National Crime Recording Standard update

Report: 13
Date: 19 January 2005
By: Commissioner

Summary

A report is required which:

• Identifies plans to improve all aspects of crime recording
• Identifies the financial implications of improvement plans for crime recording
• Details how the progress of National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) is to be reported to future NCRS committees

A glossary of terms is shown at the end of this paper.

A. Recommendations

1. Members are asked to note the contents of this report.
2. Members are asked to approve the short-term action plan to improve compliance with the NCRS within the MPS.

B. Supporting information

Attached Appendices:

• Appendix 1 Glossary of terms
• Appendix 2 Short-term Action Plan
• Appendix 3 Audit Commission tests

A review of crime recording in the MPS - 2004

Introduction

1. The National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was introduced in 2002 to bring greater consistency to the recording of crime and to develop a more victim-centred approach. The ‘Review of Crime Recording in the MPS – 2004’ was undertaken by the Audit Commission as part of a national compliance check against the standard. It was sponsored by the Police Standards Unit (PSU) and was the second audit in a three-year programme.

2. The audit was conducted in accordance with the Police Standards Unit (PSU) manual of guidance. This prescribes seven tests - see Appendix 1 – of which two objective tests were conducted this year on the incident and crime-recording systems together with an assessment of the adequacy of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)/Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) management arrangements. This resulted in an overall ‘traffic light’ assessment. This year’s tests were more extensive than those conducted previously.

3. The MPS was one of four forces to receive an overall ‘red’ assessment. This indicates that the Audit Commission considers that there are still significant issues that need to be addressed before the force and authority can be considered NCRS compliant. Whilst this result represents a deterioration from last year’s ‘amber’ grading it reflects the extent to which operational demands have had to dominate investment decisions, the scale of the task that compliance represents (especially in terms of training) and the time it takes to derive the benefits from new systems. Nationally, 60% of forces have yet to achieve compliance.

4. In the light of this result it is prudent to question the adequacy of the current approach to NCRS compliance within the MPS. A considerable amount of preliminary work has been undertaken in conjunction with the audit commission and the PSU to assess this result, to explain the outcome and propose an appropriate course of remedial action.

The 2004 audit

5. The Audit Commission’s overall assessment of NCRS compliance is an aggregate score based on objective tests (60%) and on an assessment of management arrangements (40%).

6. The first of the objective tests (test 1) was an examination of incident records (Computer Aided Despatches - CADs) to establish if they had been correctly completed as a crime, or if not, whether an adequate explanation was recorded. A decision to ‘not crime’ an incident has to be justified in accordance with the national standard. The assessment was based on a sample of 40 CAD incidents for each borough across 7 categories of crime, a total of 8960 incidents. The compliance threshold for this test was red < 80%, amber 80-90%, green>90%.

7. MPS compliance in respect of the whole incident log was red at 69%

• Only Barnet and Kensington and Chelsea scored 80%, the lowest in the range being Barking and Dagenham at 59%;
• Most boroughs complied in respect of priority crime where performance pressure might be most expected to skew results;
• The sample sizes for some categories of crime at borough level are so small so as not to be representative, none-the-less compliance at service level in respect of racist incidents and disturbances is a serious concern.

8. The primary reason for failure was insufficient information being recorded to justify the reason for not recording an incident as a crime. This was consistent with last year’s finding. However, the 10.5% decline in performance - 79.5% to 69% - was unexpected.

9. A subsequent reconciliation audit conducted by MPS staff experienced in the CAD system demonstrated 80% compliance, more in line with anticipated results. Subsequent analysis conducted in liaison with the Audit Commission established that MPS recording conventions (most notably the practice of linking CADs where police receive more than one call on the same incident and only put the result on one) had resulted in a large number of false failures. Whilst this failed to explain all the variation in performance, the result exposed the risks in relying on the dispersed efforts of 4,500 CAD staff to show why a crime record has not been made. Experience in most other forces indicates that centralized control of incident recording is the most effective means of ensuring a satisfactory quality of recording practice in this area.

10. Test 2 is a check to see if an incident record closed as a crime has a corresponding record on the Crime Report Information System (CRIS). This test was not formally reported this year but in view of the decline in the test 1 scores it is reassuring to note the 98% compliance rating.

11. Test 5 is an examination to check if a crime record classified as a notifiable offence but subsequently changed to a ‘no crime’ complies with strict decision making criteria. A crime can only be legitimately cancelled (‘no-crimed’) if it has been entered in error, has occurred outside the MPD, is a duplicate record or can be no longer regarded as a crime on the basis of ‘additional, verifiable information’.

12. The compliance thresholds for this test were red < 85%, amber 85-95%, green> 95%. The compliance level of 70% is unacceptably low. It occurs because of inadequate evidence to justify the ‘no-crime’ decision. The weaknesses in these processes had been recognized. Currently 2000 staff in crime management units or specialist squads for robbery and burglary are responsible for correct classifications. Given the difficulties with training, changes in procedure and staffing, quality control over this vital task has not been robust enough. Remedial action has already been taken to control the number of staff that can make the no crime decision. Additional training and guidance is being arranged and modifications to the CRIS system are planned for 2005 that will ‘hard-wire’ greater compliance by restricting access to supervisors and creating mandatory data fields to ensure that decisions are recorded.

13. Why did the MPS fail to secure a greater degree of compliance? The answer to this question lies in an analysis of the management arrangements and the reasons behind them.

Management arrangements

14. The Audit Commission considers accountability and leadership to be areas in which performance has deteriorated. Specifically, the problem of competing priorities is singled out as a concern. The MPS would point out that the primacy of operational delivery is non-negotiable in the current climate. With a clear focus on anti-terrorist activity, crime reduction performance, enhanced visibility and improved investigation it has not been possible to give NCRS priority in the allocation of training, systems development or management focus. The MPS strategy has been to place reliance on active audit and its investment in new command and control technology (C3i) to embed NCRS compliance. However, the scale of this change means that these benefits have yet to impact upon crime recording performance and may not do so for some time. The Audit Commission accepts the time lag involved in implementing such major change programmes.

15. The appointment of a Force Crime Registrar (FCR) and the arrangements for the Crime Integrity Team (CIT) are generally considered satisfactory. However, a reliance on audit as a means of securing sustained compliance, the capacity within the CIT to undertake a comprehensive programme of audit and the focus on casework rather than systems compliance are fundamental issues that need to be revisited.

16. Policy and administration receives an ‘amber’ assessment. However, staff training, knowledge and awareness remains ‘red’. The difficulties experienced in building NCRS explicitly into probationer training are on going given congestion within the current syllabus. In the Audit Commission’s view, it is a missed opportunity given the current growth in staff numbers. As a task it is small compared to the problem of informing and up-dating existing staff. 24,500 people input into the systems on which NCRS relies. Focused training, scoped strictly according to need, is the only sustainable strategy but this challenges the current open approach to crime recording.

17. The commentary on resources (where the assessment declined from green to red) reflects pressures within the wider organisation. Despite (and at times because of) growth there is pressure on supervisory capacity. The demand for skilled staff is also at a premium – in respect of both CAD and CRIS systems. C3i and the implementation of integrated borough operations rooms will undoubtedly relieve some of these problems.

18. The shortcomings of CAD and CRIS are the subject of lengthy comment. It is accepted that the change processes of C3i must be allowed to bed down before further changes in the CAD environment can be contemplated. CAD cannot be re-designed at this time. NCRS compliance will have to be built around the C3i system. However increased control of CRIS (restricting access, improved supervision and separating performance management from crime classification) must be considered. The report notes that centralised crime recording is being considered as a mechanism for securing this change. A range of options has been developed but finance still needs to be secured. This needs to be considered as part of a more fundamental review of the process for crime recording, as aside from accuracy, it is still too variable and lacking in customer focus.

The significance of data quality

19. Accurate crime data is vital for accountability, performance management, effective crime analysis and both strategic and tactical risk assessments. NCRS is just one data management issue that currently concerns policing. The Bichard enquiry posed fundamental questions about the handling of intelligence data. The current focus on criminal justice performance in general and crime detection rates in particular will bring those recording systems into greater focus. Crime analysis makes its own shifting demands. For example, the current assessment of knife crime is reliant upon correct flags being entered on CRIS. National impetus is added by demands for information to feed the Home Office i-Quanta system. The audit commission urges the MPA to include data quality on the corporate risk register.

20. Certain features stand out in relation to the management of NCRS in London.

• The scale of the undertaking – 4500 CAD staff handling>4m incidents a year, 20,000 initial investigators inputting 1.16m CRIS reports and 2000 staff in specialist units and crime management units classifying crime. This makes training – both one off and on going - a significant undertaking. It makes daily supervision and quality control a massive commitment.
• The complexity of the process – it involves incident handling, telephone investigation, crime recording and case supervision but it also extends into front office processes, call handling and ultimately into the citizen focus agenda. As such it is enterprise-wide
• The organisational risks – inaccurate data poses significant reputational risk to the MPS while the Human Rights implications of inaccurate data are potentially serious.
• The drive for efficiency - that will not allow resources to be dedicated to any activity that does not add value.
• Continual change – the Home Office counting rules and therefore the scope of the NCRS changes continually making the training requirement additionally burdensome.

21. Collectively these characteristics challenge the architecture of the current regime to deliver sustainable NCRS compliance. This debate is echoed outside London. Some forces have secured NCRS compliance at a cost with the price of sustainability being too great. The Audit Commission’s national report made negative comments about forces that over-rely on checking records for compliance rather than building quality assurance into their systems. Adjustments to compliant (green) regimes are as inevitable and may be almost as significant as those required in the MPS. Furthermore, there is a need to secure data quality across the range of police systems. At this point the scale of the challenge becomes apparent. It is too expensive to create bespoke compliance regimes for discrete systems. Quality has to be built in.

Moving forward

22. In the light of the above a two part process to change is proposed. Firstly, that a short-term remedial plan (Appendix 2) is launched as a means of securing compliance in the shortest time possible within the current working arrangements. Secondly, that a more fundamental review is conducted of the elements necessary to build data quality into NCRS compliance to establish a sustainable solution. This might also establish data management principles that could then be extended to other systems.

23. What does this mean in practice? Some of the elements of building data quality already exist - C3i being the obvious example. Work is also already in hand to build quality into the CRIS system: hard-wiring key data requirements, mandatory screens for monitoring decisions and being more restrictive about access are obvious routes to follow. However, the scale of the problem brought about by the sheer number of people using the crime recording systems makes compliance such a challenge to the extent that the current premis of quality being owned by the business groups and managed locally must be reviewed. This debate is central to a decision about the options for centralised crime recording and needs careful consideration. It is therefore proposed that this constitutes the second part of the NCRS response plan.

24. In the first part - set out in Appendix 2 - the Audit Commission report is used as the platform for communication to raise NCRS awareness. A compliance regime is implemented around CAD. This will comprise a programme of awareness and active audit providing real time feedback and management information. A second arm of activity will restrict the control of crime classification to Crime Management Units that will be brought up to a minimum standard and trained appropriately. Again, this will provide a source of management information.

25. Tackling these two key points in the process will have immediate and positive effect. The resultant management information will provide visibility to management board and MPA and a mechanism for integrating NCRS into the performance regime.

26. The resources for this activity will be obtained by redirecting and co-ordinating staff currently used in inspection and quality assurance roles.

27. The target is to secure amber compliance for tests 1 and 5 – the subject of this year’s audit by April 2005. This will be independently tested by the MPS Inspectorate. This degree of speed is vital if the necessary accuracy is to be obtained to monitor performance for the basket of indicators relating to the PSA targets commencing in April 2005. Given the scope of the national standard, compliance across all its elements by April 2006 will prove challenging. Negotiations with the Home Office about central expectations and the audit arrangements for the coming year will commence in January.

C. Race and equality impact

1. The MPS recognises the fact of under-reporting by disadvantaged groups and therefore the potential for disproportionality in this area.

2. The compliance results for domestic violence and racist incidents appear to cause concern. However, the Audit Commission recognises ‘in these cases it is often more difficult to identify and record the possible offences being reported based upon the initial details provided’. It is a problem that is reflected nationally.

3. The Audit Commission recognised existing MPS good practice within this area to encourage reporting by minority groups such as language line, third party reporting and use of volunteers.

D. Financial implications

Stage 1 has no implications for extra funding. Stage 2 has very significant budgetary implications, which would be covered in a future detailed report, to be presented to the PPRC in March 2005.

E. Background papers

The Audit Commission Report to the MPA on Review of Crime Recording 2004.

F. Contact details

Report authors: Deputy Assistant Commissioner Richard Bryan

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1: Glossary

CAD

Computer Aided Despatch. Computer system for recording incidents (usually initiated by telephone calls from the public), police response, and subsequent result.

CMU

Crime Management Unit. Every borough has a small team of staff who administer crime records on the Crime Reporting and Information System (CRIS).

Crime

A notifiable offence under the Home Office Counting Rules.

Crime-related incident

An incident that relates to an allegation of crime, but does not eventually result in a ‘crime’ being recorded.

CRIS

Crime Reporting and Information System. Computer system for recording notifiable offences, other crimes, and other types of incident (such as domestic, homophobic, and racist incidents).

IBO

Integrated Borough Operations. The functions remaining on Boroughs once the call handling and resource deployment functions have been centralised under the C3i Programme. Responsible for access to local intelligence, recording of results of incidents, and physical access into police buildings.

‘No-crime’

A report of crime that has been classified as a crime (notifiable offence), but is subsequently changed because the incident did not amount to an offence in the MPS because either (a) it was committed outside the MPD; (b) additional verifiable information shows it is not a crime; (c) the matter is part of a crime already recorded; or (d) it was recorded in error.

‘Not-crime’ 

An incident that relates to an allegation of crime, but does not eventually result in a ‘crime’ being recorded.

Test 1

To test whether crime-related CAD incidents are closed correctly as either a crime, or with sufficient information to explain why it is not a crime. Activity by CAD staff.

Test 5

To test whether CRIS reports that were classified as a NOTIFIABLE offence are subsequently ‘no-crimed’ correctly. Activity by CRIS supervisors: either CMU staff or supervisors of specialist units (e.g. burglary and robbery squads).

TIB

Telephone Investigation Bureau. Every borough has a unit responsible for investigating allegations of crime over the telephone and recording them on the crime system.

Appendix 3: The Tests

All of the seven tests in the Police Standards Unit Manual are designed to measure the effect that police systems have on preventing crimes from being recorded and measured. The Audit Commission report only covers two of these tests (1 and 5) and the management arrangements that overarch them.

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