Specialist operations management information

Report: 9
Date: 12 June 2008
By: AC Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report gives a summary of Specialist Operations Command performance against its objectives from January 2008 to March 2008 and an overview of performance during the 2007/8 financial year

A. Recommendation

That members note the report.

B. Supporting information

1. This report provides an overview of the performance of MPS Specialist Operations (SO) during the period January 2008 to March 2008 and an overview of the financial year 2007/8. It includes a review of significant events during this period and where appropriate makes comment on any issues affecting the achievement of targets. A summary of relevant performance measures is attached at Appendix 1.

2. In addition to reporting publicly to PPRC, SO also regularly reports on its performance with regard to terrorism related matters to the Home Office representative on the MPA, Lord Toby Harris, and Reshard Auladin (MPA Deputy Chair). This meeting provides an opportunity to discuss counter-terrorism policing measures in greater detail, including those classified as ‘Secret’. This meeting was last held on 19 May 2008.

Background

3. The SO business group comprises three separate commands - Counter Terrorism (SO15), Protection (SO1 (Specialist Protection) and SO14 (Royalty Protection) and Protective Security/Headquarters Support (SO2).

4. In supporting the MPS overarching mission of ‘Working Together for a Safer London’ the primary focus of SO activity is towards the strategic priority of Counter-Terrorism, Security and Protection. For the 2007/8 performance year this activity is being directed towards three operational objectives:

• To create a safer environment in the London boroughs through Counter-Terrorism, Security and Protection work.
• To increase advanced identification of threats from, and opportunities for, countering terrorism.
• To enhance the security of key locations and protected persons.

5. SO activity is also focused towards supporting the Government counter-terrorism strategy CONTEST. An overview of the strategy is attached at Appendix 2. This highlights the four component strands of Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.

6. The public reporting of SO operational performance is complex – not least because some of the relevant data will be either classified or sensitive. Therefore, it is necessary to strike the right balance between the need for transparency and a duty to ensure that security and operational capability are not compromised.

7. In addition, the policing activities undertaken within SO are in the main sensitive and high profile. Success will ultimately be measured by an absence of terrorist incidents and/or the safety of the public and protected persons not being compromised. This kind of performance does not lend itself to volumetric/quantative measurement in quite the same way as other fields i.e. serious or volume crime. Whilst a reduction in homicide to just a single offence would be regarded as a significant success for the MPS the occurrence of just one major terrorist incident is unlikely to be regarded in the same way. Clearly it would not be appropriate to judge the success of SO solely on the fact that a terrorist incident doesn’t occur or that a protected person survives a public engagement. It is for this reason that our performance measures tend to be more qualitative or reflective of an element of the operational activity that prevents the terrorist incident or ensures safety.

To create a safer environment in the London boroughs through Counter-Terrorism, security and protection work

8. It is widely accepted that the support of communities is vital to defeating terrorism. To create a safer environment it is essential that local communities are properly engaged and that front line staff have a broad understanding and awareness of terrorism. It is also important that counter-terrorism is embedded as ‘business as usual’ within all local policing activity.

9. Whilst SO provides specialist capability for the investigation of terrorist offences and the management of relevant intelligence, it also supports activity at a local level by maintaining close links and ensuring appropriate knowledge is shared with Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU) colleagues. This is achieved through a network of Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs). CTIOs are specially selected counter-terrorism detectives who work alongside locally based colleagues. This approach enables the officers to improve their own understanding of communities whilst providing a valuable source of expert advice and guidance for patrolling staff.

10. To ensure an appropriate CTIO capability exists, during the 2007/8 financial year SO were committed to increase the numbers of such officers so that at least 85% of London boroughs (including Heathrow) have a dedicated resource. The number of CTIOs has steadily risen during the year and the target has now been exceeded – 91% of London boroughs now have at least one dedicated CTIO compared to 76% at the start of the financial year.

11. The tasking and workload of all CTIOs is also monitored to ensure that their effort remains focussed on their primary role within BOCUs and that abstractions are kept to a minimum. During this reporting period CTIOs carried out 6403 recorded tasks, of these 5869 (91.7%) were based within their assigned BOCU. Overall, during the 2007/8 financial year, 88% of CTIO tasks were based within their BOCU. This achievement exceeds the current target of 80%.

12. The delivery of counter-terrorism briefings to new members of staff is a responsibility of CTIOs. The briefings ensure that new staff, particularly those serving within Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNTs), are fully equipped with the knowledge they need for their operational role. The greatest benefit is derived if such briefings are delivered as early as possible within an individual’s career. For this reason a target was set that 80% of new SNT staff receive a briefing from a CTIO within two months of being appointed. With the numbers of SNT staff that have been recruited in the recent past (in support of the MPS commitment to neighbourhood policing) this target has often proved extremely challenging.

13. During this financial year there has been a decline in the level of recruitment to SNTs. This has eased the pressure on training resources and enabled the target to be more easily achieved. During the period of this review 200 members of SNTs have been recruited, of these 81% (162) have been briefed on counter-terrorism within two months of their appointment. This exceeds the stated target. Only during the month of March 2008, when 79.5% of new appointments were briefed within two months, was the target not met. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year, the stated target was exceeded with 82% (574 out of 700) of new SNT members trained within two months of their appointment. Only during March 2008 (as previously stated) and May 2007 was the target not met.

14. In the event of a suspected terrorist incident occurring, our commitment to creating a safe environment is supported by the prompt and effective management of the scene. Local officers and supervisors are responsible for this initial action. Their performance is assessed by specialist officers to ensure standards are maintained and that any organisational learning/training requirements are identified. During the period of this review there were 26 such incidents, 25 (96%) of which have been assessed as being managed to an ‘appropriate’ standard. This exceeds the stated target of 90%. The incident that was assessed as ‘inadequate’ occurred in February 2008 and has been investigated by SO15 officers and the BOCU commander, with remedial action taken. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 99.4% of incidents (180 of 181) were assessed as having been managed appropriately. The level of incidents was similar to 2006/7 (177), but fluctuated during the year.

15. The prompt attendance of specialist resources to the scenes of incidents is also vital if any risks to public safety are to be minimised. MPS Explosive Officers from within SO are required to attend such scenes within a target time on 95% of occasions. During the period of this report the officers were deployed to 46 incidents and on 100% of occasions they attended within the agreed target time. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 100% of calls (576) were responded to within the target time. The volume of such calls was up by over 25% on 2006/7 (444). This reflected the increased vigilance following the terrorist attacks in Haymarket and Glasgow in June 2007.

16. In addition to their role in dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) explosive officers are also required to attend the scenes of conventional munitions such as: unexploded wartime bombs or grenades. In these circumstances the officers are also required to attend within a target time on 95% of occasions. During the period of this review they were deployed to 38 such incidents and arrived in all cases (100%) within the agreed target time. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 100% of calls (176) were responded to within the target time. The volume of such calls was lower than in 2006/7 (245), but similar to earlier years.

17. Objective feedback on MPS performance in relation to counter-terrorism in made available through the quarterly Public Attitude Survey (PAS). Questions 79 and 80 of the survey seek views from the public as to ‘how well’ they believe the MPS is doing in relation to a range of activities and ‘how important’ they believe the activities are. Preventing terrorism is included within the list of activities. Respondents are asked to grade their belief in relation to each activity on a scale between 1 (not at all well/important) and 7 (very well/important). Results from the survey run during the fourth quarter of 2007/8 reveal scores of 5.7 and 6.7 respectively. These scores have remained relatively stable over the 2007/8 financial year.

To increase advanced identification of threats from, and opportunities for, countering terrorism

18. The Anti-Terrorist Hotline offers an easy and confidential means for the public to communicate relevant information. The hotline is staffed continuously and normally receives around 300 calls per month. The promptness of response to calls to the hotline is monitored and a target has been set to answer calls within a set time on 85% of occasions. During this review period a total of 1022 calls have been received on the hotline and 97.2% (993) of these have been answered within the set time. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 4346 calls were received with 98% (4254) answered within the set time.

19. Whilst the average number of calls to the hotline is around 300 per month, the number can fluctuate significantly in response to specific events. For example during July 2007 the number of calls increased significantly as a result of terrorist incidents in London and Glasgow. Additional lines were opened and additional staffing provided. During this period technical difficulties resulted in data for the additional lines being unavailable. However, during the period 29-30 June 523 calls were received of which 508 (97.1%) were answered. And during the period 1 – 16 July 1669 calls were received of which 1644 (98.5%) were answered.

20. A key aim of counter-terrorist investigations is to disrupt terrorist networks and to reduce the capability of terrorists to carry out their crimes. To allow the planning of such crimes to continue may present considerable risk to the public. The number of such disruptions is monitored as a measure of the effectiveness of our response. Disruptions are assessed in the same way as they are for conventional criminal networks and the processes that support the assessment are the same. There will however be significant variation in the impact that such disruptions have. For example, some cases may result in the foiling of a planned major bombing campaign others may reduce the funding or resources available to mount such an attack. Given that the disruption of terrorist activity may lead to a reduction in the overall number of networks a decrease as well as an increase in such disruptions may be an indicator of success. For this reason no target for the number of disruptions achieved has been set. However during the period of this review a total of 4 networks have been disrupted. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 13 networks have been disrupted.

To enhance the security of key locations and protected persons

21. Providing effective protection against terrorism and the threat it poses to key people or locations is a vital element of our operational role. As previously highlighted, SO has responsibility for protecting members of the Royal family and their residences, Government ministers and other public figures and visiting heads of government. Staff within SO also support public event planning, to ensure risk is minimised, and provide advice/guidance to the business community in relation to protective security measures against terrorism.

22. SO performance in relation to protection of the Royal family and their residences is currently measured by our effectiveness in preventing intrusion to protected areas and how well we respond to related incidents that require an urgent police response. In relation to intrusions our aim is to prevent any intrusion into the most secure areas of a protected Royal residence i.e. those areas where a protected principal is or may be. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year there have been no such intrusions. There has also been no intrusion into the zone immediately adjoining these areas. All related incidents are monitored to ensure the overall integrity of security arrangements.

23. Security Co-ordinators (SECCOs) within SO2 are responsible for providing advice and guidance in relation to the security arrangements for major public events. They work closely with the officer in overall command of the event (Gold) to develop an effective security plan. Performance in relation to their work is currently measured in two ways. Firstly the prompt appointment of a SECCO ensures that the maximum amount of time is available for event planning. For this reason it is our aim to appoint a SECCO within two days of being notified of an event on at least 85% of occasions. During the period under review SECCOs were requested 162 times and appointed within 2 days on 159 (98.1%) of occasions. This exceeds the stated target. Overall for the 2007/8 financial year, performance was above target at 99.4% with the number of requests (486) consistent with previous years. Secondly, Gold commanders are asked to provide feedback on the performance of individual SECCOs. In this respect we seek to achieve a rating of ‘satisfactory’ or better for at least 85% of the events. During the period under review the number of responses was 86 and the achievement was 100% - this performance was consistent throughout the financial year during which there were 424 responses.

24. Advice and guidance in relation to protective security measures is provided by Counter Terrorist Security Advisers (CTSAs) within SO15. The guidance etc. is provided to the business community and other partners. It is our aim to achieve at least a ‘satisfactory’ rating in feedback on at least 85% of occasions. During the period of this review a total of 1510 partners etc. responded to the request for feedback. For all respondents (100%) an assessment of at least satisfactory was achieved. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 3294 partners etc. responded to the request for feedback with 99.9% (3288) giving an assessment of at least ‘satisfactory’.

Other significant issues/notable events:

25. During the 2007/8 financial year SO has consistently achieved most if not all of its stated operational targets. This performance has been achieved within a £2.7m (1.5%) under-spend against its budget for the financial year.

26. During the period of this review the operational demands on the Counter Terrorism Command (SO15) have remained extremely high. Much of the work has arisen from the investigation of the events in London and Glasgow during June/July 2007 as well as a number of continuing cases that are progressing towards court trial dates.

27. During the past year, the Counter Terrorism Command has led a number of high profile investigations and there is no evidence that the threat from terrorism to the United Kingdom, and London in particular, has diminished in any way.

28. Terrorism investigations are by their very nature some of the largest, most resource intensive and detailed investigations conducted by the police. Because of this, and the time taken to progress cases through the judicial system, it must be recognised that investigations, which have reached the trial stage, and appear in the media, raising public interest and spurring public debate, can often be several years old. The past year has seen many such trials, with the most notable being :

Operation Crevice

29. On 30 April 2007, Omar Khyam, Salahuddin Amin, Waheed Mahmood, Anthony Garcia and Jawad Akbar were convicted of charges under the Terrorism Act.

30. All the charges relate to Operation Crevice, in which officers recovered 600 kilogrammes of manufactured fertilizer. The men were all arrested in 2004 and at that time it was the largest counter-terrorism operation ever seen in the UK. The success was achieved through close co-operation and sharing of intelligence between the UK, the USA, Canada and Pakistan.
31. All the men were jailed for life with indeterminate (no time limit) sentences: Omar Khyam, Anthony Garcia and Waheed Mahmood will all serve a minimum of 20 years before they are considered for parole

Operation Rhyme

32. On 13 June 2007, Qaisir Shaffi was found guilty of conspiracy to murder after denying the charge. On 15 June 2007 he was jailed for 15 years. The other six defendants had all admitted conspiracy to cause explosions with intent to endanger life:

• Abdul Aziz Jalil received 26 years imprisonment;
• Nadeem Tarmohamed received 20 years imprisonment;
• Junade Feroze received 22 years imprisonment;
• Mohammed Naveed Bhatti received 20 years imprisonment;
• Zia Ul Haq received 18 years imprisonment
• Omar Abdur Rehman received 15 years imprisonment.

33. Dhiren Barot had received life imprisonment, with a minimum of 40 years to serve, in November 2006. This was reduced to 30 years on appeal earlier this year.

Operation Mazhar

34. In June 2007 Younis Tsouli, Waseem Mughal, Tariq al-Daour were jailed after they admitted incitement to commit an act of terrorism, namely murder. They are the first people in the UK to be prosecuted for incitement of terrorist murder using the internet. Tsouli was jailed for 10 years, Mughal for 7.5 years and al-Daour for 6.5 years.

35. In December 2007, Tsouli’s sentence was increased on appeal to 16 years, Mughals to 12 years and Al-Dours to 10 years (with a further 2 year sentence to run consecutively on a separate fraud offence)

Operation Vivace

36. On 9 July 2007 a jury at Woolwich Crown Court found Muktar Said Ibrahim, Ramzi Mohammed, Hussain Osman and Yassin Omar guilty of conspiracy to murder. They were jailed for life on 11 July for the attempted terrorist attacks in London on 21 July 2005; they were told that they must serve at least 40 years before they can apply for parole – a total of 160 years jail sentence.

37. On 5 November 2007, Adel Yahya admitted possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism and was sentenced to 6 years, 9 months imprisonment.

38. Four days later, Manfu Kwaku Asiedu admitted conspiracy to cause explosions likely to endanger life and he was subsequently sentenced to 33 years imprisonment.

39. Whilst the above cases are reminders of incidents investigated in the past, the events of June/July 2007 in London and Glasgow, were a graphic example of how potentially deadly a terrorist incident can be, it also provided an illustration of how dynamic, widespread and intense the investigation into such an offence can be.

40. Shortly before 2am on 29 June 2007, police were called to reports of a suspicious vehicle - a green Mercedes - parked in the Haymarket, SW1. As a precautionary measure the immediate area was cordoned off while explosives officers examined the vehicle.

41. They discovered what appeared to be a potentially viable explosive device, which they made safe. This was an act of extreme courage. The bravery of the Explosives Officers was recognised by The Queen.

42. The two officers separately disarmed and made safe explosive devices in the two vehicles, one in the street and the other in the car park. One officer received the Queen's Gallantry Medal, the other, a Queen's Commendation for Bravery.

43. Met Commissioner Sir Ian Blair described the two men as 'brave, almost beyond belief' and said he was humbled by their actions.

'They responded in the absolute finest traditions of the Metropolitan Police Service, putting their own lives at risk to save others. I am sure that when Londoners hear the full account of what happened they will share in the Met's immense pride at the cold courage shown that night.'

44. Later that day, a second potential device was recovered – a vehicle which had been parked in Cockspur Street, SW1, but had been removed to an underground car park in Park Lane, W1.

45. At around 3.15pm on Saturday 30 June 2007, a Jeep Cherokee was driven into the front door at the check-in of the terminal building at Glasgow International Airport. Emergency services were immediately in attendance and two men from the vehicle were detained at the scene. One was taken to the Royal Alexandra Hospital where he was detained suffering from severe burns and subsequently died. The other man was detained in police custody.

46. The investigation of both the London and Glasgow terrorist incidents came under the command of SO15. Detectives from the MPS worked closely with colleagues from Strathclyde Police and, indeed, from a number of police forces across the country and globally.

47. Whilst one of the people arrested in connection with this incident has appeared at court and pleaded guilty, others have yet to reach trial and therefore it is not possible to describe this case in any further detail due to sub judice laws.

Abbreviations and Acronyms:

CTIOs

Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officers

CTSAs

Counter Terrorist Security Advisers

IEDs

Improvised explosive devices

PAS

Public Attitude Survey

SNTs

Safer Neighbourhood Teams

C. Race and equality impact

There are no explicit race and equality items addressed. The activities that form this report and the data content are arrived at with a regard to delivering SO policing services to an equal standard for all Londoners. The performance report fully complies with equal opportunities policies and associated MPA/MPS Diversity issues. In addition, SO are in regular contact with key community groups and use this to assist the monitoring of the impact of counter terrorist policing in London.

D. Financial implications

SO collects performance data on a regular basis. However, additional effort is expended on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of performance measures included in this report.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author(s): Superintendent Neil Haynes, SO Continuous Improvement Unit (SO CIU), MPS

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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