Meeting borough workforce targets

Report: 6
Date: 21 October 2002
By: Commissioner

Summary

At the full Authority meeting held on 26 September 2002, concern was expressed that the full Budgeted Workforce Target [BWT] would not be achieved by 31 March 2003. The Full Authority sought further information on how this position might be rectified. This paper spells out the options.

A. Recommendations

That the Committee consider the options outlined.

B. Supporting information

1. The prospective date for the achievement of the 2002/3 Resource Allocation Formula [RAF] allocation by 7 July 2003 has caused understandable concern. In effect, the current position is that the borough BWT of 17,904 will be achieved by 31 March 2003 but, on this date, approximately 1200 officers will still be in training and will not be posted to boroughs until 7 July 2003. The effect of this is that on 31 March 2003, as things stand, the actual strength on boroughs will be 716 short of the BWT, albeit that the shortfall is covered by those still in training. Since the Full Authority meeting, further review of the growth plan and consequent deferral into next year of some components of the additional 1,000 officers, together with other minor adjustments, has had the effect of reducing the shortfall strength [by 317] to 399 on boroughs at 31 March 2003.

2. It is acknowledged that this position may not have been fully explained to, or understood by members. This was not intended and is regretted; rather it is to do with the fact that the additional recruitment generated by the extra 1000 officers plus Counter-terrorism growth has generated very different recruitment, posting and training demands and volumes from previous years. Although we are on schedule to achieve the total recruiting target, the reality is that even with the introduction of shift times at Hendon, further increased volume cannot be processed through the Training School more quickly. Indeed, it is a fact that the next training intake [on 28 October 2002] will be the last session to post out before 31 March 2003. Other intakes scheduled for December 2002, January 2003, February 2003 and March 2003 will not pass out until April – July 2003.

3. In these circumstances, options for achieving BWTs in full by 31 March 2003 involve either returning officers who have moved to specialist and non-borough units back to boroughs or delaying transfers scheduled to occur between now and the financial year-end. Both carry serious operational and financial consequences.

4. In brief detail, the options appear to be :

1. Bring forward intakes so as to increase the posting of officers by 31 March 2003.
2. Delay some or all transfers from boroughs to all non-borough units with immediate effect for periods of between 2-6 months.
3. Return officers that have been posted to non-borough units back to boroughs.
4. Bring forward and accelerate a programme of transferees and slow down the replacement of leavers in all commands, save for boroughs, Murder Units, Trident [which will not fall below 09/02 strength] and Child Protection.
5. Take no further action – in effect the position reported to the Full Authority on 26 September 2002.

5. To comment on these options, [1] is impractical. Physical training and residential accommodation do not exist to support this option. Neither can the additional trainers that would be required in order to achieve this solution be recruited in time for it to be viable. Both [2] and [3] carry serious operational and financial consequences. Dependent on the success of external specialist advertising campaigns, a number of posts would be left unfilled including up to 197 posts Counter-terrorism, 102 Transport OCU, 101 Training School and up to 300 other non-borough natural transfer posts [above current vacancies]. Both [2] and [3] conflict with operational and financial commitments made to the Home Office in terms of Counter-terrorism initiatives and the Mayor in terms of Transport OCU and bear serious operational implications that can be discussed in more detail at the meeting.

6. As an alternative and during our consideration, another option [4] has been developed involving a mix of increased transferee intake and increased vacancy levels. This option has potential for further development and whilst difficult to achieve, stands the most prospect of at least part, if not full success. The intention is to present this in more detail during the meeting.

7. This Committee’s views are sought on the way forward. Certainly, it is our view that option [1] is non-achievable. In turn, options [2] and [3] are difficult and altogether less attractive than [4] which has, at least, some prospect of success.

C. Equality and diversity implications

Achieving a balance in our workforce is one of our current most challenging priorities. The need to ensure a balance in our workforce numbers – and workforce composition – are activities that are closely monitored, in terms of experience, ethnicity and gender. Whilst this report is not primarily about these issues, we are keen to ensure that our workforce planning systems reflect our aims in achieving and maintaining a balance in the workforce.

D. Financial implications

The selection of Options [1], [2], or [3] carries serious financial implications. Options [2] and [3] both bear potential financial penalties. Option [4] does not, on the face of it, carry financial implications that cannot be contained within existing budgets.

E. Background papers

• The Mayor’s Draft London Ambient Noise Strategy

F. Contact details

Report author: Martin Tiplady, MPS.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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