Gun crime

Report: 10
Date: 11 November 2002
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report provides an update on the current position with gun related crime within the MPS and details the MPS response.

A. Recommendation

Members are asked to note the contents of this report.

B. Supporting information

1. The MPS Planning, Performance and Review Committee on 30 September 2002 requested a report on gun crime that addressed the following issues.

• An update on trends in gun crime against policing plan targets.
• Detail of borough performance and trends.
• Comment on the reasons for recent increases in gun crime.
• Comment on how Safer Streets is affecting gun crime.
• Detail of how SO is tackling gun crime.
• Other factors the MPS consider relevant.

2. This report seeks to answer the questions raised by the Committee.

MPS Performance in relation to gun crime objective

3. The MPA set the MPS a challenging target in relation to gun related crime. The service was asked to restrict the growth of gun related crime in line with the fourth quarter of 2001/2002.

4. To achieve this, the service had to remain below 310 offences per month. The MPS continues to maintain course towards achieving that objective with an average for the year to date at the end of the second quarter, of 308 offences per month.

5. Progress over this period has not been consistent, with a surge in offending in the months of July & August. (See Graph 1 overleaf)

Graph 1: Gun crime rates for 2002/2003
This graph is available from the MPA.

6. This graph also identifies some clear offending trends where a clear inference in relation to level of offending with a firearm can be drawn. Of particular interest is the level of ‘robbery of personal property’ and ‘common assault’. This provides clear evidence that the firearm or imitation firearm is being used in lower level crime on the street.

7. The characteristics of this type of offence, when committed with a firearm, pose significant difficulties for the service. The carriage of firearms by ‘street criminals’ raises officer safety concerns and demands a different level of focus, particularly in the area of ‘common assault’, than may have previously been the case. These offences are investigated by SO7 (Serious and Organised Crime).

8. Commercial robbery offences continue to show a decrease, although caution should be taken as the months immediately leading up to Christmas have traditionally been a period of increased levels of offending.

9. The number of offences where a firearm has been discharged causing injury has increased when compared with the same calendar period last year. This rise is to be found in the non-Trident investigations where over the course of the six months, there has been an increase of 15 offences equivalent to a 30% rise in this offence group.

10. Trident offending remains at the same level as last year although the rate of offending has not been consistent, with the summer months of July and August being offence prevalent. The months of September and October have seen a reduction in the level of offending and should these levels be maintained, there is a possibility of Trident offences showing a significant reduction.

Borough performance trends

11. The six Trident hot spot boroughs, Brent, Haringey, Hackney, Lambeth, Newham and Southwark remain the areas of highest offending. However, there is a clear spread across boroughs that in the past have not been greatly affected. It is probable that this is the result of a spreading culture amongst young black males that sees the firearm as a fashion accessory. Incidents amongst young Asian and Turkish males suggest that this culture, which has its roots in Caribbean / American behaviour, is spreading.

Graph 2: Gun crime across London boroughs
This graph is available from the MPA.

12. The specific challenge for boroughs that are now being confronted with firearms offences is to ensure that they exploit all intelligence, investigative and operational opportunities. This may require a change in focus of resources, particularly in relation to focus desks, to ensure compliance with service intelligence and forensic protocols.

13. Those boroughs known as Trident hot spot boroughs continue through partnership approaches, i.e. ‘Not another drop’ and local Trident IAG’s, to demonstrate a significant commitment to reduce gun crime that is grounded in local communities.

Firearms offences dealt with by Trident.

14 Firearm offences dealt with by trident during the period April 2002 to October 2002 were.

• Murder – 11 offences.
• Attempted murder – 33 offences.
• Other shootings – 71 offences.

Firearms offences dealt with by SO7.

15. Firearms offences dealt with by SO7 during April 2002 to October 2002 were

• Commercial Robbery – 323 offences.
• Shootings – 61 offences.

Reason for recent increases in gun crime

16. It can be seen from graph 1 that the overall level of offending is below the last quarter of 2001/2002 and that seasonal factors have clearly impacted upon offence levels. Whilst this is acknowledged, the Service must be concerned over the changing role of the firearm in criminality. It is no longer the preserve of the organised criminal but is now commonly used by those committing low-level street offences. This is clearly a cultural issue that will not be impacted upon by the police service alone. It requires a multi-agency approach, supported by local authorities, funding from government and underpinned by preventative legislation. This is particularly relevant in regards to the sale of replica air weapons that are capable of conversion to Section 1 firearms. The Service should seek to achieve the inclusion of firearms crime within local crime & disorder strategies.

Impact of safer streets

17. Safer Streets has surprisingly had little apparent impact on the level of firearm related violent crime. This is concerning for the Service given the increase in the levels of offences that are committed by low-level criminals. A causation factor is clearly the strength of the culture that sees a firearm as equalling power and respect.

SO response to gun crime

18. S.O. respond to gun crime in a number of ways. Operation Trident deals with offences where a firearm is discharged within the Black community, by a member of the Black community. Their response is holistic and is now considered a centre of good practice. The response by Operation Trident is intelligence led and confronts some of London’s most dangerous criminals. The two key groups of offending are underpinned by the ‘Crack Cocaine’ trade and issues of ‘Respect’. The performance of the unit over the past 12 months has significantly improved with clear-up rates for murder rising from 25% to 64%, an indication of a significant change in community support.

19. SO7 deal with other offences where a firearm is discharged or used for intimidation purposes to effect offences of commercial robbery. The response to commercial robbery is known as the ‘Flying Squad’, is mature and whilst dealing with some 30% of robbery offences, contributes some 75% of the clear-ups for the MPS. The response to shootings investigations is less mature and is still awaiting identified resources.

20. SO11 plays a supporting role, providing the strategic assessment based upon the Service Intelligence Protocols and supplying specialist operational support.

21. SO19 provides the armed response so vital to confronting those criminals prepared to use extreme acts of violence in the commission of offences.

22. Each SO1 OCU has a murder suppression team. Whilst their focus is primarily on ‘persistent dangerous offenders’, they are able to make a significant contribution confronting those persons looking to commit murder.

23. This response is co-ordinated through a Service Tasking and Co-ordinating Group that has ensured that the focus of SO has been to support boroughs by confronting those armed criminals who are beyond the capability of borough resources.

SCG Operational Outcomes

24. TRIDENT (Figures since January 2002)

57 armed operations
351 persons arrested & charged
96 firearms retrieved
2958 rounds of ammunition retrieved
3.5 kilos heroin seized
12 kilos crack cocaine seized
67 kilos cocaine seized
6.5 kilos cannabis seized

25. SO7 (Figures from May to October 2002)

236 armed operations.
281 arrests
30 firearms retrieved
130 kilo’s cannabis seized
14 kilos cocaine seized
16000 ecstasy tablets (MDNA) seized
5 kilos heroin seized
27 lives saved

Service way forward

26. The MPS strategy in relation to gun crime is articulated in Special Police Notice 5 of 2002 and was published on 17 April 2002

27. The strategy follows the MPS policing model and sets out the protocols and procedures to be followed in relation to the investigation of armed crime.

28. Clear guidance is given in relation to the identified critical success factors of intelligence and forensics with compulsory protocols to be followed which will ensure investigative opportunities are identified.

29. Implementation and monitoring of the strategy is achieved through a service control mechanism which sets out individual responsibility and includes both SO and TP representatives (Appendix 1). Performance review is undertaken alongside the safer streets review, acknowledging the clear links between street robbery offending and the lower level of Violent Armed Criminality.

Summary

30. The MPS is currently on course to achieve the objective set, which is being achieved through the efforts of both local Boroughs and Specialist Operations. The work of the SCG has become increasingly focussed on ‘men of violence’, it is the intention that this level of focus will maintain.

31. An increasing challenge for the MPS are those offences confronted by Boroughs and the culture that many young men are now developing that sees the firearm / imitation firearm as a fashion accessory.

32. This type of offence, when coupled with a confrontational attitude, poses serious problems for street duty and armed police officers.

C. Equality and diversity implications

In recognition of the potential impact of operational activity to reduce gun crime within the remit of Operation Trident, an Independent Advisory Group chaired by Mr Lee Jasper, provides advice and guidance on equality and diversity issues. This IAG is supported by local Borough based Trident IAG’s.

D. Financial implications

There are no direct financial implications resulting from this report.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Alan Brown, MPS.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

MPS control strategy

Service Lead: DAC Griffiths

Gold: Commander Alan Brown

• Provide strategic direction
• Monitor and evaluate progress

Silver Operations: Det Ch Supt Sellers

• Provide strategic and tactical advice to BOCU Commanders, Superintendent Operations and Crime Managers in support of MPS ‘Gun Crime’ objectives

Silver Intelligence Det Supt Gallan

• Provide a strategic assessment for Gun Crime to the Strategic Crime Priorities Group (SCPG)
• Facilitate the flow of firearms information between Borough, SO units and other law enforcement agencies as appropriate
• Identify and assess operational opportunities requiring SO support

Bronze Operations, SO SO1(5) & SO7, Superintendent (Operations)

• Within the OCU terms of reference (see Special Notice 5/2002) articulate a plan to counter armed criminality, including objectives
• Ensure OCU activity is focused on activities in support plan

Bronze Intelligence, SO SO1(5) & SO7 Intelligence Team Leaders

• To ensure all information received is evaluated, corroborated and subsequently actioned within a timely manner
• To ensure intelligence protocols as set out in Special Notice 5/2002 are followed

Bronze Operations, TP Hot Spot Borough OCU Superintendent (Operations)

• With Borough colleagues, create a plan to control armed criminality within the OCU in compliance with service strategy, to include objectives and performance indicators
• Ensure OCU activity is in line with the service and local strategy

Bronze Intelligence, TP Borough Crime Manager

• To ensure all information received is evaluated, corroborated and subsequently actioned within a timely manner
• To ensure intelligence protocols as set out in Special Notice 5/2002 are followed

SO1(5) = Operation Trident
SO7 = Serious & Organised Crime

Send an e-mail linking to this page

Feedback