The MPS handling of firearms incidents

Report: 8
Date: 17 March 2011
By: Assistant Commissioner on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

Following the fatal shooting of Mr. Mark Saunders on 6th May 2008 in Markham Square, London, SW3, and the subsequent Coroner’s inquest, members of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) requested a report that details how the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS):

• managed the incident that culminated in the death of Mr. Saunders and
• has responded to the issues arising out of the inquest.

The MPA requested that the following information should be included in this report:

Point 1. An outline of the Coroners’ rule 43 recommendations and how the MPS has responded to those recommendations,

Point 2. Explaining the perception that the MPS response to the incident appeared to be resource intensive,

Point 3. A summary of learning that arose out of debriefing the inquest and establishes what changes have been made in response,

Point 4. An outline of the relevant SOP’s and Protocols and summaries any work being done to provide additional guidance given to officers,

Point 5. Establishes the relevant links to the post Stockwell changes and the impact of learning from that incident.

This paper details the response to this request.

A. Recommendation

That

1. Members note the contents of this report which provide a response to the associated commissioning brief.

B. Supporting information

MPA Point 1

1. The inquest touching the death of Mark Saunders was conducted by HM Coroner Dr. Paul A Knapman at Westminster Coroner’s Court between 20th September 2010 and 7th October 2010 at the conclusion of which the jury delivered a verdict of ‘lawful killing’.

2. Following the inquest, Dr. Knapman wrote to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police under the provisions of Rule 43 Coroners Rules 1984 [1]. The three points raised by HM Coroner and the Metropolitan Police Service responses [2] to those matters are as follows:

1) “I formally draw to your attention the fact that there appears to have been a blurring of the distinction between the Firearms Tactical Advisor and Firearms Bronze Commander - and I do so for any action you may think appropriate”.

3. In the initial stages of the operation the Tactical Advisor was acting as the Bronze Commander simultaneously (this is not uncommon in the early, fast-moving stages of an operation). Ambiguity arose because in the latter stages of the operation the roles became separated. At this point both the Tactical Advisor and Bronze Commander had distinct and separate roles but incorrect references to their role titles were made by other officers. Those that subsequently investigated this incident have identified the discrepancy between the titles attributed to the different officers in incident records. This became the subject of detailed examination during the inquest and there was no evidence that it had any adverse effect on the conduct of the operation or contributed to the outcome [3].

4. This ambiguity is accepted and has been addressed through a wider work stream that professionalises command and control and provides greater clarity to the roles and response within. November 2009 saw the creation of a new unit, CO5, the MPS Firearms Command Unit. This unit is comprised of small number of supervisory officers whose sole responsibility is to command firearms incidents within the MPS. This has enabled more in-depth training, far greater operational exposure and experience, and personalised development programmes. CO5 also has responsibility for supporting OCU's in managing 'spontaneous' firearms operations, including armed incidents that develop into sieges. Firearms Command and Control arrangements were inspected by the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) in May 2010 and favourable comments were forthcoming in relation to clarity and consistency of roles and responsibility.

5. Additionally, a new nationally accredited Bronze Commander course has been developed. This course runs for a duration of five days, is accredited by the National Police Improvement Agency and training commenced in January 2011. This course is aimed at further strengthening operational command of firearms incidents and aligning the MPS fully with national command requirements, terminology and interoperability. Clarity of command in these types of incidents would now be provided by the Strategic Firearms Commander from CO5 who would have responsibility as per the ACPO Manual of Guidance in ensuring an effective and resilient command structure was in place.

2) “I formally bring to your attention that Mr Saunders, in the jury’s opinion, was a vulnerable person with regard to nature, proximity and numbers in the police containment - although in this circumstance I note that the jury did not consider it likely that it made a contribution to the cause of death. I bring this to your attention realising it is a very difficult area for what ever action you may think fit” [4].

6. This point relates to the question posed to the jury [5] concerning insufficient weight being given after 9.09pm (after a shot was fired by Mr Saunders and police returned fire) to the fact that Mr Saunders was a member of a special population group (prior to fatal shots at 9.32pm). The term ‘special population group’ has now been replaced by ‘emotionally or mentally distressed’ in the ACPO Manual of Guidance. It was identified very early on in the operation that Mr Saunders fell into this category because of his alcohol consumption. The ACPO manual at that time made specific reference to tactical considerations in situations where it was considered that a subject may be trying to force police into a provoked shooting, such as using cover, evacuating an area, or backing off.

7. In evidence Chief Superintendent Wise and Inspector Bennett articulated what their priorities were immediately after the exchange of shots at 9.09pm. In the 23 minutes they had available between 9.09 and 9.32 the containment positions were not reviewed by the Command Team due to competing priorities. Containment isolates the subject from other people and thereby reduces or neutralizes the threat they pose. In this instance Mr Saunders was contained within his home, (allowing him both the personal space and time to recover and disengage) with armed officers to the front and rear to prevent escape and greater public danger.

8. The layout of Markham Square and his home placed physical limitations on the positions the police could adopt in order to maintain sight of him and the distance they could retreat to whilst still achieving their role. This had a direct impact on both the position the officers took up for containment and the numbers of officers involved. The number of officers deployed to this incident also reflects that consideration was given to rotating officers for rest periods and that officers with specialist skills and weapons were deployed (i.e. rifles).

9. The Force Firearms Unit (CO19) have invested considerable effort in ensuring that sufficient emphasis is attributed to individuals who may be emotionally and mentally distressed (EMD) and that the recognition and management of people believed to be EMD is fully integrated into selection and training processes for the command. To assist in that process, CO19 have developed strong partnerships with mental health care professionals. These include medical professionals from Hackney Mental Health Trust (Mellow), the charity MIND, and the MPS Territorial Policing lead for mental health.

10. It is recognised that MPS CO19 officers already receive a significant input in relation to dealing with EMD persons from a tactical perspective, however it was felt that additional training would benefit officers. The aim of the training was:

• Increase understanding of recognising mental illness and mental disorders
• Increase understanding of the police's role and responsibility with regard to people with mental illness (suspected or diagnosed)
• Identify good practice guidelines that will promote police encounters with people experiencing mental ill health problems.

11. The programme uses a variety of training methods including a knowledge test, PowerPoint presentations, discussions, group work, feedback and individual officer contributions. The training includes input from a psychiatric doctor and officers meet with people that had previously suffered from mental health issues and who have been stopped by police officers (often CO19), raising officers’ awareness of mental health.

12. CO19, working with the South London and Maudsley Mental Health Trust and after a year of negotiation, have secured an information-sharing protocol. This in effect covers the London Boroughs of Lewisham, Croydon, Southwark and Lambeth which are frequently patrolled by officers from CO19. When a call is received into the CO19 control room and staff recognise that officers are dealing with an individual who may be suffering from EMD, a process now exists wherein contact can be made with the NHS trust in relation to 'critical enquiries' (A case will be considered ‘critical’ if there is immediate risk of harm to the subject or others and information is required immediately to protect individuals from such harm).

13. The above process became operational in Jan 2011 and its impact is still to be assessed however, CO19 anticipate that having more information available about subjects will assist in the resolution of incidents. CO19 are now working with the remaining nine NHS trusts in London to establish similar protocols across the MPS.

A full evaluation report of the training is available.

3) “I formally bring to your attention matters concerning documentation associated with police use of firearms generally for the reasons set out to Secretary of State for Home Affairs, a copy of which I enclose herewith.”

14. The above statement refers to correspondence from the Coroner to the Commissioner reiterating comments to the Home Secretary. This letter drew attention to the following documentation related to police use of firearms, it then made broader comments relating to firearms documentation; with some final comments regarding leadership and authority during such operations. The relevant documentation is listed below:

1. “Standing Operating Procedures on police use of firearms”. Metropolitan Police Service (97 pages).
2. “Manual of Guidance on the Police Use of Firearms” ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) (90 pages)
3. “Attenuating Energy Projectiles (AEP) Guidance” ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) (32 pages)
4. “Operational use of Taser - Operational Guidance” ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) (46 pages)
5. “Code of Practice on Police use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons”. Home Office (Centrex) NCOF (National Crime and Operational Faculty) (18 pages)
6. “Manual of Guidance on the Management Command and Development of Armed Officers” NPIA (National Policing Improvement Agency) (22 pages).

15. There is reference to six documents in the letter from Dr Knapman to the Home Secretary. Two of the national ‘Manuals of Guidance’ are in fact the same documents, as one is simply a revision of the other.

16. The MPS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is a reproduction of the National Manual of Guidance with additional information about procedures that are pertinent to the MPS only. None of the MPS procedures conflict with material in the national Manual of Guidance.

17. References to literature on AEP (known as baton rounds) and Taser guidance are specifically concerned with these less lethal options including detail on training delivery. The Home Office Code of Practice deals with such issues as each Force having to appoint an ACPO officer to manage firearms, guidance on the procurement of weapons etc.

18. The National Manual of Guidance (on which the MPS SOP is based) is important to define national standards and has been developed in response to operational learning and development experienced nationally. Some of this learning stems from Coroner and other third party recommendations (i.e. IPCC, HMIC).

19. This is complemented by the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum, which turns manual content into learning outcomes. The manuals above have a hierarchy and in their current format allow flexibility for the practitioner.

20. The armed officers at Markham Square acted in accordance with the law, the incident’s strategic objectives and their training to counter what they believed to be an imminent threat to life. A decision to ‘open fire’ is a relatively straightforward test recognising that the individual in closest proximity to the threat is most likely to be best placed to make the judgement and this is supported not constrained by manual content.

21. Regarding the concept of having a senior officer with experience of similar situations to attend and review operations. In longer-term operations or incidents a Strategic Command/'Gold Group' may be initiated which formalises an opportunity for broader oversight. This will include an opportunity to review the policing operation and to seek critical feedback. Individual commanders can request peer support, which provides the opportunity for a colleague to challenge thinking on threat, strategy and tactical options adopted. For example in the MPS deployment to Northumbria (Raoul Moat), the senior MPS officer present had the opportunity to perform such a role by sharing relevant experience.

22. The following two paragraphs concern matters presented to the Home Secretary and repeated to Sir Paul Stephenson by the Coroner [7].

23. “I formally bring to your attention matters concerning the volume of documentation associated with police use of firearms generally for the reasons set out to Secretary of state for Home Affairs, a copy of which I enclose herewith”.

The essence of this point has been demonstrated by the MPS response to the coroners’ recommendation paragraph 14-19.

24. ”The concept of having a senior officer with experience of similar situations to attend and review operations”.

The essence of this point has been demonstrated by the MPS response to the coroners’ recommendation paragraph 21.

The following paragraphs will deal with the other points that the MPA specifically requested to be included in this report, over and above those of the Coroner.

MPA Point 2

25. “The perception that the MPS response to the incident appeared to be resource intensive,”

26. The objectives for an armed operation may be summarised as follows;

27. ‘To identify, locate and contain the threat and to neutralise that threat by the safest possible means’.

28. The police tactic during this operation was to contain the threat that Mr Saunders posed to the public, while trying to negotiate his safe surrender to police. Plans were set in place to resource the operation over a number of days if necessary and contingency plans for various scenarios were in place. Paragraph 8 refers to the specific layout and deployment of officers at Markham Square.

29. An operation of this type will invariably consist of a number of components. Command and control, with appropriate logistical support will be established; an inner, armed containment; an outer, unarmed containment; traffic management; negotiators and support cell; intelligence and investigative officers.

30. The inner, armed containment required such resilience so as to prevent Mr. Saunders from leaving his premises and posing a potential threat to the wider public. In addition, further specialist officers were deployed as a contingency for deliveries, rapid entry and negotiated surrender.

31. Additionally, armed resources were assigned to provide protection to neighbouring premises whose occupants could not be safely evacuated and to the police negotiators when they courageously deployed in close proximity to Mr. Saunders’ premises in an attempt to overcome communication issues.

MPA Point 3

32. “MPS learning that has arisen out of any debriefing and inquest and what changes have been made as a response.”

33. The responses to both the Coroner and the IPCC [8] have detailed changes to practices and procedures that the MPS has made arising from the operation and the subsequent investigation.

34. There has thus far been no formal debriefing of the incident yet due to the potential for legal proceedings against officers arising from the investigation and review of live evidence at the Coroner’s inquest. This extended process is now complete and arrangements are in place for a structured debrief led by the Chief Firearms instructor, to report by July 2011.

MPA Point 4

35. “Outline the relevant SOP’s and Protocols in this area and summarise any work being done to rationalise guidance given to officers.”

The essence of this point has been demonstrated by the MPS response to the coroners’ recommendation paragraph 14-19.

MPA Point 5

36. “Make the links to the post Stockwell changes and indicate the impact on learning from that incident.”

37. Whilst there a number of factors with a common theme in all firearms operations. It should be noted that the man hunt of a failed suicide bomber in July 2005 was very different to the events of Markham Square. The 2005 attack was characterised by a deadly and determined intent to cause large scale mass murder. The events in Markham Square centred on an isolated and contained male suffering from emotional stress.

38. Nevertheless since the tragic events of Stockwell 2005 a programme of improvement known as the Extreme Threats Group (ETG) chaired by ACSO has been established. This has lead to a number of reforms which, despite being principally directed as covert intelligence-led operations there are wider benefits for incidents such as Markham Square including:

1. Command and Control. CO5 are dedicated full time specialist firearms commanders that provide a consistent and professional standard of command and control for firearms incidents on a 24/7 basis. This unit’s advantages have been further discussed in paragraph 4.
2. Control Rooms. Greater use of covert and overt control rooms is now established for more complicated firearms operations. Structured debriefs of exercises and operations have also identified how covert policing can support operations of this nature. Firearms Commanders are fully aware of the benefits and technical enhancements that these facilities can achieve in the resolution of such incidents.
3. Organisational Learning. A defined process is now in place that brings together learning from operation experiences. The process involves raising awareness, additional training and the opportunity to test new processes in learning exercises.
4. Stakeholder Engagement. CO19 and CO5 have embedded rolling programmes of engagement with interested parties to brief and increase awareness of this specialist area of work. Recent inclusions in this rolling programme of work include:
   • Briefings concerning policing response to marauding terrorists such as the Mumbai attack.
   • Consultations with mental health and groups representing disadvantaged groups (as detailed in paragraph 9).
   • The use of community group members to provide feedback to supervisors during command assessment scenarios that include a community engagement element. Regular briefings to the Crime Reporters Association concerning development in the police use of firearms.

39. The formal debrief of officers engaged at Markham Square may bring to light further areas for improvement and the work already carried out by the MPS clearly shows that as an organisation the MPS are keen to embrace change where required.

40. Reforms and improvements in firearms policing have been fast moving and far reaching since the events of 2005. Matters that have been bought to the attention of the MPS by the IPCC have been fully addressed.

C. Other organisational and community implications

Race and Equality Impact

1. This report focuses on the MPS’s response to an incident at Markham Square in 2008, where Mr Mark Saunders died. Mr Saunders was found to be a vulnerable person who fell within the MPS’s definition of someone who is presenting as EMD. As such an understanding of disability issues, including the overlap of mental health problems is central to the work that the MPS has done and continues to do with regard to firearms incidents in CO19, since this tragic incident occurred.

Financial Implications

2. Project management responsibility with regard to implementation of all recommendations both arising from the Coroner and the IPCC will rest with the relevant Project Lead in each Business Group with oversight of progress against the Plan being provided by the Programme Office and Programme Board as required. There are no additional financial implications specified.

Environmental Implications

3. There are no environmental implications in this report.

Risk Implications

4. Potential risks and actions taken to mitigate such significant risk within this report, which covers wide areas of activity, across different business groups are owned by the individual project leads and are managed accordingly.

Legal Implications

5. This paper has been reviewed by the Directorate of Legal Services and there are no legal implications associated with this report.

D. Background papers

• ACPO Manual of Guidance on the Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers 2010.
• MPS Police use of Firearms Standard Operating Procedures 2010.
• Home Office Codes of Practice on Police use of Firearms and less Lethal Weapons 2003.
• MPS SOP ‘The prioritisation of MPS armed assets - tasking and allocation process 2010’.

D. Contact details

Report author: Inspector Paul Ford CO1 with contributions from Insp. Nigel Partridge, Supt. Ian Chappell and Chief Superintendent Bill Tillbrook - Central Operations on behalf of Commander Jerry Savill, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Send an e-mail linking to this page

Feedback