MPS response to IPCC recommendations on Forest Gate

Report: 3
Date: 10 January 2008
By: Assistant Commissioner Operational Services on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

To provide an update on how the MPS is progressing the five recommendations arising from the IPCC Forest Gate 2 and 3 report. It includes

• Nominated leads for each recommendation
• Current progression
• Timeframes for further progression

A. Recommendations

That Members note the report.

B. Supporting information

1. There are two reports relating to the IPCC Forest Gate 2 and 3 investigation. The first report was written by IPCC Senior Investigator (SIO) containing 14 recommendations and the second by IPCC Commissioner Deborah Glass, which was publicly circulated as a summary of the main report, and contains five recommendations.

2. The recommendations in SIO’s report include MPS staff issues and are being progressed through the relevant leads.

3. This report is to provide an update as to the MPS response to the IPCC report by Deborah Glass.

4. Commander Stewart (July Review Group) is responsible for ensuring that the relevant leads progress the recommendations within the stipulated time frame.

Recommendation 1

5. Counter-terrorist operations should plan for the failure of intelligence, including making much better provision for innocent people who are likely to be caught up in an operation.

6. The lead for this recommendation is Deputy Assistant Commissioner Dick (Specialist Operations).

7. There are currently in existence standard operating procedures (SOPs) within SO15 for counter terrorism operations.

8. These standard operating procedures are subject to a comprehensive review by SO15 and CO11 (Public Order Planning)

9. This review takes into account the issues arising from the IPCC Forest Gate report with particular emphasis on contingency planning when engaged in converting intelligence into executive action.

10. The objective of the review is to produce an updated Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), which will instruct SO15 on planning for CT operations within a framework encompassing the key areas of:

• Community Impact Assessments
• Equality Impact Assessment
• Human Rights
• Risk Assessment
• Legal obligations / powers (with special attention to PACE codes: A [Stop & search]; B [Seizure & search] and C [Detention, Treatment, etc].
• Methodology (including contingencies)

11. The review will provide an SOP that balances the requirement for operational activity based on intelligence with sound methodology and contingencies.

12. Meetings will take place in the next few weeks to agree the review and adopt the SOP as practice within the Command.

13. Once published, it will be promulgated through the Investigation Support Unit. The SOP will remain under review.

14. Progress will be reviewed on 1 February 2008.

Recommendation 2

15. The MPS should publicly explain the process by which they evaluate and act on intelligence, to respond to some public perceptions that it can be misused.

16. The lead for this recommendation is Commander Kerr (MIB).

17. Following consultation with stakeholder groups, an explanatory flowchart for the process of turning intelligence/information into executive action has been designed. The flowchart aims to provide as much detail as possible without compromising any sensitive methodology. The flowchart seeks to identify the number of points along the process where intelligence is subject to assessment and independent scrutiny, and where decisions to take executive action are subject to legal authority and judicial interventions. The chart also seeks to illustrate the risk assessment processes that are applied to executive action and to show the review and learning process that follows operational activity. Whilst the primary chart [Appendix 1] is necessarily thorough, and therefore somewhat complex, a simpler version has been produced to suit the nature and level of individual briefings [appendix 2]

18. Meetings will take place soon with the ACPO lead (Cmdr Kerr) to agree a proposal for use of the flowchart and accompanying commentary. At this stage it is not considered practical to plan a “public launch” type approach, but it is rather seen as a document that would be presented to key external stakeholder groups as part of ongoing consultation/communication (e.g. IAGs). It is also felt that the use of the documentation in specific operations should be considered as part of the planning and impact assessment processes. The flowchart is designed in such a way that, with appropriate caveats, will allow it to be used in relation to all levels of operational activity and can cater for both fast-time and pre-planned operations.

19. Consideration will be given to the disclosure implications of the documentation and also the potential to introduce it into training packages for relevant command courses.

20. It should be noted that the response to the recommendation would not support any suggestion that the detail of actual intelligence received will be disclosed as part of this work. The purpose is to articulate the process of checks and balances through which intelligence passes before it leads to executive action.

21. Progress will be reviewed on 1 February 2008

Recommendation 3

22. Consideration should be given to having “POLICE” shown much more prominently on [firearms] officers’ clothing.

23. The lead for this recommendation is Commander Kaye (C0).

24. CO19 have undertaken a comprehensive review of armed police visibility and recognition, both overt and covert to specifically address the concerns raised in the IPCC report. It closely examines how armed officers could be more readily identified, and thereby make operations safer for the public, officers and subjects. [Appendix 3]

25. This review included consultation between the 10 armed commands within the MPS and the newly formed 'Armed Policing Reference Group' (a body of opinion formers drawn from London's communities), Health and Safety Branch and the MPS Clothing Board. The review makes recommendations and the draft report awaits ratification by the Firearms Policy and Strategy Group.

26. All 10 armed commands are represented through the Firearms Policy and Strategy Group, including the training wing.

27. Once the report is published, it will be promulgated through the firearms training wing. The MPS Firearms Policy Unit has a role in oversight and inspection within the MPS.

28. Progress will be reviewed on 1 February 2008.

Recommendation 4

29. Considering upgrading or relocating the cell block in Paddington Green Police Station to improve it for longer term detention.

30. The lead for this recommendation is Assistant Commissioner Godwin (TP).

31. Paddington Green Custody Facilities, which were last refurbished in 1999, are currently used for medium term detention of C-T suspects. In addition to the IPCC, concerns have been raised in respect of the use of these facilities for detention in excess of 14 days by the British Medical Association, Lord Carlisle and Home Office Joint Committee on Human Rights.

32. It has not proved possible over the last two years to develop a feasible and affordable scheme for either:

• The redevelopment of the Paddington Green Custody Suite; or
• The development of a purpose-built facility on another site.

33. Upgrading the Paddington Green facility is not a feasible option. Issues hindering the pursuit of a new purpose-built facility include:

• The time required to deliver such a facility (3 years + from MPA approval).
• Lack of clarity as to whether the facility is to be a national or regional resource.
• The likely capital and revenue cost of the scheme and the potential impact on the MPA/MPS finances (capital £30m + revenue £3m a year).
• The high level of security and resilience required
• Town Planning considerations
• That there is no Home Office guidance on the specification standards of such a facility.

34. In order to make progress on this issue, an approach has been made to the Ministry of Justice for the provision of the required high security facilities on the current prison estate. This will have the advantage of utilising the high security standards of the site with the procurement and construction frameworks already in place.

35. The arrangement being negotiated is also likely to involve a reciprocal arrangement whereby the Prison Service would be provided with alternative facilities within existing MPS sites as a contingency and may result in a number of cells being made available to the Prison Service. Options are being considered to minimise the impact of such arrangements on policing. This may have financial implications which are forming part of the negotiations with the Prison Service.

36. The MPA have been aware of these negotiations.

37. In the interim, improvements have been made at Paddington police station which specifically address the concerns and recommendations arising from Simon Cousin’s report.

38. Progress will be reviewed on 1 February 2008.

Recommendation 5

39. The MPS should publicly apologise to the two families affected by the raid.

40. The MPS has apologised on a number of occasions for the inconvenience and disruption caused by the raid.

41. At the time of writing of this report, mediation between the two families and the MPS is due to begin in seven days. The issue of a further apology is being considered as part of the mediation package.

C. Race and equality impact

1. It is acknowledged that this operation did have a very significant impact on community relations, both locally and in the wider Muslim community. Although considerable work continues with community representatives to address concerns, the IPCC report has identified a number of areas where more transparency and subsequent treatment of those involved, particularly those who are not suspects, would mitigate against a feeling of resentment and suspicion. These include the clarity of the intelligence handling processes and planning for proactive operations, in particular post operation care.

2. All of these recommendations have been accepted by the MPS and this report provides an outline of the progress made.

D. Financial implications

1. The immediate solution to recommendation 4, a reciprocal arrangement with the Ministry of Justice, is being pursued with the anticipation of being cost neutral. However, if new bespoke custody facilities are needed the cost has been estimated at capital £30 million, revenue £3 million a year.

2. At time of completing this report mediation with the families involved had not been undertaken, however, there are likely to be financial implications as a result of this.

E. Background papers

IPCC Forest Gate 2 and 3 Report by Deborah Glass

F. Contact details

Report author: Inspector Jeremy Wilson - July Review Group, MPS

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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