Arrangements for the oversight of covert investigations

Report: 11
Date: 13 July 2006
By: Commissioner

Summary

Paragraph 7.77 of the Morris Inquiry recommended that covert Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS) operations should be reviewed by a Chief Officer from another police service when an enquiry had run for 3 months. DPS has an oversight process that goes beyond that recommended by the Inquiry and with the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) has developed a protocol that provides for oversight of all DPS investigations more frequently than every 3 months.

A. Recommendations

Members are invited to note the level of oversight of DPS covert investigations and agree that whilst there has been a departure from the Inquiry recommendation, the current level of oversight is more rigorous than was anticipated.

B. Supporting information

1. In covert investigations, there is already provision for the review of surveillance authorities. Responsibility for this review under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) is dependant on the nature of the surveillance. Directed surveillance is authorised by a superintendent unconnected with the investigation and is often reviewed by the Operational Command Unit (OCU) Commander. The authorising officer will not be as intimately involved as the detective superintendent responsible for the investigation team(s) and this allows for a more objective decision making process.

2. Intrusive surveillance authorities are scrutinised by the Director of Professional Standards and either dealt with by him or forwarded to the Surveillance Commissioners for consideration. Regardless of whether the authorising authority is the Director or the Surveillance Commissioners, the need for ongoing authority is always reviewed by a detective superintendent (unconnected with the enquiry) or the OCU Commander and the Director. The reviewing officers will have to be satisfied that ongoing surveillance is both proportionate and necessary. It is the procedure within DPS that a presentation is made to the Director whenever an application is made for intrusive surveillance and in the case of directed surveillance a similar presentation is made to the authorising officer.

3. To ensure that DPS surveillance authorities and reviews are of the highest quality they have a dedicated RIPA office. A recent HMIC inspection said “the Office of Surveillance Commissioners recently inspected this DPS function and reported that the systems and process adopted are of a very high standard. A robust review process has been adopted by the unit for reviewing covert human intelligence sources. The documentation regarding risk assessments was comprehensive and well maintained”.

4. It is suggested that the oversight and review process of covert surveillance is more than adequate and does ensure that investigations are being conducted in a timely and proportionate manner.

5. Paragraph 7.77 of the Morris Inquiry recommended that ‘after a covert investigation has run for three months, a chief officer from another force should review the case and he or she will have the delegated authority to stop the investigation if deemed appropriate. Such reviews should continue as and when necessary’. DPS has departed from this recommendation but has implemented a more rigorous and frequent oversight process.

6. Before outlining this it may be beneficial to explain why DPS has not embraced paragraph 7.7. The nature of any investigation, but particularly a proactive covert enquiry is that it is often very fast moving, with intelligence from a range of sources often providing different lines of enquiry. The dynamic nature of these investigations would mean that a meaningful review after 3 months is likely to be costly (if using another Force), time consuming and resource intensive.

7. These are not insurmountable problems when the number of covert investigations older than 3 months is limited. In reality this is not the case. Many of these operations, taking into account the intelligence development phase will be older than this and for these operations to be reviewed almost becomes a full time task. The number of covert investigations is such that review by a chief officer from another force would be impracticable. Because the vast majority are subject to various RIPA authorities they are being reviewed, at the latest, every 4 weeks.

8. In 2005 DPS established an oversight group, the purpose of which was to demonstrate the proportionality of DPS covert investigations. The meeting is held bi-weekly and is chaired by the deputy director DPS. Membership includes the OCU commanders from the investigation, prevention and intelligence commands, detective superintendents from the anti corruption teams and specialist investigations, intelligence and support, the DPS diversity co-ordinator, detective chief inspector (Review) and Judy Clements of the IPCC. As and when the group feels it appropriate other interested parties, such as Independent Advisory Group (IAG) representatives will be invited to attend.

9. At the oversight meeting unit heads provide an overview of each of their operations to enable the membership to be satisfied that the response is proportionate, necessary and whether alternative courses of action should be considered. The Chair will have the authority to direct that action be taken on particular operations and this does include closing it.

10. The HMIC inspection referred to earlier also made favourable comment about this review process when they said, “This is an effective process for reviewing progress in cases and ensuring robust challenge, for example the need to continue surveillance authorities in the light of case developments. The… oversight meeting clearly has a thread running through it that ensures focus on capturing lessons learnt from investigations”.

11. The MPS was at the vanguard of developing a corruption referral protocol to the IPCC. This has now been adopted as national policy and effectively means that the IPCC will be made aware of a covert corruption enquiry at a very early stage. Essentially the point at which referral is made is when the need to seek resources is reached, such as directed surveillance, OR a decision is made that evidence gathering should commence immediately.

12. DPS has gone further than this and through the oversight meeting the IPCC are made aware of all DPS covert investigations. Although the meeting is supportive to the investigators its role is to challenge and as a member of the group the IPCC have played an active role in ensuring that are investigations are proportionate and timely.

C. Race and equality impact

It will have been noted that the DPS Diversity Co-ordinator is a member of the Oversight Group and that IAG members are invited when it is felt necessary. The Morris Inquiry spoke of the personal experiences of those who had been affected by DPS and this was recognised when its terms of reference were drawn up. The introduction to the terms says:

“The function of the Anti Corruption Command is to deal with allegations of corruption by members of the MPS and by those who seek to corrupt our staff. This is a huge responsibility and it is important that the command deals with the investigations in a fair, open, proportionate and transparent manner. The nature of the investigations has sometimes made it difficult to be as open as the command would have liked. The manner in which the command was initially established left a legacy of secrecy, a perceived lack of accountability and a general lack of understanding about what the command really does.

The oversight meeting seeks to address this as well as providing management information on a regular basis whilst also providing support and confidence to the Senior Investigating Officer”.

D. Financial implications

None

E. Background papers

None.

F. Contact details

Report author(s): DCS Steve Gwilliam, MPS.

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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