Member involvement in the management vetting and service confidence procedures

Report: 9
Date: 10 October 2000
By: Clerk 

Summary

The paper outlines the potential involvement of member or members of the MPA Professional Standards and Performance Monitoring Committee (PSPM) in the MPS Management Vetting and Service Confidence procedures. The paper recommends that member or members of the MPA do not become directly involved in the procedures.

A. Supporting information

1. Section 65 of the Police Act 1996 (as amended by paragraph 97 of Schedule 27 to the 1999 Act) provides that the MPA is to be the “appropriate authority” for dealing with complaints and discipline against the four senior ranks of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). Section 65 also makes the Commissioner the “appropriate authority” for complaints and discipline against officers below Commander. However, section 77 of that Act requires the MPA to keep itself informed of the workings of the complaints and discipline system in the MPS. This means it must keep abreast of those cases in which it is not directly involved.

2. The MPS has been implementing a wide-ranging Corruption and Dishonesty Prevention Strategy within the Service for the last two years. Within this strategy are a number of inter-linked strands, which are divided into more specific elements (see Appendix 1). These strands include Management Vetting (no.21) and Service Confidence (no 24). Both policies have been agreed by the MPS Management Board and are in the process of being implemented.

Management vetting

3. A note on Management Vetting (MV) is at Appendix 2. The purpose of the procedure is to protect the interests of the MPS, and individuals who represent the Service, by ensuring that designated posts are not filled by people about whom there are justifiable concerns that they may practice or be vulnerable to corruption, dishonesty or unethical behaviour.

4. A designated post is one where opportunities for corruption are highest and there could be a substantial risk of serious damage to the Service if a person who was corrupt, dishonest, unethical or vulnerable to any of these things occupied the post.

5. A preliminary survey has been carried out in which senior MPS managers have been asked to consider the proposed criteria for MV posts and identify the posts within their command that would appear to fall within the definition. Initial evidence suggests something like 1650 posts.

6. There is to be an appeals procedure for those refused clearance. It will be in two stages, the first an internal appeal to the Head of Service Security Branch, the second and final to a newly constituted Management Vetting Appeals Panel. The MPS proposal is that the Panel should consist of ACPO rank senior officers or equivalent senior civilian staff and members of the PSPM Committee or full MPA. Individual panels would be constituted of two members drawn from a pool, one in each category, one of who would act as Chair. Panels would hear appeals against refusal of MV clearance. For further details see Appendix 2.

Service confidence

7. The Service Confidence policy recognises that within the MPS are a number of staff whose verifiable lack of integrity or ability to carry out a particular role gives cause for concern. The MPS is in a position of public trust and has an obligation to take action in order to ensure that trust is not abused. The Service therefore needs to put measures in place, which will protect the security and safety of staff and its operational role.

8. The Service Confidence policy formalises how the Commissioner may use current Service conditions, which require police officers to serve where they are directed, and the mobility clause contained in the contracts of civil staff, to require officers or staff to transfer to a different work location when their integrity is called into question.

9. The procedure also allows for source sensitive information to be used at a meeting of interested and relevant parties to discuss the individual. Source sensitive information is information or intelligence obtained legally but under legislation that prohibits its use for other than intelligence purposes; and information or intelligence obtained legally, which if used for other than intelligence purposes, could reveal its source thus reducing operational options, putting people and sources at risk. In order to ensure source sensitive information and intelligence remain confidential, the meeting will be closed.

10. Options for an independent review of any decisions taken have been included as well as an appeals procedure. A copy of the policy is at Appendix 3 and a diagrammatic representation of the process at Appendix 4. The policy refers to the MPS Ethics Committee, but this has now been replaced by new arrangements based upon an MPS Professional Standards Committee. This will be an executive decision making forum responsible for progressing the Corruption and Dishonesty Prevention Strategy. It is envisaged the committee would be supported by a Professional Standards Oversight Panel comprising representatives from the MPA, staff associations, lay persons and professionals in the field of professional standards. This committee would oversee the implementation of the Corruption and Dishonesty Prevention Strategy, provide advice and guidance to the Professional Standards Committee and serve as a sounding board.

11. The policy suggests that once the Service Confidence process has been initiated, Commander (Operations and investigations) in the Directorate of Professional Standards would consider stage 2. In difficult cases it would be open to this officer to refer the papers to a non-MPS member of the Professional Standards Oversight Panel. This would provide an independent insight into the inclusion of the individual in the procedure.

12. The MPS propose that a member of the MPA PSPM Committee might also have a role in the appeals system, if not involved at the earlier stage.

13. The Service Confidence policy formalises arrangements for enforcing transfers of staff whose integrity has been called into question. It is designed to ensure that the MPS, its staff and the individual are afforded protection against corruption and dishonesty in a way that is both proportionate and fair to all.

General considerations

14. The need for fairness, objectivity and proportionality in the application of both these processes has been recognised. As with any MPS policy, a dissatisfied individual could apply to an Employment Tribunal claiming racial, sexual or disability discrimination. Whilst the MPS would not wish to disclose source sensitive information in such proceedings, the Service will need to disclose the Corruption and Dishonesty Prevention Strategy generally and the Management Vetting and Service Confidence procedures specifically. Public interest in the prevention and detection of corruption and crime may justify the action taken, although payment of compensation cannot be ruled out, especially when source sensitive information is used to defend the action taken.

15. The MPS have considered issues of disclosure, data protection and human rights when preparing the policies and systems.

16. The number of MV appeals cannot be established at this stage. The MPS envisages no more than 4-6 service confidence cases per year. This number may, however, be significantly increased during the first years of the policy’s operation due to an expected backlog.

Role of members

17. Involvement at either Stage 2 of the MV process or in the appeals stage of the Service Confidence procedure would be consistent with the MPA’s role under section 77 of the Police Act 1996, which requires it to keep itself informed of the workings of the complaints and discipline system in the Metropolitan Police Service (i.e. keeping abreast of those cases in which it is not directly involved).

18. However, we have some concerns about members of the PSPM Committee becoming too closely involved in the Management Vetting or Service Confidence procedures either within the processes themselves or at the appeals stage. Some individual cases may result in Employment Tribunal applications at which members could be called to give evidence, thereby undermining their independent status.

19. The alternative we would recommend is that members of the PSPM Committee would take an overall view of the procedures rather than become directly involved. The overall view could include reviewing the decisions made by the appeal panel, and perhaps looking at a sample of cases where MV clearance had been refused or the Service Confidence procedure invoked.

B. Recommendations

1. That the Committee note the Management Vetting and Service Confidence procedures that the MPS are introducing.
2. That members of the PSPM Committee should maintain an overall view of the process rather than become directly involved.

C. Financial implications

There would be likely to be some financial implications for the Authority if members became directly involved in either process.

D. Review arrangements

There is a Best Value Review of Complaints, Discipline and the Corruption and Dishonesty Prevention Strategy. The Strategy will be under constant review as each strand is introduced.

E. Background papers

The following is a statutory list of background papers (under the Local Government Act 1972 S.100 D) which disclose facts or matters on which the report is based and which have been relied on to a material extent in preparing this report. They are available on request to either the contact officer listed above or to the Clerk to the Police Authority at the address indicated on the agenda.

• The MPS Corruption and Dishonesty Prevention Strategy (Special Notice 36/98) published 16 December 1998.
• The Policy for reporting wrongdoing within the MPS and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (Special Notice 14/00) published 30 June 2000.

F. Contact details

The author of this report is Alan Johnson.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 2

Management vetting

1. The objective is to protect the interests of the MPS, and the individuals who represent the Service, by ensuring that designated posts are not filled by people about whom there are justifiable concerns that they may practice or be vulnerable to corruption, dishonesty or unethical behaviour.

2. A designated post is one where opportunities for corruption are highest and there could be a substantial risk of serious damage to the Service if a person who is corrupt, dishonest, unethical or vulnerable to any of these things occupied it. The criteria are intended to cover police, civil staff and contractors’ posts.

3. A preliminary survey has been carried out in which senior MPS managers have been asked to consider the proposed criteria for MV posts and indicate the posts within their command, which would appear to fall within the definition. Whilst the results of this survey will need to be considered further and anomalies ironed out, the likely number of posts would appear to be in the region of 1650.

4. It is important to acknowledge that MV is not “security vetting” which is a separate process used to verify that people may have unsupervised access to the higher levels of protectively marked information. However, it is possible that the checks carried out in the “Developed Vetting (DV)” process (which is designed to assure the integrity of people who may have access to Top Secret information) would be sufficient to assure their suitability for a MV post. The major difference between DV and MV is that DV includes a check of Security Service records and interviews with all candidates and if necessary previous line manager and referees. MV does not include a Security Service check and will only include interviews if there are matters needing clarification or if the conclusion of the process is that the candidate be refused clearance.

5. The basic HMG clearance level required for all MPS staff is Counter Terrorist Check (CTC). However, this has only been the standard since 1994. There has been no catching up exercise to bring everybody’s vetting up to this standard although it has been done in some circumstances. The result is a very patchy application of the CTC standard throughout the MPS. Once granted, CTC remains valid for 10 years. When a candidate applies for a MV post, his/her security vetting status would be checked and if necessary brought up to the CTC standard (or higher, of course, if the post also requires security vetting).

6. MV is a system along the lines of Developed Vetting but without the checks of Security Service records. It includes thorough checks of all available indexes and Service records for the candidate, their partner, ex-partners and any known associates; references from previous employers and / or line managers; personal references; and medical screening. Candidates also have to complete an application form and declarations regarding their health, financial affairs, convictions cautions and complaints and discipline history. This entails all candidates’ partners and referees being interviewed to probe aspects of the candidate’s background, which may not have been revealed in the candidate’s application or, by the referee.

7. The enquiries would aim to examine the following five aspects:

• Financial vulnerability,
• Inappropriate behaviour,
• Personal integrity,
• Vulnerability to improper pressure or influence,
• Vulnerability through health or welfare condition.

8. If considered necessary a candidate interview could be carried out to clarify any of the issues raised during the MV process

9. The following factors would be taken into account in reaching a decision:

• Evidence of wealth inconsistent with income or other assets which has not been satisfactorily explained;
• Severe unresolved financial difficulties;
• A pattern of behaviour indicating a propensity to breach discipline codes;
• Active or unexpunged disciplinary action (except isolated minor matters dealt with by way of words of advice or verbal warning);
• A pattern of inappropriate behaviour, referenced by more than one source;
• A conviction, caution or outstanding matter which has not been reported to line management in accordance with MPS policy;
• Close association with any person under investigation, or having convictions, for offences;
• Membership of any body the nature of which may bring discredit on the MPS or be incompatible with the police service;
• The nature of any relationship or association and the likelihood of improper pressure being successfully applied;
• The ability of the candidate to be able to recognise, report and resist any attempted improper pressure or influence;
• Inappropriate use of or addiction to any substance which, in the opinion of the Occupational Health Service, might result in the candidate being seriously vulnerable to corruption, dishonesty or unethical behaviour;
• Current health concerns which, in the opinion of the Occupational Health Service, might render the candidate seriously vulnerable to corruption, dishonesty or unreliability;
• Provision of false or misleading information during the MV process.

10. MV post holders would be subject to “aftercare”. This is a process of active monitoring by line managers to identify changes in personal circumstances or behaviour that may cause concern. Holders of MV clearance would be required, in addition to complying with existing Service policy on reporting changes of circumstances to report changes in personal or professional circumstances, to the Management Vetting Unit (MVU). This would include, but not be limited to:

• Convictions,
• Complaints, disciplinary allegations or investigations,
• Marriage, divorce or change of partner,
• Change of address or telephone number,
• Adverse county court judgments or serious financial difficulty,
• Business Interests.

11. All candidates whose clearance is refused or those individuals whose clearance is withdrawn have the right to appeal.

Appeals procedure

12. Stage 1: Appellate body - Head of SSB (Service Security Branch PRS2 (2)) MVU will invite the candidate to set out in writing the grounds for appeal. Head of MVU will pass all MV papers to the Head of SSB who will see the applicant if necessary to clarify any issues or if requested by the applicant. The applicant will have the right to be accompanied by a friend who is a member of the MPS or a recognised trade union/staff association representative. The head of SSB will convey his or her decision to the applicant and head of MVU.

13. Stage 2: Appellate body - ‘Management Vetting Appeals Panel (MVAP)

The proposed MVAP could consist of:

• A number of senior MPS officers of ACPO level or at least grade 6 civil staff who hold current SC and MV clearance (Category A); and
• A number of Members of the PSPM Committee or Members of the MPA who are cleared to SC and MV level (category B). MVAP will consist of two members drawn from the pool, one in each category, one of who will act as chair. The Director of Personnel, or nominated senior representative, will appoint the panel.

14. A hearing would be convened for the appeals body. The Head of the SSB (Presenting Officer) will present to the panel the process that was followed and the reason(s) for the refusal decision being made. The presenting officer may call others as witnesses in the case, including The Senior Consultant Physician In cases where the refusal of clearance was on the advice of the Senior Consultant Physician, he or she or a practitioner dealing with the case will be called as a witness. In these cases, the applicant must have given the Senior Consultant Physician written permission to reveal all relevant information. If such permission is withheld, the panel may not allow the appeal. Head of Department providing adverse information In cases where the refusal of clearance was on the basis of information received from an MPS department such as DPS, the head of department (or representative) will be called to present their evidence to the panel. Evidence will be presented in full. Line Managers In cases where refusal was based on information provided by line management, the relevant senior manager will be called to present their evidence to the panel in full.

15. In cases where revealing evidence to the appellant or their representative would be likely to:

• frustrate the apprehension or prosecution of offenders;
• frustrate the prevention or detection of crime;
• damage national security;
• lead to any statutory breach; or
• compromise information given in confidence,

the MVAP will consider hearing the relevant evidence from the witness ‘in camera’ with only the panel members present. Where such evidence exists, the presenting officer will inform the secretary to MVAP in advance of the hearing of a request for a separate hearing. This request will be supported by a rationale. If agreed by the MVAP members, a separate hearing can be convened to cross-examine the relevant witness. Following any such hearing, the chairman can direct that the evidence is suitable for open disclosure and cross-examination in which case the evidence will be presented with the appellant present.

16. Witnesses may be examined and cross-examined by the members of MVAP, the presenting officer, the appellant or a representative acting on behalf of the appellant, except in cases where parts of hearings are held ‘in camera’. The chairman will decide the relevance of questions, act as an adjudicator of objections and provide directions as to answers in cases of dispute.

17. Following their deliberations, MVAP may:

• recommend to the Director of Personnel that the decision to refuse management vetting clearance should stand; or
• recommend that the decision to refuse management vetting clearance should be overturned; or
• make any comments on the way that the process was conducted or on changes to the management vetting process that they may consider appropriate.

The Director of Personnel shall consider the recommendations of MVAP and take any action considered appropriate.

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