Crime Management Best Value Review

Report: 08
Date: 18 April 2002
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report provides a brief summary of the Crime Management Best Value Review (CMBVR) findings and is supplementary to the CMBVR Report (dated 16 October 2001) and the CMBVR Supplementary Report (dated 6 February 2002) both of which have been circulated to Members. The Review focused on the two key business processes of 'crime investigation and detection' and 'intelligence', although more emphasis was placed on the former as having the greater potential for increasing customer focus, improving business processes and realising efficiency savings whilst improving service delivery. 

Improvements proposed by the Review include establishing a central telephone investigation bureau (CTIB) staffed by dedicated civilian operators; the introduction of a central victim focus desk within the CTIB; establishing a borough based crime management system (CMS) incorporating standard operational procedures (SOPs); and employing civilian investigators within the CMS. 

Full implementation based upon the preferred civil staff model is estimated to cost £10.3m per annum, with one-off set up costs of £0.6m together with the opportunity costs of the implementation team over 2 years totalling £2m. Efficiency savings (non-cash releasing) of £22.5m per annum should be realised consisting of £21m police opportunity costs (equivalent to an extra 611 officers for operational deployment) and £1.5m civil staff opportunity costs, which will improve the speed and quality of the front counter services. By reducing the police strength by 611 officers the efficiency savings could theoretically be converted to cash releasing savings equivalent to £10.7m per annum net. 

Both models would still realise the aforementioned £1.5m civil staff efficiency savings in relation to front office services.

A. Recommendations

The CMBVR findings and recommendations have previously been circulated to Members in the aforementioned reports (see Summary overleaf) and are replicated at Appendix 1 to this report.

It is recommended that Members consider the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Crime Management Best Value Review (CMBVR) and specifically:

1(a) Approve in principle CMBVR Recommendation 1 at Appendix 1 that a 24-hour Central Telephone Investigation Bureau (CTIB) be established;

1(b) that the CTIB is staffed by dedicated civilian operators; and

1(c) approve the costs as shown in Appendix 2.

Any additional costs other than those shown in Appendix 2 would be the subject of separate business cases by the Implementation Team.

2(a) Approve in principle CMBVR Recommendation 2 at Appendix 1 that a victim focus desk is established as part of the CTIB (intermediate term);

2(c) approve the costs as shown in Appendix 2.

Members should consider whether immediate implementation on each Borough takes place and/or be deferred and the role reviewed for incorporation into the CTIB.

3(a) Approve in principle CMBVR Recommendation 5 at Appendix 1 that civilian investigators be employed in suitable roles within the crime management system (CMS); and

3(b) take note of the costs and savings as shown at Appendix 2.

The costs and savings indicated at Appendix 2 are based upon an average of two civilian investigators per Borough, however, it is likely to be greater than this. Members should note that the Implementation Stage may reveal scope for more extensive civilianisation based upon individual Borough profiles for which separate business cases need to be submitted. Implementation should take account of the Police Reform Bill.

4. Approve in principle CMBVR Recommendations 3-4 and 6-16 at Appendix 1.

These recommendations are currently being progressed by the MPS within existing budgets. Whilst not anticipated, should additional funding be required to progress any of the above then the Implementation Team will submit separate business cases.

B. Supporting information

Review scope

1. Crime management incorporates the prevention, response to and investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders. However, to make the scale of the CMBVR more manageable 'crime prevention' was included in the "Community Engagement and Community Safety" BV Review and the prosecution of offenders was included in the "Bringing Offenders to Justice" BV Review.

2. The CMBVR includes the two key processes of 'crime investigation and detection' and 'intelligence', both of which together, account for approximately 25% of the MPS' annual revenue expenditure. The CMBVR is therefore a major undertaking, both in respect of its relative importance to the public and its costs. In 2000/01 the MPS recorded 1,121,629 crimes on its Crime Reporting and Information System (CRIS). These were reported in various ways, including victims using the emergency telephone (999) or local systems (66% of the total); personal callers at police stations (22%); and by other means, e.g. police officers discovering crimes themselves.

Current performance

3. The MPS generally features at the lower end of the fourth quartiles in the national league tables for performance against crime (see Appendix A of CMBVR Supplementary Report). However, nationally there are significant difficulties with 'performance benchmarking' relating to under recording of crime and resultant inflation of detection rates. There is also the impact of social and economic factors such as poverty, unemployment, urban decay and overcrowding. Research by Leeds University taking these issues into account and using Home Office crime data based upon Boroughs / basic command units resulted in over two thirds of London Boroughs featuring in the top two quartiles for good performance against crime. This would place the MPS in much higher quartile positions (see Chapter 5 of CMBVR Report and Appendix B of the CMBVR Supplementary Report) than currently shown by the Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs).

Review team

4. A small team was established and a scoping exercise undertaken to define the parameters of the Review (see Chapter 2 of the CMBVR Report). The focus was on volume crimes at a Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU) level where there was the greatest potential for quality improvements and efficiency savings.

5. Overseeing the Review was a Project Board chaired by an assistant commissioner and consisting of various representatives from within and outside the MPS, including an MPA Member (Sir John Quinton). Sir John was also a member of the Independent Challenge Panel (ICP) and facilitated the holding of a 'workshop' for MPA members and officers to discuss in detail the CMBVR findings (note of workshop previously circulated to members).

The four 'C's

6. The challenge element was the key to achieving significant service improvements. Rigorous challenge was provided at a number of levels and included the Review team, various user groups, the MPA member, the MPS Legal Directorate and the ICP (see Chapter 3 of the CMBVR Report).

7. Extensive consultation was undertaken both within and outside the MPS and the national Police Service, with a strong focus on the views of victims of crimes. The results of consultation were used to inform the Review findings (see Chapter 4 of the CMBVR Report).

8. Comparison with other police forces (particularly the upper quartile of performers and metropolitan forces), law enforcement agencies and private companies were undertaken. The emphasis was placed on 'process' as opposed to 'metric' or 'performance' benchmarking in an effort to compare 'like with like' (see Chapter 5 of the CMBVR Report).

9. In addressing the competition element the question of whether a police function or role could be civilianised or outsourced was examined, followed by what should be civilianised or outsourced. The Review not only examined these aspects but also what services could be bought in from outside agencies, for example investigators, what could be outsourced and what could be dealt with by partners. Further work was not undertaken as this was not considered cost effective when there were proposed changes to business processes as a result of the recommendations, changing volumes as a result of the new standards within the National Crime Recording Standards and the impact of the Police Reform Bill was then unknown. Additionally, there is a need to determine the strategic and political implications of further civilianisation or outsourcing of police posts, particularly against the backdrop of increasing the police strength and the current shortfall in the civil staff strength. Until this issue is resolved the question of further civilianisation is purely speculative. At present there are few alternative service providers of 'Crime Management functions' and none with the capacity to fully meet MPS needs. Additional non-financial benefits of civilianisation could include:

• a larger and more diverse recruitment market;
• greater flexibility in working practices;
• the potential to recruit from organisations employed in similar work;
• improved performance and quality through specialisation; and
• improved motivation and focused management activity.

Once these issues have been settled and the CTIB is established and running, the question of buying in services from other agencies or outsourcing should be revisited.

(See Chapter 6 of the CMBVR Report).

CMBVR findings

10. The MPS has much to be proud of and many of its practices are 'leading edge' and have been complimented by HMIC, for example the murder review process and the work of the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force. Good practice was also identified during the CMBVR, however, the very nature of BV requires focus on those areas where there are the greatest opportunities for improvements to be made. It was fairly evident from the outset that all of the 'crime investigation and detection' sub-processes (reporting, recording, screening, allocation, investigation and disposal) were in need of reform.

11. As previously stated The MPS currently records over one million crimes each year and with changes in reporting practices (through the adoption of the National Crime Recording Standards in April 2002) and improved telecommunications the number is likely to increase in years to come. The way in which the MPS reports and investigates crime has changed little in recent years. Individual officers attend crime scenes and report and input crimes that are subsequently allocated to individual officers to investigate.

Crime reporting

12. There are a number of ways in which crime can be reported to police, although more than two thirds of initial contacts are by telephone, either by the emergency '999' system or by local calls to BOCU. The change in crime reporting towards prima facie criteria will increase the number of recorded crimes. Removing the identified slippage of crimes between the incident logs, created within the Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) system at New Scotland Yard and on BOCUs, and CRIS is also likely to increase this total.

13. Existing arrangements for telephone reporting would not be adequate to cope with this extra demand. Since their introduction Telephone Investigation Units (TIUs) have not achieved the anticipated target of recording and investigating 30% of crimes. Significant variations exist in TIU opening hours, or are lacking altogether in some boroughs. On average 70% of staff on TIUs are police officers, although examination of the role found little evidence that their knowledge, skills and experience were required. A BOCU based TIU does not represent the most efficient and cost effective way of undertaking the initial recording and investigation of crime.

CTIB

Appendix 1, Recommendation 1

14. It is essential that a system of reporting and recording crime is implemented that does not involve the attendance of police officers at crime venues unless their skills, knowledge and experience are needed. The CMBVR believes that, unless an officer's attendance is required under the existing immediate 'I' call definition, all crimes should be referred to a dedicated crime reporting and investigation bureau to undertake initial action and determine, together with the victim, the future investigative response required.

15. The current system of individual officers reporting and recording most crimes is costly in police officers' time. Additionally, with 19,000 different people using the CRIS system there are real and persistent problems with data standards compliance. This has a knock-on and detrimental effect on the 'intelligence' process. Consultation and comparison with other forces identified that a number have tried to overcome these issues by introducing centralised crime reporting centres. The HMIC Thematic Inspection Report, "On the Record", also identified the merits of 'establishing a centralised civilian reception facility'. Within the MPS, the Command, Control, Communication and Information (C3i) Project, dealing with centralised call receipt and despatch, offers the opportunity to incorporate centralised crime reporting. There is good evidence in support of the recommendation that a 24-hour CTIB is established, staffed by dedicated civil staff investigators, with officers no longer inputting directly onto CRIS, and that 100% of initial CRIS entries should be generated by the CTIB.

16. The CTIB should be a discrete unit that not only records crime, but also undertakes initial investigation and offers advice on crime prevention, scene preservation and victim care. Staff should be able to identify crimes that can be put away or sent to another unit for further investigation. To ensure a quality service is provided SOPs should be developed for use by the CTIB staff.

17. A central property input system linked to property stores should become part of the CTIB that enables fast searching of all records and the identification and restoration of property to the owners. A system for recording property over the Internet would complement crime reporting and the expansion of this communication media.

18. More than 20% of crimes are reported via personal visits to police stations. Development of confidential self-reporting facilities directly to the CTIB in all suitable police buildings should be introduced without the need to refer to the station reception officer.

Improved communication

Appendix 1, Recommendation 3

19. Not all members of the community are comfortable reporting crime at a police station or on the telephone. Initiatives need to be undertaken that increases the accessibility of the crime management services. Third party reporting should be expanded to schools and centres for the elderly and disabled, Internet reporting should be further developed together with the adoption of a 'Language Line' type facility for those who have difficulty communicating in English. Additional facilities are also required for those with speech and hearing difficulties. A publicity strategy needs to be developed to ensure that all the channels of communication available are fully advertised to the public.

Management and auditing

Appendix 1, Recommendation 9

20. In order that a central objective focus is maintained and to assist continuous improvement it is accepted good practice that a senior police officer, who is not responsible for crime performance, is appointed to the post of crime registrar to ensure that the crime reporting and recording systems and procedures are accurate and ethical. Similarly, a process owner should be identified to authorise process changes and ensure optimal performance.

21. Additionally, performance indicators are required that measure not only timeliness and ethicacy, but also the quality of investigations based upon the success of allocated tasks. To compliment this a review system is necessary that identifies good practice and adopts SOPs to maximise success.

22. Screening of crimes is currently achieved according to four categories: those that are mandatorily screened in; those that are detected; those that are considered solvable; and those that BOCUs have discretion to screen in. Consistency in screening varies across BOCUs. Decisions do not always take account of resource availability or the relative importance of different crimes, leading on occasions to resources being deployed less effectively. An earlier MPS project, 'MetCrime', had already identified some of these deficiencies.

Crime management system (CMS)

Appendix 1, Recommendation 4

23. Once screened in, crimes are either self allocated or allocated by the BOCU Crime Management Unit (CMU) with little account taken of available resources other than allocating Level 3 (serious) crimes to detectives. CMUs have largely become administrative units providing little advice about the investigation, nor are decision logs or investigative plans identifying the minimum levels of investigation used.

24. A new CMS is needed, with SOPs established throughout the process, from initial investigation and reporting to disposal. CMUs should be replaced by BOCU CMSs that are responsible only for the allocation and supervision of those crimes that have been referred to them by the CTIB. A senior detective should be responsible for the CMS and have line management responsibilities for all investigators. Upon receipt of a crime the CMS supervisor will develop an investigative plan for that offence that takes into consideration resources, prioritisation and solvability criteria. The tasks within the investigation should be allocated to individuals with the appropriate skills. A decision log should be included within the CRIS system that articulates the course of the investigation. The investigative plan should be continuously updated until it is considered that no further action can be taken at that time.

25. Better use needs to be made of financial investigation; some specialist departments that investigate commercial crime routinely undertake them and are consequently proficient. Despite investment having been made in training financial investigators on BOCUs, this has not been capitalised upon. Financial investigation should be included in the investigative plan where appropriate.

26. The MPS Scientific Support Strategy Implementation Plan is developing and enhancing the role of Identification Officers as investigators at crime scenes, where their knowledge and expertise is utilised. In most instances they should be responsible for completing the offence methodology for crimes scenes they attend.

Civilian investigators

Appendix 1, Recommendation 5

27. The Review identified that a significant proportion of the various investigative roles and functions could be undertaken by trained civil staff as opposed to police officers. Other police forces have successfully civilianised these roles, including statement taking and CCTV collection and viewing. Suitably trained members of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary should be aligned to the CMS and utilised in such roles, together with trained and accredited members of Neighbourhood Watch and other appropriate individuals and groups.

Custody teams

Appendix 1, Recommendation 6

28. Post arrest investigations are an established part of the managed process undertaken by Murder Investigation Teams. In order to maximise the efficient use of resources in dealing with volume crime, dedicated teams, not necessarily police officers, should be responsible for conducting post arrest investigations under the supervision of the CMS. The prisoner handling teams should be more than just administrative, but intelligence led, skilled and trained to maximise detections and improve case preparation. This would also allow a quicker return of arresting officers to front line service delivery.

Victim care

Appendix 1, Recommendation 2

29. An objective of the CMBVR was to "better match the MPS to the needs and expectations of the diverse community of London". Extensive consultation identified that, although the majority of victims were satisfied with the way they were dealt with, there was an underlying and consistent theme for improvement, particularly in respect of the service provided to victims.

30. To complement the many suggested changes in crime management a new system of victim care is proposed. In the intermediate to long term a victim focus desk should be established within the CTIB (in the short term on each BOCU). A tactical options menu for victim care should be developed. An existing Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) officer should be appointed process owner for victim services, with a senior member of staff on each BOCU responsible for setting strategy and tactics for victim care. Victim care should be considered a partnership issue and form a specific strand of BOCUs crime and disorder strategies.

31. The MPS has already made significant advances in victim care, particularly with regard to family liaison in which it is an acknowledged leader. However, consultation has shown that there is a need to improve appropriate initial contacts with victims and their families. Training needs to be given to properly equip officers for such contact and all decisions relating to victims and their families must be documented.

Demand reduction strategies

Appendix 1, Recommendation 10

32. A fundamental principle behind many of the CMBVR recommendations is to reduce the burden on operational staff. Whilst there were some isolated pockets of good work to manage demand regarding non-priority crimes, no overall strategic co-ordinated responses were found. This has led to resources being demand led and often diverted from focusing upon priority crimes. Furthermore, the absence of a corporate approach has led to inconsistency in service delivery. Other agencies are exploring outcomes other than prosecution. Strategies need to be developed, in consultation with those affected, which identify the appropriate responses to all crime types.

CRIS functionality

Appendix 1, Recommendation 8

33. Many of the CMBVR findings have implications for the CRIS system and the ongoing 'refresh project' to improve its functionality will take account of the findings contained within this report for inclusion in future upgrades.

34. With the adoption and implementation of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) the CMBVR examined only those areas of intelligence that directly support the 'crime investigation and detection' process, the provision of 'hot intelligence' to operational staff and a few other relevant specific areas.

Crimestoppers

Appendix 1, Recommendation 11

35. The dedicated Crimestoppers Unit within the MPS provided information and intelligence that led to a total of 521 arrests in 2000/01, as well as large drug and property seizures. Since May 2001 the method of passing information to BOCUs has been improved to make use of computer, as opposed to paper, transfers.

36. The success of Crimestoppers relies on its ease of access to all sections of the community by telephone. In line with the MPS Diversity Strategy it is necessary to improve its access by use of a 'Language Line' type facility, by providing facilities for those with hearing and speech disabilities and through focused publicity within the specialist media.

Covert Human Intelligence Source

Appendix 1, Recommendation 12

37. Significant improvements have recently been made in dealing with informants or CHISs. This year a computerised Informant Management System (IMS) has been introduced. The CMBVR examined ways to streamline, and increase integrity within, the informant payment process. In the short-term credit transfers can be made to BOCUs from central funds thereby negating the need for officers to travel to central locations. This also offers an approximate annual saving of £80,000 in opportunity costs. A subsequent evaluation of IMS with respect to workloads of authorising officers could yield further efficiency savings by redefining their roles and centralising the function.

38. Many roles within crime management do not require police powers and there are advantages to be gained in using civil staff in certain specific roles. Recruitment can be made outside of the police norms and, as training is specific, costs could be reduced. There are certain surveillance duties already undertaken by civil staff, for example photographers. Further work needs to be undertaken to establish the appropriate level of civilianisation without compromising the effectiveness and efficiency of the surveillance capability.

39. A number of different agencies were visited and consulted by the CMBVR team. It was apparent that, with a few exceptions, there was little appreciation of each other's work. Many of the agencies have similar investigative and intelligence processes that could benefit the MPS. In order that experiences and best practice can be shared closer liaison is needed; this could be realised through the development of an exchange programme for investigators.

Corporate IT systems

Appendix 1, Recommendation 13

40. Individual members of staff currently submit and input information directly to the corporate criminal intelligence system (CRIMINT). Consequently, data standards suffer, officers are abstracted from front line service delivery, and intelligence submissions are delayed. In the short-term this could be addressed with improved training and education of staff in the use of intelligence. However, in the longer term it is likely to be more beneficial if a centralised inputting system (or the use of mobile data terminals) was adopted and the current computer systems improved so that they become self-populating, that is, require single keying.

41. Although CRIMINT is the corporate intelligence database, in reality information and intelligence is held on many different systems, for example CAD, the Police National Computer, CRIS and the Custody system. Whilst there are projects underway to enable retrieval of some of this intelligence, there needs to be a system of single key entry and access to all the systems, particularly the intelligence database.

Tasking of resources

Appendix 1, Recommendation 14

42. Proactive operations are co-ordinated using Proactive and Tasking Proformas (PATPs). Disparity of content and quality of completion, particularly in closing reports, has inhibited any subsequent analysis of success. It is important that proactivity is intelligence led through analytical research and sanctioned by tasking and co-ordinating groups. The PATPs need to incorporate sufficient information to enable cost benefit analysis to be undertaken. In time, a costed tactical menu should be developed allowing operational decisions to be made based upon probabilities of success and costs. On a more positive note the Operational Solutions Database has already begun the process of sharing good practice via the Intranet.

Borough intelligence

Appendix 1, Recommendation 15

43. Current opening hours of Borough Intelligence Units (BIUs) limit the provision and use of analytical services. Intelligence briefings and taskings are generally provided at the beginning of a tour of duty in the form of a briefing on parade, without further updates during the shift. Officers are despatched to incidents often with the barest of information and are not given the best opportunity to detect offenders, or to protect themselves or the public from known risks that are potentially held within disparate corporate databases.

44. The Service Intelligence Bureau provides a twenty-four hour service, subject to certain criteria, but the increase in identified critical and serious incidents requires the provision of similar borough based capabilities. This could be achieved through a twenty-four hour BIU, or by improved information technology systems that enable live intelligence updates throughout tours of duty and for CAD directed intelligence tasking.

Training requirements

Appendix 1, Recommendation 7

45. An assessment of the training needs required to implement the recommendations is required. In some cases there may be savings, for example a reduction in the amount of CRIS training given to police officers, and in others the need for greater investment, such as managers receiving training in the effective use of intelligence, performance management and data analysis. Training should be aligned to qualifications, such as National Vocational Qualifications, that recognise the competencies of those involved in investigation. In essence a comprehensive training needs analysis is required to ensure that the right people have the right skills for their roles and that there is an appropriate return on any training investment made. A full business case will be required should it be necessary for additional funding to progress this recommendation.

46. The CMBVR also identified a number of management issues in line with its remit as a 'pathfinder review'. These recommendations are listed in Chapter 9 and Appendix II of the CMBVR Report and in the Supplementary Report and are being progressed as part of MPS corporate development. Where appropriate each management recommendation will form a specific project, the costs of which will be met from the existing delegated budget. Should additional funding be required for any other aspect of the Review then the Implementation Team will submit separate business cases for each.

47. The CMBVR Supplementary Report provides a breakdown of the Improvement Plan and includes details on the rationale, budget implications, non-financial benefits and the current MPS position.

Conclusions

48. Without significant change there is limited scope to more effectively manage existing resources against the background of increasing demand, whilst providing an efficient and effective service to the public. The impact of implementation of the proposals is anticipated to lead to an improved quality of service which focuses more on victims' needs leading to increased public satisfaction, not only from victims of crime but also from callers at police station front offices and telephone callers requiring police officer attendance. Abstractions from patrol will be reduced and the patrol function will be enhanced. Judicial disposals will increase and the quality of police evidence and prosecution case papers will improve with a resultant reduction in court discontinuance rates.

49. The Review took 15 months to complete at a cost of £569,500, and below that budgeted for the Review. The final report was delivered in October 2001, one month ahead of schedule.

50. Members are asked to endorse Recommendations 3-4 and 6-16, which are currently being progressed by the MPS within existing budgets, and to approve in principle Recommendations 1-2 and 5, and decide upon the most appropriate method of financing these improvements. Members should also note the management issues contained within the original report and Supplementary Report.

C. Financial implications

1. Full details of the costs and benefits are provided at Appendix 2 (see Supporting material). Full implementation of the preferred civil staff model is estimated to cost £10.3m per annum with additional one-off set up costs of £0.6m and opportunity costs for the Implementation Team over 2 years of £2m. This should provide £22.5m per annum in efficiency savings (non-cash releasing) consisting of £21m police opportunity costs (equivalent to an extra 611 police officers for operational deployment) and £1.5m civil staff opportunity costs, which will improve the other front counter services.

2. The annual running costs of the CTIB (Appendix 1, Recommendation 1), using the preferred civil staff model is estimated to be £8.7m of which £0.6m is contained within the existing budget (this model requires a budgetary growth of £8.1m). The annual running costs using an alternative police staff model is £11.1m of which £5.2m is contained within the existing budget (this model requires a budgetary growth of £5.9m per annum). However, efficiency savings are substantially reduced (from 611 officers to 386 officers) using the police staff model.

Options

3. Members are asked to approve in principle the key CMBVR recommendations shown at Appendix 1 and where there is a financial cost to approve an option to finance from those shown at Appendix 2 (see Supporting material).

4. There are 2 models for staffing the CTIB, victim focus desk and civilian investigators, namely the civil staff model and the police model, full details of which are provided at Appendix 2 (see Supporting material). Each model is subdivided into three to reflect the various options for financing them as follows:

CMBVR Recommendation 1 - Establishing a 24-hour CTIB

Model 1 Civil staff model

1(a) Funded by new budget;
1(b) Funded by Accenture Review cashable efficiency savings;
1(c) Funded from existing police staff budget through trading police posts for civil staff.

Model 2 Police model

2(a) Funded by new budget;
2(b) Funded by Accenture Review cashable efficiency savings;
2(c) Funded from existing police staff budget through redeployment of staff.

CMBVR Recommendation 2 - Establishing a victim focus desk; and CMBVR Recommendation 5 - Employing civilian investigators within the CMS

Both CMBVR Improvements 2 and 5 are subject to similar financial options as CMBVR Improvement 1 above or a combination of all three options.

5. Members should note that the stated efficiency savings are based upon the civil staff model and could be turned into cash releasing savings by reducing the police strength by the numbers identified in the review. By fully implementing the CMBVR recommendations an efficiency saving of £21m per annum, equivalent to 611 police officers, can be made whilst incurring an expenditure of £10.3m per annum. Were Members to decide that a similar reduction in police numbers could be made through these efficiency savings, then approximately £10.7m net per annum could be cash releasing. This approach, however, would appear to be counter-productive to the current recruitment campaign to increase police numbers.

Preferred option

6. It is strongly recommended that the civil staff model is adopted as this will maximise efficiency savings and release the optimum numbers of police officers to patrol duties. If possible, new finance should be found, either through increases in the revenue budget or by redirecting cash releasing efficiency savings identified by Accenture. There is, however, an option to accommodate these costs within the existing police budget by trading police posts for civil staff although this is likely to adversely impact the current drive to increase the MPS strength. This will also require an agreed approach between the MPA and the MPS and the development of new performance indicators that measures the strength and / or percentage of total police strength deployed on operational / patrol duties as opposed to the current measurement of police strengths / numbers.

Implementation

Appendix 1, Recommendation 16

7. A communications strategy has been devised that addresses both internal and external needs and forms part of the implementation plan, however, marketing of the Review's findings, recommendations and implementation plan is subject to Members approval of the CMBVR report.

8. A Project Board will be established to monitor the progress of implementation of the Improvement Plan. Sir John Quinton has agreed to be the MPA representative on the Board, which will also include a former member of the ICP and senior representatives of the MPS. The costs of implementation will be collated centrally and regular updates provided to Project Board. A programme of post-implementation evaluations will be conducted to ensure anticipated benefits are achieved.

D. Background papers

None.

E. Contact details

Report author: Detective Chief Superintendent John Bates, MPS.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1: CMBVR Recommendations

1. A 24-hour Central telephone Investigation bureau (CTIB) be established, staffed by dedicated civilian operators:

1. Police officers only attend crime-related incidents that demand an immediate response and all other crime is reported by telephone;
2. All crime reports to be created by the CTIB, including subsequently those incidents attended by police officers due to the need for immediate response;
3. The CTIB to be a discrete unit with its own supervisory structure that undertakes initial investigation, identifies investigative leads and provides advice based on Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), on scene preservation, crime prevention and victim support and is able to identify repeat victims and their special needs;
4. The CTIB assesses all recorded crimes to identify if they can be put away or need to be passed to another unit for further investigation;
5. A central property input system be part of the CTIB linked to other property recording systems and CRIS;
6. An Internet access system for the direct recording of property is established;
7. That confidential telephone reporting facilities, with direct access to the CTIB be established at suitable police buildings;
8. 'Third party' reporting to be extended to schools and venues specifically for the elderly, persons with disabilities and the homeless;
9. A project is initiated to enable the direct reporting of crime to the CTIB on the Internet.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.1-7.36 and 7.61 refer)

2. A victim focus desk should be established on each borough. A review is undertaken for a central victim focus desk with the establishment of the CTIB:

1. A tactical options manual for victim care is developed.
2. An existing ACPO officer is made the process owner for victim care.
3. A senior member of staff on each OCU is made responsible for setting strategy and tactics for victim care.
4. Victim care forms a specific strand of BOCU Crime and Disorder Strategies.
5. Existing training should provide the skills to equip officers to deal with victims and their families at the time of initial contact.
6. Decisions re victims and involving /informing families be documented.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.73-7.80 refer)

3. Improve communication:

1. A strategy is developed to publicise crime reporting procedures, making use of all the available methods of communication including the Internet, taking into consideration those customers who do not have English as their first language, persons with speech, hearing or other disabilities.
2. A 'language line' type facility to be adopted to enhance the service provided to those who have difficulty communicating in English or who have speech or hearing impairments.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 4.32-4.33 and 7.37 refer)

4. A Crime Management System (CMS) is adopted with SOPs throughout the process from initial reporting and investigation to the point where a crime is 'put away':

1. A 24 hour BOCU CMS replaces the existing Crime Management Unit (CMU) and should be responsible for the allocation and supervision of crimes that have been referred to them by the CTIB.
2. The BOCU CMS is managed by a senior detective officer with line management responsibility for all investigators.
3. On the receipt of each crime, the CMS develops an investigative plan that is germane to the offence and takes into consideration resources, prioritisation and solvability.
4. Tasks within the investigation are allocated to individuals with appropriate skills.
5. The investigation plan be updated until it is considered that no further reasonable action can be taken.
6. Financial investigation to be included in the plan for appropriate crimes.
7. Identification Officers are to complete the method section of CRIS in cases they attend.
8. Selected and suitably trained Metropolitan Special Constabulary (MSC) officers to be assigned to the CMS as part of the investigative team.
9. A decision log is adopted within the CRIS system to articulate the course of an investigation.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.40-7.61 and 7.64 refer)

5. Civilian investigators be employed in suitable roles within the CMS:

1. The feasibility of training and accrediting members of neighbourhood watches and other suitable organisations and individuals to enable them to assist in witness appeals, searching open spaces and clerical checking of statements is explored.
2. A detailed assessment is made of the costs and benefits (financial and operational) of employing civil staff on surveillance duties, both static and mobile, as part of surveillance teams.
3. Training for civilian investigators.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.62-7.63, 7.65 and 7.94-7.101 refer)

6. Pre-charge prisoner reception (custody teams) are established with suitably trained staff, operating to appropriate SOPs and supervised from within the CMS.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.66-7.72 refer)

7. A training needs analysis (TNA) be undertaken to establish the new level of training required as recommendations are adopted:

1. The establishment of a recognised qualification for the competencies involved in investigation.
2. Training for managers in the effective use of intelligence, performance management and data analysis.
3. Research and establish an exchange programme for investigators with other agencies.
4. Training for prisoner handling teams.
5. Training for dedicated statement takers.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.61-7.63, 7.72, 7.102-7.103 and 7.124-7.127 refer)

8. The CRIS refresh project considers improvements to CRIS functionality including:

1. Facilities to provide even more accurate and timely management information and intelligence.
2. An input page with prompt questions to facilitate telephone investigation.
3. Automatic recognition of repeat victims.
4. Automatic audit of CAD incident reports against CRIS entries.
5. The provision of a decision log facility.
6. A prompt when crimes are transferred from CTIB to inform BOCU CMS that a crime awaits allocation or that new information has been added.
7. SOPs for crime screening and victim care.
8. Generic investigation plans.
9. Development of algorithms that produce correct classifications.
10. DNA and fingerprint identification and evidence to be sent via CRIS with prompt for CMS that the information has been attached to the crime report.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.85 refers)

9. Management and auditing:

1. An existing ACPO officer be identified as process owner for crime investigation and detection:
2. A senior police officer, who is not responsible for crime performance, be appointed as Crime Registrar.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.38-7.39 refer)

10. Strategies be developed, following consultation, that identify the appropriate response to all crimes taking into consideration the nature of the crime and history of offender:

1. Performance indicators to be developed that measure not only timeliness and ethical practice but also the quality of the investigation.
2. A Review system is developed that identifies good practice and adapts SOPs to maximise success.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.52-7.61 and 7.81-7.84 refer)

11. Improvements are made to Crimestoppers by:

1. Having information sent to BOCUs via CRIMINT.
2. Introducing a language line and facilities for those with speech and hearing difficulties to facilitate information gathering.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.91-7.93 refer)

12. The means of paying CHIS (Covert Human Intelligence Sources previously known as informants) be made more efficient and auditable:

1. The introduction of a credit transfer facility from central funds to BOCUs (short term).
2. Payments made to CHISs against signature and thumb print (long term)
3. Consider how and to what extent direct payments can be made to CHISs via the banking system (long term).
4. With the introduction of Informants Management System and electronic transfers the opportunity exists to consider the location and number of authorising officers.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.94-7.97 refer)

13. Improved IT systems, access and partnership for intelligence:

1. Single key entry and access to the intelligence database.
2. The inputting of intelligence via mobile data terminals or central inputting via a secure communication channel.
3. The use of enhanced Information Technology (IT) incorporating programmes to 'clean' information.
4. IT to self populate the CRIMINT system from other sources, e.g. CRIS.
5. Greater liaison with partner agencies to maximise the benefits of intelligence systems.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.108-7.114 refer)

14. Proactive and Tasking Proformas (PATPs) to be redesigned to ensure minimum standards of completion and to include costings and results:

1. That all PATP forms emanate from the Borough Intelligence Unit (BIU) and are approved by the Co-ordinating and Tasking Group (CTG) or the Operations Manager.
2. A review system of PATPs is introduced to analyse success.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.115-7.118 refer)

15. A 24-hour BOCU intelligence service is provided either by the Borough Intelligence Unit (BIU) or by the adoption of IT within control rooms:

1. Live feeds of intelligence during a tour of duty to operational officers and the delivery of taskings to individual officers where appropriate.
2. Provision of intelligence that requires a specific and focused response through BOCU control rooms.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 7.119-7.122 refer)

16. Implementation of the CMBVR findings is progressed by an implementation team, adhering to recognised project management principles and reporting to a specific project board. The team must be adequately supported by trained staff and have the specific task of setting meaningful targets applicable to the baseline data at that time so that proper evaluation can be undertaken.

(CMBVR Report paragraphs 8.1-8.7 refer)

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