MPS performance against drugs

Report: 8
Date: 12 June 2001
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report follows the initial report on Operation Crackdown submitted to the February PSPM meeting. It summarises 2000/2001 performance against drugs targets and shows borough level performance. The report covers the independent evaluation of Operation Crackdown and MPS response to the evaluation and future plans for Crackdown. The report finishes with details of progress of arrest referral schemes.

A. Recommendation

That Members are asked to note the report.

B. Supporting information

2000/2001 performance against drugs targets

1. During 2000/2001 the MPS set a target to increase the number of judicial disposals (JDs) for supply and possession with intent to supply class A drugs by 10 per cent with particular focus on heroin, crack and cocaine (baseline: 1998/1999 level). The MPS exceeded this target, achieving a 27 per cent increase in JDs relating to Class A supply and Possession with Intent (PWI) offences, and 26 per cent, 40 per cent, 14 per cent increases respectively relating specifically to heroin, crack and cocaine.

2. The MPS also undertook to refer 2000 arrestees into treatment via drug arrest referral schemes. Latest numbers show that 2382 people were referred during 2000/2001. Further details of Arrest Referral Schemes in the MPS, including a borough breakdown, follow later in the report.

3. For 2001/2002, targets have been set to increase the number of JDs (supply and PWI to supply Class A drugs) by a further 10 per cent compared with the number of JDs achieved during 2000/2001. The target for the number of referrals through drug arrest referral schemes has increased to 3000.

4. Chart 1 (see Supporting material) shows the monthly variation in Class A JDs for supply and PWI to supply (1998/1999 and 2000/2001 levels). This shows a clear increase in the number of JDs during February 2001, during which time the second phase of Operation Crackdown took place.

Borough performance

5. A breakdown of borough performance against the 10 per cent target to increase the number of JDs (supply and PWI to supply Class A drugs) is shown in the following charts. The first chart shows the percentage variation by borough compared with the 1998/1999 level. Boroughs have been arranged, in both charts, by the percentage variation between the years.

6. Chart 2 (see Supporting material) shows the actual number of JDs by borough and shows, of those, the number relating to heroin, crack and cocaine. It should be noted that actual numbers of JDs vary considerably, from over 250 at Greenwich, to seven at Barking and Dagenham. Percentage variations in the numbers of JDs can therefore be misleading. Sutton, for example, has the second greatest percentage increase but a relatively small number of JDs in total.

7. The top of chart 2 shows that, of the 32 boroughs, 18 achieved the 10 per cent target. The greatest achievement, both in terms of the percentage increase, and the actual number of JDs, was attained at Greenwich. The increase in numbers of JDs at Greenwich was over 50 per cent of the total numerical increase across the MPS as a whole.

8. Greenwich attributes its success to the fact that for the past 18 months they have had a permanent drugs squad. Test purchase operations are carried out every week, and officers can therefore respond quickly to intelligence. Suppliers are either arrested the same day, or in some cases arrest is not immediate in order to secure best evidence. There is also a very active source cell providing accurate intelligence. Maintaining the drugs squad is resource intensive, and through active bidding for additional resources, Greenwich made the best use of additional funds (the greatest share of maintaining the drugs squad has come from sources other than the original budget). Greenwich attribute success against street crime (4.9 per cent reduction 2000/01) and to a greater extent, against burglary (19 per cent reduction 2000/01), to their tactics for dealing with drug offences.

9. Following the second phase of Operation Crackdown, a central drug support team has been established within Territorial Policing. The role of the support team includes being the tacticians and advisors for boroughs.

Age profile of persons accused of drugs offences

10. Chart 3 (see Supporting material) shows the age profile of persons accused of offences relating to crack, heroin, and cocaine. Whilst the proportions are broadly similar, there is a slightly greater proportion of persons over 40 accused of crack offences, and a slightly greater proportion of persons up to 20 accused of heroin offences compared with the other drug types.

Operation crackdown

11. On reviewing the three-year drug strategy created by the Drugs Directorate, a key objective that was not being achieved, or its feasibility tested, was to disrupt Class A drug supply in London.

12. It was identified from Safer Streets activity that there was a potential linkage between overt street drugs markets and drugs dens and levels of street crime.

13. As a result of an assessment of our tactics against such markets, it was identified that our interventions were sporadic, and uncoordinated. This meant that all we were effectively doing was moving the client base around the MPS as opposed to causing any significant pan London disruption.

14. In November 2000, Operation Crackdown was established across the 10 inner city boroughs with the highest level of street crime offences. This was to co-ordinate our efforts and disrupt Class A markets in those areas. The key ambition was to test whether removing a large number of dealers at the same time disrupted supply and thereby impacted on crime. Additionally an intelligence cell was created to maximise this intervention opportunity by gathering criminal intelligence. This initial phase was the subject of an earlier report to the MPA Professional Standards and Performance Monitoring Committee meeting on 13 February 2001.

Independent evaluation of Operation Crackdown

15. An independent evaluation of the impact of Operation Crackdown was commissioned by the MPS and carried out by the Criminal Policy Research Unit at South Bank University (authors Russell Webster, Mike Hough and Anna Clancy). The purpose of the report was to evaluate the impact of Operation Crackdown in terms of:

• the sale of drugs within the study area;
• local crime rates;
• critical success factors for effective local enforcement activity.

16. A copy of the full report is available in the MPA library, however Appendix 1 summarises the methodology and main findings of the report.

17. Following the learning from the first Crackdown operation, a second operation took place to attempt to discover at what point 'critical mass' could be achieved ie: when the number of drug disruptions begins to influence the levels of street crime.

18. Whilst the findings indicated limited success in terms of crime reduction, we have achieved positive gains in the reduction in the fear of crime and community reassurance. It is therefore our intention to maintain our attack on Class A street markets and drug dealers in the same co-ordinated fashion. There will be three operations in this planning year. These will allow us to fully test the 'critical mass' theory in relation to associated crime reduction.

19. In reality, in the medium to long term, we need to encourage the government to focus international effort on disrupting the producers. Our focus should be to enhance activity in terms of drugs users as the only true solution to disrupt any market economy, is to either stop production or the demand for the product. This will be developed through the Territorial Policing Crime Forum over the next 12 months to replace our current 3-year drug strategy.

Operation Crackdown 2001/2002

20. Since the last Crackdown phase concluded, at the end of February, a central drug support team has been established within the Territorial Policing Crime OCU. Their role is to be the tacticians and advisors for the boroughs, and to co-ordinate the MPS support services/resources during the three activity phases scheduled for the year 2001/02.

21. The aim is to:

• reduce bureaucracy, as responsibility for drug enforcement comes under one command;
• create an apparently seamless but sustainable attack on drug dealers;
• create the opportunity to raise officer morale;
• enhance community satisfaction, by making communities safer for those who live and work in them, and contribute to 'making London the safest major city in the world';
• create strong local partnerships with drug referral agencies, local housing authorities etc;
• work towards the delivery of the 10 per cent increase in the number of judicial disposals for Class A supply and PWI to supply offences;
• enhance the ability of boroughs to run their own drug enforcement operations, through appropriate training where identified as a need;
• enhance the intelligence surrounding drug dealers and methods of dealing, to deliver more effective operations.

Learning from the 2000/2001 Operation Crackdown

22. This section gives details of lessons learned from the earlier phases of Operation Crackdown, and of steps that have been to address those issues raised in the independent evaluation.

23. One of the difficulties highlighted in the independent evaluation was 'how do we ensure that those 'crack houses' that are identified and raided, are permanently closed'. During the first phases of Operation Crackdown, boroughs were actively encouraged to establish strong working relationships with their partners in the borough councils. This message will continue to be promoted and the local crime managers will be urged to liaise closely with local housing departments. Every borough senior management team (SMT) is being visited to ensure that the Crackdown philosophy is understood. By working together, it is anticipated that the local authorities will be able to reclaim some of their properties and properly secure them against re-entry.

24. Following the first phase, it was also identified that vulnerable groups included those people who suffer from mental illness. Quite often, these vulnerable individuals are targeted by drug dealers for a 'take over', in which dealers will simply move into their premises for a protracted period. This message will be promulgated, however experience shows that most dealers operating from 'crack houses' have already identified their next premises in anticipation of being disrupted. No specific target has yet been set for the closure of 'crack houses'. The evaluation suggests that there should be an aim to close identified premises between two to four weeks after notification. Whilst this is accepted as an ideal, there needs to be a balance between closing the premises quickly, and using the premises as an intelligence source. This decision needs to be made locally by the Borough Commander in conjunction with his/her partner agents. That said there is an expectation that, save in exceptional circumstances, such premises will be subject to enforcement activity within four weeks.

25. The impact that Operation Crackdown has had on both the price and availability of drugs is acknowledged to be limited. The independent evaluation suggested that this may in part be due simply to the growing demand for Class A drugs. It equally alluded to the fact that the high profits that can be made by dealing in drugs influence the number of people who become involved. However, that is not to conclude that Operation Crackdown did not make significant impacts. The report suggested that the gains to be made from a community safety perspective are substantial, resulting in a very real reduction in fear for those residents who reside within targeted areas. In the Dalston area, Operation Crackdown has significantly contributed to restoring local confidence in the police. Equally, the morale of officers was enhanced as they witnessed pro-active enforcement against known dealers/markets.

26. The independent evaluation also identifies the emerging market of the mobile telephone. The relative anonymity associated with 'pay as you go' mobile phones have made them an increasingly attractive means for dealing in drugs. There are at present limited tactics for this emerging trend. However, as the markets develop so will the tactics and fundamental to this will be the intelligence that is obtained. In order to progress the intelligence issue, an individual has been established who will be responsible for co-ordinating the Borough Intelligence Units and advising them appropriately. Intelligence will also be collated centrally in order to identify those dealers who supply the street dealers.

27. The intelligence unit will also affect a close working relationship with the Forensic Science Service who provided detailed data relating to the make up of drug deals. This included the purity of the drug and the means by which it was wrapped. The disparity associated with Crack cocaine suggests that its production is still very much a 'cottage industry' rather than a large organised operation. The information generally has allowed inferences to be drawn and has contributed to a greater understanding of how some London drug markets interact. The message that was consistently given, that each operation should be considered for a comprehensive 'scene examination', did not filter through to the 'practitioners' on borough. Probably the most disappointing aspect of the first phases was the lack of requests that were made by borough for 'forensic support'. The conclusion is that there is a lack of understanding by many of the potential to use forensic support as an intelligence tool. This important message will again be delivered and systems will be put in place to reinforce it.

28. Cross-borough co-operation, or possibly the lack of it, was a feature of Operation Crackdown during the year 2000/01. A number of difficulties were identified in running a pan-London operation of this size. SMTs on each borough have been urged to communicate effectively and to consider any opportunities to jointly impact on shared 'markets'. A single borough SMT representative has been identified as having responsibility for driving borough activity. Crackdown Support Desk will monitor each 'test purchase' operation, and an assessment of its potential mutual benefit will be made. Collective meetings with Borough Supt's will take place fortnightly both during, and in the weeks immediately prior to an 'activity phase'.

29. The independent evaluation questioned whether the majority of street robberies were drug related and believed that most were committed by young offenders who were unlikely to be drug-dependent.

30. It did however acknowledge that proactive drug operations targeting areas in which drug-related crimes occur might impact on robbery figures. This is supported, to a degree, by the experiences of Kensington and Chelsea in the last phase of operation Crackdown. The borough ran an undercover 'test purchase' operation in the Earls Court area. The operation ran from the 15 January – 28 February 2001 and was funded via Crackdown. Covert intelligence sources had indicated that Earls Court was a drug-dealing centre, predominantly for crack cocaine and heroin. Other intelligence however, failed to support this theory. Police observations identified a number of people who were clearly engaged in drug dealing and this identified the street market. The dealers were then also identified as known robbers and burglars. In total over 50 charges for 'trafficking' offences have been preferred and the expectation is that they will secure some 60 judicial disposals for Class A drug offences. Most notable however, are the early crime analysis indications. A comparison between the three months immediately following the operation, as against the same period last year, shows that the Earls Court area has seen a 25.8 per cent decrease in burglary and an 18 per cent reduction in street crime.

31. In conclusion, it is important to remember that the pro-active enforcement campaign conducted during November 2000 and February 2001 was the first co-ordinated pan London activity to take place. It is important to evaluate properly the enforcement activity and the effect it may have on reducing acquisitive and violent crime. It is suggested that such an evaluation should take place at the end of this year's enforcement, which will comprise of three, four weeks activity phases. These phases will require the participation of every borough within the MPD, and in addition, 10 London boroughs also have substantial targets to achieve outside of these phases. This will result in a constant drive against drug dealers in those boroughs, which have the most significant problems.

32. It is difficult to know what the effects of a long-term campaign will be. At best, it is hoped that society will come to view drug misuse as socially unacceptable, similar to the social stance now taken against drink driving. The fight against the consumption of illegal drugs is difficult. Sustained effort and focus is required by all those involved to combat the damaging influences of usage. Ultimately the key must be education, but there must also be a powerful enforcement strategy to maintain and reduce the pernicious aspects of illegal drug use.

Drugs arrest referrals schemes

33. The MPS made a commitment in its 1998/1999 Policing Plan to introduce Arrest Referral Schemes in all custody suites within the Metropolitan Police Area by April 2000. This commitment was fulfilled with the awarding of contracts to selected provider agencies in January 2000.

34. The commissioning of the schemes has been co-ordinated centrally, but the commissioning panels have consisted of borough police commanders or their representatives and members of local Drug Action Teams (DATs). In August 1999, the MPS published the service specifications for all the schemes that would be operating in the London Boroughs from April 2000. Tenders were invited from provider agencies; presentations were made to the DAT commissioning boards in November/December 1999. All contracts were subsequently awarded by the end of January 2000.

35. The schemes commenced on the 3rd April 2000, though not all the schemes were fully operational at that stage due to recruiting problems. There are thirteen different agencies, both statutory and voluntary, employing 61 drug workers running the schemes across London.

36. The MPS also recognised the importance of a rigorous evaluation of the schemes to ensure their effectiveness. However, with the announcement of a national strategy to have schemes operating in all custody suites in England and Wales by March 2002 the Home Office became a partner in developing an evaluation process. The findings from this evaluation will be extremely influential when decisions are taken nationally regarding the future funding of arrest referral schemes.

37. The contract to undertake the evaluation has been awarded to a consortium led by Southbank University, supported by the Imperial College, School of Medicine and the National Addiction Centre, Maudsley Hospital.

38. The evaluation will provide regular data, each quarter, on the schemes in each Borough, covering the following areas:

• number of prisoners seen by the drugs workers;
• number of assessments;
• number of referrals;
• number entering treatment (This information is not available at present. The London Arrest Referral Monitoring (LARM) Database has recently been linked with the Regional Drug Misuse Database (RDMD). The RDMD collates information from treatment agencies. It is envisaged this information will be available towards the end of 2002).

39. This information can then be analysed using the following sub-set of data:

• Age
• Sex
• Ethnicity
• Offence for which arrested
• Arrested inside/outside Borough of residence
• Drug misuse profile
• Offending profile

40. The evaluation will also incorporate the identification of a cohort, of around 600 individuals (though this figure may be lower due to recruiting difficulties), who will be subject to extensive follow-up research six months after their arrest. This will involve further interviews, drug testing and repeat offending profiles. Twelve schemes across London will also be examined in detail to identify good practice in their operation and management. Details of this part of the evaluation are expected to be available by the autumn.

41. The MPS target for 2000/2001 was to refer 2000 arrestees on to treatment. To date 2382 arrestees have been referred during this period, though this may yet still rise slightly. The target for the current year has been increased to 3000. A borough breakdown of arrest referrals during 2000/2001 is attached at Appendix 2.

C. Financial implications

None.

D. Background papers

• An evaluation of the impact of Operation Crackdown (Russell Webster, Mike Hough, Anna Clancy - Criminal Policy Research Unit, South Bank University)

E. Contact details

The author of this report is Lesley Nichols, Corporate Performance Analysis Unit, Insp Jim Davis, Operation Crackdown and Insp Martin Fanner, Drugs Directorate, MPS.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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