Update by the MPS on the Home Office Anti-social behaviour pilot/field trials

Report: 8
Date: 13 October 2011
By: Assistant Commissioner Territorial Policing on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides an overview of the MPS involvement within and developments as a result of the 2011 Home Office ASB case management pilot/field trials.

A. Recommendation

That members note the contents of the report and progress made by the MPS in dealing with Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB).

B. Supporting information

Background

1. The MPS recognises that ASB can directly impact on public perceptions and confidence. Worry about ASB is key driver in relation to community confidence and it is understood that ASB can adversely affect quality of life for both individuals and communities alike. As a result ASB is a key performance indicator (KPI), under safety KPI number 5 for 2011 / 2012 for the MPS and is an integral part of the MPS’s safety and confidence objectives. The MPS “London Business Plan” (2011-2014) has set the corporate objective of raising the MPS response to vulnerable / repeat victims. As such ASB now forms part of the MPS performance structure and is reviewed at the Key Performance and Review Meetings (KPRM).

2. The British Crime Survey (BCS) assesses all forces in relation to public confidence within a number of key areas including that of ASB. The MPS has a number of methods for gauging public confidence in policing including its own Public Attitude Survey (PAS). This survey asks two specific questions in relation to ASB, has a broader sample size and is carried out across all London Boroughs. The following PAS results relate to ASB for the financial year 2010/2011:

• The PAS survey for the rolling year 2010/2011 showed that 25% of Londoners had ‘worry about ASB’. This is a reduction of 14% from 39% in the financial year 2008/2009
• The PAS survey 2010/2011 showed that 12% of Londoners ‘perceived levels of high ASB’. This is a reduction of 11% from 23% in the financial year 2008/2009

3. In May 2010 the MPS and other police forces were subject to an inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC). HMIC made a number of recommendations that the MPS actively worked towards addressing (such as circulating minimum standards to boroughs). The HMIC review, alongside a number of other influencing factors, has helped guide MPS policy. Other influences have included:

• The MPS recognises the need to learn lessons from national and local level approaches to ASB and has been pro-active in its approach to this. This became particularly relevant following the events surrounding high profile incidents such as the Pilkington case
• The MPS has in place an ASB steering group, chaired by the commander Crime and Customer Strategy Command (CCS).This group comprises unit leads from a number of key MPS departments (including Safer Neighbourhoods(SN), Central Command and Control (CCC) and the Intelligence Standards Unit) and its remit is to influence and guide long term approaches to ASB. The MPS steering group helped facilitate the HMIC visit and holds responsibility for implementing recommendations as a result of its findings (a copy of the 2010 HMIC review is available upon request)
• The MPS has been a key stakeholder in the Pan-London ASB steering group (along with key London local authorities, housing providers, emergency service providers etc) and ASB managers meetings which have historically been forums for exchanging of good practice and ideas
• The MPS held a number of focus groups with staff across a number of portfolios to identify areas of risk, good practice and areas for improvement. These groups were coordinated by and fed directly into the ASB steering group
• Upon announcement of the Home office ASB trials (the subject of this report) the MPS actively volunteered and was accepted onto the trials along with seven other forces

MPS definition of ASB

4. As a result of the HMIC inspection and to provide clarity for our staff we have defined ASB as outlined below. This definition underpins the MPS “ASB” Strategy.

5. The MPS utilises the definition of ASB as defined in S1 of the crime and disorder act 1998, namely:

“An individual acting in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as him / herself”

6. As work / training relating to ASB intensifies this has been supported by the following statement, agreed by the MPS ASB steering group.

ASB can be viewed as:

“Any incident where nuisance, intimidating or threatening actions, activity or behaviour scares or damages an individual’s quality of life”

Historically the MPS has recognised the 14 national ASB type codes (as defined under the national call handling standards) for classifying of ASB on its command and control systems.

7. As of the 7th August 2011 hoax calls to emergency services are no longer classified as ASB. While retaining the remaining 13 ASB types, the MPS has adopted 3 new (nationally agreed) qualifiers for ASB call handling. These are:

• Personal ASB (where the incident was targeted at a specific individual or group)
• Nuisance ASB (where the incident targets the wider community, not individuals or groups)
• Environmental ASB (where the incident targets the wider environment e.g. public spaces / buildings, but is not aimed at a specific individuals or groups)

8. The adoption of the above three qualifiers ensures that the MPS complies with Home Office regulations on the recording of ASB. The MPS ASB steering group directed that, during the Home office trials, any use of the MPS crime reporting system (CRIS) for case management of high risk ASB would reflect the ASB categories identified above.

The Home Office field trials / ASB Pilot

Rational for the MPS inclusion in the national ASB pilot

9. The Home Office ASB fieldwork pilot (sometimes referred to as the Home Office ASB fieldwork trials) ran nationally from January 2011 until the end of July 2011. Assessment of the trials within the MPS has taken place throughout August and September with the final report due at the Home Office by 30th September 2011. Whilst under the umbrella of a national pilot, all activity and assessments were directed by the individual forces based on individual expectations and local requirements of the scheme.

10. The Home Office trials outlined five particular areas for forces to assess their performance and build on ASB management. These were:

• Use of effective call handling systems
• A common set of principles for tackling ASB
• Usage of a risk assessment matrix / tool
• Use of IT systems that help provide a quicker and timelier response to ASB
• An approach to community engagement that ascertains concerns, priorities and harm at neighbourhood level (including active problem solving and partnership work)

It should be noted that the Home Office were non prescriptive in relation to these five areas and forces were authorised to concentrate on any or all five areas.

11. Prior to commencing work on the ASB pilot it was recognised that there were varied approaches across the service with inconsistent methods adopted by boroughs. This was further re-enforced by the 2010 HMIC inspection which highlighted that intelligence and ASB information was frequently lost between initial call handling / resource deployment and that methods of recording of ASB related matters varied widely across the MPS.

12. The decision to actively seek inclusion in the trials was agreed by the MPS ASB steering group. The MPS submitted an application outlining its rationale for inclusion, with a brief synopsis of desirable outcomes from the trial. The MPS believed that the trial would:

• Allow a more in-depth review of its processes, including risks to individuals and corporate risks to the MPS and partners in relation to ASB management
• Allow the MPS to learn from both internal and external good practice in providing quality responses to ASB
• Help support the MPS “London Business Plan” (2011-2014) which has set the corporate objective of raising the response to vulnerable / repeat victims
• Allow the MPS to see how it performs in comparison to other forces
• Build on and where appropriate, escalate existing work. A number of workstreams and concerns had already been identified and were being progressed by the ASB steering group

Pilot structure within the MPS

13. Whilst the Home Office identified 5 key areas for consideration, the pilot forces were at liberty to identify which of the five “principles” they would focus on during the trials. Whilst the MPS recognised this opportunity to limit its focus, the decision was made that it would look at all five key principles as it was felt that each had a significant impact on the others and could not realistically be reviewed individually.

14. In full consultation with the Home Office it was agreed that, due to its size and complexity, the MPS would trial aspects of the pilot on four of its boroughs (this approach was reflected in a number of the other pilot forces). Following a brief period of consultation with boroughs, four were identified for inclusion within the scheme. These were Hackney, Harrow, Lambeth and Richmond. Whilst all four sites were volunteers they were chosen due to the fact that they represented a broad cross section of communities and demographic areas.

15. The pilot was coordinated by a central Safer Neighbourhoods (SN) team. Structures were instigated to ensure there was full liaison with key business groups throughout the pilot as well as partners, the Home Office and other pilot forces. Key MPS business groups included:

• Central Command and Control (CCC)
• Crime Directorate (Emerald-Criminal Justice)
• Department of Information (DOI)
• Intelligence Standards Unit
• Territorial Policing Performance Unit
• Strategic Research and Analysis Unit
• Patrol Operational Command Unit
• Pilot boroughs, (each pilot borough elected a community stakeholder, either a local authority or statutory social housing group to provide partner input)

16. The pilot was organised into a three part process comprising of:

• An initial scoping exercise / review of existing practice (completed at both borough and central levels)
• An implementation / activity phase
• A formal review / evaluation phase.

It should be noted however that throughout the three phases there was regular, ongoing evaluation. This was managed through locally and centrally held action plans and monthly meetings with the stakeholders identified above.

17. The central SN team has become the link between the Home Office, partner forces and the MPS, becoming a contact point and facilitator for shared information / emerging good practice.

Pilot Activities

18. During 2011 a revised structure within the CCS command was put in place to support the ASB agenda. This consists of a Chief Inspector, Inspector, Sergeant and a police staff member. The team remit is focused on policy and strategy with a view to championing the ASB agenda on behalf of the Commander (Crime and Customer Strategy Command). This team in conjunction with the SN performance team led on coordinating MPS pilot activity.

19. As part of the scoping exercise the central units and pilot boroughs critically assessed their own procedures and activity against the Home Office principles recorded against action plans. Outlined below are the key initial findings across the pilot boroughs and central units together with activity subsequently implemented.

I. Use of effective call handling systems / a common set of principles for tackling ASB:

Initial scoping / identified issues

20. The following themes were identified by pilot sites and departmental stakeholders:

• Variation in (call handling) staff awareness of ASB related issues
• Variation in deployment of staff to ASB related incidents
• Variable levels of identification of repeat / vulnerable callers with appropriate flagging
• Lack of consistency in resulting of ASB dispatch reports (CADs) with meaningful and auditable results
• Limited ability to capture ASB information received via non CCC processes
• Scoping found there was variation of practices across the MPS with no specific central guidance around ASB management

MPS activity in response to initial scoping

Central activity

21. The central SN team completed a central guidance document which was provided to boroughs. This outlined the procedures to be adopted by staff when dealing with initial ASB call handling when information is received both via CCC and other means such as front counters, SN teams etc. Guidance outlined minimum standards including:

• A named SMT lead for ASB on each borough
• Minimum standards for contact with callers relating to ASB
• Performance management frameworks to be in place at borough level to monitor and support local ASB practices
• Regular problem orientated partnership meetings with local partners to discuss ASB related matters
• ASB, repeat and vulnerability issues to be agenda items within borough intelligence processes including at daily management meetings (DMM) and tasking meetings
• The use by staff of the nationally accepted vulnerability assessment / matrix

22. As part of a formal project plan monthly meetings were held with pilot boroughs and relevant operational command units to ensure consistency of understanding and approach. The Central ASB team provided additional support through regular visits to the pilot sites.

CCC activity

23. The CCC system (CAD) now provides a drop down prompt to assist call handlers with the identification of vulnerable ASB callers. Whilst this prompt is not a risk assessment, the callers responses aid the evaluation of response decisions. This prompt is shown on appendix IV for your information.

24. CCC has implemented an internal performance management framework to ensure quality of service around call handling. CCC perform internal audits and intrusive supervision of call handling (including listening to live / recorded calls) and ensure continuous improvement through training, dip sampling etc.

25. The central TP performance team completes regular audits of CAD reports (including listening to recorded incidents) to ensure quality, effectiveness, appropriate deployment and appropriate closures of call reports. This compliments the audits carried out by CCC management.

26. CCC has adopted the three new national ASB qualifiers (personal, nuisance and environmental ASB).

Borough activity

27. All boroughs have implemented the minimum standards to ensure all ASB cases are appropriately recorded and managed. Regular visits to boroughs ensure that this remains the case.

28. Front line staff have been briefed on the key drivers of ASB, definitions, minimum standards and the importance of the vulnerability matrix to identify those most at risk. The SMT lead on each of the boroughs is responsible for ensuring that staff, e.g. SNTs, response teams and front counter staff are aware of these requirements.

29. The role of the Borough Intelligence Unit (BIU) is critical in making sure that MPS databases are searched to ensure that we correctly identify repeat callers and those considered vulnerable. These cases are then brought to the attention of senior management via the daily intelligence meeting. These processes are an integral part of the minimum standards.

II. Use of risk assessments and identification of repeat / vulnerable ASB:

Initial scoping / identified issues

30. The following issues were identified through initial scoping:

• There were varied approaches across the MPS to identification of repeat / vulnerable ASB issues
• There was an inconsistent approach across the MPS in identifying risk in relation to ASB
• There were varied approaches to vulnerability assessment across partners with little joined up partnership identification of victims
• No real analysis present in relation to ASB such as victim, location, offender and time (VOLT) profiling

MPS activity in response to initial scoping

Central activity

The decision was made to adopt the national ‘standard’ vulnerability assessment matrix on all pilot sites. This is Home Office approved and used by a number of other pilot forces. A Copy of this assessment matrix is available as appendix VI.

31. To aid early ASB identification the central SN team actively encouraged boroughs to ‘flag’ any CADs where initial investigation led them to believe there was an element of vulnerability. This assists BIUs in their daily research activity.

32. The MPS Performance Information Bureau (PIB) produces regular data that identifies repeat callers to CCC (this information is provided to boroughs to support early identification and management of repeat / vulnerable ASB victims).

33. Through the pan-London ASB managers forum the MPS actively encouraged the use of the vulnerability assessment by partner agencies. All four pilot boroughs have successfully negotiated the adoption of the risk matrix with their Local Authorities and registered social landlords.

CCC activity

34. Due to the nature of CCC it was identified at an early stage that completion of the vulnerability assessment was best placed with initial investigating officers on borough and not at CCC as this could potentially slow down the call and dispatch processes.

35. Throughout the pilot CCC staff continued to use the dropdown prompt that has previously been mentioned. Whilst this prompt is not a vulnerability assessment as such it provides key questions to the call handler to assist them in making appropriate dispatch decisions and can also act as an indication to deployed staff of potential vulnerability issues.

Borough activity

36. All four pilot sites have adopted the use of the vulnerability matrix which is completed by the initial investigating officer. On all four boroughs the risk matrix is supervised by at least a sergeant rank and all risk assessments are retained for future reference. The outcome of the risk assessment ultimately guides management of the ASB caller. Under the pilot guidelines anyone identified as high risk was case managed using the MPS Crime Reporting System (CRIS). All four pilot sites have worked closely with partnership agencies such as Local Authority and social housing groups which has resulted in a number adopting the vulnerability assessment (ensuring consistency of approach both externally as well as internally).

37. All four boroughs have put in place regular and structured ASB action groups, at which key stakeholders discuss and task actions relating to high risk and vulnerable ASB issues. Low level ASB is discussed with key stakeholders on a more ad hoc basis.

38. At borough level repeat ASB incidents and those involving vulnerability must be considered at the boroughs daily management meeting and as part of its intelligence process.

39. Examples of where the above processes have been effective are shown in Appendix V.

III. Use of IT systems that help provide a quicker and timelier response to ASB

Initial scoping / identified issues

40. Initial findings included:

• There was no one case management system in place across the MPS
• Individual borough maintained varied approaches to case management. This led to individual boroughs adopting approaches that potentially stored information in poorly accessible formats held locally (Spreadsheets etc).This was highly criticised by the HMIC and was viewed by the MPS as a major risk to individuals/communities due to lank of intelligence / information share
• Whilst a number of forces are looking at integrated command / control and case management systems this area must be considered as part of the more long term CCC futures projects and was not considered as part of the pilot
• Due to data sharing issues there are no systems currently in places that allow easy exchange of non-sanitised data with partner agencies

MPS activity in response to initial scoping

Central activity

41. The MPS identified CRIS as the best fit IT solution for case management of ASB. As a result the CRIS system was adapted to include the 14 national ASB codes and was authorised for use by staff on the four pilot sites. To facilitate use of this system for case management of high risk ASB the central SN team provided written guidance to borough staff supported by PowerPoint training.

42. Guidance to boroughs re-enforced that, where appropriate, intelligence reports should be completed for ASB incidents to maximise information held on MPS systems and assist early identification of ASB issues / trends etc. The central SN team and DOI monitored ASB CRIS entries being recorded to ensure they were relevant, timely and appropriate for case management in line with guidelines. Processes were put in place to allow borough audit and measurement of ASB report levels.

43. Whilst it was recognised that the pilot would not be able to fund any MPS-partner joint IT systems, part of the initial scoping process ensured that boroughs reviewed information sharing protocols with partners to maximise early recognition of issues.

CCC activity

44. During this time no specific changes have been made to the CAD system of the MPS. It should be noted however, that the MPS is currently reviewing it’s systems as part of the ‘CCC futures project’.

45. CCC has ensured that staff have been made aware of minimum call handling standards and CCC have established a quality assurance, monitoring and governance regime in conjunction with the TP performance team (this is in order to improve the quality of CADs and call handling).

Borough activity

46. All four pilot sites adopted the use of CRIS for managing high risk ASB incidents.

47. All four boroughs complied with the centrally produced guidelines to ensure a consistent approach when dealing with ASB issues (irrelevant of initial method of reporting).

48. Boroughs have been monitoring levels and quality of CADs, CRIS’s, intelligence reports and vulnerability assessments etc. to ensure they can build appropriate pictures of ASB issues (thereby supporting early identification of issues and ensuring relevant intervention).

49. Boroughs have worked with local partners to ensure structures are in place to support information exchange at an early stage. As indicated later Harrow has co-located staff to assist with intelligence flow and all four boroughs have provided evidence to support more efficient flow of intelligence. Whilst none of the boroughs have a shared IT systems all boroughs regularly exchange information in a sanitised format and via other mediums such as regular ASB action groups (ASBAGS).

IV. An approach to community engagement that ascertains concerns, priorities and harm at neighbourhood level (including active problem solving and partnership work)

Initial scoping / identified issues

50. Initial findings included:

• Whilst historically the MPS has developed good partnership / community relations the effectiveness in tackling ASB across the MPS varied from borough to borough
• On the pilot sites there was high enthusiasm and drive across police / partners for improvement in information exchange and partnership work though on one BOCU it was felt by police that initially there was greater buy in from non local authority partners such as social landlords
• As previously highlighted police and partners had multiple methods for assessing vulnerability with lack of consistency being apparent
• Across the MPS and pilot sites there was variance in partnership problem solving approaches and wide variance in the presence of joint partner ASBAGs
• It was identified that whilst crime related victims had potential to be surveyed as to their experiences, no specific process existed for ASB

MPS activity in response to initial scoping

Central activity

51. The central SN team re-enforced with boroughs the need for engagement in line with the current SN engagement model. The model is a seven stage process based on:

• Research
• Engagement with community, partners etc.
• Identification of issues relevant to the community
• Investigation and analysis of identified issues
• Presentation of findings to the community and allowing the community to set priorities
• Dealing with the problem (utilising partnership and problem solving approaches)
• Review of activity and feedback to community of outcomes

Whilst explanation of the seven stage model is outside of the scope of this report, a number of methods are available to engage communities. These include face to face meetings (via surgeries, street briefings, public meetings etc.), use of Key Individual Networks (KINS), via IT interphases (SN websites, forums etc.) via social media (including twitter, local press etc.). These, along with research of MPS and other databases (Such as PlanWeb) allows identification of key community issues and setting of priorities (ASB being a regular community priority).

A detailed report in regards to the “MPS Community Engagement Report” was presented to the Communities, Equalities and People Committee on the 5th May 2011. The report summarises the MPS response to the joint MPA / MPS Community Engagement Commitment 2010/2013 and introduced an action plan through which improvement activity can be coordinated and driven during the lifetime of the strategy.

52. The central SN team also instigated quality call back of victims of ASB as discussed in the evaluation section.

53. The MPS public facing website was updated to provide advice to the public in relation to ASB reporting (including use of 999, 101 and local police / partner contacts).

54. The central SN team has re-enforced the need for public feedback on its newsletters and using the ‘you said, we did’ format, provides feedback to communities in relation to issues including ASB. SN teams highlight via their websites current priorities and these often contain ASB related issues. This can be evidenced by the fact that on 1st September 2011 there were 704 ASB related priorities set across the MPS.

CCC activity

55. During this period CCC worked with the Home Office on implementation of the non-emergency 101 number. One facet of this was a public information campaign highlighting when and how this number should be used. This was supported by messages conveyed by SN teams to the communities highlighting the use of 101 but reiterating the importance of using SN direct numbers to speak with police about local issues. As part of the introduction program, CCC are monitoring usage of the 101 number (including volume levels).

Borough activity

56. Throughout this period boroughs have continued to focus on community engagement as per the MPS engagement model. Borough volunteer staff were actively engaged in monthly ‘quality call back’ of victims of ASB where a set of questions were asked concerning their experience when reporting ASB. This will be expanded upon under the evaluation and review section.

Evaluation and Review

57. As a result of on-going work by the ASB steering group, in 2010 the central TP performance unit began a program of CAD audits relating to ASB. The key focus of this audit was to ensure:

• Quality of CADs
• The CADs are allocated an appropriate deployment
• If not designated as requiring an immediate response then the relevant SN team has been made aware of incident
• That the CAD has been appropriately resulted

Where quality assurance issues were identified the unit put in place processes to allow relevant units to take appropriate action to remedy issues. The unit also put in place on-going dialogue to ensure corporate and individual learning to improve quality of CADs. At the commencement of the pilot the team identified that MPS wide only 72% of completed CADs appeared to have been notified to SN teams. The decision was made by the ASB steering group that the performance team would pay particular attention to the four pilot sites during the program. Throughout the pilot there was close liaison between the performance team, CCC and borough points of contact to ensure that teams were made aware of relevant ASB CAD issues. As a result, three of the pilot boroughs have shown performance improvements leading to the relevant SN teams being informed of relevant CADs in 100% of audited reports. This 100% compliance rate compares with the overall MPS average of 55%.

58. Boroughs provided monthly updates to the central SN team outlining numbers of ASB CADs, vulnerability assessments completed (including the number of assessments converting to crime reports) and the number of intelligence reports. As the pilot progressed all boroughs saw an increased number of vulnerability assessments completed and as of a result, increased case management of vulnerability issues. As part of the pilot a requirement was made of boroughs to monitor vulnerability assessments to ensure they were appropriately completed and actioned.

59. Current information suggests that during the life of the project staff on pilot sites completed 1,706 risk assessments. As a result of these assessments 88 CRIS reports for high risk ASB cases were opened and managed. Examples of how high risk ASB has been managed through the pilot are shown under appendix V (Case studies) but in general, under pilot guidelines, case management should have included the following:

• Follow up contact / support from police
• Further background research and analysis
• The incident should have been brought to the attention of the local SN team
• The adoption of a partnership / problem solving approach to the case management
• Discussion at the locally held ASBAG meeting

60. During the pilot DOI monitored CRIS to assess levels of usage and impact on the system. This will ultimately allow the MPS ASB steering group to decide whether to roll out the use of CRIS MPS wide and whether to allow case management of non high risk ASB via CRIS. Existing borough departments (crime management units) were utilised to ensure compliance with ASB CRIS reporting guidelines and all boroughs monitored reports for quality. Records show that:

• Hackney opened 38 Vulnerable ASB CRIS reports
• Lambeth opened 29 Vulnerable ASB CRIS reports
• Harrow opened 9 Vulnerable ASB CRIS reports
• Richmond-Upon-Thames opened 12 Vulnerable ASB CRIS reports

All four boroughs showed a progressive increase in reports opened between March to July 2011.

61. The CRIS IT system supported the case management function outlined with no adverse affect on the current operating ability of the system. It is however, important to note that use of CRIS was restricted purely to the four pilot sites. It was also restricted to use for recording ‘high risk’ ASB cases. These criteria were put in place in order to assess user demand, impact on the system and appropriateness of using CRIS for ASB case management. The use of CRIS must now be assessed by relevant MPS stakeholders to identify:

• whether CRIS should be adopted MPS wide
• Whether CRIS should remain restricted to ‘high risk’ ASB cases or the criteria relaxed
• Whether the current CRIS system is capable of sustaining extra demand or requires adaption and if any cost implications are justifiable
• If adopted MPS wide will existing support functions (e.g. crime reporting units) be able to fully support any roll-out

This review will be coordinated by the ASB steering group over the coming months.

62. The central SN team coordinated a program of quality call back surveys for victims of ASB. This took place on all pilot sites utilising members of the volunteer program. Volunteers were utilised during this process in order to reduce burden on line managers, reduce workloads and aid continuous improvement of service provided. The surveys asked a series of key questions that gauged public opinions in relation to the MPS’s approach to ASB and allow the MPS to learn lessons from public experiences of reporting ASB. The methodology of this survey mirrored that of a survey conducted by HMIC during its 2010 review thereby allowing comparative analysis. Information from the quality call backs were monitored centrally and feedback provided to relevant departments to support service delivery During the pilot 936 victims of ASB were contacted on both pilot and a number of non-pilot ‘control sites’. Within the pilot sites (395 contacts) key findings include:

• Question: ‘Did the police tell you they would be taking action as a result of your call’. This showed an improvement of 16% over the HMIC findings
• Question: ‘How satisfied where you with the element of how seriously was your call taken’. This showed an improvement of 7% over the HMIC findings
• Question: ‘Do you know if police took any action, those who answered yes’. This showed an improvement of 6% over the HMIC findings
• The remaining survey questions provided an improvement in performance of between 1% and 4%
• Question: ‘What the MPS could do better to improve the service for dealing with ASB’. The overwhelming response was that victims should be kept informed of any police action in relation to their call including any outcomes

63. As part of the review of the pilot a number of processes were scheduled by SN performance team. These included:

• Full assessment of the quality call back program on the four pilot sites in comparison to the four control sites
• A number of focus group with MPS staff / officers (including borough and CCC) and volunteers involved with the quality call backs

As a result of the recent public disorder the ongoing quality call backs have temporarily been suspended and the focus groups / assessment have been postponed. These will however, be completed at the earliest opportunity and the findings made available.

64. Satisfaction is not currently part of the performance framework for ASB. However, we are working alongside the Strategic Customer Service team to determine how we can include this via the ASB Steering Group.

Other ASB related issues

Safer Neighbourhood involvement in ASB management

65. Whilst the pilot has identified the need for all units (both operational and support) to be aware of how to deal with ASB issues and the impact they can have, the MPS recognises that a large proportion of ASB related incidents will be dealt with by Neighbourhood teams and views SN teams as key to successful ASB management. Whilst specific investigations may be allocated to non Safer Neighbourhood resources, the SN teams are essential in:

• Investigating ASB issues (where appropriate). Minimum standards dictate expectations that, when on duty, neighbourhood teams will check crime / ASB CRIS, intelligence and CAD for matters relevant to their team (even if they are not identified as investigating units). When incidents are allocated to a neighbourhood officer for investigation / follow up then they should automatically be informed
• Identifying ASB related issues from within their neighbourhoods via public engagement, use of Key Individual Networks (KINS) etc.
• Building public confidence by encouraging and supporting setting of ASB based priorities by community panels
• Linking with community partners / stakeholders in tackling of ASB issues (including the community itself)
• Providing follow up support and reassurance to individuals / communities suffering from ASB related matters
• Utilising problem solving processes not only to tackle existing ASB but in prevention of potential future ASB issues

Intelligence Standards Unit

66. This department is currently reviewing intelligence processes across the MPS. Part of this process has run parallel with the ASB pilot. During this period the above unit has reviewed how intelligence material is managed at borough level. This review is directing the future structure of local intelligence units and will include methods for identifying ASB and vulnerability issues. The analysis and research model for Territorial Policing is by definition ‘problem focused’. It seeks to identify crime and disorder issues that pose the greatest risk or potential risk to the community by scoping a wide breadth of data sources. As with reported crime, recorded ASB data and intelligence will be one of the many sets of data that will be scanned on a day to day basis by local analysis and research teams. This will be done initially to compile the borough crime picture and secondly to identify and changes in it or emerging risks to the community. The borough crime picture is made up of a series of category B long term persistent problems - those that have the greatest impact upon crime and disorder in a given area. This will and can include ASB hotspots, problem estates and problem families amongst other potential causes of ASB. Once the problem has been determined it will then be monitored daily to chart how the patterns in disorder change.

The “MASH” (Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs) project

67. A report on MASH was presented to the MPA Communities, Equalities and People Committee on 7th July 2011.

68. Whilst the pilot and MASH project groups are distinct teams within the MPS there has been close liaison throughout the ASB pilot as both are looking at identifying risk and vulnerability at an early stage. MASH will provide three key outcomes:

• Informed risk based decisions for safeguarding vulnerable people
• Identification of harm to individuals
• Enhanced partnership strategic assessment and problem solving

69. By collating all notifications of concern into one point, where it can be researched and assessed against the breadth of information held by the partnership, a full information and risk picture can be established. For instance, the vulnerability and risk to an individual may seem low when it is assessed against a picture of one reported crime of ASB. When that picture is enhanced by repeated reports to other partners, such as housing and health, the risk may increase. By identifying that risk, MASH allows the partnership to better identify where to place their resources to intervene in the most effective manner. With the MASH in place, wider research on the causes of ASB in communities is possible, allowing the partnership to tailor their interventions to effectively problem solve those causes. Whilst MASH is initially child-based, it will develop to include notifications on vulnerable adults. Even without adult notifications, it will highlight ASB. We know that domestic violence by adults is a significant factor in the vulnerability of children - it is a factor in 80% of open cases on children in some boroughs. It would be fair to assume that ASB will be an equally significant factor. Consequently it will be visible within MASH.

Non-emergency 101 number

70. The MPS has recently introduced the new 101 non-emergency number and is currently promoting this across London. While ASB callers are still encouraged to contact local SN teams directly (in non-emergency situations) the 101 number provides the public with another method of contacting the police in relation to ASB issues.

Public facing crime maps

71. During the period of the pilot (though not directed by the pilot) the MPS public facing crime mapping website was adapted to include information relating to ASB.

Harrow Joint Analytical Group

72. The Joint Analytical Group (JAG) consists of analysts from across partnership organisations within the borough and includes police, health and the Local Authority analysts. The group is looking to widen its structure further, to include for example, Trading Standards, London Fire Brigade etc. The group is co-located in a dedicated room at the Council offices containing secure local authority and police systems. This allows more timely and dynamic sharing of information and data in line with the local Information Sharing Agreements. The group produces joint analytical products, overlaying and interpreting various sources of data and providing recommendations to key stakeholders (including 'repeats' data from partners). As well as ad-hoc sharing of information, the group sits monthly to share information, identify risks / vulnerability within the community, problem solve issues relevant to the groups remit and task appropriate activity.

73. Whilst the Harrow Joint Analytical Group was not specifically part of the ASB pilot (having been set up prior to commencement of the field trials) its structure has fully supported the local management of ASB throughout the pilot. The structure has assisted in providing timely and coordinated activity between police and partners.

Victim Codes of Practice (VCOP)

74. An overall VCOP paper was submitted to the MPA in September 2011 though the ASB pilot will have no undue bearing on the MPS approach to victim support and follow up.

75. Throughout the pilot, the four MPS sites have put in place minimum standards for contact with victims of ASB following initial contact. All ASB victims / callers should receive follow up contact with police though the type / level of follow up will be dependant on the incident and circumstances relating to the incident (e.g. victim/community vulnerability, repeat nature of incident etc will impact on levels of support provided).

76. Under pilot guidelines only high risk / vulnerable ASB incidents are currently case managed through the MPS CRIS. (This is to be reviewed as part of the post-pilot process via the ASB steering group) and victims of these crimes receive ongoing visits as part of investigation. Where the ASB reported is underpinned by an identified crime then VCOP fully applies and is subject to full victim support criteria.

77. As previously stated, following the Home Office trials the MPS will be looking at methods for ensuring victim support can be appropriately applied to all ASB issues and this will be a key area for development through the MPS steering group.

ASB performance management

78. The year 2011 / 2012 will be used as a benchmark for measurement of ASB levels within MPS. The pilot has developed processes that allow a more accurate measurement of ASB levels being dealt with by the MPS. The MPS, via the ASB steering group, will need to identify which aspects of these processes should be utilised MPS wide in order to provide a clear picture of ASB issues.

79. Area Commanders currently hold borough senior management teams (SMT) to account via a quarterly KPRM. As of 2011 ASB has been introduced to this process and areas monitored include the number of ASB incidents reports on CAD and data relating ASB ‘repeat’ callers.

80. As previously eluded to, the PIB department currently produces weekly data relating to ‘repeat’ ASB callers. This data can be utilised at both borough and central level and as well as being used operationally it can inform performance management frameworks.

81. Following the recent review of SN, the central SN team are formulating guidance for performance management at local, central and senior management level and a key element of these frameworks will be ASB and ASB management.

82. The BCS and PAS will continue to feature as key elements of any future performance management frameworks.

Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBO)

83. During the period of the trials internal guidance in relation to ASBO management has been fully reviewed. This has resulted in completion of a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and associated Equalities Impact Assessment (EIA). These documents currently await policy clearing before sign off by MPS managers prior to full circulation to staff.

84. Following both internal and external consultation the MPS provided valuable input into the 2011 Home Office review of ASB powers and procedures. A number of key points raised by the MPS underpinned the final ‘national’ police response to the Home Office.

ASB platforms

85. During 2011 a number of processes have continued or have been implemented to improve staff understanding of ASB issues. These include:

• Review of the internal MPS SN intranet site including sections for advice and guidance
• Formation of an internal MPS ‘Special Interest Group’ (SIG). This is a web based forum which allows staff to exchange good practice
• A number of key individuals within the pilot structure are members of a National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) SIG (known as the Police Online Knowledge Area – POLKA). This is a web based platform for sharing of information and good practice. Information from this site is cascaded to boroughs where appropriate
• Whilst the afore mentioned site is a closed site purely for pilot members POLKA also hosts a forum for open discussion in relation to ASB for all members of the police service
• The MPS has continued to host and play an active part in ASB forums and manager groups (external) for exchange of good practice

C. Other organisational and community implications

Equality and Diversity Impact

1. The key element underpinning the MPS approach to ASB management is the identification and support of repeat and/or vulnerable individuals / communities.

2. Elements of this report highlight the importance of continuing to capture and understand the experiences of as many service users and different communities as possible. This will help assess factors that can help identify those most vulnerable to ASB within our communities.

3. Our ambition should be to ensure that we maintain a high standard of customer service principles and that improvement is seen and felt by Londoners, particularly when examining the different satisfaction rates between white and BME customers. At this stage this is not a formal part of the ASB agenda but is being assessed as part of the review of the Home Office ASB field trials (for example the quality call back process has started to collate data relating to any BME satisfaction gap).

4. Activity towards ASB management is consistent with the expectations of the MPS “Diversity and Equality Strategy” (2009 / 2013) specifically theme one, 'Fair and Responsive Services'. The expectations are that we:

• Ensure we are delivering services that are accessible and responsive to peoples needs
• Ensure we are treating people fairly and with respect

5. The MPA and MPS “Community Engagement Commitment” (2010 / 2013) contain a commitment to monitor broadly similar themes, namely:

• Increased public confidence in the police
• A wider range of people taking part in MPA and MPS community engagement
• We can constantly strive for improved public confidence by demonstrating we are on the side of communities, to fight crime, reduce criminality and tackle quality of life issue to make our communities safer, and to deliver the best possible value for money by involving people in priority setting and active citizenship

6. No specific equality risks were identified during the pilot but if any good practice / guidelines identified / developed during the pilot are adopted MPS wide then an equalities impact assessment must be considered and are required as part of any completion of MPS SOPs.

Met Forward implications

7. MPS efforts to refine their work in relation to ASB support a strategic objective of the Policing London Business Plan and Met Streets. As previously stated the MPS pilot assessment report is to be submitted to the Home Office by 30th September 2011. Commander CCS will be attending a meeting with the policing minister on 18th October 2011 along with representatives from the other seven pilot forces to discuss the pilot outcomes. Following this the MPS ASB steering group will meet to discuss:

• Lessons learnt from the pilot
• How and in what format to implement good practice / trialed processes MPS wide
• Future ASB challenges for the MPS

Financial implications

8. At this time there are no financial implications arising from the report or the Home Office pilot at this time.

Legal implications

9. There are no legal implications arising from this report which is presented for information only.

Environmental implications

10. At this time there are no environmental implications arising from the report or the Home Office pilot at this time.

D. Background papers

None

E. Contact details

Report author: Inspector Neil Allen and Mike Drury (Safer Neighbourhoods Unit - Crime & Customer Strategy Command) and A/Supt Gary Fryer, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendices

• Appendix 1: Initial CCC ASB screening questions/prompt

• Appendix 2: Examples of borough good practice

• Appendix 3: National/MPS vulnerability assessment/matrix

• Appendix 4: Quality call back questionnaire

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