Crime Management Best Value Review, Implementation Plan Update

Report: 18
Date:12 July 2004
By: Commissioner

Summary

An implementation plan for the Crime Management Best Value Review (CMBVR) was approved by the Planning, Performance and Review Committee in September 2002. At the same time it was decided that progress on implementation would be reported in formal, twice yearly reports.

The last report, in December 2003, outlined that as a result of a decision to withdraw funding for implementation, most of the outstanding recommendations of the CMBVR, notably the establishment of a Central Telephone Investigation Bureau (CTIB), could not be progressed.

The report, however, outlined the need to develop and enhance the service provided by existing, borough based Telephone Investigation Bureaux (TIB) to both improve the service provided to victims of crime and to support the C3i Programme.

This paper outlines the progress made in establishing enhanced and corporate borough based TIB.

A. Recommendations

1. Members note the progress made in developing borough based Telephone Investigation Bureaux and remaining recommendations of the Crime Management Best Value Review.

B. Supporting information

1. In the last update report to the Authority the implications of withdrawing funding for the implementation of the CMBVR were outlined, in particular the impact on the establishment of a CTIB, the main recommendation of the review.

2. The decision to progress a borough based option for TIB rather than CTIB means that the original implementation plan is no longer relevant to the development of telephone investigation within the MPS. The decision not to progress with it had implications on other recommendations of the CMBVR, some of which were dependent on CTIB development.

3. Some funding already provided for CMBVR implementation (a sum of £1.3m per annum) has been earmarked to support the development of corporate TIB on Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU). These are required to support the implementation of the C3i Programme.

4. A quality assurance review of existing TIB service has been conducted and has been used as a benchmark against future service provision. Details of this review are considered in Appendix 1.

5. Territorial Policing (TP) is now assessing the standard of service provided by existing TIB and establishing a corporate standard in preparation for Metcall. This will allow the new Metcall OCU to pass suitable calls to TIB on boroughs according to set criteria and within agreed opening hours. A scope for crimes that are suitable for reporting by TIB has been considered and agreed by both the TP Command Team and C3i Strategy Group. This scope is outlined in Appendix 2. The scope was designed in consultation with BOCU TIB staff, notably those in the first tranche of boroughs transferring to Metcall.

6. The rollout of the ‘corporate’ TIB will mirror that of the C3i Programme. A BOCU ‘change pack’ has been designed to assist boroughs so that their TIB is working to the approved scope before the transfer of command and control from the relevant BOCU to Metcall. A trial BOCU will be used to validate the scope and agreed processes.

7. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are being developed to ensure that TIBs maximise the number of detections of telephone reported crime as well as ensuring the retrieval of any forensic or other evidence.

8. The remaining recommendations being progressed as part of development of Integrated Borough Operations or by ‘Operation Emerald (Criminal Justice) are considered in Appendix 3.

C. Race and equality impact

The under reporting of crime, in particular by minority ethnic communities and vulnerable groups throughout London, was identified by the CMBVR. The enhanced TIB will allow greater access to the crime reporting processes of the service and thus to the more vulnerable groups in society.

D. Financial implications

1. In the financial year 2003-04, £1.3million was made available for the implementation of the CMBVR. A similar sum is available for the current financial year. This has been set aside to develop TIB and to obtain the facilities and equipment necessary to allow it to roll out in conjunction with Metcall. All other funding has been withdrawn.

2. The CMBVR identified the potential for significant opportunity cost savings as the result of telephone investigation, by reducing the requirement for police officers to attend and record allegations of crime, which were suitable for investigation and recording over the telephone. Opportunity cost savings as a result of the increased use of TIB have previously been reported on. These will continue to be realised as a corporate TIB is developed across the MPS.

3. In order to allow a link between BOCU TIB and Metcall, a link to the C3i Contact Handling System has been obtained over existing IT systems. This portal is being developed at a cost of £430k. It will allow the transfer of data to and from BOCU and Metcall and ensure that TIB are compliant with National Crime Recording Standards. It will be available for BOCU TIB prior to their transfer to Metcall.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report Author: Robert Broadhurst, Commander (Patrol) TP HQ

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

Quality Assurance Check of BOCU based TIB, summary of findings.

This Quality Assurance Check (QAC) involved a total of 98 telephone contacts with Borough Operational Command Units, where a ‘member of the public’ rang to report a crime. A mystery shopping methodology was used whereby individuals known as assessors covertly posed as members of the public to test the MPS service delivery in this area. Although this approach is relatively new within the police service, it is a well established method of assessing service delivery in the private sector.

A private company with extensive experience in the mystery shopping field (FDS International) was contracted by the MPS to undertake the exercise in consultation with the Metropolitan Police Inspectorate. The company is one of several participating in a contract with the MPS whereby they tender for each bespoke QAC project within an established framework. The company most able to deliver the objectives of the exercise in a cost efficient manner is awarded the project.

The primary objective of the exercise was to benchmark MPS performance when a member of the public attempted to report a crime which was suitable for telephone investigation and recording.

The second objective was to assess MPS compliance with the National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS). The NCRS were introduced in 2002 to standardise how police forces in England and Wales deal with initial allegations of crime and ensure greater consistency.

In keeping with recommendations made by the MPS Internal Consultancy Group (ICG) the assessors employed on the exercise represented the three main ethnic groupings of White, Black and Asian. In addition, the assessors were an equal number of males and females with a wide range in ages.

FDS monitored and evaluated the results, with the MPS Inspectorate conducting remote monitoring of the CAD and the CRIS systems to ensure that none of the exercises were compromised and that CRIS reports were screened out and completed to minimise the impact on police resources.
Each Borough OCU was contacted by three different assessors wishing to report the theft of a pedal cycle; with two additional pilot exercises being conducted within Westminster.

Key Findings.

Overall, this exercise has determined that the MPS operate telephone crime recording on all the 32 Borough OCUs. It has demonstrated that 85% of allegations were recorded as a crime without the victim attending the station in person. In 83% of cases, police were judged to be ‘very professional’ or ’professional’ in dealing with the allegation.

Approximately 12% of calls to the switchboard were misrouted, with victims being transferred to TIBs or Crime Management units rather than the appropriate Control Room.

TIBs were efficient at returning the victims initial call but generally unavailable when the victim attempted to phone back into the TIB to provide greater details. This unavailability of police staff resulted in only 63% of victims actually speaking to members of the TIB.

There was often a perception that police expected the victim to report the crime at a time convenient to the police, rather than the reverse.

Police staff were poor at providing the victim with a reference number, particularly at the point of initial contact (CAD). This sometimes led to difficulties in police identifying the victim later in the process.

The quality of service varied both between and within BOCUs, with a lack of consistency in the way victims were treated. The advice provided at the initial point of contact was not always representative of the service actually offered by that OCU.

The unavailability of TIB staff to victims returning calls led to significant inefficiencies. Some victims attempted to contact police on as many as five occasions, responding to multiple answerphone messages left by police.

Some staff still failed to record allegations as crimes due to difficulty in re-contacting the victim (4 occasions).

Despite the availability of TIB on all Boroughs, seven assessors were advised to attend a local station to report their crime.

Approximately 2% of initial contacts with police to report a crime were ‘lost in the system’, with no traceable CAD or CRIS number. It is assumed these callers were transferred to non Control Room extensions.

All of the 32 BOCUs contacted during the exercise were operating a TIB and recorded at least one crime using the telephone system.

On average, initial calls to BOCUs received a response from TIB staff within one and a half days. 50% received a response on the same day.

35% of callers never spoke directly to a member of the TIB, although in the majority of cases a crime was recorded.

A significant number of assessors had difficulty in obtaining a response from Control Rooms after transfer by the switchboard staff. There were 146 attempts to achieve 96 contacts beyond the switchboard.

Significant difficulty was encountered when trying to call back to the TIB. Assessors made 170 attempts, resulting in 62 successful contacts.
Assessors were given no explanation of why police asked seemingly irrelevant questions while recording the crime.

There was a reluctance to provide reference numbers over the telephone (CAD or CRIS numbers).

Police staff demonstrated a lack of understanding for victim availability, workplace rules or lifestyle.

All but one of the CRIS reports generated adopted the structured reporting style. All the CRIS reports were supervised, classified and completed.

Barriers to efficient telephone investigation of crime

• Misrouting of calls directly to the TIB or CMU when the victim makes initial contact.
• Victims having to wait in excess of 5 minutes for Control Room staff to answer their call or having to phone back on several occasions.
• Staff misadvising victims regarding BOCU TIB policy.· Not providing victims with a CAD reference number following initial contact.
• Lack of explanation to victims of police reporting practices.
• A lack of TIB staff availability when victims call back to provide details in response to a police request.· An implied expectation to victims that they must be available to receive a call from police at an unspecified time to report the crime.
• A lack of explanation regarding the asking of seemingly irrelevant questions (to the victim), particularly relating to occupation and ethnicity.
• Some staff failing to record crime because of victim unavailability

Recommendations.

Switchboard staff to be reminded of policy for TIB Investigation and need to transfer initial callers via appropriate Control Room.

Consideration given to identifying low demand times for Control Rooms and encouraging victims to contact police during these hours if unsuccessful when initially transferred.

BOCUs to ensure local staff are advised of BOCU telephone investigation capability and procedures.

Control Room staff advised of benefit of providing CAD reference to crime victims at first contact.

Assessing local demand for TIB services and resourcing appropriately. TIBs should have an answerphone message available for victims, providing details of opening hours and best times to call. Staffing should be structured to meet this expectation.

Staff advised to provide greater explanation to victims of why questions are asked that are not directly related to the crime being reported.

Control Room and TIB staff further reminded that victim unavailability is not in itself a reason to no crime an allegation previously made to the CAD staff.

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