Operation Dockery - the investigation into the murder of Laurent Bonomo and Gabriel Ferez

Report: 12
Date: 9 July 2009
By: Commander Specialist Crime Directorate on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

The report provides some details of the investigation. The main focus will be on how the circumstances around the release of one of those convicted Daniel Sonnex in February 2008 and the events leading up to the murder in June 2008. A number of agencies (including the MPS) had responsibility dealing with Sonnex during this period. The actions of the MPS have been subject to an investigation and report by the IPCC. The report gives details of their recommendations and the subsequent MPS response to them.

A. Recommendation

That the report be noted.

B. Supporting information

Background

1. On 29 June 2008, Laurent Bonomo and Gabriel Ferez, two young French students studying in the UK were brutally murdered at their address in Sterling Gardens, SE14. This was a particularly savage attack, with both young men being stabbed repeatedly and tortured, prior to being set on fire along with the premises. The murder was subject to an intense level of media coverage, both in the UK and France where there was a significant amount of concern raised about the particular horrific way in which the young men died.

2. The investigation was lead by DCI Michael Duthie from SCD1. On 4 June 2009 two individuals – Daniel Sonnex and Nigel Farmer were convicted of the offence. Both have been given life sentences with Daniel Sonnex to serve a minimum 40 years and Nigel Farmer a minimum of 35 years.

3. The investigation was successfully concluded with the conviction of Sonnex and Farmer. It was however carried out against a backdrop of some complicating factors:

• Although there was a significant amount of forensic and circumstantial evidence to support the case against Sonnex and Farmer, it was necessary for a number of witnesses to give their evidence in difficult and intimidating circumstances. Evidence was given by these individuals with considerable courage and fortitude.
• Family Liaison was intricate and complex. The two MPS Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) carried out their work in a particularly professional and diligent manner.
• The case was subject to intense scrutiny in France and by the French authorities in the UK.
• There was considerable media interest into the issues around the release of Sonnex and the subsequent failure to revoke his license in time to possibly prevent this matter.

4. Daniel Sonnex was the main instigator and motivator for the infliction of such awful injuries on the young men. He was on licensed release from prison at the time of the murder, and although arrangements had been made for his license to be revoked, these were not successful.

5. In 2003 he was sentenced to eight years imprisonment for wounding with intent to do grievous harm. In October 2007 in preparation for his release Sonnex was the subject of a discussion between the Jigsaw team on Lewisham Borough and the London Probation Service (LPS) to determine how he should be managed upon his release from custody, and at what level he would enter the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA). This session was unfortunately not formally recorded. On his release from prison (which was the latest day that he could be released) he was assessed by the LPS as “Level 1”, leaving him to be dealt with by a sole agency – the London Probation Service.

6. This is a crucial issue in that this assessment meant that there were no formal arrangements for intelligence and information from other agencies (including the MPS) to be shared. On 9 February 2008 Sonnex was released on licence from prison. Within two days of his release he was suspected of committing several serious criminal offences – which the victims did not wish to substantiate to the investigating officer. His behaviour was reported to the LPS, although further intelligence that he was displaying signs of violence, was in possession of weapons, and seeking retribution was not. He was under the supervision of the LPS at this time.

7. In April 2008 he was arrested and charged with handling stolen goods and appeared before Greenwich Magistrates Court and was remanded in custody. He was held in custody until his trial for the handling stolen goods charge began on the 16 May 2008. He was released on bail following an application by the defence at this point. There is some confusion about where his recall papers were during this time, and there were a number of failures in communication between Court and LPS staff about his status as a recalled license prisoner.

8. On 13 June his license was revoked and a revocation notice and warrant of arrest was transmitted from the recall section of the Ministry of Justice. His details were placed on the PNC and the warrant was forwarded to Lewisham Borough.

9. There were a variety of actions taken by the Borough at this point including updating the Emerald Warrant Management System (EWMS), creating a CAD message to notify Borough staff of the need to prepare a risk assessment / plan for Sonnex and various tasking activities. (Including a briefing package to all front line staff.) The first active intervention by the MPS however, was not until the afternoon of 29 June 2009 – when two double crewed units attended Sonnex parents’ address (given as his last known home address) and searched for him. He was not at the address. (It is likely that this was after he had committed the murder). Sonnex remained at large until he was arrested by SCD1 officers on 10 July.

10. Three separate reports have been completed in relation to the management of Sonnex.

• The IPCC have reviewed the activities of the MPS from the discussion in October 2007 to the actions in dealing with the warrant between the 13 and 29 June 2008. Their recommendations relate to Jigsaw operating procedures and creating intelligence entries on MAPPA Offenders and the need for documented risk assessments of all MAPPA offenders who are subject to prison recall. They also recommended appropriate action (administered as words of advice) to an individual officer in Lewisham Borough. They also brought to the attention of the Ministry of Justice a number of recommendations for other agencies.
• The National Offender Management Service (NOMS) conducted an internal review which has made a series of recommendations.
• The London Criminal Justice Board (LCJB) carried out a review on behalf of representative agencies to examine any multi agency areas of systemic weakness – and invited partner agencies to review the context of this report from their own individual agencies points of view. This is the first time that such an exercise has been attempted by the LCJB, and it has been done with the intention of trying to examine joint agency accountability rather than individual agency faults.

The IPCC review

Recommendation 1

11. ‘The Metropolitan Police Service should take appropriate measures to ensure that Borough Intelligence Units are complying with Operation Jigsaw Standard Operating procedures, in particular that an appropriate intelligence entry is created on the nominal record of all MAPPA offenders directing officers and staff of the need to contact the probation officer named and the Borough Jigsaw team.’

12. .During their investigation the IPCC contacted TP Jigsaw to establish the roles and responsibilities of the BOCU Jigsaw teams and their access to MPS Policy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). They were made aware that the (then) existing SOPs were subject to their periodic review and an updated version was due for publication in the autumn of 2008. At the time of the incident that SOP did not make reference to Borough Intelligence Units (as above).

13. In light of this case and following contact by the IPCC, TP Jigsaw immediately reviewed the newly drafted SOP and included the paragraph relating to BIU and nominal records. The new SOP was approved and published in September 2008.

14. In December 2008 the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) introduced a form (Form A) to record screening meetings between police and probation where management levels are discussed. However, this only includes those subject to management at level 2 or 3.

15. The subject in this case was being managed by probation at level 1 so would not have been included had Form A been in use at that time.

16. Aware of potential intelligence gaps MPS TP Jigsaw revised form A for police purposes to include all subjects, regardless of management level. BOCU Jigsaw teams use this information to create a Crimint + intelligence record.

17. BOCU teams have been reminded of this requirement; it has been flagged to the Crime Academy for inclusion in the MOSAVO (management of sexual and violent offenders) course and is included in TP Jigsaw police training to BOCU staff and managers.

18. It is now the BIU responsibility to create a core ‘named person’ record. It is then owned by the MPS, with the relevant BIUs attaching / linking intelligence reports relating to that named person. This forms part of the Crimint + Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). BIU managers should monitor SOP compliance.

Recommendation 2

19. ‘The Metropolitan Police Service should take appropriate measures to ensure that a documented risk assessment is conducted in respect of all MAPPA offenders who are subject of prison recall.’

20. Since the 19 February the MPS has been working with the London Criminal Justice Board’s (LCJB) Enforcement & Compliance Manager to produce a LCJB License Recall Practice Guide for Practitioners. This is a cross-agency document that covers the end-to-end process of dealing with a License Recall in London.

21. The new LCJB License Recall Practice Guide for Practitioners now includes a requirement for the IBO staff to complete a dynamic risk assessment, which will be documented on the CAD that is created when they receive the early notification of a License Recall from the relevant Probation Offender Manager. The IBO will initially use the details provided to them by the OASys Probation report and this will be supplemented by any additional intelligence that the local Jigsaw team are able to provide from the VISOR system.

22. Now that the cross-agency process has been agreed, the current MPS instruction documents will be updated and distributed to BOCUs for compliance.

23. A new MPS Wanted Offender Policy and Standard Operating Procedure will then be written and implemented, which will provide corporate requirements on all staff and will replace the current instruction documents. It is anticipated that this Policy and SOP will be completed by 1 September 2009.

24. Although due for publication in September this year - the arrangements for improvement procedures in relation to the monitoring of and recall of all people who are wanted / missing (including those high risk offenders released on licensed) are in place and being actioned now.

25. These include:

• A system on each Borough to manage the information in relation to these offenders and the publication of the data about them on a weekly basis. Superintendents (Operation) on Borough are accountable for these systems.
• A system on each Borough to ensure that any action to arrest and detain these offenders is coordinated through one point.

26. It is through the revised and focused arrangements on each Borough that systems are now in place to ensure that dangerous individuals such as Sonnex are highlighted and steps taken to detain them quickly and within the agreed time limits.

Other issues:

27. MPS DPA coordinated and organized briefings between the various press officers from Home Office, Ministry of Justice, NOMS, MPA and FCO ensuring consistent public comment about this case.

28. The French Ambassador has been personally briefed by the MPS about the circumstances of this case (and difficulties around Sonnex). This was done on advice of French Police within Embassy (who have worked closely with the investigation team) in the light of concern of the Ambassador about the likely reaction in France to the difficulties around the license recall. The FCO were involved in these discussions.

29. Family liaison was maintained through SCD1. The relationship was positive and constructive. Access by all agencies to the family was through the FLOs. The families gave their own press conference at NSY in the aftermath of the conviction.

30. The acceptance and implementation of the recommendations by the IPCC have provided the basis for the reviewed focus on the arrangements in place to deal with offenders who are wanted or missing, and with particular reference to the category of offenders who are on licensed recall from prison. The number of these individuals varies from week to week - and by far the majority is individuals who are low risk in that they do not prevent a substantial risk to the public. The tragic circumstances of the release of Daniel Sonnex and his subsequent actions in randomly murdering these two completely innocent individuals are a clear reminder of the responsibility of the MPS to focus on this particular area of risk for London.

C. Race and equality impact

The considerable publicity on this case has impacted on the fear of these types of individuals. The reaction in France will undoubtedly have a disproportionate impact on French citizens intending to visit or living in London. Close liaison and work with the French authorities will seek to mitigate this wherever possible.

D. Financial implications

The major cost implication for this case has been in the investigation into the offence within the capacity of SCD1. Additionally arrangements have now had to be put in place to manage the process of prison licence recall offenders. This was however part of the ongoing review into offender management - absorbed by the Boroughs and coordinated through Emerald in TPHQ.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Commander Simon Foy, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) overview

MAPPA subjects fall into three categories:

• Registered Sexual Offenders (Cat 1 – primary responsibility rests with police)
• Violent Offenders and other Sexual Offenders (Cat 2 – primary responsibility rests with probation) and
• Other Dangerous Offenders (Cat 3 - primary responsibility is the first agency that deals with the offender).

There are also three levels of management:

• Level 1 (ordinary agency management) is used where the risk posed can be managed by the agency responsible for supervision (police, probation, YOT etc), other agencies may still be involved but it is not considered necessary to use the MAPPA framework.
• Level 2 (active multi-agency management) is used where the active involvement of more than one agency is required.
• Level 3 (active multi-agency management) requires the engagement of senior management who can commit resources. This level is for managing the ‘critical few’ who pose most risk.

Information can be shared with the Responsible Authorities (RAs - Police, Prisons and Probation) and Duty to Co-operate agencies under MAPPA and there are provisions for the disclosure of information outside of the MAPPA partnerships.

The subject in this case was a Category 2 (violent) offender being managed by London probation (having been released on license) at level 1.

ViSOR is the National Violent and Sexual Offenders Register owned and managed by the National Policing Improvement Agency. It is a confidential system and is not linked to MPS databases. There is a link between ViSOR and the Police National Computer (PNC). Police areas use ViSOR to record and manage RSOs, regardless of management level. The Prison service update a record if one already exists and the Probation service creates a record for their offenders but only for those managed at level 2 or 3. All the RAs can be made a partner to a record and update / exchange of intelligence. ViSOR records are transferable between Force / Probation areas.

Intelligence / Information (considering Bichard / Magee recommendations) - All Registered Sexual Offenders who receive a term of imprisonment are entered on ViSOR by police prior to their release. Those who do not receive a custodial sentence are entered on ViSOR by police either prior to, or upon, registration.

All violent offenders who meet the MAPPA criteria are known at the point of entry into the Prison system and could be entered on ViSOR by the Prison Service. This record could be owned and managed by the prison service that could populate the relevant fields and record information / intelligence relating to that subject. Upon release the ViSOR record could be transferred to the probation service, regardless of the determined level of management, and the police service made partners to the record for the term of the of the supervision period. In this way all the Responsible Authorities would be able to manage the offenders using the National ViSOR database and share intelligence / information in a timely fashion.

The MPS have undertaken the following actions to improve the MPS Wanted Offender Process:

• Implemented a Corporate Wanted Offender Tasking Process in February 2009, which requires all BOCUs to focus activity on investigative research to find the offender, Task through MetBats, and then daily SMT monitoring of enforcement outcomes.
• Production of a Weekly Wanted Offender Performance Report, which provides snapshot performance data and raw data on offenders who can still be arrested to meet the timeliness targets for FTA warrants and License Recalls.
• An immediate review of the take-up of the process by the BOCUs with a focused report back to the BOCU Commander for further action to improve, in March.
• Raised the profile of the importance of this process with BOCU Commanders, demonstrating how it impacts on public safety and, crime reduction, detection and prosecution performance targets.
• Updated any confirmed Historic License Recalls on EWMS for BOCU tasking to arrest.

The MPS has in addition worked with the LCJB, London Probation, HMCS, and the Home Office Public Protection Casework Section (PPCS) on the following actions to improve the cross agency processes:

• Production of LCJB License Recall Practice Guidance documents for practitioners
• Clarification of the PPCS Unlawfully at Large (UAL) List for London to confirm the status of all Historic License Recalls who are UAL from prison.

The following key activities are planned to further improve the effectiveness of the MPS process:

 Updating and dissemination of current MPS instructions with regard to each ‘Wanted’ type, reflecting the LCJB cross-agency documents, which were published in April 2008.

• Production and implementation of an MPS Wanted Offender Policy and SOP, which will be informed by the lessons learnt from the BOCU Process Review.
• A review in 3 months time to assess the implementation of the identified actions by the BOCUs in the initial process review.
• Improvements to Corporate intelligence functions such as ‘Met Most Wanted’, intelligence sharing with the Borders Agency, access to Open Source intelligence and CHISs.
• Planned proactive operations such as ANPR at key locations.

The following key activities are planned with the LCJB, Probation, HMCS and PPCS to further improve the effectiveness of the Cross-Agency processes:

• Production of LCJB Practice Guidance documents for the FTA warrants and Community Penalty Breach warrants.
• Clarification of the requirements on each agency of the Prison License Process.
• Clarification of the process and cost implications of extraditing License Recall offenders back to the UK.

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