Learning from murder and serious violence

Report: 8
Date: 15 October 2009
By: Assistant Commissioner Territorial Policing on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

A report on the lessons learnt by the MPS in respect of recent high profile cases in relation to Homicide and Serious Violence (Including Rape).

A. Recommendation

That this report is noted.

B. Supporting information

Homicide Offences

1. Daniel Sonnex was convicted with Nigel Farmer of the brutal and sadistic murders of two French students, Laurent Bonomo and Gabriel Ferez.

2. Sonnex was on licence and complied with his requirements until 23 April 2008, when he was arrested for handling stolen goods and remanded in custody. On 3 May, his offender manager initiated the process to recall him to prison in the light of the alleged offence. However, he was granted bail from court. The recall was not submitted for approval until 12 June and the police did not attempt to serve the warrant and arrest him until 29 June. This was the same day as the murders were committed.

3. In July 2008, the Metropolitan police referred the case to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, who subsequently made two recommendations to the MPS which have been accepted namely:

• The MPS should ensure that Borough Intelligence Units are complying with Operation Jigsaw Standard Operating Procedures, in particular, that an appropriate intelligence entry is created on the nominal record of all MAPPA offenders directing officers and staff of the need to contact the probation officer named and the borough Jigsaw team.”
• That the MPS ensure that a documented risk assessment is conducted in respect of all MAPPA offenders who are subject to a prison recall.

In relation to recommendation 1

4. Following contact by the IPCC, TP Jigsaw immediately reviewed and amended its Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The new SOP was approved and published in September 2008. National Offender Management Service (NOMS) introduced a form (Form A) to record screening meetings between police and probation where management levels are discussed. However, this only includes those subject to management at level 2 or 3. The subject in this case was being managed by probation at level 1 so would not have been included had Form A been in use at that time.

5. Aware of potential intelligence gaps MPS TP Jigsaw revised form A for police purposes to include all subjects, regardless of management level. BOCU Jigsaw teams use this information to create an intelligence record.

6. BOCU teams have been reminded of this requirement; it has been flagged to the Crime Academy for inclusion in the management of sexual and violent offenders (MOSAVO) course and is included in TP Jigsaw police training to BOCU staff and managers.

7. The Borough Intelligence Unit (BIU) is responsible for creating a core ‘named person’ record. It is then owned by the MPS, with the relevant BIUs attaching / linking intelligence reports relating to that named person.

In relation to recommendation 2

8. The MPS has been working with the London Criminal Justice Board’s (LCJB) Enforcement & Compliance Manager to produce a LCJB License Recall Practice Guide for Practitioners. This is a cross-agency document that covers the end-to-end process of dealing with a License Recall in London. This guide now includes a requirement for the Integrated Borough Operations (IBO) staff to complete a dynamic risk assessment, which is documented on the CAD record created when they receive the early notification of a License Recall from the relevant Probation Offender Manager.

9. Improvement procedures in relation to the monitoring of and recall of all people who are wanted / missing (including those high risk offenders released on licensed) are in place and being actioned now. These include:

• A system on each Borough to manage the information in relation to these offenders and the publication of the data about them on a weekly basis. Superintendents (Operation) on Borough are accountable for these systems.
• A system on each Borough to ensure that any action to arrest and detain these offenders is coordinated through one point.

Serious Violence Offences

10. Peter Woodhams was the victim of a serious assault in which he was stabbed by two males in East London sustaining significant facial injuries. The stabbing was investigated by the Metropolitan Police Service (Newham) which categorised it as grievous bodily harm with intent. No suspects were spoken to or arrested and the investigation was marked as ‘complete’. Eight months later Peter Woodhams was fatally shot. Due to complaints by Mr. Woodhams family, the MPS referred the matter of the police investigation into the Stabbing to the IPCC and an independent investigation was started. A male was subsequently convicted of the murder.

11. Two principal findings by the IPCC were:

• Failings in the primary investigation into the stabbing of Peter Woodhams by officers attending the scene.
• Policy in place at the time permitted an inappropriate delegation of responsibility. The IPCC suggested to the MPS that detective inspectors (DI’s) should retain responsibility for the supervision of the investigation of serious crime and of the officers conducting these investigations.

12. In response to the issue of quality assuring investigations a Serious Violence Team (SVT) was created within territorial policing. The role and function of the SVT is to centrally monitor and review the investigation of serious assaults in line with the MPS Serious Violence Strategy, which include all offences of GBH and attempted murder (investigated by Territorial Policing) across all MPS borough commands.

13. The daily monitoring of serious assault investigations by the SVT involves reviewing crime reports on the CRIS database; within each crime report the following areas are evaluated:

• Establish whether secondary investigative strategies have been put in place.
• Establish whether a risk assessment and control measures have been implemented.
• What documented supervision took place?
• Upon identification of a suspect, was positive action taken to make an arrest? (Arrest strategy and enquiries documented on crime report?)
• What case disposal option was taken, with regard to the outcome of the investigation?

Rape Offences

14. Operation Danzey is the investigation into a series of drug facilitated sexual assaults (DFSA) committed by John Derek Worboys, a licensed hackney Carriage driver.

15. Operation Anflora is the investigation into a linked series of sexual offences committed by Kirk Reid, centred on the Wandsworth between 2000 and 2008.

16. In relation to both of these investigations a number of changes in how the MPS investigated rape and serious sexual offences were implemented, including;

• Lessons learned from the Danzey investigation have been addressed in new National ACPO and CPS Guidance on Investigating and Prosecuting Rape.
• The establishment of Public Protection Groups on boroughs brings a focus on sexual offences to the Daily Management Meetings.
• A training package covering first response to Rape and Serious Sexual Assault, including the use of early evidence kits has been piloted and now rolled out across the MPS. This is now mandatory training for all first response officers from PCSO to Inspector and includes awareness of ‘Drug Facilitated Sexual assault’ (DFSA).
• The Met Intelligence Bureau (MIB) established a sexual offences desk which identifies emerging trends and link’s in with BOCU analysts. MIB monitor all rapes and sexual assaults, maintaining a database of unique features (CRIS Sex Offences Screen).Cases identified are assessed at ACPO Level through MPS Corporate Tasking.

17. Additionally, on the 23 September 2009, the responsibility for the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences passed from Territorial Policing (TP) to the Specialist Crime Directorate (SCD). This new bespoke command, referred to as SCD2, will have teams at eighteen sites across London, who will cover the MPS 24 hours a day.

18. Bespoke training provided by the Crime Academy will be given to all investigators on the new command, up to and including detective inspector.

Review process

Homicide

19. When a homicide is reported the ‘On Call’ SCD detective superintendent from Homicide Command (SCD1) will conduct an “Initial Assessment” as soon as possible and in any case within the first 72 - 96 hours.

20. The appropriate SCD detective superintendent will then conduct a Significant Stage Review within twenty-eight days of the start of the investigation, should it remain undetected. They are then periodically reviewed.

21. The Specialist Crime Review Group (SCRG - SCD20(2)) will contact the relevant SCD commander by letter at 21 days with a view to conducting a review of an undetected investigation, and make recommendations as necessary.

22. If all enquires are exhausted, then the case is ‘closed’ but reviewed every 24 months to see if any leads (primarily forensic) have developed which would warrant the case be reinvestigated.

Serious Violence and Rape Investigation

23. Standard operating procedures (SOP) exist to give guidance on the investigation of violent offences including Rape.

24. The SOP includes bespoke review periods, which were designed to ensure early intervention of detective sergeants, further supported by the effective leadership of Borough senior investigating officers i.e. DCI / DIs.

25. The current review periods for Serious Violence and Rape are:

• First Review: Must be conducted between 10 and 18 hours after first report to police by a detective sergeant. The allegation should be brought to the attention of the senior detective on Call for the Borough.
• Second Review: Must be conducted 7 days after the report being made or at the conclusion of the case if sooner by a detective inspector.
• Third Review: Must be conduct by the designated BOCU DCI after 28 days from the report being made (if the case remains unsolved).
• Subsequent Reviews: Must be conducted by the SIO (DI) in consultation with the designated BOCU DCI at 28 day intervals thereafter (until the case is solved or closed).
• If a case is re-opened when new information comes to light such as a 'DNA hit' on the database, a DS, in consultation with a DI, must ensure that the investigation is being satisfactorily progressed and note this fact on the CRIS within 24 hours.

26. As part of SCD2, a 'Continuous Improvement team' has been set up to review and inspect the working practices of Sapphire teams and make recommendations to constantly improve and roll out best working-practice. They will also work closely with community stakeholders and staff at the Sexual Assault Referral Centres known as the HavensC. Race and equality impact.

The MPS is mindful of any adverse impact or disproportionality that may occur as a result of the delivery of its services. In the delivery of its services the MPS fully embraces the need to engage with and consult with the communities and their representatives

D. Financial implications

The current Sapphire budget identified by TP is £21.497 million (2008/09 prices). This budget will be transferred to SCD to support a 24-hour OCU of approximately 370 officers and staff responding to a minimum of 4,000 allegations a year.

E. Legal implications

1. Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and Disability Discrimination Act 2005 and the Equality Act 2006 et al.

2. There are no legal implications in the production and replication of this report.

F. Background papers

• None

G. Contact details

Report authors: Mark Simmons, Commander TP Crime and Jim Foley, Detective Inspector TP Crime, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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