MPS response to the MPA Stockwell Scrutiny

Report: 9
Date: 2 April 2009
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Crime on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

To provide an update on how the MPS is progressing the 34 recommendations arising from the MPA Stockwell Scrutiny Report. It includes

•  Nominated leads for each recommendation
• Current progression
•  Timeframes for further progression

The report also provides an update on progress against the recommendations in the HMIC inspections and Stockwell 1 & 2 and a summary of the new information arising out the Inquest.

A. Recommendation

The Members note the report.

B. Supporting information

1. In July 2008, the MPA conducted a scrutiny into how the MPS had responded to the recommendations made by the IPCC following the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell Underground Station on 22 July 2005.

2. In December 2008, the jury returned an open verdict at the inquest into the shooting. Consequently, the coroner made a report under Rule 43 of the Coroners' Rules 1984. Under this rule a report may be made where a Coroner is holding an inquest into a person's death, the evidence gives rise to a concern that circumstances creating a risk of other deaths will occur, or will continue to exist in the future, and in the Coroner's opinion action should be taken to prevent the occurrence or continuation of such circumstances or to eliminate or reduce the risk of death created by such circumstances.

3. The Coroners Rule 43 report (Appendix 1) was sent to the to the MPS, MPA Home Secretary, Lord Chancellor and all interested persons on 7 January and was published on 4 March together with the responses from the MPS (Appendix 2) and MPA.

4. An HMIC review of MPS progress against the 16 Recommendations from the IPCC Stockwell 1 report (Appendix 3 – available on website or on request from MPA Committee Services) commenced on 23 February and concluded on 13 March. At the time of writing, the HMIC findings were not known to the MPS however an update report will be sent to the MPA by HMIC.

5. In addition to the above, the HMIC will be speaking to the Scrutiny Panel in April 2009 and providing an update as to MPS progress against the 16 recommendations.

6. In relation to the 6 recommendations arising from the IPCC Stockwell 2 Report (Appendix 4 - available on website or on request from MPA Committee Services), the MPS has incorporated Recommendations 1, 2 and 6 into its development of the Knowledge Management Centre (KMC). The response to Recommendations 3 and 4 is as per the response to MPA Scrutiny Recommendations 23 (paragraph 118) and 31 (paragraph 146). In respect of Recommendation 5, an agreement was reached with the IPCC that this recommendation would not be accepted.

7. Commander (July Review Group and Directorate of Professional Standards) is responsible for ensuring that the relevant leads progress the recommendations in relation to Stockwell within the stipulated time frame.

8. The Extreme Threat Review Group (ETRG) evolved from the Kratos Review Group. Chaired by Commander (CO), it is responsible for managing the extensive change programme required to address recommendations made by the MPA, the HMIC, the IPCC and subsequent recommendations made by the MPS Inspectorate.

Recommendation 1
9. That the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should review post-incident debrief processes to ensure that it is maximising opportunities for learning without jeopardising any future legal or misconduct proceedings.

10. The lead for this recommendation is Commander Stewart (Directorate of Professional Standards)

11. The result of any strategic review will inevitably be disclosable and therefore could influence subsequent legal proceedings, possibly adversely. However, it is vital that the MPS is able to quickly collate any lessons learnt from critical incidents; therefore the assumption is that, following any such incident, a review will take place.

12. Where it is possible that a post incident review will jeopardise any subsequent legal proceedings, the Department of Legal Services should be contacted for advice as to terms of reference. In addition all reviews should include a contextual element to assist those who may have to refer to it at any subsequent legal forum, thereby ensuring that all understand the circumstances under which the review was held.

13. The purpose of the review in such cases is to identify early organisational shortcomings as soon as possible (e.g. technical problems that can easily be rectified) and not gain an early account of events from individual officers by way of debriefing.

14. It has been accepted by the IPCC that they also have a duty to provide emerging findings of organisational shortcomings as soon as possible whilst conducting investigations. (See Recommendation 30)

15. A syllabus is currently being devised for a course on Post Incident Procedure training, which will include the protocol under which debriefs will take place (see para 117).

Recommendation 2
16. That the MPS Management Board strengthens a culture of learning within the organisation by developing and supporting processes which allows for innovation and initiative and accepts that mistakes will sometimes be made.

17. The lead for this recommendation is Commander Stewart (July Review Group)

18. During 2008 all Counter Terrorism (CT) Surveillance Teams undertook a three week ‘Advanced Surveillance’ course culminating in a three-day pass/fail exercise working with CO19 firearms teams, full Command & Control suite support, a Counter Terrorism Senior Investigating Officer, and also an Extreme Threat Tactical Commander. The course and exercise incorporated in learning requirements many of the points raised within the IPCC concerns and subsequent HMIC recommendations from ‘Stockwell One’.

19. All exercises conducted by SO15 (Counter Terrorism) Organisational Learning Department have since early 2008 had the HMIC recommendations (Stockwell 1) as the primary learning requirement. In addition joint exercises have taken place across business groups (Hook Norton) with a number planned for 2009 and beyond.

20. The new Extreme Threat Tactical Commander cadre training is expanding beyond previous training for senior officers employed in this specialist field by introducing for the first time a basic training and exercise participation requirement. A nationally accredited five day firearms crime in action course (Silver2) will be delivered by CO19 followed by a three day Command & Control based course incorporating a requirement to participate within the live play exercise as the Extreme Threat Tactical Commander and also to undertake stints as observers within the surveillance and firearm command vehicles to understand the pressures presented to those staff. These exercises will also offer the opportunity to further strengthen the links between surveillance and firearms as per the HMIC recommendations (Stockwell 1)

21. All other established exercises with the military, (Ex Wooden Pride) and other partners now incorporate and test the learning from the various Stockwell recommendations such as; digital transfer of imagery, recording within operations room, interoperability of surveillance and firearms.

22. As part of the work being undertaken MPS wide regarding Organisational Learning, a model has been developed, which demonstrates the cyclical process by which organisational learning should be managed. A project team with representatives from each business group has been created and have identified the areas of the model currently existing within the MPS. The team are now in the process of identifying actions to fill any gaps also identified. Work has also been undertaken with other forces to identify learning regarding this matter. An internal inspection across the MPS into the current status of organisational learning is imminent.

23. On 5 February 2009, an Organisational Learning paper was presented to the MPA Strategic Operational Policing Committee.

24. Progress will be reviewed by 1 May 2009.

Recommendation 3
25. That Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is invited to undertake a further assessment of the progress being made by the MPS to implement the IPCC recommendations within three months of the completion of the Inquest.

26. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (July Review Group)

27. An HMIC review of MPS progress against the 16 Recommendations from the IPCC Stockwell 1B report (Appendix 3) commenced on 23 February and concluded on 13 March. At the time of writing, the HMIC findings were not known to the MPS however an update report will be sent to the MPA by HMIC.

Recommendation 4
28. That as a matter of urgency, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) deliver revised doctrine and firearms manual.

29. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (CO).

30. The mature draft of the revised ACPO Police Use of Firearms Manual of Guidance is currently out for consultation and publication is anticipated in June 2009. The MPS has been active in re-shaping the new manual particularly in relation to the authority to use lethal force and is currently active in developing the issues of command and control, cross border operations and national terminology.

31. There are a number of areas in the manual which we do not believe fully align themselves to the need for change as recommended by the MPA and other bodies. Generally, these relate to issues that affect our ability to operate outside of the MPS geographical boundaries and where it would be inappropriate for us to work in isolation of broader strategic guidance. The MPS is actively working to influence uniformity and, where necessary, change through a number of national and regional working groups. To date, we have been successful in negotiating local arrangements for cross border operations across the south of England and are seen as the national leaders in this area.

32. Because of our involvement in the manual’s development we have been able to pre-empt the need for further change and have recently appointed staff who have commenced a wholesale re-write of the MPS Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). This will see the SOP aligned to the manual in both content and style, creating a synergy that will ensure that compliance is maintained with national guidance. It is intended that new SOPs will be published in June 2009 to coincide with the publication of the ACPO manual.

Recommendation 5
33. That the MPS should review its position on the retention of the term and role of Designated Senior Officer (DSO), in the light of the emerging NPIA command doctrine and the revised ACPO Firearms Manual when they become available, and in the meantime should continue to test command and control as a matter of routine internal inspection.

34. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (CO).

35. The revised ACPO Police Use of Firearms Manual of Guidance will set out that the Gold (strategic) Silver (tactical) Bronze command structure, which should be adopted within all firearms operations.

36. The role formerly known as DSO is now recognised as a tactical command function and the terms DSO and Kratos have been removed from the lexicon. The MPS retains the view that in cases of extreme threat, the role should be performed by an officer of at least commander rank.

37. To ensure this role is sufficiently specialised the number of ACPO Officers involved in this activity will be reduced to twelve. A selection process is now underway which will be followed by the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) accredited ‘Crime in Action Training’. Thereafter the 12 Officers will be aligned to a minimum of three Counter Terrorism exercises per year to maintain operational competence.

38. MPS has reached agreement in principle across business groups to a generic command and control model, which can be applied across all disciplines. It is a flexible model based upon recognition of strategic and tactical functional areas of responsibility, and is compliant with the draft NPIA Command and Control Guidance. It is being tested in exercise later this month, with a view to publication in a MPS Command & Control Policy by end March 2009. This work is being undertaken in consultation with those responsible for the ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters Interoperability Project Command and Control work stream. This will review the role formerly referred to as DSO, the skill set required to perform it, and how it should fit into NPIA and MPS doctrine.

Recommendation 6
39. That HMIC should objectively consider the benefits and disbenefits of the MPS position on the term DSO in the course of its future progress reviews.

40. See response to Recommendation 5.

41. This forms part of the HMIC Inspection referred to in paragraph 4.

Recommendation 7
42. That the MPS should ensure its firearms standard operating procedures reflect the need to ensure contingencies are in place for achieving effective handovers between gold/silver/bronze commanders, should operations run over several days.

43. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (CO).

44. The Extreme Threat Review Group (ETRG) is reviewing handover contingencies in relation to Command & Control - Roles, Responsibilities & Language. This will form part of the final MPS Command & Control Policy which is aimed to be published at the end of March 2009.

45. The MPS SOPs currently state ‘any transfer of roles must be fully documented and must also include the reasons and considerations of the action taken, together with the time and date of such a transfer’. They go on to say ‘any hand-over of Gold, Silver or Bronze command roles must be recorded in writing and signed by the incoming and outgoing commanders. Changes of ‘Silver’ will be recorded in the Form 3605 [firearms command log].’ The SOP is supported by a number of ongoing practices as described below.

46. The ability to ensure effective handovers of command is reliant on the effective passing of information through authorising and logging processes. The NPIA recently issued guidance on the minimum standards of command logs and the MPS is compliant with these. Due to changes emerging in the ACPO manual, it is necessary for further changes to be made and this work is already underway, with an expectation that it will be complete by the end of March 2009.

47. An essential part of command handovers is the ability to review the continuing need for armed officers to be involved in the operation. The MPS has well-established, effective processes (forms FA1 – 4) for doing this that are so well regarded there is currently a proposal for these to be adopted regionally.

48. The MPS are national leaders in the development and use of cross-border command protocols and have been instrumental in establishing common practices across southern England. These protocols support the establishment and transference of command between organisations as demanded by the needs of any particular operation.

49. In complex and long-running specialist operations, the bespoke command suites (see rec 8) have access to the CLIO information management system that allows for contemporaneous recording of decisions and retrospective interrogation by relieving commanders. The use of this system ensures a high degree of integrity of decision making recording and easy review of these by subsequent commanders.

50. In addition, we are engaged in a project to create a cadre of firearms commanders to manage the planning and delivery of the MPS’s authorised firearms operations at both the strategic and tactical level. It is envisaged that this cadre will employ a total of 30 officers (15 Gold commanders and 15 Silver commanders) who will be dedicated to the role and through this provide a level of operational competence significantly greater than that currently available. This much smaller number of officers will also result in a more consistent approach to functional activity such as handovers.

Recommendation 8
51. HMIC should be invited to consider whether the MPS now has a sufficient number of scaleable and interoperable command suites and with supporting technology, and with the ability to engage with other services to ensure that effective cross service working can be achieved within an enhanced all purpose control room environment.

52. This forms part of the HMIC Inspection referred to in paragraph 4.

53. The MPS believes that it has sufficient, scaleable command suites and a review is ongoing through the ETRG to identify the steps that need to be taken to ensure full interoperability with other command suites, both in the MPS and nationally, as necessary.

Recommendation 9
54. That the MPS ensure there is a clear understanding across the organisation of what facilities are available and officers ensure they use the control room that best meet the demands of their operation, regardless of where it sits in the organisation.

55. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (CO)

56. The MPS operations room infrastructure is well established and operates with clarity in terms of day to day business and deployment of resources to meet demands as they happen, through the CCC centres at Hendon, Lambeth and Bow. The Special Operations Room (SOR) provides further support and flexibility in command & control of escalating incidents and pre-planned operations across the MPS where a combined police response is required. In high-risk crime in action operations such as kidnap, Room C3000 is utilised and in CT operations and CT surveillance the CT Operations room (Room 1600) will be used.

57. The Extreme Threat Review Group is currently working with the different Command & Control suites across the MPS to produce an SOP on interoperability. This will formalise how the command structure would work on multi disciplined response scenarios.

58. In relation to the recording in operations rooms, the MPS has very recently received legal advice on the issue of comprehensive continuous recording. This legal advice is being considered by the relevant officers in SO15. Current (compatible) SOPs exist on recording in Room C3000 and the CT Operations Room 1600.

59. This forms part of the HMIC Inspection referred to in paragraph 4.

Recommendation 10
60. That the Commissioner and Management Board inform the authority about what has been done to secure effective operational integration between surveillance and other resources within Specialist Operations and other parts of the MPS and CO19 (firearms) in particular. We also recommend that HMIC be invited to present a further update on progress to the Authority within two months of the end of the Inquest.

61. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (SCD).

62. All armed surveillance officers are trained in the use of firearms for personal protection, or for protection of the public, in response to emerging threats.

63. The Met have participated in a National Armed Surveillance working group which has defined armed surveillance in the ACPO Police use of Firearms Manual of Guidance for the first time.

64. Tactical refresher training has included exercising against an emerging extreme threat scenario, where the rationale for reaching the decision whether or not to take a critical shot is explored. In addition, SO15 surveillance teams have exercised with CO19 teams to test the handover process. To enhance the tactical firearms competence of surveillance officers, an additional training module is being introduced to stop vehicles and control the occupants of vehicles and options for action to be taken by surveillance officers in the event of an authority to fire being given by an Extreme Threat Tactical Commander in the absence of a specialist team.

65. Specialist Firearms Instructors have also developed Close Support/Small Team Course for a better deployment of Specialist Firearms Officers (SFOs) alongside or integration with surveillance teams. All current SFOs will have completed this training by April 2009.

66. A bespoke advanced surveillance course has now been delivered to all SO15 surveillance teams. This included a 3-day exercise developing into an extreme threat scenario and involving the engagement of SCD11, CO19 resources and an Extreme Threat Tactical Commander.

67. From 1 April, all crime and CT dedicated surveillance teams will come together under a single dedicated surveillance command headed by a Detective Chief Superintendent.

68. This forms part of the HMIC Inspection referred to in paragraph 4.

Recommendation 11
69. That the effective implementation of Airwave to meet the needs of the MPS receives ownership and priority attention at MPS and Transport for London (TfL) Management Board level and that a further update report should be presented to the MPA within two months of the end of the Inquest.

70. The lead for this recommendation is Director of Information (DOI).

71. The Covert Airwave rollout programme is now complete within the MPS, eradicating the 'range' problems experienced with the Cougar system. Through a system of shared talkgroups, secure communications are now achievable between different MPS departments, and where necessary with other Forces and Agencies, and can be monitored from the appropriate Control Rooms.

72. The National Policing Improvement Agency has successfully completed its rollout of Airwave radio to the 125 deep underground stations. MPS officers have been provided with briefings on the service available, which includes platform communications and some, albeit limited, tunnel coverage. MPS covert and overt officers are now regularly using the service and feedback to date is positive. The capacity limitations in the underground, together with the new ability to communicate directly with British Transport Police (BTP), City of London Police and other emergency services are the subject of a joint operating protocol which was agreed at the MPS Airwave Strategy Group in January 2009. Operational instructions derived from the protocol are available to Central Communication Command (CCC) operators and supervisors. The MPS is participating in a BTP led initiative to exercise the protocol.

Recommendation 12
73. That immediate steps are taken to establish protocols between MPS and TfL governing MPS access to, and when necessary control of, road CCTV cameras for the purposes of operational intelligence and control, and to secure systematic operational liaison between the MPS control room and TfL operating controllers. This will necessitate a commitment from TfL that they establish and meet agreed service standards for the reliability of the CCTV installed on their buses, underground trains and stations. We will be asking the Mayor to take this action forward.

74. The lead for this recommendation is Director of Information (DOI).

75. The C3i Programme led a project relating to the technical linking of TfL's CCTV cameras into the MPS's extensive ground based CCTV network, allowing for 'real-time' Transport for London (TfL) CCTV images to be viewed at general operational (radio despatching) positions in CCC and Special Operations Room (SOR).

76. There are sharing protocols in place for all London's Local Authority public space CCTV operations. In addition, CCTV sharing agreements between TfL and the MPS have been in existence since 2006.

77. London Underground has considerably reduced the CCTV requirements for new/replacement systems and is not currently supporting MPS/BTP desire to network their digital CCTV systems to allow remote live viewing and playback.

78. At present, the MPS has very limited connectivity to the London Underground CCTV network via BTP control rooms. Steps are being taken to link the MPS with BTP CCTV control rooms thereby allowing the MPS similar connectivity. In addition, work is being carried out to support network connectivity with National Rail Stations.

79. Progress will be reviewed by 1 May 2009.

Recommendation 13
80. That the evidence given at the inquest should be critically appraised by the MPS to identify any further learning in regard to the deployment of CO19 Specialist Firearms Officers (SFO) and that the MPS carry out a further systematic review of SFO mobilisation arrangements within two months of the end of the Inquest. We will invite HMIC to provide an external validation of this process.

81. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (SO).

82. Firearms tasking and deployment procedures have been reviewed and considered adequate. The accepted call-out time from home is one hour to base and one hour for equipping and briefing, plus travelling time to the scene. In January 2008, HMIC found that the MPS achieved this level of response in a dip-sample of operations. This has continued over the past 12 months in over 40 incidents requiring a fast time response with officers being called out from their home addresses throughout a 24 hour period.

83. There is planned growth for SFO and Tactical Support Team (TST) resources in response to the ongoing terrorist threat and in preparation for the 2012 Olympics. This growth is being funded through SO15 counter terrorist budget, and there will be an expectation that CO19 will provide a specialist firearms response dedicated to counter-terrorist operations.

84. The recruitment process into SFO operations is necessarily demanding and is unlikely to reach the required growth target within the next year. A staged process was therefore agreed to recruit a third TST team pending training sufficient officers for the additional SFO requirement.

85. It is intended that the additional TST team will fill some of the lower level authorised operational requirements, which in turn, will enable a dedicated SFO response to CT operations.

86. It was accepted by the Coroner for the inquest that at the time Jean Charles de Menezes emerged from the block in Scotia Road there were 'probably six firearms officers at the holding point very nearby, who could have performed the stop if they had been ordered to do so' and that 'it is clear from the evidence of DAC Dick that she would not have ordered the firearms officers to leave their holding point at any time earlier than that at which she actually gave the order'.

Recommendation 14
87. That the Commissioner and Management Board should demonstrate the corporate commitment and effort to achieve effective joint working between surveillance teams and firearms teams, and consistency of working across MPS commands, by reporting progress to the Authority not later than two months after the end of the Inquest, taking full account of evidence given in the Inquest into the death of Mr de Menezes.

88. The response to this is dealt with under Recommendation 10.

Recommendation 15
89. That the MPS develops and implements a community engagement strategy that aims to make Londoners better informed about the MPS policing model, which includes outlining how profiling is used in surveillance operations, and underlines that racial profiling is not used by the MPS.

90. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (MIB).

91. In response to Recommendation 2 of the IPCC Forest Gate report, “That the MPS should publicly explain the process by which they evaluate and act on intelligence to respond to some public perceptions that it can be misused,” the MPS has produced both detailed and summary flow charts to explain how the MPS turns information/intelligence into executive action.

92. It is intended to utilise these flow charts in training and presentations with stakeholders with the key message being that intelligence passes through a series of checks and balances before it leads to executive action.

93. Additionally, the MPS has granted unprecedented media access to the Specialist Firearms Command, CO19. On the lead up to the Stockwell Coroner’s enquiry the MPS provided comprehensive briefings on the conduct of firearms operations providing significant detail around tactical options and constraints. Additionally, both the revised ACPO firearms manual and the MPS SOP are being re-written to enable them to be public facing documents.

94. A 2-part television documentary about the work of CO19 has been aired in 2 parts on 10 and 17 February. It is hoped that this open access to the unit will continue to build confidence and give Londoner’s a realistic understanding of the difficulties faced in fast-moving operations.

95. Progress will be reviewed by 1 May 2009.

Recommendation 16
96. That the MPS should develop a cohesive framework for partnership action with all London boroughs, through engagement with London Councils, with a view to encouraging every borough to adopt an effective community cohesion strategy for major incidents, and to disseminate learning and good practice from other parts of London.

97. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (SO).

98. The Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team (CTSET) co-ordinates activity on cross-Borough and MPS-wide issues. Corporate guidance is provided via the CTSET website, which is based on national best practice.

99. Work is underway through the PREVENT strand to support Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNT) in identifying and engaging 'harder to reach' communities. This will be done through adopting ward-based engagement plans and promoting SNT panels.

100. A PREVENT linked paper is being drafted with a recommendation that the MPS/MPA community engagement strategy be refreshed to encompass engagement across business groups.

101. Progress will be reviewed by 1 May 2009.

Recommendation 17
102. That whatever the outcome of the Inquest, there will be community concerns and therefore the MPS needs to develop a comprehensive engagement strategy aimed at reassuring Londoners that London is effectively policed.

103. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (SO).

104. CTSET is represented on the Stockwell Gold Group, which met regularly throughout the Inquest. Activity was undertaken throughout Health and Safety Trial and the Inquest to monitor tensions through established community contacts and Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs). There was also proactive engagement with media towards conclusion of Inquest to provide the public with information and reassurance.

105. This engagement strategy is to be added as a strand to ETRG Community Reassurance Work Stream.

Recommendation 18
106. That as a matter of principle, Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) protocols and practices should be clear and consistent, so that officers are reassured, that any officer involved in a fatal shooting is regarded as an important witness, and not as a suspect unless or until there is evidence of an offence by an officer.

107. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (Directorate of Professional Standards).

108. The IPCC have clarified that officers are not regarded as suspects unless there is evidence that an offence has been committed. This position has been repeatedly stated in publications such as Police Review and in public forums, most recently in the Saunders judicial review.

Recommendation 19
109. That the practice of allowing officers to confer in the preparation of their notes is discontinued and procedures put in place to facilitate genuinely independent recollections. The MPS should review the provisions of the Met Standard Operating Procedure for use of firearms, and ACPO should review the Firearms Manual to reflect this change.

Recommendation 20
110. That in the meantime whilst the review is underway, current practice should be amended so that the exercise is captured on video and audio tape. Safeguards should be put in place to ensure no inappropriate use of the material in subsequent investigations.

Recommendation 21
111. That MPS in conjunction with HMIC and MPA should move forward to change its own procedures in the event that ACPO decides not to make a change.

Recommendation 22
112. That the MPS engage with the Police Federation during the process and if necessary move gradually but firmly over a period of time from the present practice to a more transparent practice.

113. The lead for these recommendations is Commander (Directorate of Professional Standards).

114. On 24 October 2008, the Chief Constable's Council proposed and accepted an amendment to the provisions falling within the ACPO Manual of Guidance for the Police Use of Firearms stating; "As a matter of general practice officers should not confer with others before making their accounts (whether initial or subsequent accounts). The important issue is to individually record what their honestly held belief of the situation was at the time force was used. There should be no need for an officer to confer with others about what was in their mind at the time force was used. If, however, in a particular case a need to confer on other issues does arise, then, in order to ensure transparency and maintain public confidence, where some discussion has taken place, officers must document the fact that this has taken place, highlighting the time, date and place where conferring took place, the issues discussed, with whom and the reasons for such discussion. There is a positive obligation on officers involved to ensure that all activity relating to the recording of accounts is transparent and capable of withstanding scrutiny.

115. In response, the MPS has issued interim guidelines to armed commands whilst it seeks national guidance with regards to how revisions should best be applied in practice.

116. In addition, Portsmouth University has been commissioned to conduct a 12-month scientific research project on behalf of the MPS and Police Federation to identify the system that ensures the most accurate recollection of events to assist a fair investigation. This is anticipated to report in December 2009.

117. Operation Bodwen is a working group reporting to a Gold Group re. note writing conferring in relation to all other police related death and serious injury. They are recommending to the Gold Group that all other death and serious injury at the hands of the state are given Post Incident Management support. In addition, a police notice is being drafted to reiterate the existing policy re conferring. Work is also underway with the Leadership academy to scope the training requirements for Post Incident Procedure training.

Recommendation 23
118. That the development of the Knowledge Management Centre (KMC) should continue as planned, and the MPS should report progress to the MPA in early 2009 with a further full account of the development and use of the Knowledge Management Centre and Crisis Management Team. The Report should include an account of the action taken to ensure the integration of senior MPS officer private offices into the Knowledge Management Centre network, and to improve the routine flow of information between the offices of Management Board Members before a Knowledge Management Centre mode is convened.

119. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (July Review Group).

120. A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for 'Communication between the Commissioner and Senior Management Team' has been drafted. It awaits the approval of Management Board before implementation. This SOP principally outlines the Commissioner's requirement to be informed of any incident which has, or has the potential to:
 Seriously endanger the general public
 Endanger the Royal Family
 Impact upon the business of Government or Parliament
 Impact upon the reputation of the MPS
 Influence relations between the MPA and the MPS
 Seriously impact upon the transport infrastructure
 Influence the MPS' relationship with Government, key partners, or communities
 Result in the death of a serving member of the police family

121. The SOP also details the steps that must be taken to ensure that an appropriate audit trail is created, and defines 'out of hours' procedures.

122. A new strategic lead for the Knowledge Management Centre will be established, when the July Review Group disbands on 31 March. An options paper on who this lead should be is currently being drafted for Management Board.


Recommendation 24
123. That the MPS must as a matter of urgency adopt more transparent criteria for invoking the Knowledge Management Centre, and the Management Board as CMT.

124. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (July Review Group).

125. The decision to form the KMC will be taken by the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner during times of extra-ordinary challenge for the MPS. It is not considered practicable to provide a more specific definition. It should however be considered in conjunction with the 'critical information' outlined in the draft SOP detailing the Commissioner's expectation in relation to the type of incidents of which he should be informed.

Recommendation 25
126. That an ongoing programme of training is established for staff volunteering to work in the Knowledge Management Centre.

127. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (July Review Group).

128. A training seminar and CRIMINT Plus training was delivered in August 2008. This was followed by paper-based exercise to test staff in roles against defined responsibilities.

129. An ongoing training programme to be decided by the new KMC Strategic Lead when the July Review Group disbands at end of March 2009.

Recommendation 26
130. That in future, the designated gold for a crisis event should have explicit responsibility for a proactive communications strategy.

131. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (CO).

132. The designated Gold has always had overall responsibility for the event communication strategy. A proactive communication strategy is an integral part of any Gold Group meeting, event policing plan and associated response. The communication strategy is often drawn up through consultation benefiting advice from the Directorate of Public Affairs and other parties e.g. IAG/CTSET. The MPS continues to endorse this position, and will ensure that it is re-enforced at Gold Cadre training events.

Recommendation 27
133. That the Commissioner reports back to the MPA in early 2009 with an explanation of how Specialist Operations, given the pressures they would be under during a London terrorist attack, is integrated into the KMC arrangements.

134. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (July Review Group).

135. SO15 have formed a Communications and Information Cell (CIC), which will provide the link to the KMC when it forms. A memorandum of understanding exists to define the interim process while it is decided who will assume responsibility for the KMC once July Review Group has disbanded.

Recommendation 28
136. That the MPS develops guidance for the public, outlining how the identification process works (particularly in relation to deceased individuals) and includes an explanation of why this can take some time.

137. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (Specialist Crime Directorate).

138. After consultation with DPA, a document has been produced by SCD which explains the identification processes in simple terms. Publication is anticipated by the end of April 2009.

Recommendation 29
139. That the IPCC, MPS and ACPO agree the development of a protocol or agreed practice to set out the basis of operation of any Salmon process in connection with an IPCC investigation in the future. In particular we recommend that recipients of “Salmon” letter should be requested to confirm in writing, before they receive the relevant extracts, that they will not exchange information about the contents.

140. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (Directorate of Professional Standards).

141. Legal advice is that the Salmon Process is not relevant to police misconduct proceedings and therefore should not be applied. This is because Police Misconduct investigations are an entirely different entity to Public Inquiries and the need for the safeguard provided by the Salmon Process does not arise. The Police Reform Act and ancillary regulations protect the interests of police officers subject to investigation by service of Regulation 9 Notices and similar protections apply to police staff. These should not be undermined.

142. The proposed requirement to provide written confirmation as suggested is unlikely to achieve the desired aim. This is because such confirmation will be unenforceable and, as the statutory framework governing the misconduct process for police officers does not provide for this requirement, it is unlikely that it could amount to a lawful order. If an officer is denied access to evidence needed to formulate his defence that issue is likely to be subject to legal challenge, particularly if the evidence is given to others.

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143. That the IPCC should recognise however that in the event of a major critical incident being investigated by them they have a duty to provide emerging findings as to organisational shortcomings as soon as possible.

144. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (Directorate of Professional Standards).

145. In a letter received on 25 September, the IPCC commented as follows: 'The IPCC already recognises that in the event of a major critical incident we are investigating, we have a duty to provide emerging findings of organisational shortcomings as soon as possible. This is reflected in 'Learning the Lessons' protocols adopted within the IPCC, which explicitly provide for communication of "quick time learning". As you are also aware, one of the IPCC stocktake proposals is to produce early interim reports in IPCC investigations'.

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146. That the MPA’s Chief Executive in consultation with the Commissioner draws up a protocol detailing the internal arrangements in the MPA for implementing the MPA’s communications strategy during a critical incident or crisis event, defining roles for MPA senior staff and explaining how communication with members of the MPA will take place and how the integrity of the members of professional standards committee will be protected. This should be in place by October 2008.

147. The lead for this recommendation is Chief of Staff.

148. An SOP for communication between Commissioner's Office and MPA during a critical incident or crisis event has been drafted and will shortly be going out for consultation. This provides guidance as to the type of incidents or events where information should be shared with the MPA Chief Executive's office, and the process by which this should take place.

149. Progress will be reviewed by 1 May 2009.

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150. The MPS, MPA and IPCC establish annual meetings aimed at facilitating dialogue and improving understanding between the organisations.

151. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (Directorate of Professional Standards).

152. A formal meeting structure is already in place between the MPS and the IPCC including bi-monthly meetings between Detective Chief Superintendent DPS Investigations Command and the IPCC regional Director for London. In addition, there are South East and quarterly meetings between the Deputy Commissioner and Director of DPS and Deputy Chairman of the IPCC.

153. Additionally a senior representative of the IPCC regional Director or Commissioner is invited to attend/participate in the monthly MPA Strategic and Operational Policing (SOP) meetings.

154. This structure is considered to provide adequate mechanism to facilitate dialogue and share understanding.

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155. That a panel of MPA members is reconvened to consider any further learning requirement emerging from the evidence given to the inquest.

156. This took place on 10 February 2009.

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157. That the Chief Executive together with the Commissioner negotiate with HMIC for the continuation of independent audit of the programme to implement change and report proposals back to the MPA, with a view to HMIC presenting an update report, taking account of any new issues emerging from the Coroner’s Inquest, within two months of the end of the Inquest or by March 2009 at the latest.

158. The lead for this recommendation is Commander (July Review Group).

159. An HMIC review of MPS progress against the IPCC Stockwell 1B recommendations will commence on 23 February 2009. This will be followed by an update report to the MPA, taking account of issues emerging from the Inquest.

C. Race and equality impact

Any response to the recommendations that may have a race and equality impact will be addressed by the nominated lead.

D. Financial implications

1. Several of the HMIC recommendations do have cost implications to the MPS although at this stage it is difficult to quantify the full impact of these. However, it is envisaged at this stage that any additional costs will be met from within existing budget and resource allocations.

2. If required, nominated leads of the recommendations will provide further updates in due course that will include information relating to any financial benefits / costs that may result.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Inspector Jeremy Wilson - July Review Group, MPS.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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