Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) review

Report: 06
Date: 12 July 2007
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report outlines the work of SO15, the MPS Counter Terrorism Command. It provides details of how SO15 engages with communities, our organisation and key partners to make London safer. The report describes SO15’s workforce, its challenges and successes as well as initiatives being undertaken to make the OCU more representative of London’s communities.

A. Recommendations

1. Members are requested to note the content of this report and support the following recommendations.

Members are invited to agree that:

2. SO15 CTC should continue its commitment to recruit officers and staff from black and minority ethnic communities and other under represented groups in particular female police officers, by active representation at careers fairs and engaging in recruitment initiatives.
3. SO15 CTC should, through its Equal Opportunities and Diversity Champion (a standing member of the Senior Management Team –currently the Head of the International Liaison Section (ILS)) and it’s HR Workforce Planning lead, initiate a Workforce Development Programme, under the auspices of Organisational Development, to reflect the various diversity strands and assist in the progression and retention of staff from under represented groups including those to be supported by the:
   • Age strand
   • Disability strand
   • Faith/Belief strand
   • Gender strand
   • Lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender (LGBT) strand
   • Race strand
4. SO15 CTC should form a Diversity Working Group to support the Command in its delivery of tangible outcomes for the benefit of individuals and communities affected by issues arising from diversity.
   1. The Command’s Equal Opportunities and Diversity Champion will lead on this with the support of key staff.
   2. That key staff invited to sit on the Diversity Working Group will be identified by (i) the nature of their roles i.e. those staff whose area of responsibility is likely to impact upon the communities we serve and (ii) staff who wish to positively contribute by virtue of their personal experience.
   3. The composition of the Working Group should reflect the diverse nature of the communities we serve where possible.
5. That the Diversity Working Group actively participates in the implementation of the tangible outcomes it recommends.
6. That the Diversity Working Group takes responsibility for monitoring performance within the Command on diversity issues, on behalf of the Senior Management Team, providing evidenced based feedback to support their observations.
7. That SO15 Counter Terrorism Command demonstrates its commitment to Borough liaison and Community Engagement through the introduction of the proposed Standard Operating Procedure, which is further described below below.

B. Supporting information

Overview

1. This report comes at a time of significant change and modernisation within Specialist Operations and specifically the Counter Terrorism Command, which is backlit by national events and global issues. It is recognised that these external influences could be perceived by members of our communities as being inextricably linked to the nature of work undertaken by the Command. This is despite the fact that officers and staff engaged at SO15 are committed and dedicated to serving Londoners from all communities without prejudice with the aim of ensuring public safety. The political and public debates on terrorism incorporate wider social issues that policing alone will not resolve.

2. The current threat assessment issued by the Joint Terrorist Analysis Centre (JTAC) is determined to be Severe [at time of report 27 June 2007]. The definition of ‘severe’ is that a terrorist attack is highly likely. This coupled with public comments made by the former Director General of the Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, on 09 November 2006 that “officers and Police are working to contend with some 200 groupings or networks, totaling 1600 identified individuals (and there will be many more we don’t know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist activity here or overseas” remain a stark reminder of the scale of the problem facing those charged with confronting it.

3. The Commissioner commented further, on 11 November 2006 in his speech on ‘Protecting Cities’ at the Berlin Urban Age Summit, ‘In Britain, that threat is very real. The bombings of July 2005, in which fifty-two innocent people lost their lives in London, in the greatest single act of murder in recent English criminal history. We have had other attempted bombings, together with allegations involving ricin and ammonium nitrate and now you may have seen this week the full horror of what Dhiren Barot was planning: a dirty bomb, for which he was sentenced to a minimum of forty years imprisonment’ (subsequently varied on appeal to 30 years).

4. Other significant events such as the tragic death of Mr. Jean Charles de Menezes and the community issues arising from executive action in Forest Gate (as a consequence of Operation Volga) have also served to polarise perceptions of the work carried out by this Command. Such events have added to the unique policing challenges we face particularly in terms of maintaining community confidence whilst ensuring public safety. Learning from these incidents has and will continue to shape the way in which we operate. We are however precluded, for legal reasons, from reporting publicly issues pertaining to legal proceedings that could prejudice the outcome of them.

5. A further factor that influences our ability to articulate the Commands position to communities is the rigid reporting restrictions imposed during criminal proceedings relating to persons awaiting trial. Several convictions in cases prosecuted as a result of SO15’s activity have gone largely unreported until linked cases have been resolved. By the time they are reported the public and media interest has diminished but the consequence of unanswered questions remains like an unwelcome legacy. Many recent cases managed by the Command have been interlinked and were of a particularly complex nature. As a result they have taken a considerable time to come to trial despite appropriate case management by Police, CPS and the Judiciary. The information void that is precipitated by these circumstances has been filled with speculation that, under current guidelines, goes unchallenged. The Attorney General recently announced a review of such reporting restrictions. It should be noted that the Command is grateful for the work already undertaken by the MPA in relation to this as illustrated in ‘Counter Terrorism: The London Debate.’ These issues have been discussed and the matters arising subject to further work.

6. Another significant diversity issue that reflects upon this Command, by virtue of the responsibility we have for counter terrorism in London, is stop and search conducted under the Terrorism Act – Sections 43 and 44. This is despite the fact that we do not actually have a direct role in the administration or accountability of such searches. This issue is central to community and police relations and requires careful management to ensure that the operational benefits derived from the provision of such powers are not eroded by inappropriate application. However a feature of pre-planning for terrorist attacks, borne out by evidence from trials of recently convicted terrorists within the United Kingdom (e. g. Dhiren Barot) and abroad, is that they do conduct extensive surveillance activity of landmarks, iconic sites and similar potential targets. We do encourage uniformed officers to be vigilant for such activity and to use their experience and discretion in the exercise of their powers. Once again the Command would like to highlight the significant work undertaken by the MPA in relation to the application of Sec 44 and the subsequent issues that arose as a result of this piece of research. The Command is committed to work with the MPA on these matters to ensure transparency of process and to enhance communication flow.

7. Our activity, within the legal framework provided for by legislation, also attracts attention from parties concerned with prisoner welfare and Human Rights. This is particularly so with regard to the length of detention permitted prior to charging under the Terrorism Act. Consideration of extending the maximum period of pre-charge detention from 28 days to 90 days, under the Act, by Her Majesty’s Government is an emotive issue. This point is highlighted when the MPS high security custody suites located in Paddington Green and Belgravia routinely feature in media coverage after police enforcement activity relating to terrorism. It is also the subject of great debate within both Houses of Parliament and within the country as a whole. We, the CT Command in London, are particularly scutinised with regard to the application of this legislation because we have cause to make extensive but proportional use of the powers afforded us by Parliament. It should be stressed that pre charge detention under the Act is subject to Judicial authorisation of warrants of further detention and that it is the Crown Prosecution Services decision whether to charge a detained person.

8. SO15 has a responsibility to develop in line with other capacity building within counter terrorism. This is particularly important with regard to the new Regional CT Hubs. The hubs are currently operational in the Midlands, the North East and North West. SO15 works very closely with our colleagues from the CT Hubs and appreciates that local officers are well placed to deliver positive outcomes for their communities to whom they are directly accountable. The CT hubs, although a regional resource are governed by a lead police force and police authority. The CT hubs are therefore subject to local policy and guidance in relation to Equality and Diversity policies and processes. The statistics in relation to the CT hubs are supplied to that lead force Police Authority.

9. A further and fundamental factor is the type of threat that has emerged. The threat has now manifested itself in the form of the suicide bombings in London in 2005 and other terrorist atrocities, involving mass murder orchestrated by determined and committed groups, by means of multiple and simultaneous attacks on a scale not previously envisaged, specifically the:

• Bali bombing in 2002 that killed two hundred and two people
• Istanbul bombings in 2003, on the HSBC bank and the British Consulate, that killed fifty-five people
• Madrid bombings in 2004 that killed one hundred and ninety-one and injured 1,755 people

Such factors have significantly affected the way in which we approach potential terrorist attacks. The global terrorist aspiration is now on a grand scale. This linked with the willingness to commit suicide whilst undertaking acts of terrorism, in furtherance of a cause or belief, provides a new environment within which we seek to police by consent.

We train officers from within the Command to deal with Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear events and that this is to counter and respond to possible terrorist activity.

10. Public safety is and will always remain to be our principle objective. We, on occasions, will have to act at times to disrupt terrorist conspiracy’s relying on evaluated intelligence but without the luxury of being in possession of overwhelming evidence prior to taking overt policing activity. In essence, sometimes we have to move earlier to mitigate the threat to public safety and acknowledge the challenges that this may pose to community confidence but we will do everything we can to reduce the impact upon those communities as a result of our preventative action.

11. On 02 October 2006 the Metropolitan Police Special Branch SO12 and the Metropolitan Police Anti-Terrorist Branch SO13 merged into one Command renamed the Counter Terrorism Command SO15. Staff from both OCU’s came together to form this single Command merging core business functions such as Finance, Resources, Human Resources and Workforce Planning in April 2007. The implementation programme has tackled people and organisational issues including accommodation, information technology and realignment of staff within the new Command structures. We have combined different working practices and processes and are still engaged in consultation with the Police Federation and Staff Associations. The Command adopted a new set of Values incorporated in a single document that can be found at Appendix 1.

Role of SO15 Counter Terrorism Command

12. The Counter Terrorism Command sits within the Metropolitan Police Service’s Specialist Operations and has primacy in matters relating to Terrorism within London. The Command also supports a number of national functions such as the National Terrorist Financial Investigations Unit and the Counter Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officer network.

13. SO15’s strategic goal is to support the MPS priority of Counter Terrorism and Security and Her Majesty’s Government counter terrorism Contest Strategy under the strands of Prepare, Prevent, Protect and Pursue. In doing so we directly contribute to the corporate Mission of working together for a safer London by:

• Mitigating threats to public safety arising from terrorism
• Investigating terrorism
• Building confidence with key partners on a local, national and international basis to support the delivery of these objectives

The Command’s activities also support Safer Neighbourhoods as a consequence of the real interaction between our Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIO’s) who reach out on BOCU’s to local staff and communities. Their role is key to our representation within London Boroughs and is all about building relationships internally and externally. Our work also contributes to the MPS’s priority of Criminal Networks because a major feature of our output relates to prosecuting terrorist conspiracies and the criminal networks that underpin them.

14. SO15’s core business area’s are:

• Major Covert Terrorist Investigations
• Initial response to acts of terrorism
• Reactive investigations including crimes against humanity
• Case preparation
• Gathering, evaluating and assessing intelligence in furtherance of such investigation
• Single point of contact for the MPS in relation to terrorism
• Protective security

Service delivery

15. The head of the Counter Terrorism Command is a Deputy Assistant Commissioner who reports to the Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations.

16. The incumbent DAC also holds the position of National Co-ordinator of Terrorist Investigations on behalf of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) committee concerned with Terrorism and Allied Matters (TAM).

17. The DAC has a deputy at Commander rank within SO15 CTC who also deputises in the National Co-ordinators role.

18. The Command is arranged into four business areas headed by three Detective Chief Superintendent’s and a Business Manager respectively.

Investigations

19. The core of SO15 Investigations is comprised of 4 ‘pods’ each consisting of four teams of investigators. A Detective Superintendent heads each pod.

20. Other specialist units within Investigations include the:

• Forensic Management Team
• The CBRNE Team (formerly known as Explosives Officers)
• National Terrorist Financial Investigations Unit
• Special Prosecutions Unit
• CCTV Unit

Intelligence

21. The Intelligence function of the Command comprises of the following units:

• Reception and receipt
• Development, Analysis and Tasking
• Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer programme
• The Muslim Contact Unit

Operational support

22. Operational Support comprises of the following units:

• Organisational learning and protective security
• Search Wing
• Covert Policing
• International Liaison Section (ILS)
• Training
• Ports

Business support

23. The Commands Business Manager heads business support and is responsible for delivering services across the following functions:

• Finance
• Resources
• Human Resources and Workforce Planning
• Information Management
• Information Technology
• Performance
• SMT Support

Peaks of activity

24. In recent years the Command has managed a number of large- scale operations. When a threat to public safety leads to overt policing activity or we respond to acts of terrorism we mobilise hundreds of staff, often at very short notice. Many have worked extended shifts and done so over prolonged periods and some have had to work in other parts of the country. Others have had to work in very unpleasant circumstances and environments. There is a considerable demand stemming from operational deployments overseas.

25. We recognise the commitment of our staff and respond by supporting them by ensuring that local accommodation is accessible for them should they be unable to make it home, that subsistence is catered for outside of normal working hours and where necessary they are able to obtain basic essentials such as toiletries, underwear or clothing. Provision of such basic requirements is part and parcel of our operational planning and response to unexpected events.

26. Another key matter for the Command is managing occupational health issues that arise from our operational activity particularly during peaks of service delivery. We have, in very recent times, had cause to work in close proximity with the Director of Occupational Health (OH) within the MPS. OH staff, including the Director, worked from our offices at New Scotland Yard for a time. This ensured that those staff affected by the issues we were addressing had access to the best advice available within the organisation.

27. We have also worked closely with the lead for Health and Safety within the MPS and colleagues responsible for completing work place and role based risk assessment. The valuable advice given by our Health and Safety Unit ensured our staff were protected against potential hazards whilst working in the underground network post the bombings of 07 July 2005. This contribution enabled our staff to work safely in that environment. This contribution cannot be underestimated, as on 27 July 2005 seventy-eight SO13 officers were still deployed in the underground scenes.

28. More recently the lead for MPS Health and Safety was engaged and participated in a CT exercise looking at the consequences of a terrorist attack adding value in terms of learning and experience from their perspective.

Monitoring of service delivery

29. SO15 CTC is measured across its range of activity on a monthly basis. Our performance is captured for the Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations to drive continuous improvement. We submit performance data on the following activities:

• CTIO activity
• Counter Terrorism Search Advisor (CTSA) activity
• CBRNE activity
• Hotline message handling
• Terrorist networks
• Operation Fairway (intelligence activity)
• HR
• Training
• Finance

Further detail of relevant performance

CTIO activity

30. In relation to CTIO postings we have achieved a dedicated coverage of 82% of all BOCU’s so far. CTIO staff from neighbouring Boroughs support BOCU’s who currently await CTIO’s. We are on track to meet our target of 85% within this financial / planning year.

31. We are achieving targets set to ensure that our CTIO’s core work is customer focused and directed to Borough based activity. The target is set at 80% and we are currently achieving an average of 85% on year to date reporting within this financial / planning year.

32. The CTIO programme is able to evidence its links with our Safer Neighbourhoods Teams (SNT) by way of ensuring that SNT members will receive a counter terrorism briefing by a CTIO within two months of their appointment. In the last quarter of the financial / planning year (January to March 2007) we achieved a 78% success rate. We strive to attain and surpass our target of 80%. This demonstrates the accessibility that staff working within London’s communities have to the Counter Terrorism Command and is inclusive of Support Staff, Police Community Support Officers (PCSO’s), Police Officers and their Supervisors. Our CTIO programme supports those working directly with Londoners on a daily basis as well as the local Borough senior management teams where they are based.

33. Our CTIO’s are encouraged to speak with members of the community regarding their concerns relating to terrorism and build bridges within their Boroughs, although they are not a ‘front line’ resource and they are not there to replace the interaction between the Borough personnel and their communities. Invariably the contact with the community will be as a result of a referral from a Borough resource such as a Safer Neighbourhood Team member. They do act as a bridge between the Boroughs and the centre and expedite contact between the community and the Command. They receive much of their work through referrals from SNT members as a consequence of the links they have forged. They are however a resource of our Command as opposed to that of the Boroughs within which they work. Their exposure within the community has to be balanced with the nature of some of their work as some of it is of a confidential nature i.e. liaising with members of the public who have concerns about issues relating to terrorism. This does not detract from the very positive interaction they have with SNT staff within their respective places of work.

CTSA activity

34. Our security advisors are key to our relationships with the business community in London. However they interact with both the private and the public sector to provide quality protective security advice to support the prevention strand of the Governments Contest strategy. Protecting the economic well being of London and our critical national infrastructure is vital for maintaining normality for all of London’s communities. Making London a less attractive proposition for terrorist targeting contributes to making it a safer place for all. The quality of that interaction is demonstrated by the feedback provided by their customers in completed questionnaires for presentations, training courses, seminars and exercises. So far this financial / planning year 96% of those who completed the feedback questionnaires were wholly or very satisfied with the interaction.

ILS activity

35. The SO15 ILS has the benefit of employing police officers and police staff who are talented linguists. One of their functions is to support the foreign liaison officer community based in London. This involves holding bi-monthly sessions to share information and to share beneficial practices with our international partners. A recent initiative involved a visit to the East London mosque, facilitated by the local Borough and the Muslim Police Association. The feedback received was very positive and all found the visit to be informative.

36. The ILS employs multi faith officers and staff who are invaluable in assisting International visitors to the Command. We try as far as possible to ensure that cultural and religious needs and requirements are met and indeed feedback we have received from visitors demonstrates just how beneficial this is. To date this year the ILS has facilitated fifty visits to the Command.

37. One of the key objectives with any visit is to ensure that there is a two way flow of information and any opportunity we can gain to learn from our partners is seized. This has recently been demonstrated by an exchange of research documents from Singapore in relation to their de-radicalisation programme. As a result of this they will be put in touch with the Home Office lead for the ‘Prevent’ agenda to assess if there is scope for us to look at other aspects of this programme and to learn from their beneficial practices.

38. Due to the diverse breakdown of the ILS personnel, certain needs and requirements are catered for. There are two Orthodox Greek officers who have provision to take Easter and their ‘Name’ days as leave. Provision was also made for one of the officers to comply with the strict mourning period and restrictions placed upon him following a relative’s unfortunate death.

39. Officers from the ILS regularly provide assistance to other Government Departments, as illustrated by the input to the Home Office Counter Terrorism Policy Department on religious and cultural issues in relation to national CT exercises.

40. The ILS supports the Counter Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officer network and as such variations of working patterns were negotiated to ensure that cover is available for officers who work in different time zones and who do not work a ‘conventional’ working week. As a result our officers deployed overseas have access to desk office support and access to an on call supervisor.

41. SO15 ILS is the designated single point of contact to provide support to the F&CO Global Opportunities Fund (GOF) programme – specifically in support of HMG CONTEST. The Command continues to provide training and assistance to priority countries as determined by the Overseas Contest Group to support and improve capacity and capability in terrorist investigations.

Other performance issues

42. We also engage with the Commissioners Office, the Home Office, the Cabinet Office and many other Government Departments to provide accurate performance data relating to our operational activity. This data is subsequently provided to the public in many different ways. This provision is both structured and demand driven.

43. An example of the structured provision of performance data arises from our national responsibility to record and update records of Terrorist Act (TACT) arrests. These figures are supplied to the Home Office who publish the data on their website.

44. Demand driven requests for the provision of performance data may come as a result of a parliamentary question, a request under the Data Protection Act or Freedom of Information Act or as a result of a specific question raised within the organisation to respond to a community concern.

Training

45. The merger between SO12 and SO13 allows all staff from the new Command access to the dedicated training unit. This unit was an integral part of SO12 providing training support for officers and staff from within that Branch. It is now able to freely share its facilities and training delivery across the Command to the benefit of all. Training delivery is monitored and reviewed and trainers are all appropriately qualified to undertake their roles.

46. A new training manager has been appointed to lead this unit during this time of change. The training manager is in the process of reviewing the training programme. The Training Manager attended a ‘Managing Disability’ Conference in June and will be looking at cascading information learnt through the training unit.

Policy

47. Local policy and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) developed in the command are done so within the framework outlined by the Strategy, Modernisation and Performance Directorate under their guidance for corporate policy entitled ‘Management of policy development in the MPS’.

Our people - Reflecting the communities we serve

48. The police officers ‘Budgeted Workforce Target’ (BWT) is set at one thousand two hundred and four point five [1204. 5] for the Command. At the time of writing the actual strength is 1066. Please note that the BWT for 2007 / 2008 represents an increase in numbers and that recruitment and selection activity is in hand. The police staff ‘Affordable Workforce Target’ (AWT) is 300. 9. At the time of writing the actual strength is 270. These figures naturally fluctuate on a daily basis because of the push and pull of people into and out of the Command.

49. The most recent review of ethnicity and gender breakdown was completed in February 2007. This was after the merger of SO12 and SO13 Branches but before the actual amalgamation of central functions such as HR within the new CT Command, SO15. The breakdown was as follows:

50. For SO12, from a total of six hundred and twenty seven police officers 569 (90%) declared themselves to be white and 55 (10%) from Black or minority ethnic groups. These figures are compiled from information supplied by officers and staff on a voluntary basis and three officers chose not to specify. Of these seventy (11%) are female and the remaining 558 (89%) are male.

51. For police staff from SO12 the breakdown was one hundred and thirty six (82%) of the 166 declared themselves to be white and twenty-nine (11%) to be Black or minority ethnic groups. One person chose not to specify.

52. From the one hundred and sixty six police staff within SO12 a total of 104 (63%) are female, the remaining 62 (37%) are male.

53. For SO13, from a total of four hundred and thirty eight officers 418 (95%) declared themselves to be white and twenty (5%) to be Black or from minority ethnic groups. Of these twenty nine (7%) are female and the remaining 409 (93%) are male.

54. For police staff within SO13 the breakdown was eighty-six (82%) of the 103 declared themselves to be white and eighteen (18%) black or from minority ethnic groups. Of these police staff forty-eight (47%) are female, the remaining fifty-five (53%) are male.

55. To aggregate these figures for the CT Command this gives nine hundred and eighty seven (92%) from 1066 police officers self declared as white and seventy five (8%) to be Black or from minority ethnic groups. Of these ninety nine (9%) are female and the remaining 967 (91%) are male. For police staff the figures are two hundred and twenty two (82%) of 270 self declared as white and forty-seven (17%) to be Black or from minority ethnic groups. Of these one hundred and fifty two (56%) are female and the remaining 118 (43%) are male.

56. In SO the figures are 7. 2% female police officers and 40% female police staff, 5. 4% police officers and 19. 5% of police staff are black and minority ethnic origin. For the MPS these figures for the same period were 20% police officers and 53% police staff are female and 7. 8% police officers and 24. 4% police staff are black and minority ethnic origin. These statistics may be seen more clearly when laid out as follows:

57. SO15 employs a diverse workforce. We are fully committed to supporting both police officers and police staff seeking to adopt flexible working patterns. At present there are sixty five (6%) police officers and 24 (8%) police staff working a variety of flexible work patterns including variable shift rosters, annualised hours, compressed hours and part time working.

58. With regard to age there is a good balance across the age range for police staff. We have between 20% and 26% in each group from eighteen to 29 up to fifty to 60 years of age. Currently 4% of the police staff are over 60. In respect of police officers the greatest percentage is those between forty and 49 years of age with equating to 58%. A total of 26% are between thirty and 39 with 12% between fifty and 60 and 3% under 29 years of age.

Recruitment

59. All recruitment and selection activity within SO15 is co-ordinated through the CT Command Human Resources Unit (HR) and all such processes are run in accordance with the relevant MPS HR policies and processes. The Command has a Standard Operating Procedure with regard to its selection process to ensure that applicants demonstrate their awareness of diversity issues. There is an expectation that applicants score at least a grade three on a scale of five for diversity before they can successfully join the Command irrespective of other areas of assessment.

60. The importance of ensuring that this standard is consistent with existing staff as well as new recruits is an issue currently being addressed by the Training Manager. One option is to ensure that any corporate Diversity Refresher Training is delivered expeditiously. This is currently being discussed at Management Board level. However at a local level Diversity Refresher Training currently forms part of a larger training project focusing on support for all members of SO15. It is based upon material provided by the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate and it will be incorporated into existing courses as well as new course modules.

61. The Command also ensures that the opportunities provided through NCALT are available and used by staff. Mandatory training modules are subject to management scrutiny, however, the Training Unit when delivering all course modules actively promotes the facility. On line learning is available in the following areas:

• Diversity and the Police
• Race and the Police
• Disability and the Police
• Religion and Belief and the Police
• Age and the Police
• Gender and the Police
• Sexual Orientation and the Police

62. SO15 officers and staff are encouraged through the Training Bulletin facility to access and complete these on-line modules These however are not mandatory and not subject to audit.

63. Following training on the Diversity Excellence Model staff from within the Human Resources Unit incorporated amendments to local procedures to ensure they were being inclusive. An example of this would be the addition of a paragraph within invitation letters for selection procedures specifically requesting candidates contact the Command should they have any individual needs.

64. In 2003, research was commissioned and conducted within SO regarding MPS staff perception of the business group. It was subsequently reported that potential staff needed more information about the specialist roles within the SO12 and SO13. In response to this the SO Careers Consultancy (SOCC) was established to provide a central point of contact for staff considering a career in this business group.

65. The SOCC hosted its fifth Careers fair in February 2007. SO12 and SO13 have been represented at previous events and SO15 were represented at the February event and delivered a number of well-received presentations.

66. Seven hundred and forty six delegates attended this fair and of these 352 were from the provincial constabularies. 111 females attended and 66 BME potential staff attended. 18% of those that attended had done so because they were interested specifically in working for SO15. The SO Careers Consultancy also attended a significant number of positive action event open days in 2006/07 representing the Command. Follow up of all expressions of interest are made by SO2 on behalf of SO15. Feedback is taken on board and used as a learning tool for follow on events, for example, following the first event, facilities were made to ensure that information became available for officers looking at Force transfer, pay and conditions and allowances.

Retention

67. One of the key issues for the CT Command is being able to support those officers and staff who wish to work a flexible working pattern to achieve an effective balance between work and home. In addition to those staff who have taken the opportunity to adopt some form of flexible working there are 15 on career breaks or maternity leave, 7 (46%) female and 8 (54%) male.

68. All staff are encouraged to seek development through a range of corporate schemes including working for qualifications related to current posts (Diploma in Management Studies, CIPD, mentoring, counselling and coaching). A number of staff have also attended Police Leadership courses going through a 360 degree feedback process. Senior managers have recently been encouraged to participate in the National Senior Career’s Advisory Service initiative. This was broadcast in particular to those groups currently under represented, as a result at least two senior officers have taken up this offer of assistance.

Qualitative issues impacting the age strand

69. The Command has embraced the opportunity presented by experienced officer’s being retained within the organisation through the thirty plus scheme. This has not disadvantaged younger officers from joining the Command. This can be evidenced by the opportunity presented by the gap between Budgeted Workforce Target (BWT) and actual police officer strength of 138. 5. These vacancies are open for all who can evidence their suitability against the Competency Related Framework for the respective roles.

Qualitative issues impacting the disability strand

70. We understand our obligations to staff with disabilities and comply with the Disability Discrimination Act. Building works have been undertaken to accommodate staff with disabilities through the ‘Access to work’ initiative.

71. Less able-bodied staff members are supported through the HR department to ensure that their needs and requirements are met as far as possible. To this end a number of AWARE enabled laptops have been purchased to enable staff the opportunity to work from home should circumstances dictate, according to their individual needs.

72. Other examples of how we have listened and recognised our obligation is in the provision of specially commissioned workstations after feedback from assessment. We have also invested in ergonomic seating for back pain sufferers.

Qualitative issues impacting the faith / belief strand

73. Officers from the Command have, over the last two years, attended in-country training in Egypt to enhance their understanding and appreciation of Islam in the context of an Islamic society. The training provided important insight from religious and academic scholars. This programme included familiarisation with and greater awareness of the issue of radicalisation, which impacts upon the Islamic communities here, in the Boroughs of London.

74. This was undoubtedly an enriching experience that provided learning for both the individuals concerned and the organisation. The latest report submitted upon the officer’s return spelt out clearly the benefits that this experience has had for the Command and on those who attended. They include the:

• Provision of context and historical background to Islam
• Greater understanding of the diverse Islamic landscape
• Access to religious leaders
• Enhanced understanding of religious extremism from an international context
• Insight into the Arabic worlds customs and culture from a non-western perspective

75. Staff from within the Command recently attended the East London Mosque (June 2007) where they were warmly welcomed. They benefited from face to face dialogue with the Imam who gave them a briefing on Islam and on issues impacting their community. Officers and police staff of both sexes attended this valuable meeting.

76. Another recent example of our work relating to faith / belief was when the Command co-hosted a conference on radicalisation between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). We were able to hear directly from the Muslim Safety Forum on their perspective on radicalisation and the community. Other notable speakers to attend this event included Lord Goldsmith the Attorney General.

77. The Command plays an active role in the G8 Lyon Roma work stream for Counter Terrorism. To this end the Command led and co-ordinated a G8 sponsored seminar on radicalisation in October 2006. Representatives attending included all G8 partners, with specific input from the French delegation. The seminar will be followed by an event planned for October 2007 to look at de-radicalisation and the experience of non- G8 countries. Whilst the Home Office is leading the initiative, this Command will play an active role in both presenting at conference and facilitating attendance of International partners.

78. The Command plays an active role in a number of Staff Associations, where we have representation in the Greek, Italian and Black Police Officer Associations to name but a few. There is also a very active Christian Society and a number of seminars and presentations have been arranged by members of the CT Command under the auspices of the Alpha Programme. Commander McDowall also chairs a regular meeting with the Federation to ensure access and information sharing.

Muslim Contact Unit

79. The Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) sits within the Counter Terrorism Command and, in support of the ‘Prevent’ strand of counter-terrorist endeavors, works in partnership with those organisations seeking to engage positively with individuals and communities in danger of militant radicalisation. In this work the MCU seeks to provide a confidential conduit between Muslim Communities and the Police Service, providing ‘community intelligence’ and informed opinion on terrorism matters for Senior Management. These relationships, whilst not covert, are however confidential by their nature and the disclosure of partner details by Police could jeopardise their positions within their communities.

80. The Unit’s success has been based in large measure in finding devout Muslims within the Police service who bring a unique perspective to the Unit’s work and complement the experience of the other members of the team.

81. Because the MCU work is very specific, it is focused on a relatively small number of key partners within the Muslim communities of London, many of whom speak for those communities traditionally regarded as ‘hard to reach’ and who are often isolated within both Muslim communities and the wider population.

82. Among the hardest to reach groups have been those women who lack English language skills and access to training. For both cultural and social reasons, they can find it difficult to get employment outside their own groups. While by no means exclusive, both the Somali and Bengali populations have suffered from this and the Unit is actively seeking to recruit female Officers to work in support of these communities, work that male officers cannot undertake as for both religious and cultural reasons, it is not possible for male officers to form confidential relationships with Muslim women.

Qualitative issues impacting the gender strand

83. Our Equal Opportunities and Diversity Champion has attended various forums including a series of SO careers open days and female officers courses at Bramshill (Senior Staff College) to promote the Command.

84. Such attendance has provided SO15 with visibility amongst prospective female colleagues and has given us the opportunity to challenge preconceptions that the Command is a male only environment. Presentations delivered were inclusive and geared towards opportunities for all, police staff, officers, uniformed officers and detectives.

85. We have members in both the Senior Female Police Staff Association and the Association of Senior Women Officers.

Qualitative issues impacting the lesbian, gay, bi-sexual and transgender (LGBT) strand

86. The Command has promoted LGBT issues by distributing strand posters across all of our sites and by placing them prominently on display. A record of the poster distribution was kept to demonstrate our action.

87. We are aware that this strand requires further activity and the Training Manager is currently working with the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate around an action plan for SO15. The Command is aware of the Enlighten Strategy, which aims through a series of initiatives, actions and reviews to put the MPS at the forefront of the change agenda for LGBT. Enlighten recognises that in order to achieve change there will be a need to address attitudes and stereotyping. The review of support training currently being conducted by the SO15 Training Unit will incorporate these principles wherever appropriate.

88. We have taken steps to reassure potential staff that the vetting procedure required for many posts within the Command does not preclude people from LGBT communities from applying and we have identified a gay member of staff who has stated their willingness to act as a point of contact for those applicants who are concerned to advise and provide a helpful guide through the process.

89. We are unable to provide statistics relating to the composition of our staff in terms of their personal sexuality.

Qualitative issues impacting the race strand

90. Staff from BME communities, who already work within the Command, have volunteered and participated at careers fairs held to promote SO15 as a rewarding place to work. They have been able to talk to prospective staff about their own experiences within the Command and help describe the environment, the work and the social aspects connected with it. We have also attended recruit sessions to promote the Command as an attractive career option and to identify areas of concern and interest at an early stage.

91. We have two officers from BME communities who act as mentors within the Command.

92. We have sought the assistance of Staff Associations by asking them to distribute leaflets regarding applications for vacancies.

93. The Command has benefited from the corporate resource provided through the CCRU utilising staff from communities with which we interact. This has helped on several levels including enhancing understanding of cultural issues and reducing barriers to communication. Several members of staff from the MPS who have assisted SO15 with sensitive investigations where cross-cultural communication were an issue have been supported through the national security vetting process. These members of staff are still required to evidence individual suitability to attain vetting clearance but have had the benefit of advice and encouragement from colleagues and supervisors party to the investigation. This demonstrates our willingness to engage with diverse communities, understand the people we have contact with and value the contribution made to our work by staff from those communities.

94. SO15 also maintains a voluntary database of officer’s language skills and supports language training by staff from within the Command.

95. We also encourage staff to complete the corporate feedback expected after foreign travel to capture both the operational and cultural issues encountered whilst working abroad. A minute is placed on foreign travel files for staff traveling directing them to complete the feedback as requested by the central unit called SCD13 responsible for capturing the data. It must be noted that this requirement is specifically in relation to being deployed overseas and does not apply to officers undertaking social travel.

96. Our work has another dimension that impacts upon diversity, which is the international aspect of terrorist investigations. A recurring feature of our enquiries is that they cross international borders. Our staff are exposed to an extremely broad number of cultures as a result. We benefit from close working relationships with many countries and learn from them each time we travel abroad. We also deliver work related training and mentoring within many countries and receive visitors from across the globe on a regular basis. This international aspect of our activity reflects the diverse nature of our capital city.

The treatment of persons detained under the Terrorism Act

97. People arrested and detained under the Terrorism Act come from many backgrounds. The Command demonstrates its commitment to diversity by ensuring that individual’s needs are taken into consideration. Not only do we comply with legislation in relation to the treatment of detained persons we often far exceed such requirements. This applies across all diversity strands. We do this in partnership with the professional assistance of our uniformed colleagues who work within the secure custody suites located at Paddington Green and Belgravia. For example, there is ground floor access to all facilities and every detainee has access to a medical examiner and hence the opportunity to discuss needs and requirements with a health professional.

98. Collectively all staff have responsibility for persons in their custody but officers independent from the investigation and SO15 have oversight and specific responsibility for their care and treatment. Notwithstanding that, when issues relating to the treatment of detained persons arise, it is often our officers who take responsibility to resolve them.

99. We have made provision for religious / faith issues e. g. We have ensured that religious observance is considered when scheduling interviews and meal times; matters relating to dietary requirements and personal hygiene are catered for. We accommodate for male and female prisoners and manage issues such as childcare for infants including weaning. Disability is another area where we have delivered specific support to persons in our custody specifically in relation to one detainee who was a wheelchair user, this took the form of ensuring that appropriate measures were taken for purpose built transportation to be used for travel to and from place of detention.

100. Health care professionals consider the physical and mental welfare of persons detained. The Command has a protocol with a retained Forensic Psychologist to achieve this aim. Fitness to be detained and to be interviewed is crucial to all concerned with any investigation. Should officers breach an individuals rights any evidence obtained is likely to be ruled inadmissible. The actions of officers who are engaged in terrorist investigations are scrutinised extremely closely and their behaviour is of the highest professional order. The secure custody suites and interview rooms where they work are covered by closed circuit television. Their evidence is probed and tested by some of the most experienced legal minds in the country. Furthermore our investigations tend to be subjected to intense media scrutiny. The rights of detained persons are, in most cases, represented by solicitors or qualified legal representatives. Vulnerable persons and juveniles also have the support of appropriate adults to represent their interests.

101. The Command is aware of the comments of the IPCC in respect of custody facilities at Paddington Green Police Station and the comment of Lord Carlisle, the independent reviewer of terrorist legislation. The Command is in the process of negotiating the provision of new facilities and is seeking any further ways to ameliorate the current accommodation in the interim. Commander McDowall leads on this issue. A breakdown of data indicating length of detention under terrorist legislation is attached as Appendix 2.

Equality and diversity training

102. A number of staff on the Command have been trained in the Diversity Excellence Model and prior to the amalgamation had initiated a number of working groups to consider its implementation. Due to organisational change the full benefits derived from this work have yet to be realised within the new Command however thought will now be given to revisit what was considered a useful template to drive development across our business.

103. As a result of the above initiative we have been able to look at various aspects of the model. One of our key strengths in relation to our people was the introduction of flexible and part-time working and also the introduction of compressed hours working.

104. The Training Unit achieved the ‘Centre of Excellence for Training’ award, which was Centrex approved and it is envisaged that the newly combined command will be able to achieve the same recognition post merger.

105. Areas to address were also identified during this process and there was universal agreement that the Diversity Excellence Model should be integral to Command strategy. It was also acknowledged that diversity and equality needed to be ‘mainstreamed’ into all processes from recruitment and selection through to training and development. To this end a number of our initiatives have addressed this, for example, the introduction of the mentoring scheme and ensuring compliance with PDR objectives. However, as a Command we are very aware of the dangers of complacency and this will be a closely monitored activity and integral to the work of our Diversity Working Group.

106. Training on Equality Impact Assessment is being provided centrally and staff upon the Command, including Fairness at Work Advisors, are benefiting from this.

107. Our staff have also undertaken corporate mandatory training on diversity.

Working with the diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate

108. SO15 has engaged with the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate to improve links between Communities and the MPS by providing information relating to terrorism investigations. Working practices have evolved to develop lines of communication. These have been driven by the circumstances encountered or when a requirement has been articulated by DCFD.

109. There are immense challenges for the organisation when balancing the requirement to keep secure the highly sensitive intelligence handled by the Command for the purposes of ensuring public safety and the expectations we have within the Service to engage with communities to provide reassurance. This is particularly problematic for the Counter Terrorism Command as the reality often is with terrorist investigations that covert operations turn into overt police action at a time and place dictated by dynamic events and driven by operational necessity.

110. With the advent of twenty-four hour live news coverage the media frequently have the ability to broadcast breaking news stories before trusted partners have been engaged. This has, on a number of occasions, proved testing for all concerned.

111. The dilemma is that by widening the circle of knowledge regarding covert policing activity, or even an intention to visit a particular location by officers from our Command, we may frustrate the very objective we seek to achieve, which is to ensure public safety. Such operational considerations are a significant concern to all staff and wherever possible early engagement is sought to reduce the affect our activity has.

112. We aim to build trust by listening to feedback from communities and local officers who work within them. As a result of listening to such feedback our staff have engaged in constructive dialogue with senior officers from Borough based Territorial Policing and the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate to deliver improvement on two fronts. The first is Borough liaison and the second Community engagement. This will put a more formal basis to the way in which we engage with communities with the assistance of our policing colleagues.

113. We will now identify an officer, of Detective Inspector rank, from within SO15 Investigations to act as ‘Bronze Community’ at the instigation of an operation or specified event / activity. The word Bronze relates to the role being one that has responsibility to physically deliver specific outcomes. In this case the Bronze will deliver outcomes relating to Community and Borough engagement. They will have responsibility for liaising with the DCFD Community Tension Team, the National Community Tension Team (NCTT) and local Borough’s.

Community Impact Assessments

114. The feedback provided by these key partners coupled with the Commands knowledge will form the basis of a Community Impact Assessment. This assessment will evidence real / tangible community engagement undertaken by the Command during operational activity. This will now ensure that at our busiest times, when our operational activity peaks, we will be able to maintain our links with communities when we and they need them most.

115. The Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) will be responsible for signing off the Community Impact Assessment recognising the piece of work as the community strategy for the corresponding operation. In effect, the SIO will have responsibility for delivering the community strategy on behalf of the Command. This active role will take into account any other issues identified by ACPO officers responsible for National Co-ordination of terrorist investigations arising out of their responsibilities for managing terrorist investigations.

116. The Bronze Community will also be the single point of contact within the Command for questions from our community contacts relating to operational activity. Their role will ensure accessibility, as they will be a core member of the SIO’s team thus ensuring clear channels of communication.

117. The above procedure is being ratified formally with the production of a Standard Operating Procedure and policy for implementation in the Command, following extensive consultation with Territorial Policing.

118. The National Communities Tension Team attends the Commands operational co-ordination and tasking meeting. This provides them with a three hundred and sixty degree view of our operational activity and ensures we engage at the earliest stages with regard to issues likely to impact upon communities.

Engaging with the community

119. SO15 engages with a wide range of communities within our Capital City. To this end we would widen our definition of communities to include, residents; business communities; foreign liaison officers and the diplomatic community and the Whitehall community.

120. Through CTIO activity we actively engage with Borough colleagues to reach out to local communities. This is done through interaction with Safer Neighbourhood Teams, Police Community Support Officers, Transport for London employees and indeed local authorities. CTIO activity is predominantly used as a conduit for local information to feed into the Command and informed to deal with the threat facing them.

121. The Muslim Contact Unit provides an essential service in its ability to access Muslim Communities on a confidential level, which enables facilitation of community intelligence and also an informed perspective on issues for Senior Management.

122. The Command has a proactive relationship with the Muslim Safety Forum and use is made of this relationship to both discuss and gain advice on certain issues, from the impact of legislation changes to the best way to communicate on yet to be reached communities.

123. There are a number of units within the Command who enjoy a close working relationship with business communities. The CTSA’s interact with both the public and private sectors to provide protective security advice and the NTFIU enjoys a healthy and productive relationship with the financial sector and government departments designated to deal with financial crime and related activity.

124. The ILS of SO15 supports both the foreign liaison community in London and the Whitehall community in support of G8 activity, the Global Opportunities Fund Program and Overseas Contest Group. The ILS is the designated single point of contact for all CT related Eurojust and Europol enquiries.

Challenges and successes

125. Many of the challenges faced by the Command have been dealt with within the body of this report. Some key challenges that particularly impact upon equal opportunities and diversity are:

• Balancing the nature of the current terrorist threat whilst maintaining public safety with initiating timely and appropriate community engagement
• Articulating the Commands position within the restraints set by current legal parameters
• Counter radicalisation
• Delivering continuous improvement across all diversity strands internally and externally
• Delivering a diversity workforce development programme
• Managing organisational change whilst maintaining staff relations

126. Our successes include the following:

1. Recognising staff, from across the Command, for their contribution on and after 07 July 2005. Staff members fulfilling the following roles have been awarded Commissioners commendations for their individual acts:
   • Administrative Clerk
   • Analysts
   • Communications staff
   • Detective Constables, Sergeants, Inspectors and Chief Inspectors
   • CBRNE staff
   • Finance and resources Manager
   • Finance Clerk
   • Finance Manager
   • Indexer
   • Resource Clerk
   • Uniformed Constables, Sergeants, Inspectors

This spread of recognition clearly demonstrates the value we place on all staff.

2. The composition of our police staff with regards to the % of BME and female colleagues
3. The recruitment of female officers and BME officers to work within the SO15 CTC Surveillance Section
4. Our CTIO coverage and borough based activity
5. The work of the Muslim Contact Unit
6. The work undertaken to enhance our community engagement and borough liaison
7. Working together for a safer London as demonstrated by the following facts [correct at time of report - 27 June 2007]:
   • Five terrorist cases currently at trial generated by the Command
   • Seven cases awaiting trial – dates having been set
   • Fourteen cases awaiting trial dates
   • One hundred and twenty two arrests in 2005 under TACT by officers from this Command
   • Eighty six arrests in 2006 under TACT by officers from this Command
   • Thirty eight arrests so far in 2007 under TACT by officers from this Command
     These figures are evidence of how the Command delivers public safety for all of London’s diverse communities. Much of this success is difficult to quantify in qualitative terms e.g. we cannot be sure of exactly how community cohesion has benefited from the success of the above activity although we recognise the damage done to it by acts of terrorism. Equally the quantitative outcomes in terms of the impact upon the community are also hard to assess e.g. how many lives have we saved as a result of this effort? We simply don’t know.

Abbreviations

ACPO

Association of Chief Police Officers

AWT

Affordable Workforce Target

BME

Black and Minority Ethnic

BWT

Budgeted Workforce Target

CIPD

Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development

CONTEST

Governments Counter Terrorist Strategy

CT

Counter Terrorism

CTELOs

Counter Terrorism & Extremism Liaison Officers

CTIO

Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer

DCFD

Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate

ET

Employment Tribunals

FAW

Fairness at Work

F&CO

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

GOF

Global Opportunities Fund

HR

Human Resources

ILS

International Liaison Section

LGBT

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender

NCTT

National Community Tensions Team

MCU

Muslim Contact Unit

MPA

Metropolitan Police Authority

MPS

Metropolitan Police Services

NJU

National Joint Unit

NTFIU

National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit

OCG

Overseas Contest Group

OCU

Operational Command Unit

SIO

Senior Investigating Officer

SO15

Counter Terrorist Command

SOCC

Specialist Operations Careers Consultancy

TAM

Terrorist and Allied Matters

C. Race and equality impact

1. All recruitment and selection activity is in line with corporate policy. All staff working in the CTC command are required to undergo additional vetting and every effort is made to explain the process to applicants before they start the recruitment process. This can add weeks and in some cases months to the process but every case is treated according to its own merits. All policies in the CT Command are subjected to an equality impact assessment during development. The Command is aware that the vetting process has caused some concern, especially in relation to those who have relatives born outside the UK. This does have an impact on the length of time it takes to undergo the vetting procedure. The Command is bound by this policy and in the majority of cases is reliant on processes in place within the country where enquiries are made. We have strived to ensure that all this information is given to potential candidates at an early stage to prepare them for this eventuality. We plan to re-format the recruitment information pack and to identify a single point of contact so that progress and concerns can be discussed with one individual.

2. The Command is committed to recruit a representative and diverse workforce. In order to achieve this we will look to increase the number of officers and staff from BME and other under represented groups, particularly female police officers. The Command will challenge preconceptions that it is a male dominated and exclusive place of work by positively targeting those groups that would not look at this type and nature of work as a first option. This will revolve around looking at issues of inclusion and accessibility. We will do this through positive input at career fairs and through targeting probationer sessions so that recruits can think about this career path at an early stage. We will use positive role models and mentors to ensure that staff are supported and developed at each stage of the process from recruitment and selection through to deployment in the Command. We will not be complacent in the fact that current statistics demonstrate that we are slightly ahead of the organisation in terms of employing BME officers and significantly ahead with regards to employing BME and female police staff. We will continue to proactively target and promote this Command as an inclusive and attractive working regime.

3. Our proposed Workforce Development Programme seeks to support staff where diversity impacts upon their lives, from whichever strand. By undertaking this programme of continuous improvement the Command seeks to value the diversity of the staff it has and ensure that everyone’s contribution is recognised and reaches its full potential. We hope this will be a positive initiative for members of staff who may otherwise feel that diversity excludes them or marginalises them from valued participation or advancement. This initiative will add value to our whole activity and should not detract from the contribution of staff that fall outside of the diversity strands.

4. SO15 Counter Terrorism Command will instigate an Equalities Impact Assessment of the policies and procedures advocated to identify any likely impact they may have on the promotion of equality to ensure compliance with the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, the disability Discrimination Act 2005 and the Equality Act 2006.

D. Financial implications

1. The CT Command draws a substantial amount of funding from both the MPA and from other government sources. There are ranges of financial policies and procedures in place to ensure that due account is kept of these funds. All appropriate corporate policies are observed and complied with. In some areas there are additional safeguards to ensure best use of additional funding.

2. For the financial year 2007/08 the budget for SO15 is £94,446,893. This is the total amount of funding allocated including the additional counter terrorist funding granted after the events of 7 July 2005.

3. The instigation of the Commands Workforce Development Programme and Diversity Working Group will initially be borne from CTC funds allocated above. Work arising from recommendations, projects and proposals made as a consequence of these initiatives will be supported by funding already allocated or from appropriate sources identified i.e. SO, ACPO TAM amongst others. The application for funds from ACPO TAM is subject to a stringent and robust bidding process. Each bid must state its key objectives, aims and outcomes along with predicted spend and a timetable for progress and completion. The bid is then subject to scrutiny by the ACPO TAM Finance Board and if agreed the funds will be released. Spend is monitored by the SO Business Manager and progress is reported to ACPO TAM through the Finance Board. Commander McDowall represents the Command on the Finance Board and the Board can dip sample and supervise any funded project they wish. Financial accountability for money provided is monitored and reviewed by the SO Business Manager. A detailed report is required from any project lead in relation to acquisition of any ACPO TAM funds and subsequent spend and outcome.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Commander John McDowall, MPS

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

SO15 CTC Values document

Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) Values

We are one team: Team Met

We all have a duty to play our part in making London safer

• We will be proud to deliver quality policing. There is no greater priority.
• Put the needs of individuals and communities first. Be helpful and attentive.
• Make the best use of our resources.
• We will build trust by listening and responding.
• Be accessible and approachable. Build relationships. Encourage others to challenge and get involved.
• We will respect and support each other and work as a team.
• Work to bring people together. Trust and value the contribution everyone makes.
• We will learn from experience and find ways to be even better.
• Be prepared to do things differently. Challenge how we work. Share experiences and ideas.
• Living the MPS values drives all our decisions, policies, activities and behaviours.

We will be proud to deliver quality policing.

The Counter Terrorism Command (CTC) is dedicated to:

• Preventing terrorist attacks in London and beyond – the disruption of terrorist activity and the prosecution of offenders using an intelligence driven framework that integrates and optimises all information sources to drive proactive interventions, evidence gathering and protective security.
• Minimising major security threats in London – greater community awareness of counter-terrorism contingency planning, advice and information.
• Pursue terrorists and their means – professional, world-class response to terrorist related incidents.
• Protect the people, infrastructure and economy of London by ensuring it is prepared for current and emerging threats – continual community engagement and reassurance.

The establishment of the CTC provides a capacity and capability that compliments the developing national counter terrorism structure; the design has also been developed within the wider Met Modernisation Programme and will contribute to improved operation and service delivery across the organisation.

We will build trust by listening and responding.

We are committed to engaging with communities to identify specific areas of concern and responding to their needs and as part of the extended MPS family we have helped build up community trust and confidence in the service. We regularly engage with the Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate and National Community Tensions Team. This activity, especially in support of community concerns whilst undertaking executive action, continues to be refined and enhanced.

The National Anti-terrorist Hotline is a free phone number that members of the public can use to contact the CTC and give information in confidence.

The CTC Implementation Team held a Live Forum on AWARE as way to provide CTC personnel with the means to express their views and ask questions directly to the Team and the CTC SMT. There is also a robust series of various team and Command meetings throughout the year.

We will respect and support each other and work as a team.

Good leadership within the CTC is key to motivating and enabling our inclusive workforce to work together, pool their skills, knowledge and experience, working to their full potential and feeling valued.

The design of the CTC reflects the very best of Special Branch (SO12) and the Anti-terrorist Branch (SO13) while recognising that the nature of the threat from terrorism and domestic extremism required new structures and ways of working. The CTC is therefore more than the sum of the parts of SO12 and SO13. It provides a clear purpose for counter terrorism within the MPS by bringing together intelligence analysis and development with investigation. The Initial Response and Coordination Cell, the Coordinating and Taking Office, the CT Operations Suite and various National Intelligence Model (NIM) driven meetings provide synergy across the CTC bring together assets.

Not only are we fully committed to supporting our colleagues within the MPS tackle crime successfully, we fully support the CT effort under the auspices of Operation DELPHINIUS and have BOCU-based Counter-terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs) in situ across the MPS. These officers are the first point of contact for front-line colleagues, providing advice, briefings and a conduit for intelligence / information to and from SO15.

Intelligence staff from all SO OCUs, SCD and Operation Rainbow will have embedded presence with the CT Command. This will enable intelligence to be viewed from the perspective of each Command, ensure expert interpretation and provide a more comprehensive understanding of its implications.

CBRNE Officers provide an ordinance disposal capability for London. They provide operational forensic expertise regarding devices and deliver immediate advice and risk assessments, taking charge of a scene until it has been declared safe. They are significant part of the CTC team that interfaces daily with MPS colleagues, the public and partners.

We will learn from experience and find ways to be better even better.

The CTC is outward looking in its approach to learning as well as benefiting from the experiences of other police organisations, whether MPS or otherwise. Organisational learning processes are activities that will be undertaken within the CTC and contribute to the organisational memory. We are adopting a systematic approach of reviewing operations to extract and maximise knowledge. This knowledge will inform:

• How future operations are conducted through changes to standard operating practices;
• Identify new intelligence trends opportunities;
• Training and exercises for the CTC;
• Areas for further research and development;
• Learning for the Specialist Operations Business group and the extended MPS family.

This approach will contribute to the effectiveness of the CTC through continuous improvement and development by ensuring that knowledge opportunities are maximised from staff, operations, research and development and performance.

Appendix 2

Length of detention of persons arrested under terrorism legislation or terrorist related offences as at 31 December 2006

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