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Report 4 of the 6 December 2007 meeting of the Co-ordination and Policing Committee asking for approve of the terms of reference for the Stockwell scrutiny.

Warning: This is archived material and may be out of date. The Metropolitan Police Authority has been replaced by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC).

See the MOPC website for further information.

Stockwell scrutiny

Report: 4
Date: 6 December 2007
By: Chief Executive

Summary

The Committee is asked to consider and approve the terms of reference for the Stockwell scrutiny to be led by the Chair of the Authority, and to confirm the members who will participate.

A. Recommendations

That

1. the terms of reference for the Stockwell scrutiny, as set out in Appendix 1, be approved subject to any amendments agreed by the Committee; and

2. the members who will participate in the scrutiny be confirmed.

B. Supporting information

1. Following the debate at full Authority on 22 November, draft terms of reference appear below for the Stockwell scrutiny to be led by the Chair of the Authority.  The committee is asked to consider them and approve them subject to any changes agreed in discussion.

2. The committee is also asked to confirm the members who will participate.

C. Race and equality impact

The scrutiny will address issues relating to community relations.

D. Financial implications

There are no direct Financial Implications of the scrutiny itself.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: David Riddle

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

 

G. Appendix 1

DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE
MPA SCRUTINY OF THE RESPONSE BY THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE AND THE METROPOLITAN POLICE AUTHORITY TO THE IPCC REPORTS ON STOCKWELL (1, 1B AND 2)

The Scrutiny will be led by the Chairman of the Authority assisted by other MPA members (membership to be decided).

It will be conducted during January 2008 with a view to a report of the Scrutiny being presented to the full Authority meeting in February 2008.

A. To scrutinise and report comprehensively to the full Authority and the people of London on:

1. the response by the MPS and the MPA to the Stockwell IPCC Reports 1, 1b and 2;

2. the extent to which the recommendations made by the IPCC have been accepted and implemented;

3. how lessons learnt from the fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell on 22 July 2005 and the subsequent handling of information have been incorporated into procedures, practices and command structures by the Metropolitan Police Service and other agencies;

4. what changes, if any, are needed in relation to the MPA’s practices for oversight of major critical incidents and their aftermath, including the MPA’s role in public information and communications;

5. what further action is needed, by the MPS, the MPA or other agencies to secure sustainable changes in policy and practice.

B. To make recommendations as it considers necessary to the MPA, the MPS and other agencies.

Notes

1. Pending decisions by the IPCC in relation to allegations of misconduct against DAC Cressida Dick and other MPS officers (Stockwell 1) and AC Hayman (Stockwell 2) those matters must be regarded as sub judice and the Scrutiny cannot include consideration of the misconduct allegations nor can it make any findings or recommendations that might compromise or prejudice consideration of the disciplinary issues by IPCC or MPA or by any subsequent disciplinary tribunal.

2. The MPS will make available to the Scrutiny all necessary documentation held by MPS, and the Scrutiny will consider as necessary the transcripts of the evidence given to the Health and Safety trial.

3. The Scrutiny will seek submissions from and dialogue with relevant MPS Management Board members, HMIC, ACPO, the IPCC, and other agencies as appears relevant to the scope of the Scrutiny.

4. Without limiting the scope of the scrutiny, it is currently envisaged that the scope will include inter alia:

  • A definitive timeline of events from 4.00 am on Friday 22 July until the time when it was publicly confirmed that an innocent man had been shot.
  • Analysis of the 19 failings by MPS alleged by the prosecution in the HASW trial.
  • An account of the processes and the complexities involved in establishing the identity of a victim of homicide or other causes of death
  • The operating procedures and protocols of the MPS Knowledge Management Centre,
  • A full description of the roles and responsibilities of the MPS Management Board members and other relevant designated officers in a critical incident operation (gold, silver, bronze), and the evidence that these are clearly delineated and understood
  • Assessment of the protocol agreed between the MPS and the IPCC in respect of the control of scenes of crime where the interests of the IPCC investigators and the MPS investigating officers may potentially diverge
  • Assessment of the protocol agreed between the MPS and the IPCC in respect of the release of information following an incident where the IPCC is leading an investigation, drawing on the experience of Forest Gate as well as of Stockwell 2
  • A review of post incident procedures relating to writing up of officers’ logs and accounts.
  • The operation of the “Salmon” process during Stockwell 2 and lessons to be learned in future cases.
  • The Authority’s own processes and procedures for briefing and informing members on critical incidents.
  • An update on the refinements to Operation Kratos introduced to the national policy since July 2005, and the status of contingency planning for a wide range of terrorist scenarios [Note: derives from motion agreed at full authority on 22 November 2007]
  • Assessment of the operational implications of the trial verdict and of the case for a change in the law relating to the use of HASW Act in relation to police operations.
  • Review of the MPS framework for managing risk in relation to policing operations in response to the Stockwell verdict. [Note: derives from motion agreed at full authority on 22 November]
  • Whether racial profiling was used by the MPS in relation to Stockwell.
  • Practices and protocols in use in MPS for instructing Counsel on areas to pursue and not to pursue, particularly regarding the character of witnesses or claimants.
  • Development of a community engagement strategy for public reassurance pre and post the inquest into the death of Jean Charles De Menezes.

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