The accountability and effectiveness of Gold Groups

Report: 8
Date: 5 June 2008
By: Deputy Assistant Commissioner Territorial Policing on behalf of the Commissioner.

Summary

This report informs members of the background, development and business benefits of Gold Groups operating within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and highlights the accountability and effectiveness of such groups.

A. Recommendations

That the MPA continue to support the operation of Gold Groups within the MPS.

B. Supporting information

1. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) currently defines a Gold Group as “a strategic forum designed to add value to the response to an internal or external Critical Incident. This is achieved by bringing together appropriately skilled or qualified stakeholders who can inform the effective and successful management of the incident”. Its central aim is to consider the needs of the victim, family, community, the investigation and the vulnerability to the MPS.

2. In addition, the MPS currently defines a Critical Incident as ‘any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community’.

3. The concepts of Critical Incidents and Gold Groups were developed as a consequence of issues and recommendations that arose from the tragic racist murder of the late Mr Stephen Lawrence and the public inquiry that followed.

4. The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry concluded that proper direction, organisation, co-ordination and accountability were lacking in the police response to Mr Stephen Lawrence’s murder.

5. The Inquiry also provided constructive comment that there should be recognition of the community concerns and confidence when police respond and manage an incident. In addition, they recommended that there should be Openness, Accountability and the Restoration of Confidence. This recommendation lies at the heart of, and is the principal foundation on which the MPS has developed its guidance in relation to critical incident management, gold groups and the development of a critical incident manual and training.

6. The concept of gold groups was developed to assist in the effective management of critical incidents. Upon introducing the concept of critical incidents and gold groups into MPS systems and processes and quality assuring such procedures, it was identified that many critical incidents (both internal and external) frequently involved trust and confidence matters. Such matters often require a co-ordinated senior police management intervention to ensure proportionate and effective control measures are introduced, resourced and actioned with additional supportive review processes.

7. Gold groups have, utilised since 2000, been used to successfully manage a diverse range of critical, serious and major incidents impacting on all of the MPS Business Groups.

8. The term gold group and the general guidance were initially described within the first critical incident manual published in 2000. This manual, which is now on Version VII, is managed by Territorial Policing (TP) Violent Crime Directorate (VCD).

9. The current manual, which was published in July 2007, is the only formal corporate guidance for gold groups within the MPS. There are no additional policies or mandatory procedures for gold group management at this time. However, it is recognised that the adoption of this way of working and its integration into business practices means there are local borough practices across the MPS e.g. within murder enquiries there is specific advice around gold groups attendees, agenda content etc, which is similar to the advice provided in the critical incident manual (available to members on request).

10. A number of recent MPS policies and procedures have incorporated the use of Gold Groups in their Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), for the effective management of incidents. These include Threats to Life and Missing Person SOPs.

Gold Group identification and attendees

11. The requirement for a Gold Group is usually identified by a chief officer (Association of Chief Police Officer [ACPO] rank or grade), the Operational Command Unit (OCU) commander or a member of her/his senior management team. In addition, the requirement for gold groups is also identified by MPS departments and directorates that perform review functions pertaining to specialist disciplines e.g. VCD in relation to public protection matters. In the majority of circumstances, it will be the borough commander and/or her/his senior representative who identifies the need for a gold group.

12. The MPS recognises the importance and benefits of gold groups. However, it is also recognised that such groups must have a clear sense of purpose in order to be effective and add value.

13. The key questions in identifying if a gold group is needed are:

• What is the rationale for setting up the gold group?
• What value will it provide in managing the various facets of the critical incident e.g. victim/community trust and confidence, community reassurance etc?
• Can the gold commander and senior investigating officer successfully manage the incident without this support?

14. If it is decided that a gold group is required then clear terms of reference for the meeting and membership of the group (determined by the nature and profile of the incident) must be established by the chair.

15. In terms of membership, existing guidelines state that the following personnel should be considered for attendance when first creating a group. This list is not exhaustive nor compulsory and it is advised that membership of the group could alter as the nature and complexity of the incident being managed changes. That said, it is recommended that a core membership remains until the critical incident has concluded.

• Appropriate lead officer ACPO
• Senior Investigating Officer (SIO)
• Investigating Officer (IO)
• Senior Identification Manager (SIM)
• Independent Advisor(s)
• Local Borough Commander
• Family Liaison Co-ordinator
• Family Liaison Officer
• Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS
• Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)
• Staff Support Associations
• Faith Leaders
• Voluntary Organisations
• Press Officer
• Critical Incident Advisor
• Solicitors Department
• Health Service Representatives
• Family Liaison Advisor
• Unions/Federation
• Crime and Disorder Reduction Partners (CDRP)
• Local Authorities
• Non governmental Organisations
• Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA)

16. In addition to the above, it is recommended that attendees at such meetings either have the authority to take forward requests or changes or bring particular specialist knowledge to the meeting. All the participants should be in a position to add value to the process.

What does a Gold Group do?

17. A gold group is implemented to:

• Bring together informed stakeholders to ensure there is an effective, meaningful and joint approach to identify and manage risks (actual and perceived);
• Provide effective communication;
• Provide leadership and direction;
• Challenge mindsets;
• Access independent and expert advice;
• Review investigative strategies;
• Review the level of resources allocated to an investigation;
• Review the community concern (impact) assessment of the incident; and
• Review the critical incident management strategies and the accompanying control measures.

18. The main subjects discussed in a gold group are:

• Terms of reference;
• Factual update;
• SIO update (investigative progress);
• Review of decision-making;
• Family concerns;
• Other planned events e.g. court appearances, funerals etc
• Community concerns;
• Community concern (impact) assessment review;
• Resources;
• Issues of disclosure;
• Media strategy; and
• Legal advice.

19. It is essential that there is an accurate documented account of the gold group’s business, which is communicated to the membership on a timely basis to check for accuracy and to discharge actions. This is particularly important as the events relating to critical incidents may be aired in public inquiries, criminal and/or civil proceedings. The MPS and its strategic leaders should be in a position to confidently represent the MPS position and provide, where necessary, the rationale for its actions.

20. There will come a time when the investigation or incident being managed will come to a natural or managed conclusion, whereby the gold group lead determines that the level and breadth of strategic support is no longer necessary and that the incident may be managed using day-to-day structures such as the borough or senior management team daily management meeting (DMM).

Gold group accountability

21. The existing MPS gold group guidance has clear accountability contained within it. This accountability begins from the initial analysis of why a group is required, determining terms of reference to manage the incident (which may change as time passes), up to the responsibilities of the police under common law, Human Rights Act, Health and Safety legislation, duty of care, policing objectives et al.

22. Accountability is further re-enforced within the management structures that exist to implement/authorise the development of such groups. Where an OCU commander leads a gold group, she/he is accountable to the representatives (internal/external to the MPS) at the meeting, the local community, victim and family. In addition, the OCU commander or gold group lead is accountable to the link commander for their OCU and ultimately to the Assistant Commissioner leading their business area.

23. With the ACPO lead, the accountability is again transparent. Essentially chief officers will lead group groups which impact on the area of business for which they already have accountability unless it is otherwise agreed to transfer responsibility to another chief officer. The question must always be posed: Who is best placed to lead the Gold Group?

24. This is demonstrated most clearly within TP, where there is already a robust, internal tried and tested accountability system. The DAC TP maintains a risk register of all high-risk gold groups currently being managed by TP ACPO Officers. There is a monthly (or more frequent as required) documented meeting chaired by the DAC to review all current high risk gold groups, risk assess and record decisions regarding the groups’ status. The DAC assesses the affect on the wider community, affected communities and the MPS, whilst considering anticipated key dates, anniversaries and predictive events. This allows additional support to be offered to the ACPO officers managing the incident, while making clear the accountability they have in effectively managing incidents. The relevant TP ACPO officers provide meaningful updates of the group’s progress that they lead prior to this monthly risk assessment meeting-taking place.

25. In addition to the above, the DAC’s review process has a positive impact on the manner in which the gold groups are monitored, whilst ensuring the needs of the people involved and/or affected by the incident are being consistently considered and addressed.

26. Accountability has also been clearly defined within other MPS business groups. For example the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) monitor gold groups operating within their area of business. At the MPA EODB in October 2005, the senior DPS representative set out specifically how gold groups would operate, the accountability level and adherence to the then Deputy Commissioner’s Command (DCC) Risk Management System.

27. Suffice to say, DPS appoint membership according to accountability, discipline knowledge and skills. That said, representatives of complainants, persons subject to the investigation or any other involved parties will not be invited to join a gold group.

28. Although there have been hundreds of gold groups across the MPS since its inception in 2000, there has not been a known recorded issue where the accountability of a gold group has been brought into question either within or outside the MPS.

29. As a further check and balance high risk gold groups are further reviewed by senior ACPO staff at the MPS Diamond Group, which meets monthly.

Training

30. Training is being provided by the MPS Crime and Leadership Academies to reinforce the awareness and accountability of managers who may be required to lead, attend or are otherwise required to manage or oversee a gold group. Training has been in place since 2003 for officers of chief inspector rank and above, and inspectors as part of their promotion and development training, such as Strategic Firearms, Firearms Incident Commanders, Senior Investigator and Critical Incident courses.

31. In addition, courses for chief inspectors and above, there are regular development courses and training packages provided by the Leadership Academy and the National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) where gold groups and decision making form the principal foundation of the training exercises.

32. Training for police officers and staff around Gold Groups has been targeted specifically at inspectors and above. This is to ensure those staff making strategic decisions at a critical incident, are aware of what needs to be considered and actioned.

33. For inspectors, the gold group training is part of the Duty Officer Critical Incident Training (DOCIT) course. This utilises Hydra to support learning outcomes. Hydra is a syndicate based command simulation system used to train police officers in the tactical and strategic management of both large-scale critical incidents and major crime investigations such as rape and murder. It allows command officers who would typically be responsible for managing large teams at such incidents to work as a gold group in a safe training environment where they can share best practice and exercise their command skills.

34. The DOCIT offers an opportunity for senior staff to demonstrate the value of gold groups and allows the decision-making processes within these groups to be seen. Inspectors are able to gather valuable experience in how incidents should be responded to and decisions recorded to support the strategic aims necessary to effectively respond to an incident. This is replicated within the Initial Firearms Command Training (IFCAT) course that uses the same principle of training but concentrates on firearms incidents.

35. Senior officers attending the Senior Officers Critical Incident Training (SOCIT) course also use the Hydra system, but the expectations, training and learning is directed purely towards strategic decision-making. The gold group system is used to provide key learning points and demonstrate methods to improve the way decisions and strategies are recorded and the efficiency of the group improved. All of the courses provide an opportunity for recent good practice from gold groups to be highlighted during the training.

36. Since 2005, the MPS has provided awareness training to BOCU Independent Advisory Group (IAG) members about gold group and critical incident management matters and their prospective roles. Essentially this training is designed to heighten their awareness of such matters to inform their thinking and their input.

37. For example, in relation to the above the MPS co-hosted a LGBT critical incident conference in 2006, which brought together local critical incident contacts, provided training, de-mystified police terminology and introduced attendees to the mechanics of a gold group.

How effective are Gold Groups?

38. When identifying how effective a gold group is, it has been recognised that one can realistically assess at 1 – 3 months if an incident has not deteriorated since the involvement of a gold group and its impact in effectively managing the effects that the critical incident causes.

39. However, the nature of the incident being managed will determine the time span of the gold group and/or other subsequent mechanisms for managing the incident. If the group is managing a significant pan–London, regional or national incident then the gold group will probably operate for a longer period of time, when it will with the assistance of the MPS Communities Together and ACPO National Community Tension Teams (NCTT) be able to monitor the impact on community reassurance and other gold group objectives on a medium to longer term basis.

40. The Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate’s (DCFD) Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team (CTSET) is an essential resource in this sphere of policing, particularly in terms of measuring community impact, MPS vulnerability and as an essential conduit of communication between communities and the MPS.

41. The Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team exists to:

• Provide a source of independent advice to the MPS in its response to major events and the reaction of communities to that response;
• Act as a conduit for reassurance messages from the MPS, to a broad cross-section of communities and individuals;
• Act as a conduit for community information and intelligence to be returned to the MPS, for collation and distribution through MPS intelligence systems;
• Provide access to a variety of independent advice sources to TP, SCD, SO and other branches and to operate an on-call system for advice as necessary;
• Collate and produce pan- London community tension returns from all BOCUs and maintain a weekly SPOC (single point of contact) list for each BOCU;
• Carry out pan-London community impact assessments and environmental scanning of issues likely to affect London's communities;
• Respond to specific community engagement tasking requests, as appropriate

42. The Communities Together Strategic Engagement Team prepares an external community bulletin updated weekly consisting of:

• A redacted version of the Met Intelligence Bureau’s (MIB) and TP Intelligence Unit’s daily bulletins
• Press Lines
• National Community Tensions Team (NCTT) bulletin
• Other key messages the MPS wishes to circulate
• Local borough initiatives.

43. Each BOCU is required to provide the DCFD’s Communities Together Team with a detailed weekly update concerning community tensions authorised for dissemination by the superintendent or chief inspector partnership. Each report is accompanied by an action plan with control measures to manage the outcome of the assessment process.

44. The BOCU community tension assessment process consists of four main facets;

• Experienced (how do communities feel, rumour or perception etc);
• Evidenced (factual information);
• Potential (what might happen, predicted or panned activity); and
• Action Plan (with proportionate but effective control measures).
• Each of these areas is assessed and an assessment level is determined.

45. The BOCU community tension returns forms the basis for a Pan London Community Impact Assessment.

46. Other MPS business groups have local methods of managing their own gold groups e.g. completed firearms incidents are routinely quality assured within Central Operations (CO) at gold group level to ensure compliance with policy and procedures and to ensure all good practice and areas for improvement are maximised.

47. The SCD Homicide and Serious Crime Review Group when analysing murders etc do review the gold group records and structure to determine if there is good practice or areas for improvement to be taken forward. There is a structured review process in place for such crimes, which is managed on a timescale basis through SCD ACPO and these reviews include, progress assessments which occur normally 28 to 42 days into an investigation, Thematic - as directed, to deal with key issues, early intervention which are snapshots of the enquiry at the early stage and Concluding and unresolved reviews. The reviews are managed and audited through the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) database, which ensures that organisational learning and recommendations are robustly followed through to completion and actionable activity is duly recorded in a retrievable format.

48. This is further monitored by a presentation board, chaired by an SCD DAC that assesses the reviews and the recommendations. This provides another quality assurance process around the effectiveness of gold groups and re-enforces the accountability of the persons involved in these groups. It provides additional strategic guidance and senior management support to ensure recommendations from these reviews and organisational learning are implemented and disseminated fast time.

49. There are numerous examples across the different MPS business groups that reflects the effectiveness of gold groups:

• The DPS Equalities Board in 2006 identified that on one occasion although the DPS gold group was not able to influence the incident it acted as a conduit between the MPS and the local community. Following the death of the late Mr Derek Bennett, who was fatally injured after being shot by MPS firearms officers, Northumbria Constabulary, led an investigation under the direction of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). The investigation had a notable impact on the MPS and London’s communities and a gold group was formed to manage the incident. The gold group proved useful in providing lines of communication with community representatives during the investigation process and the subsequent inquest.
• After the homophobic murder of the late Mr Jody Dobrowski on Clapham Common on 15 October 2005, widespread concern was voiced from Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people and other community members about the effectiveness of the initial and ongoing police response. A gold group was formed under the leadership of the local borough commander. During the subsequent gold group meetings key messages were identified around how and what actions were necessary to support LGBT people and the wider local community. The objective of the gold group was to prevent a loss in confidence from LGBT people as the attack, which was homophobically motivated, occurred in a recognised Public Sex Environment (PSE). As a result of these meetings public confidence was maintained and it was identified MPS guidance needed to be prepared about policing PSEs and developing LGBT liaison officers. MPS PSE guidance has since been prepared and much has been done to recognise and professionalise the role of the MPS 213 LGBT liaison officers, which is recognised as national best practice. There has been valued MPA participation in this development process.

Moving forward

50. A number of matters relating to accountability and effectiveness of MPS gold groups are being taken forward, including:

• Formal corporate guidance for gold groups; and
• Maximising organisational learning opportunities.

Formal corporate guidance for gold groups

51. There is currently variance in the manner in which gold groups (across business groups) are identified, managed and closed. However, it is pertinent to note that this has not undermined the effective response to identifying and operating gold groups. Indeed this has not detracted from the effectiveness of the operation of such groups within the MPS. However, it is common for Gold Groups to impact on a cross border or pan-London basis and across business groups e.g. a murder enquiry will involve a number of MPS business groups including TP, SCD, DPA, DCFD etc. Although information will be shared, the content, recorded decision making and areas considered in these groups may vary. The Critical Incident Manual VII is under review at present and this guidance will be updated to reflect this issue.

Organisational learning opportunities

52. Given the volume of gold groups which operate across TP’s 32 BOCUs, and other MPS business groups it is likely that there may be variance in how gold groups are:

• structured;
• risk assessed;
• recorded;
• managed; and
• how the gold group information is collated and disseminated.

53. It is recognised that through such mediums and the review processes that they undertake, that good practice and areas for improvement will be identified. It is essential that there is a recognised formal communication process to capture organisational learning from incidents at all levels, which is effectively disseminated and acted upon.

54. There are examples of good practice in this area. The MPS July Review Group (JRG) formed following the Stockwell Inquiry, is currently identifying existing corporate mechanisms to identify, collate, audit, disseminate and action organisational learning and to make recommendations to improve this process.

Conclusion

55. The MPS wholly supports the continuation of the gold groups methodology and values their role in the effective management of critical and major incidents. The MPS recognises that these multi-agency groups are essential if the MPS is to accurately assess the impact that certain events have on the people of London (community reassurance) and the further impact on their trust and confidence in the MPS. The MPS is fully aware that it must have the trust and confidence of Londoners and visitors to effectively deliver its business and achieve its policing objectives.

56. There is an increased public awareness of gold groups and the decision-making processes they manage. This has been most recently demonstrated by a number of Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) 2000 requests for the minutes from certain high profile gold groups.

57. The existing gold group system has operated within the MPS since 2000. Although the existing directions for gold groups are guidelines, the combination of this framework with the experiences gained across the MPS in the last 8 years has allowed an effective, robust and coherent approach to be delivered.

58. Despite the number of gold groups that have been created within the MPS there has been no known internal or external scrutiny that undermines the concept or existing processes and procedures.

59. Accountability for these groups is clear within the systems and guidelines that exist, and this will be reinforced once the existing guidance is updated in April 2008.

60. Work continues to be taken forward to maximise organisational learning opportunities arising from gold groups.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACPO

Association of Chief Police Officers

BOCU

Borough Operational Command Unit

CIAT

Critical Incident Advisory Team

CTSET 

Communities together Strategic Engagement Team

CO

Central Operations

DAC

Deputy Assistant Commissioner

DCFD

Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate

DMM

Daily Management Meeting

DPA

Data Protection Act

DPS

Directorate of Professional Standards

DOCIT

Duty Officer Critical Incident Training

EODB

Equal Opportunities and Diversity Board

FOIA

Freedom of Information Act

HOLMES

Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

HR

Human Resources

IAG

Independent Advisory Group

IFCAT

Initial Firearms Command Training

JRG

July Review Group

LA

Leadership Academy

LGBT

Lesbian, Gay, Bi-sexual and Transgender

MARAC

Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference

MPS

Metropolitan Police Service

NCTT

National Community Tensions Team

NIM

National Intelligence Model

NPIA 

National Policing Improvement Agency

OCU

Operational Command Unit

SCD

Specialist Crime Directorate

SOCIT

Senior Officers Critical Incident Training

SIO

Senior Investigating Officer

SMT

Senior Management Team

SOP

Standard Operating Procedures

TP

Territorial Policing

VCD 

Violent Crime Directorate

C. Race and equality impact

The MPS is mindful of any adverse impact or disproportionality that may occur as a result of the delivery of its services. In the delivery of its services, the MPS fully embraces the need to engage with and consult wisely with all communities and their informed representatives.

An equality impact assessment is incorporated into an informed risk assessment, identification and management of each individual incident. It is essential to recognise the impact of equality and diversity and ensure that such considerations are threaded into every gold group and review process.

D. Financial implications

Future financial implications may be generated if the gold group guidance identifies that additional resources or training are required.

Future financial implications may additionally be generated as the MPS seeks more creative and innovative methods regarding community engagement, and assessing the effectiveness of gold groups.

E. Legal implications

There are legal implications concerning the information recorded during gold groups, which is sensitive material and falls under the DPA and FOI Act 2000. Where information is sought using this avenue, section 30 and 31 (FOIA) identifies key exemptions that could prejudice any disclosure. Any decision regarding disclosure must be documented clearly.

F. Background papers

None

G. Contact details

Report author(s): Gerry Campbell, Acting/ Detective Superintendent

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Send an e-mail linking to this page

Feedback