Specialist operations management information

Report: 12
Date: 14 February 2008
By: AC Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report gives a summary of Specialist Operations Command performance against its objectives from September 2007 to December 2007.

A. Recommendation

That Members note the report.

B. Supporting information

1. This report provides an overview of the performance of MPS Specialist Operations (SO) during the period September to December 2007. It includes a review of significant events during this period and where appropriate makes comment on any issues affecting the achievement of targets. A summary of relevant performance measures is attached at Appendix 1.

2. In addition to reporting publicly to PPRC, SO also regularly reports on its performance with regard to terrorism related matters to the Home Office representative on the MPA, Lord Toby Harris, and Reshard Auladin (MPA Deputy Chair). This meeting provides an opportunity to discuss counter-terrorism policing measures in greater detail, including those classified as ‘Secret’. This meeting was last held on 22 January 2008 the next is scheduled for 19 May 2008.

Background

3. The SO business group comprises three separate commands - Counter Terrorism (SO15), Protection (SO1 (Specialist Protection) and SO14 (Royalty Protection)) and Protective Security/Headquarters Support (SO2).

4. In supporting the MPS overarching mission of ‘Working Together for a Safer London’ the primary focus of SO activity is towards the strategic priority of Counter-Terrorism, Security and Protection. For the 2007/8 performance year this activity is being directed towards three operational objectives:

• To create a safer environment in the London boroughs through Counter-Terrorism, Security and Protection work.
• To increase advanced identification of threats from, and opportunities for, countering terrorism.
• To enhance the security of key locations and protected persons.

5. SO activity is also focused towards supporting the Government counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST. An overview of the strategy is attached at Appendix 2. This highlights the four component strands of Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.

6. The public reporting of SO operational performance is complex – not least because some of the relevant data will be either classified or sensitive. It will always be necessary to strike the right balance between the need for transparency and a duty to ensure that security and operational capability are not compromised.

7. In addition, the policing activities undertaken within SO are in the main sensitive and high profile. Success will ultimately be measured by an absence of terrorist incidents and/or the safety of the public and protected persons not being compromised. This kind of performance does not lend itself to volumetric/quantative measurement in quite the same way as other fields i.e. serious or volume crime. Whilst a reduction in homicide to just a single offence would be regarded as a significant success for the MPS the occurrence of just one major terrorist incident is unlikely to be regarded in the same way. Clearly, it would not be appropriate to judge the success of SO solely on the fact that a terrorist incident does not occur or that a protected person survives a public engagement. It is for this reason that our performance measures tend to be more qualitative or reflective of an element of the operational activity that prevents the terrorist incident or ensures safety.

To create a safer environment in the London boroughs through Counter-Terrorism, security and protection work

8. It is widely accepted that the support of communities is vital to defeating terrorism. To create a safer environment it is essential that local communities are properly engaged and that front line staff have a broad understanding and awareness of terrorism. It is also important that counter-terrorism is embedded as ‘business as usual’ within all local policing activity.

9. Whilst SO provides specialist capability for the investigation of terrorist offences and the management of relevant intelligence, it also supports activity at a local level by maintaining close links and ensuring appropriate knowledge is shared with Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU) colleagues. This is achieved through a network of Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs). CTIOs are specially selected counter-terrorism detectives who work alongside locally based colleagues. This approach enables the officers to improve their own understanding of communities whilst providing a valuable source of expert advice and guidance for patrolling staff.

10. To ensure an appropriate CTIO capability exists, during the 2007/8 financial year SO are committed to increase the numbers of such officers so that at least 85% of London boroughs (including Heathrow) have a dedicated resource. The number of CTIOs has been steadily rising during the year and the target has now been exceeded – 91% of London boroughs now have at least one dedicated CTIO.

11. The tasking and workload of all CTIOs is also monitored to ensure that their effort remains focussed on their primary role within BOCUs and that abstractions are kept to a minimum. During this reporting period CTIOs carried out 8240 recorded tasks, of these 7252 (88%) were based within their assigned BOCU. This achievement exceeds the current target of 80%.

12. The delivery of counter-terrorism briefings to new members of staff is a responsibility of CTIOs. The briefings ensure that new staff, particularly those serving within Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNTs), are fully equipped with the knowledge they need for their operational role. The greatest benefit is derived if such briefings are delivered as early as possible within an individual’s career. For this reason, a target has been set that 80% of new SNT staff receive a briefing from a CTIO within two months of being appointed. With the numbers of SNT staff that have been recruited in the recent past (in support of the MPS commitment to neighbourhood policing) this target has often proved extremely challenging.

13. During this financial year, there has been a decline in the level of recruitment to SNTs. This has eased the pressure on training resources and enables the target to be achieved. In the period of this review 173 members of SNT have been recruited, of these 86% (149) have been briefed on counter-terrorism within two months of their appointment. This exceeds the current target of 80%.

14. In the event of a suspected terrorist incident occurring, our commitment to creating a safer environment is supported by the prompt and effective management of the scene. Local officers and supervisors are responsible for this initial action. Their performance is assessed by specialist officers to ensure standards are maintained and that any organisational learning/training requirements are identified. During the period of this review, there have been 52 such incidents. In 100% of cases the management of the scene has been assessed as ‘appropriate’. This exceeds our target of 90%.

15. The prompt attendance of specialist resources to the scene of incidents is also vital if any risks to public safety are to be minimised. MPS Explosive Officers from within SO are required to attend such scenes within a target time on 95% of occasions. During the period of this report, the officers were deployed to 328 incidents and on 100% of occasions they attended within the agreed target time.

16. In addition to their role in dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) explosive officers are also required to attend the scenes of conventional munitions; such as unexploded wartime bombs or grenades. In these circumstances, the officers are also required to attend within a target time on 95% of occasions. During the period of this review they were deployed to 62 such incidents and arrived in all cases (100%) within the agreed target time.

17. In December 2007, an MPS Explosive Officer was awarded the Queen’s Gallantry Medal; another received a Queen’s Commendation for Bravery. These awards related to the heroic actions of the two officers during the events of 29 June 2007 in central London. The MPS is of course delighted that the individual bravery of these officers, and the valuable contribution they make on a daily basis to the safety of Londoners, has been publicly and formally recognised.

18. Objective feedback on MPS performance in relation to counter-terrorism in made available through the quarterly Public Attitude Survey (PAS). Questions 79 and 80 of the survey seek views from the public as to ‘how well’ they believe the MPS is doing in relation to a range of activities and ‘how important’ they believe the activities are. Preventing terrorism is included within the list of activities. Respondents are asked to grade their belief in relation to each activity on a scale between 1 (not at all well/important) and 7 (very well/important). Results from the survey run during the second quarter of 2007/8 reveal scores of 5.45 and 6.625 respectively.

To increase advanced identification of threats from, and opportunities for, countering terrorism

19. The ability of SO to identify threats from terrorism and provide an appropriate response depends greatly on the level and quality of available information/intelligence. It is recognised that communities will always be the most significant source of such intelligence; which is why they are so important to countering-terrorism. To ensure effective engagement with communities and that counter-terrorism is embedded as ‘business as usual’ within all local policing activity, SO provides support to Territorial Policing (TP) through Operation Delphinus. In order to gauge the success of our efforts a measure has been developed to reflect the amount of intelligence received from BOCU staff (through the Criminal Intelligence System (CRIMINT)) that is suitable for further development. Whilst the limitations of this measure are recognised e.g. the exact value of a piece of intelligence may not be recognised at the time of initial assessment, it will provide a rough indication of how efforts to raise local awareness and understanding of terrorism are impacting on the quality of any intelligence provided. During this reporting year, the measure is being used to establish a baseline but a target has been set for at least 10% of intelligence received being suitable for further development within SO15. During this reporting period achievement has fluctuated between 8.8% and 12.8%. Full year to date performance is currently 8.7%. It is intended that the results of this monitoring be used to inform future research into how improvements can be achieved and how best SO can support their colleagues.

20. The Anti-Terrorist Hotline offers an easy and confidential means of communicating relevant information. The hotline is staffed continuously and normally receives around 300 calls per month. The promptness of response to calls to the hotline is monitored and a target has been set to answer calls within a set time on 85% of occasions. During this review period 1244 calls have been received on the hotline and 97.6% (1214) of these have been answered within the set time.

21. Whilst the average number of calls to the hotline is around 300 per month, the number can fluctuate significantly in response to current events. For example during July 2007, the number of calls increased significantly as a result of terrorist incidents in London and Glasgow. Additional lines were opened and additional staffing provided. During this period technical difficulties resulted in data for the additional lines being unavailable. However, a 1700 CRIMINT entries were initiated as a result of calls to the hotline. This would indicate a significant surge in the number of calls.

22. A key aim of counter-terrorist investigations is to disrupt terrorist networks and to reduce the capability of terrorists to carry out their crimes. To allow the planning of such crimes to continue may present considerable risk to the public. The number of such disruptions is monitored as a measure of the effectiveness of our response. Disruptions are assessed in the same way as they are for conventional criminal networks and the processes that support the assessment is the same. There will however be significant variation in the impact that such disruptions have. For example, some cases may result in the foiling of a planned major bombing campaign others may reduce the funding or resources available to mount such an attack. Given that the disruption of terrorist activity may lead to a reduction in the overall number of networks a decrease as well as an increase in such disruptions may be an indicator of success. For this reason no target for the number of disruptions achieved has been set. However, during the period of this review nine networks have been disrupted.

To enhance the security of key locations and protected persons

23. Providing effective protection against terrorism and the threat it poses to key people or locations is a key element of our operational role. As previously highlighted, SO has responsibility for protecting members of the Royal family and their residences, Government ministers and other public figures and visiting heads of government. Staff within SO also support public event planning, to ensure risk is minimised, and provide advice/guidance to the business community in relation to protective security measures against terrorism.

24. SO performance in relation to protection of the Royal family and their residences is currently measured by our effectiveness in preventing intrusion to protected areas and how well we respond to related incidents that require an urgent police response. In relation to intrusions, our aim is to prevent any intrusion into the most secure areas of a protected Royal residence i.e. those areas where a protected principal is or may be. During the period of this review there have been no such intrusions. There has also been no intrusion into the zones adjoining these areas. We have responded to 30 related incidents during this reporting period. All incidents are monitored to ensure the overall integrity of security arrangements.

25. Security Co-ordinators (SECCOs) within SO2 are responsible for providing advice and guidance in relation to the security arrangements for major public events. They work closely with the officer in overall command of the event (Gold) to develop an effective security plan. Performance in relation to their work is currently measured in two ways. Firstly, the prompt appointment of a SECCO ensures that the maximum amount of time is available for event planning. For this reason it is our aim to appoint a SECCO within two days of being notified of an event on at least 85% of occasions. Secondly, Gold commanders are asked to provide feedback on the performance of individual SECCOs. In this respect, we seek to achieve a rating of ‘satisfactory’ or better for at least 85% of the events. During the period under review, the number of events etc. was 166 and the achievement on both of the relevant measures was 100%. This performance was consistent throughout the period.

26. Advice and guidance in relation to protective security measures is provided by Counter Terrorist Security Advisers (CTSAs) within SO15. The guidance etc. is provided to the business community and other partners. It is our aim to achieve at least a ‘satisfactory’ rating in feedback on at least 85% of occasions. During the period of this review, 1257 partners etc. responded to the request for feedback. For all respondents (100%) an assessment of at least satisfactory was achieved.

Notable Events/Other significant issues

27. During the period of this review the operational demands on the Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) have remained extremely high. Much of the work has arisen from the investigation of the events in London and Glasgow during June/July 2007 as well as a number of continuing cases that are progressing towards court trial dates. Key events during the period are outlined below.

28. 9 September 2007 four men were arrested on suspicion of committing offences relating to the breach of a control order under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. The relevant offences included the breach of the order itself as well as conspiring to breach the order or assist another person to do so. Three of the men have now been charged in relation to the offences – one has also been charged with 13 other offences relating to terrorism. On 20 September 2007, a further suspect was charged in relation to the conspiracy to breach a control order. All four men appeared at the Central Criminal Court on 22 January 2008.

29. 25 September 2007 Abdul Muneem Patel was jailed for six months at the Central Criminal Court after being found guilty of possessing a document containing information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, Contrary to Section 58(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000. The document in this case was a copy of a book entitled the 'EOD Improvised Explosives Manual'. Patel was arrested in August 2006 as part of the Operation Overt investigation.

30. 3 October 2007 two men were arrested on suspicion of committing offences relating to acts of terrorism. The men were arrested at separate residential premises in Surrey. On 16 October, both men were charged with various offences under the Criminal Law Act 1977 and the Terrorism Act 2000. The charges included possessing (or conspiring to possess) money and other articles or documents for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism.

31. 23 October 2007 two further men were arrested in relation to the above on suspicion of money laundering. These men were subsequently released on bail.

32. 8 November 2007 a 23 year-old woman, Samina Malik, who called herself the "Lyrical Terrorist", was found guilty at the Central Criminal Court of possessing documents likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing acts of terrorism. Malik was arrested at her home in Southall on the morning of 27th October 2006 as part of an ongoing investigation.

33. On searching her room, officers discovered documents on a computer relating to terrorism. These included ‘The Al Qaeda Manual’, ‘The Terrorists Handbook’, ‘The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook’, a manual for a Dragunov Sniper Rifle, ‘The Firearms and RPG Handbook’ and a document entitled ‘How to Win hand to hand fighting’. Malik had downloaded the material from the Internet and she had also applied to join extremist ‘subscription only’ websites.

34. Officers also discovered writings, jottings and poems revealing her violent extremist views. On the back of a till roll (she previously worked as a shop assistant) Malik had written: "The desire within me increases every day to go for martyrdom…. The need to go increases second by second". Emails from Malik also revealed that she had enquired about how to donate to the Mujahideen. On 6 December 2007 Malik was given a nine month prison sentence suspended for 18 months for possessing documents likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing acts of terrorism.

35. 5 November 2007 Adel Yahya pleaded guilty to an offence of possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism. He was jailed for six years and nine months.

36. 20 November 2007 Manfo Kwaku Asiedu was sentenced at Kingston Crown Court to 33 years imprisonment for his part in the attempted bombings of the London transport system on 21 July 2005. He had earlier pleaded guilty to conspiracy to cause explosions likely to endanger life at a hearing at the Royal Courts of Justice.

37. 11 December 2007 Two men appeared at City of Westminster Magistrates Court charged with inciting another to commit an act of terrorism, wholly or partly outside the UK which would, if committed in England and Wales, constitute murder. Marri was also additionally charged possessing a prohibited weapon Contrary to S5(1)(b) of and Schedule 6 to the Firearms Act 1968. Both men were remanded until 1 February 2008.

38. 18 December 2007 at the Court of Appeal, the sentences of three convicted terrorists were increased; the sentences having been referred under the Unduly Lenient Sentence Scheme by the Solicitor General. The case related to the convictions in July 2007 of Younis Tsouli, Waseem Mughal and Tariq al-Daour; all three defendants had admitted incitement to commit an act of terrorism, namely murder, contrary to Section 59 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The three men had been arrested in October 2005 and were the first people in the UK to be prosecuted for incitement of terrorist murder using the Internet.

39. Tsouli's sentence was increased from 10 to 16 years and Mughal's sentence was increased from 71/2 to 12 years. Daour was sentenced to 10 years - he was also sentenced to a further 2 years to run consecutively on a separate fraud offence.

40. 19 December 2007 three men who were detained at Guantanamo Bay by the US authorities arrived in the UK. Two of the men were arrested on board the aircraft shortly after it arrived at Luton Airport on suspicion of the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. One of these men was released the other was arrested on a European Arrest Warrant on behalf of the Spanish authorities - which alleges terrorist-related offences. The third was detained under Schedule 7 Port and Border Controls contained within the Terrorism Act 2000. He was later arrested on a European Arrest Warrant on behalf of the Spanish authorities – which alleges terrorist-related offences.

41. Both men appeared at City of Westminster Magistrates Court 20 December 2007 – they were remanded on conditional bail to re-appear on 9 January 2008.

C. Race and equality impact

There are no explicit race and equality items addressed. The activities that form this report and the data content are arrived at with a regard to delivering SO policing services to an equal standard for all Londoners. The performance report fully complies with equal opportunities policies and associated MPA/MPS Diversity issues. In addition, SO are in regular contact with key community groups and use this to assist the monitoring of the impact of counter terrorist policing in London.

D. Financial implications

SO collects performance data on a regular basis. However, additional effort is expended on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of performance measures included in this report.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Superintendent Neil Haynes, SO Continuous Improvement Unit (SO CIU), MPS

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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