appropriate to judge the success of SO solely on the fact that a terrorist incident doesn’t occur or that a protected person survives a public engagement. It is for this reason that our performance measures tend to be more qualitative or reflective of an element of the operational activity that prevents the terrorist incident or ensures safety.
To create a safer environment in the London boroughs through Counter-Terrorism, security and protection work
8. It is widely accepted that the support of communities is vital to defeating terrorism. To create a safer environment it is essential that local communities are properly engaged and that front line staff have a broad understanding and awareness of terrorism. It is also important that counter-terrorism is embedded as ‘business as usual’ within all local policing activity.
9. Whilst SO provides specialist capability for the investigation of terrorist offences and the management of relevant intelligence, it also supports activity at a local level by maintaining close links and ensuring appropriate knowledge is shared with Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU) colleagues. This is achieved through a network of Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs). CTIOs are specially selected counter-terrorism detectives who work alongside locally based colleagues. This approach enables the officers to improve their own understanding of communities whilst providing a valuable source of expert advice and guidance for patrolling staff.
10. To ensure an appropriate CTIO capability exists SO have been committed during the 2008/9 financial year to ensuring that at least 85% of London boroughs (including Heathrow) have a dedicated CTIO. This target has been exceeded, with 91% coverage achieved for the Financial Year To Date. The remaining boroughs have arrangements in place to receive support from neighbouring boroughs.
11. The tasking and workload of all CTIOs is also monitored to ensure that their effort remains focussed on their primary role within BOCUs and that abstractions are kept to a minimum. During this reporting period CTIOs carried out 14,496 recorded tasks - of these 84% were based within their assigned BOCU. For the Financial Year To Date 18,521 tasks were carried out, 84% within their assigned BOCU. This achievement exceeds the current target of 80%
12. The delivery of counter-terrorism briefings to new members of staff is a responsibility of CTIOs. The briefings ensure that new staff, particularly those serving within Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNTs), are fully equipped with the knowledge they need for their operational role. The greatest benefit is derived if such briefings are delivered as early as possible within an individual’s career. For this reason a target was set that 80% of new SNT staff receive a briefing from a CTIO within two months of being appointed. With the numbers of SNT staff that have been recruited in the recent past (in support of the MPS commitment to neighbourhood policing) this target has often proved extremely challenging. During the Financial Year To Date performance as a whole was above target at 82%, with the monthly target being narrowly missed in May, July and December where, on each occasion, the briefings were one attendee short of achieving the target.
13. In the event of a suspected terrorist incident occurring, our commitment to creating a safe environment is supported by the prompt and effective management of the scene. Local officers and supervisors are responsible for this initial action. Their performance is assessed by specialist officers to ensure standards are maintained and that any organisational learning opportunities or training requirements are identified. During the period of this review there were 77 such incidents, 74 (96%) of which have been assessed as being managed to an ‘appropriate’ standard. In the Financial Year To Date there have been 106 such incidents, of which 102 (96%) have been assessed as being managed to an ‘appropriate’ standard. This exceeds the stated target of 90%. The incidents that were assessed as ‘inadequate’ occurred in April, September, October and November 2008 and have been investigated by SO15 officers and the relevant BOCU commander and remedial action has been taken.
14. The prompt attendance of specialist resources at the scenes of incidents is also vital if any risks to public safety are to be minimised. MPS Explosive Officers from within SO are required to attend such scenes within a target time on 95% of occasions. During the period of this report the officers were deployed to 156 incidents and on 100% of occasions they attended within the agreed target time. During the Financial Year To Date 100% of the 205 calls were attended within the target time.
15. In addition to their role in dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) Explosive Officers are also required to attend the scenes of conventional munitions such as unexploded wartime bombs or grenades. In these circumstances the officers are also required to attend within a target time on 95% of occasions. During the period of this review they were deployed to 89 such incidents and arrived in all cases (100%) within the agreed target time. During the Financial Year To Date 100% of the 110 calls were attended within the target time.
16. Objective feedback on MPS performance in relation to counter-terrorism is made available through the quarterly Public Attitude Survey (PAS). Questions 79 and 80 of the survey seek views from the public as to ‘how well’ they believe the MPS is doing in relation to a range of activities and ‘how important’ they believe the activities are. Preventing terrorism is included within the list of activities. Respondents are asked to grade their perception in relation to each activity on a scale between 1 (not at all well/important) and 7 (very well/important). Results from the survey conducted during the second quarter of 2008/9 reveal scores of 5.6 and 6.54 respectively - these scores remain relatively stable.
To increase advanced identification of threats from, and opportunities for, countering terrorism
17. The Anti-Terrorist Hotline offers an easy and confidential means for the public to communicate terrorism related information. The Hotline is staffed continuously and normally receives around 300 calls per month. The promptness of response to calls to the Hotline is monitored and a target has been set to answer calls within a set time on 85% of occasions. During this review period a total of 3532 calls have been received on the Hotline and 98% (3449) of these have been answered within the set time. Overall during the Financial Year To Date 4139 calls were received with 98% (4034) answered within the set time. Whilst the average number of calls to the Hotline is around 300 per month, the number can fluctuate significantly in response to specific events. The increase in call numbers in December and January was caused by prank calls and are correct. To the credit of the Hotline staff they still managed to answer them all within target.
18. A key aim of counter-terrorist investigations is to disrupt terrorist networks and to reduce the capability of terrorists to carry out their activities. To allow the planning of such terrorist offences to continue may present considerable risk to the public and the number of such disruptions is monitored as a measure of the effectiveness of our response. Anti-terrorist disruptions are assessed in the same way as they are for conventional criminal networks and the processes that support the assessment are the same. There will, however, be significant variation in the impact that such disruptions have. For example, some cases may result in the foiling of a planned major bombing campaign whilst others may reduce the funding or resources available to mount such an attack. Given that the disruption of terrorist activity may lead to a reduction in the overall number of networks a decrease as well as an increase in such disruptions may be an indicator of success. For this reason no target for the number of disruptions achieved has been set. However during the Financial Year To Date a total of two networks have been disrupted.
To enhance the security of key locations and protected persons
19. Providing effective protection against terrorism and the threat it poses to key people or locations is a vital element of our operational role. As previously highlighted, SO has responsibility for protecting members of the royal family and their residences, government ministers and other public figures and visiting heads of government. Staff within SO also support public event planning, to ensure risk is minimised, and provide advice/guidance to the business community in relation to protective security measures against terrorism.
20. SO performance in relation to protection of the royal family and their residences is currently measured by our effectiveness in preventing intrusion to protected areas and how well we respond to related incidents that require an urgent police response. In relation to intrusions our aim is to prevent any intrusion into the most secure areas of a protected royal residence i.e. those areas where a protected principal is or may be. Overall during the 2008/9 Financial Year To Date there have been no intrusions. There have also been no intrusions into the zone immediately adjoining these areas. All related incidents are monitored to ensure the overall integrity of security arrangements.
21. Security Co-ordinators (SECCOs) within SO2 are responsible for providing advice and guidance in relation to the security arrangements for major public events. They work closely with the officer in overall command of the event (Gold) to develop an effective security plan. Performance in relation to their work is currently measured in two ways. Firstly the prompt appointment of a SECCO ensures that the maximum amount of time is available for event planning. For this reason it is our aim to appoint a SECCO within two days of being notified of an event on at least 85% of occasions. Unfortunately, data for January 2009 is not currently available. However, for the Financial Year To December 2008 SECCOs were requested 354 times and appointed within two days on 348 (98%) of occasions. This exceeds the stated target, with the number of requests consistent with previous years. Secondly, Gold commanders are asked to provide feedback on the performance of individual SECCOs. In this respect we seek to achieve a rating of ‘satisfactory’ or better for at least 85% of the events. During the Financial Year To December 2008 the number of responses was 307 and the achievement was 100%.
22. Advice and guidance in relation to protective security measures in the built environment is provided by Counter Terrorist Security Advisers (CTSAs) within SO15. The guidance etc. is provided to the business community and other partners. It is our aim to achieve at least a ‘satisfactory’ rating in feedback on at least 85% of occasions. Unfortunately, data for January 2009 is not currently available. However, for the Financial Year To December 2008 a total of 2634 partners etc responded to the request for feedback. For all respondents (100%) an assessment of at least satisfactory was achieved. Due to operational commitments of both the Officers supplying the advice and guidance and the recipient partners, the seminars, presentations and meetings were not held in December.
Response to CONTEST strategy:
23. In spite of our successes we recognise there is no single solution to terrorism and it cannot be solved by the police service working alone. Whilst Specialist Operations (SO) leads for Counter-Terrorism in the MPS all business groups are encouraged to consider how they will contribute to enhancing our capacity and capability to make London safer from terrorism and domestic extremism. Specialist Operations on behalf of the MPS has produced a Counter-Terrorism and Domestic Extremism strategy “Enhancing capacity and capability”.
25. The strategy is a long term plan of action it outlines in broad terms what we the MPS will do, either alone or in partnership with our communities and other agencies, to address all threats in terrorism and domestic extremism and to minimise the risk it presents to London. It consolidates our current CT activities and initiatives to achieve our shared aim to make London safer by “Enhancing our counter-terrorism capability and capacity”.
26 This strategy is supported by a delivery plan, which sets out the activities, which is undertaken by all business groups. The governance arrangements will ensure that performance is managed within existing MPS structures and that identifiable individuals are accountable for delivery for all aspects of the plan.
27. The strategy is based firmly within the Governments counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST and the National Community Safety Plan 2008/11 and strategic policing priorities / key actions for the police service 2008/9. The National Community Safety Plan makes clear that communities and local partnerships have an essential role to play in countering terrorism and national extremism. They are:
- PREVENT – to stop people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists
- PURSUE – to stop terrorist attacks;
- PROTECT – to strengthen our overall protection against terrorist attacks;
- PREPARE - where we cannot stop an attack, mitigate its impact.
These objectives have been fully adopted and form the key aims of the MPS CT strategy.
28. Strategic leads for each one of the 4 strands are:
- PREVENT – Commander ‘SO’
- PURSUE – DAC (Senior National Co-ordinator Terrorist Investigations) ‘SO15’
- PROTECT – DAC ‘SO’
- PREPARE – T/AC ‘CO’
29. To ensure that the above strand leads are working together they are all members of a strategic “London CONTEST Board” chaired by Assistant Commissioner SO. Also on this board are MPA and Government Office for London (GoL) representatives. This board, previously known as the CT Strategic Partnership Board, receives themed reports on the above strands.
30. Within SO a counter-terrorism support unit (CTSU) has been created that brings together all relevant strategic support activities for the counter-terrorism and domestic extremism strategy, improving communication and providing a better service for all stake holders.
31. Under the Prevent strand there is an attempt to engage with communities within London. The number of communities in London represents huge diversity and SO is attempting to engage with a number of them. A recent initiative will demonstrate this commitment. SO launched a London Somali youth forum conference in January this year in order to deliver information to the wider Somali community and provide direct and quick access across London in times of critical incidents. This was driven by SO with the Somali Youth Development Resource Centre (SYDRC). In addition during the Gaza conflict the members of the Community Safety Trust and the Muslim Safety Forum were both provided with information and consulted on a regular basis.
32. To support the Prevent strand a Prevent Engagement Officer (PEO) network is being introduced, with the intention that is will eventually cover the entire Metropolitan Police area and they will be deployed locally by the BOCU Commander. Likewise funding for coordinators for the Channel Project is being sought from the Home Office and it is anticipated that there will be small number of sites in London. A London Prevent Board has been established as a partnership board comprising key London based agencies.
33. The Pursue strand continues its success by successfully convicting 50 people of terrorist related offences across the UK in 2008, of these 21 individuals pleaded guilty. This number includes a conviction and sentence of 32 years imprisonment as a result of planting two car bombs in the heart of London and an attempted suicide attack at Glasgow Airport.
34. Eight men are currently on trial at Woolwich Crown Court accused of conspiring together and with others to murder persons unknown by the detonation of improvised explosive devices on board transatlantic aircraft. Likewise at Kingston Crown Court, three men are currently on trial accused of unlawfully and maliciously conspiring with others to cause an explosion on the transport system for London.
35. Under the Prepare strand of activity a number of exercises have been held to test the MPS response and resilience to counter terrorism threats. There is currently a review to ensure that the MPS response and its interoperability are properly calibrated.
36. The Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CSTSA) continue to work with businesses and other significant areas within London to ensure that they receive advice on how to prevent or reduce the risk of terrorism attack at their location.
37. The Protect strand is very much focused on maintaining activity to protect London and Londoners by using intelligence led policing activity both high visibility or reassurance and deterrent patrols at specific location or events.
Abbreviations
- CT
- Counter Terrorism
- CTSU
- Counter-Terrorism Support Unit
- DAC
- Deputy Assistant Commissioner
- GoL
- Government Office for London
- NCTI
- National Co-ordinator Terrorist Investigations
- SO
- Specialist Operations
- SO1
- Specialist Protection
- SO2
- Protective Security/ Headquarters Support
- SO14
- Royalty Protection
- SO15
- Counter Terrorism Command
C. Race and equality impact
The activities that form this report and the data content are arrived at with regard to delivering SO policing services to an equal standard for all Londoners. The performance report fully complies with equal opportunities policies and associated MPA/MPS Diversity issues. In addition, SO are in regular contact with key community groups and use this to assist the monitoring of the impact of counter-terrorist policing in London.
D. Financial implications
1. The CT Activity referred to in this report is funded by the following specific grants totalling £322.5m in 2008/9:
- MPS CT Specific Grant - £176.4m
- Dedicated Security Posts CT Specific Grant - £127.8m
- National CT Specific Grant (from ACPO(TAM)) - £18.3m
2. The MPS has also received a CT Specific Capital grant of £8.8m in 2008/9.
3. Full details of forecasts and expenditure against the CT Grants are provided to members of the MPA CT and Protective Services Sub-committee.
4. There are no additional financial implications as a result of this report.
E. Background papers
None
F. Contact details
Report author: John Bunn QPM, SO CTSU, MPS
For information contact:
MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18
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