

## Appendix 4



Working together for a safer London

# Appendix IV Equality Impact Assessment

<b>Freedom of Information Act Document</b>		
<b>Protective Marking:</b>		<b>Publication (Y/N):</b> Y
<b>Title:</b> Equality Impact Assessment on the Standard Operating Procedures for the Police Use of Firearms.		
<b>Summary:</b>		
<b>Branch / OCU:</b> Firearms Policy Unit, Central Operations		
<b>Date created:</b> 14 <sup>th</sup> May 2008	<b>Review date:</b> May 2011	<b>Version:</b> 1
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## Equality Impact Assessment on the Metropolitan Police Service Standard Operating Procedures for the Police Use of Firearms.

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## **1. Aims and Purpose of Proposal**

The policy relating to the Police Use of Firearms (PUoF) within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) establishes a corporate standard presenting a clear framework for MPS staff. It clearly outlines procedures, roles, and responsibilities to ensure that all armed operations are necessary, proportionate, legal, and that the MPS is accountable.

All policy in relation to the MPS PUoF is codified within the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) on MPS PUoF (hereafter referred to as the 'SOP'). The SOP provides a structure to ensure that any firearm operation complies with the relevant legislation to enable the deployment of armed officers within the law with particular regard to the Human Rights Act 1998, and the ACPO manual of guidance on the Police Use of Firearms (PUoF).

The SOP is for the benefit, safety, and security of all communities in London, as well as the general public who travel into the Metropolitan Police District (MPD) area to live, work, or socialise. It also applies to MPS officers and staff who may be operating in an armed capacity outside of the recognised boundaries of the MPD. In addition to the public at large, the SOP notably impacts upon MPS police officers, staff and stakeholders (i.e. Metropolitan Police Authority, Home Office, Greater London Authority). It also affects persons suspected of, or involved in firearms crime as well as the subject's family, friends and associates. The police service has a duty to safeguard all these groups, or individuals.

The aim of the Equality Impact Assessment (EIA) is to ensure that the SOP complies with key legislative requirements (i.e. Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, Sex Discrimination Act 1975, as amended by the Equalities Act 2006, Disability Discrimination Act 1995, etc). This legislation enforces a positive duty on the MPS to have due regard to issues affecting race, gender, and disability in areas of employment, training and the provision of services. The MPS equality scheme is also committed to incorporating sexuality, age, religion, and beliefs within this requirement. By taking these six strands into consideration the MPS is promoting positive equality, eliminating discrimination, and promoting equal opportunities.

An essential element of the EIA is to ensure that stakeholders are identified and involved in being actively consulted wherever possible on the development of the SOP. The MPS strives to maintain quality policing by listening, consulting and responding effectively within the community in a clear and transparent manner. This is in an effort to ensure that our approach sufficiently takes into account community needs and the impact of armed policing upon on them. This, it is hoped, will encourage greater community involvement and therefore not only continual improvement of the SOP, but also a high level of community reassurance facilitated by a greater understanding of the competing demands under consideration within any firearms operation.

To enable completion of this EIA, the SOP has undergone an extensive consultation process. However this has not been without limitations due to it being a restricted document (documented in chapter 5). It is important to note that the SOP is also considered to be a living document under continual review and consultation with the ability to promptly reflect any changes in legislation or safety critical information. It is through this organic approach that best practice and procedures are promulgated. This process

includes capturing best practice not only within the MPS firearms commands but also from non-firearm commands as well as external organisations both national and international.

By default, the external consultation links into community networks through the feedback provided by BOCUs and Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNTs). It is expected that any feedback they provide to this SOP will reflect the communities they serve.

## 2. Introduction and Background

The MPS provides an armed capability to assist in combating armed criminality and terrorism within the MPD, and throughout the United Kingdom. These duties include diplomatic protection, royalty protection, airport security, court security, armed surveillance, armed escorts, armed personal protection, central London security patrols as well as spontaneous and proactive armed operations.

The MPS will only arm officers who have undergone a specific selection and training programme with each Authorised Firearms Officer (AFO) being equipped in accordance with their training and role. AFO's will be required to maintain specific levels of training and fitness in order to continue their role. No officer will be deployed without the appropriate authority.

When considering authorisation of a firearms operation procedures have to be adhered to as outlined within the SOP. Throughout the authorisation process there is a continual requirement to assess the impact of any operation on the community, and to allow for any community impact assessment to be considered within the planning process. This directs that advisory groups or the local community should be consulted whenever possible within the constraints of the armed policing operation. Such constraints may include the need for confidentiality or the fluidity of an operation meaning that its final location for its conclusion not being known until after its inception. The impact of this assessment or consultation is that in some circumstances the operation may not proceed.

Firearms commands provide a support role to unarmed policing activity. There are approximately 2700 armed officers within the MPS who undergo continual training, and assessment in addition to their operational commitments. It is therefore not possible for the firearm commands alone to build extensive community ties across the MPS. For this reason to maximise community engagement and minimise subsequent community impact, wherever possible, management of an armed operation is retained at a local level with specialist support and advice being provided by the appropriate armed command. This allows decisions to be made by officers who have geographical responsibility for the area concerned. As such these officers are most aware of local community issues, and supporting networks. This benefits the operation by being able to proactively harness the local knowledge and skills of the community and SNTs to assist in the management of the operation to shape and deliver solutions.

Firearms operations can be sourced from a wide variety of activities as previously outlined. Due to the nature of some of these activities it is not always possible to anticipate the community impact, or when the community will be impacted upon, (i.e. an armed surveillance operation covering a large geographical area). The SOP therefore seeks to manage community involvement and impact with such a diverse range of deployments by ensuring that multi disciplinary teams from across the MPS have clear roles and responsibilities. The contribution of Borough policing is vital in understanding community concerns and tensions which may be needed to be taken into account, in addition to providing information and reassurance at the conclusion of an incident.

The MPS, and in this context the armed commands within the MPS, recognise the importance of developing community links to consult with the community. Community

engagement throughout the MPS is under continual development and armed commands not only have the ability to access local networks where required, but also seek to develop similar community links (i.e. APRG<sup>1</sup>, school talks etc) through supporting local or specialist initiatives (i.e. Trident). Following an incident armed commands also offer specialist community support where required in an effort to aid understanding between the community and any police action (i.e. 'Could you presentations<sup>2</sup>').

### **3. Scope**

This EIA will engage the SOP which sets out a framework for the decision making process, and procedures to be followed by all officers and staff when considering the planning, authorisation, deployment, and post incident procedures involving armed officers and weaponry by the MPS.

The production of this SOP is driven by the needs of both firearms practitioners, planners and commanders from conception to conclusion, providing a framework that supports the legislation for authorisation, deployment, strategies, and tactics. It recognises the balance that needs to be maintained between their needs, what the law permits and what society deems to be acceptable.

However the SOP does not direct strategy, or tactical options and therefore, neither will be considered by this EIA. It does create uniformity in the implementation of procedures across 10 armed commands with differing needs and functions and creates parameters in which they are expected to operate. The SOP does not provide the means to scrutinise specific operations but does provide the standards by which they may be reviewed.

The choice of tactical options and the selection of equipment including weaponry and ammunition available to the MPS is largely directed by a bi-annual Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment and again these subjects therefore fall outside of the scope of this EIA.

The selection of any equipment undergoes a separate assessment, and evaluation process relevant to the intended task. Where appropriate the SOP does provide a framework for the use, issue, authorisation, deployment, and post incident procedures in relation to such equipment.

Lastly, the SOP articulates the minimum common standards for occupational health and physical fitness as they should be applied to all armed officers within the MPS.

However each command is responsible for recruiting its own staff and each employs different processes and looks for different role related skills and attributes. Accordingly the SOP does not address recruitment per se; each command should produce its own EIA for this process.

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<sup>1</sup> APRG is the Armed Policing Reference Group, established in 2007 and composed of independent advisor from each diversity strand of the main MPS Independent Advisory Groups

<sup>2</sup> Could You? is a programme of interactive presentations initiated by CO19 in 2006 and continuing to the present day. These involve taking a mobile laser range to community groups and encouraging them to experience decision making exercises that demonstrate the pressures placed on armed police officers. Further information is captured in Annex 4

#### **4. Legislation impacting upon the SOP**

There are some significant human rights, and other legal considerations, which are synonymous with all police firearms operations. One of the purposes of the SOP is to ensure these legal provisions are undertaken (i.e. Command and control). Legislation in certain circumstances has also driven the advance in less lethal options (i.e. Taser), and therefore the requirement to cater for these, and other matters within the SOP.

Key areas of legislation that impact upon the SOP are set out below. These should be considered in context with the primary objective of all police firearms operations this being to safeguard the public. In meeting the primary objective, police officers must identify and assess any threat or risk, thereby minimising and managing the risk using only such force as is absolutely necessary (in defence of any person from unlawful violence, or to effect a lawful arrest etc).

The aim of all firearms operations is to identify, locate, contain, and thereby neutralise the threat posed. While conflict management within the Police Service normally aims to manage and minimise threats, the degree of threat justifying the deployment of Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) is such that resolution must be more robust and it must be completely neutralised (i.e. ensuring no continuing threat exists), ACPO PUoF Chap 5.8.3.

The provisions for the use of reasonable force are contained within Common Law, S3 Criminal Law Act 1967 and S117 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and receive both constraint and validation through the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into Domestic Law, and in particular, Article 2 of the Convention.

The concepts of absolute necessity and proportionality contained in Article 2 demand an additional test to that of reasonableness in the aforementioned legislation.

The Human Rights Act and the ECHR enshrine the rights of individuals, and protects them against abuse of power by public authorities acting for the State. All staff employed by the police service, whether civil staff or police officers are members of a public authority and are required to comply with the ECHR. The public authority is liable for any convention breaches by its individual employees. This does not change the liability of employees with regard to any civil action or misconduct procedures. The necessary engagement of, or interference with, any human right must be fully justified and recorded.

Those suspected of firearm offences may have the following convention rights interfered with. However such interference is justifiable under the ECHR, the Human Rights Act and UK domestic law.

- Right to life - subjects may need to be stopped by using such force as necessary and 'as is reasonable in the circumstances'. There is also a right to life for the public at large, those under threat of firearms offences, and MPS staff.
- Prohibition of torture- the use of less lethal options, notably the Taser. Proportionate, legal, and necessary alternative to the use of lethal force within the conflict

management model to protect life, or to incidents or events of officers facing 'violence or threats of violence of such severity.' Tightly controlled, and audited.

- Right to liberty - subjects may be detained
- Right to privacy - subjects may need to be placed under surveillance authorised in accordance with the law, and policy.

Interference is necessary and can be justified in order to protect the right to life of others (members of the public and police staff). Under Article 2 (Right to Life), deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this when it results from the use of force, which is no more than absolutely necessary in defence of any person from unlawful violence but it must also be 'strictly proportionate' to the achieving of aims. These requirements combined provide a stricter test than that of reasonable force in S3 Criminal Law Act 1967, S117 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and Common Law Duty to Protect Life. Article 2 also implies a positive obligation on the State to take preventative operational measures to protect life.

Article 2 has particular relevance to the planning of armed operations. When police are deployed with firearms, and hence capable of delivering lethal force, the effectiveness of command and control of those officers will be taken into account. It is not just the officer who used force that must explain his or her actions to satisfy any enquiry. It will be necessary to demonstrate that the operation as a whole was commanded and controlled in a manner that respected the requirements of Article 2, (*McCANN -v-UK* 5<sup>th</sup> September 1995). For this reason careful consideration should be given to how an incident could be dealt with, without the use of force. If force is used there should be documentation to support the contention that all other options were first given consideration.

Officers should be properly briefed with only appropriately trained officers being deployed. It is of great importance that proper consideration should be given to the need to avoid the risk of innocent persons being injured either directly or indirectly by police, or by the suspects. Consideration must be made of the manner in which strict control was exercised in relation to the actual force used (as opposed to that anticipated when the operation was planned) to ensure that the force was 'proportionate' and no more than 'absolutely necessary'.

This policy therefore does not breach any convention rights, despite this it is likely that in the event of any suspected person being injured or killed as a consequence of police action then legal processes will be instigated. This will ensure accountability through statutory investigations, coroner's inquests criminal trials and other legal challenges.



## 5. Consultation

The SOP undergoes two distinct methods of consultation. The first method of consultation is a formal review of the SOP undertaken at three-year intervals to ensure that it complies with the aims of this proposal as described in Chap 1. The second consultation process is more complex as the SOP is under constant review and consultation takes place to ensure that it is continually fit for purpose.

**Common to both methods of consultation is the desire of the MPS to learn from the community we police by offering transparency and allowing communities to challenge and scrutinise armed policing methods. However within this process there are certain parameters that must be adhered to in order to ensure that operational safety is not compromised (i.e. by revealing specialist tactics or techniques). In these circumstances the MPS seeks to facilitate scrutiny as far as possible by innovative methods of consultation.**

### 5.1 Three-year consultation review

Those consulted in the formal three-year review are documented in Table 1 (below). This process consisted of two phases. During the first phase the SOP was sent out in full by email to all the identified stakeholders, and feedback sought. The feedback was then collated and assessed with appropriate amendments made prior to the second consultation. This phase extended the consultation to external partners in the same manner as in the first phase of consultation with the exception of the APRG.

The APRG is composed of experienced independent advisors who serve on other MPS IAGs. In most cases, members of the APRG have worked with the police for a number of years and are very familiar with police practices and procedures. In recognition of their unique role, the APRG have been given additional 'training' to help them understand armed policing in general. This is an ongoing process.

Due to the 'restricted' security classification imposed on the SOP the APRG were sent an index with a break down on the contents of each chapter. They were then asked to identify areas that they wished to interrogate further. Once relevant sections were identified the representatives were allowed full access to the selected chapters with a member of the FPU present to obtain any feedback. Only the disability representative took advantage of this opportunity, with feedback being gratefully received, and acted upon. However, the full APRG, that has representatives from all 6 diversity strands, was given a detailed review of both the Taser and Officer identification SOP.

The feedback from this consultation process is provided in annex 3.

Table 1- Formal consultation	
1st consultation (Oct 2007)	2 <sup>nd</sup> Consultation 31 <sup>st</sup> January 2008
<b>MPS Firearms Commands</b>	
All Firearms' Commands	All Firearms' Commands
All Chief Inspectors CO19	All Chief Inspectors CO19
All Inspectors, CO19	All Inspectors, CO19
All Firearms Instructors at MPSTC	All Firearms Instructors at MPSTC
<i>MPS</i>	
Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA)	Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA)
All Commanders	All Commanders
All Borough Commanders	All Borough Commanders
Chief Firearms Instructor	Chief Firearms Instructor
Superintendents Association	Superintendents Association
Directorate of professional Standards (DPS)	Directorate of professional Standards (DPS)
Occupational Health Branch (OH)	Occupational Health Branch (OH)
Health and Safety Branch	Health and Safety Branch
Intelligence Standards Unit	Intelligence Standards Unit
Directorate of Legal services	
Police Federation	Police Federation
Directorate of Training and development	Directorate of Training and development
Central Communications Command	Central Communications Command
<b>MPS Consultation focusing on Equality</b>	
Cultural and Communities Resource Unit (CCRU)	Cultural and Communities Resource Unit (CCRUU)
Diversity and citizen Focus Directorate	Diversity and citizen Focus Directorate
SAMURAI (Support Associations meeting up regularly and Interacting)	Support Associations meeting up regularly and Interacting, (SAMURAI). See annex 1 for further details.
Police Staff Trade Union	Police Staff Trade Union
<b>External consultation</b>	
Independent Police complaints Commission (IPCC)	
	British Transport Police (BTP)
	City of London Police (CoLP)
	Ministry of Defence Police (MOD)
	Provost Guard Service
	Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
	Armed Policing Reference Group (APRG) comprising Independent Advisory Group (IAG) members from each of the equality strands (Representing: Race, LGBT, Travellers Youth Islamic Community Safety Trust, Jewish Faith, Arab Women and Disability). The APRG also not only links into the community, but also has further links into other relevant IAG groups (e.g. Trident IAG).

## 5.2 Continual consultation and review process

It should be noted that due to the risks involved in armed policing the SOP is considered to be a 'living document' under constant review with feedback actively sought as part of an ongoing and continual learning process. This includes listening to community concerns.

When examining the SOP it is important to note that its content is also driven by statutory legislation, and other stakeholder requirements (i.e. Home Office). Additionally to achieve a national standard and reflect good practice the SOP is strongly influenced by ACPO PUoF, together with advances in technology (i.e. communications, and less lethal options), as well as learning from international policing (i.e. Police Aux Frontieres).

All policies in relation to the police use of firearms were codified in 2004 into the PUoF SOP. Since its conception the document has been republished twenty one (21) times. Within these publications over ninety-five (95) sections of the SOP have been amended. These amendments have been driven by continual learning through consultation. Some of this feedback is a mandatory requirement of the SOP (i.e. firearms debrief feedback). For the benefit of this EIA an overview of the amendments within the last three years is provided in annex 2.

Feedback is obtained from a variety of sources from both within the organisation, and externally (outlined in Table 2 below). Information is fast tracked when appropriate through the command chain with changes being made in a timely, prioritised manner. The SOP can be republished at short notice to reflect good practice, and to ensure that highest standards are achieved in relation to any aspect of an armed operation. This procedure will include matters that affect equality, and community issues.

Every authorised operation debrief is documented within a database capturing and distributing relevant information. This is supported by dip sampling operations by examining all aspects of them to identify shortfalls, and best practice (i.e. armed operation oversight committee). The continual review of the SOP is intended to identify, formally and informally, best practice and safety critical information to allow development of procedures, and training. Ultimately, the aim of this is to benefit and increase community confidence, taking into account equality issues by active engagement.

In addition to monitoring and analysing feedback each of the armed commands seeks to extend community engagement and consultation through working with colleagues (i.e. Trident school talks, and community engagement) in support of the MPS community engagement strategy. Feedback from these engagements and Borough liaison is recorded and assessed, with good practice being progressed through the aforementioned process.

The consultation process does not stand alone, but is supported by a continual monitoring process, for early identification of emerging issues, (chap 5.2).

Table 2	Typical Sources of continual feedback- (This list is not exhaustive).
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Home office</li> <li>○ Her Majesty Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC)</li> <li>○ Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)</li> <li>○ National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA)</li> <li>○ Metropolitan Police Authority (i.e. Taser deployment, and management, armoury reviews, etc)</li> <li>○ Coroners inquests (Scrutiny, and recommendations of the inquest)</li> <li>○ Post incident recommendations, (early recommendations following initial inquiry)</li> <li>○ Review Groups (i.e. July Review Group, Forest Gate, Op Cassin, etc)</li> <li>○ Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)</li> <li>○ Department of Professional Standards (DPS)</li> <li>○ Complaints procedure</li> <li>○ MPS Director of Legal Services (DLS) have taken part in the consultation process and provided legal advice.</li> <li>○ Strategic risk assessments (Undertaken by each command)</li> <li>○ Firearm de- briefs. Required as part of the SOP at the conclusion of a firearms incident, this is forwarded to the FPU for action; all authorised operations are documented, and followed up) when no de brief report is received.</li> <li>○ Daily handover reports, (reflect ongoing operations, and community matters)</li> <li>○ Armed operations are also randomly dip sampled, with relevant personnel involved in the operation invited attend the '<i>Armed operations oversight meeting</i>' to interrogate the actions and promote good practice.</li> <li>○ CO19 Diversity Issue Group (Command group set up to examine all aspects off diversity within the armed command units)</li> <li>○ Feedback on Mental Health matters(notably this has resulted in additional training of armed officers).</li> <li>○ Health and safety (risk assessments, and management of risks)</li> <li>○ Occupational Health (Specialist support, and advice).</li> <li>○ Hearing conservation groups.</li> <li>○ Near miss reports (Health and Safety, can apply to all aspects of an operation where possible danger was encountered, to allow future identification, and possibly engineer/ plan to remove/ manage the danger in the future).</li> <li>○ Good work reports (Innovative solutions, and actions)</li> <li>○ Intelligence reports</li> <li>○ Specialist monitoring (including equalities monitoring) of crime trends, to support intelligence led policing</li> <li>○ Feedback in the use of Taser (National perspective as well).</li> <li>○ Talks (i.e. Trident, schools, etc).</li> <li>○ Presentations (i.e. Could you?).</li> <li>○ Armed Policing Reference Group, (APRG, meets quarterly).</li> <li>○ Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs),</li> <li>○ Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB). Reflecting national recommendations, and studies.</li> <li>○ Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)</li> <li>○ Examination of other international police force methods. These include members of the '<i>Atlas Group</i>', which is a collaboration of 38 European Union (EU) countries funded by the EU. This links firearms units of the police forces within these countries, to identify best practice on firearms policy and tactics.</li> </ul>

### **5.3 Community consultation and assessment within a firearms operation**

The command structure of an armed operation utilises the national model of Gold, Silver, and Bronze commanders, each having a specific role. Designed within this framework is a requirement for the needs of the community to be taken into consideration at every stage of an armed operation. The requirement to make these considerations is unambiguously articulated within the SOP.

This is initially achieved through an authorisation process that requires consideration to be given to community impact. This process is both articulated and recorded on MPS forms FA1 (Initial request for authorisation), FA2 (Authorisation) and FA3 (Repeat authorisation). Each of these forms includes a community impact assessment with consideration to the community at large as well as focusing on the six strands of equality. These authorisations seek to ensure that any impact on the community is identified at the earliest stages of an operation, and continual monitoring is undertaken. Where any community impact is identified the forms record how this is justifiable and direct those involved to explore any proposals to minimise the impact. In some circumstances due to endangerment to life it may not be possible to reduce community impact, before the conclusion of the armed operation.

The decision log for armed operations (F3605) completed by Silver commanders also captures the community impact assessment, ensuring that any plans have been implemented, and further development is undertaken where required. It also seeks the identification of community officers within the command chain (i.e. Bronze community).

In the majority of operations, ensuring the Borough Commander or their deputy is the authorising officer (Gold), retains the close links with the community. Because of their geographical co-location, they have the greatest knowledge, and experience of the local community.

There are however circumstances when due to the specialist nature of an operation the authorising officer is not the local Borough Commander. In these circumstances, unless due to the confidential nature of an operation, the authorising officer is required by the SOP to liaise with the local Borough commander to ensure any views are taken into consideration. However it may not always be apparent at the early stages of specialist operations which communities may be affected, (i.e. armed surveillance operation across a large geographical area). In these circumstances liaison is required as soon as practicable.

Early assessment of community concerns is limited in the event of a spontaneous firearms operation, (i.e. a requirement for the immediate deployment of armed officers without prior planning).

In these circumstances the community impact assessment will be carried out as soon as practicable. Again this is facilitated by a local command structure with firearm teams operating in support of them. Accredited firearms commanders are generally independent from the firearms team and their assessment of impact is therefore likely to be more impartial. This process allows for a system of checks and balances in the PUoF, allowing decisions to be taken with the needs of the community in mind.

Irrespective of how the armed operation is initiated, a post-incident requirement is in place to examine community concerns. The local Borough, which is best positioned to listen to the community and activate a network of community ties, would facilitate this. This requirement is articulated in the decision log for armed operations (F3605).

The post incident process requires feedback and debriefing to be documented, and returned to the Firearms Policy Unit (FPU). It is one of the FPU's roles to identify and disseminate any organisational learning and good practice, and use this to influence future policy and procedure.

## 6. Monitoring

Monitoring of armed operations, and SOP compliance is undertaken through a number of routes starting with its ownership sitting under the strategic ownership of Commander CO. As a member of the relevant ACPO working group on the police use of firearms, Cmdr CO is able to monitor how the MPS with a national policing perspective.

Commander CO also manages the Firearms Policy and Strategy Group (FPSG), which has three sub groups providing it with information. All of these groups meet regularly and strongly influence the SOP. The sub groups are: Operations, and Tactics, chaired by Chf Supt CO19; Firearms Training, chaired by Chf Supt CO18; and the Weapons and Equipment Sub Group, chaired by Chf Supt SO14. It is relevant that each group is chaired by a separate armed command to encourage greater diversity in the management of armed operations, and therefore a wider perspective on the SOP requirements and compliance with it.

The daily management of the SOP is undertaken by the FPU, which is responsible for managing consultations and meetings, subsequently making appropriate amendments and disseminating the information. The FPU is responsible for monitoring outcomes from operational activity and identifying learning activities and is in the process of recruiting a quality assurance officer to manage this process.

In addition, other activities are undertaken which provide monitoring of the SOP.

1. Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment. The purpose of this is to establish the operational requirement for the police use of firearms within the MPS and enable the FPSG to make informed decisions on firearms deployment profile across the MPS; firearms capability; firearms training, and future demands and threats.
2. Taser, a breakdown of all deployments is maintained. This includes the circumstances, age, ethnicity; self defined ethnicity, and Special Population Groups (SPG)<sup>3</sup>.
3. Deployments. The number of armed deployments, spontaneous, or authorised is maintained.
4. The number of stops carried out by armed officers is recorded, and a breakdown of these by age, race and gender is subject to scrutiny.
5. De brief reports. At the conclusion of every incident a full de brief will take place and a separate review taken in the following areas: Command, and control, Initial intelligence and information; Tactical advice; Deployments; Communications; Training requirements; Current policy; Community concerns/ input; and, areas for development.
6. Armed operation oversight committee. This is a review group that dip samples a number of authorised operations, and examines all aspects of the operation to identify good, and bad practice, making recommendations where appropriate.

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<sup>3</sup> The term 'Special Population Group' is used to describe a group of people who, from the firearms officer's perspective, do not behave in an expected or rational manner as a result of some form of mental impairment (either permanent or temporary).

7. Apart from training requirements, a database of all discharges by police is maintained. This is regularly interrogated to detect trends, and where required changes in procedures, or enhanced training is initiated.
8. Discharge of firearms subject to full investigation and IPCC enquiry. This procedure investigates the circumstances of a police shooting, looking at all aspects, and additionally acts as an independent method to monitor SOP compliance, and ensure the SOP is fit for purpose.
9. Specialist Crime Directorate monitoring of crime by age, race and gender.
10. Health and safety near miss reports.
11. Monitoring of results from the Job Related Fitness Test (JRFT) based on age and gender.
12. Firearms training pass/ failure statistics to identify trends.
13. Presentations and feedback to analyse community needs.
14. Compliance matrix completed in cases of SOP amendments where required.

Information gathered from the FPU, with the support of:

- Intelligence units from each of the armed commands
- Firearm enquiry teams
- Quality assurance
- Crime reporting information system
- Specialist Crime Directorate
- Counter Terrorism Command.



## 7. Screening Process for relevance to Diversity or Equality issues

- (i) Will the proposal have significantly higher impact on a particular group, community or person the MPS serves or employs?

Yes

Explain:

Specific armed operations are intelligence led. In the case of a firearms incident taking place without prior warning (spontaneously), any stops and searches are likely to be carried out as a result of information from the public that will, wherever possible, be supported by further intelligence.

There is concern from within the black community, particularly among young males, that police will target them. This is a well published concern within the media and recognised by the MPS. Intrusive systems of monitoring stop and search, and armed operations are in place to ensure that officers carry out their duties without discrimination and are not responsible for disproportionately stopping one particular ethnic group (see also EIA on MPS stop and search).

These figures represent an accumulation of operations that might give an overall picture that suggests the SOP create (or at least suffer) disproportionality. However nothing in this proposal directs activity on the basis of any diversity strand. Instead, it directs operations based on intelligence and information that originate from sources not subject its constraints. That is to say, the provisions of this proposal are only enacted once a subject is identified as a potential threat and by this time there is no ability on the part of the police to be selective about whom they apply these procedures to.

Armed policing in relation to terrorism offences has identified community concern that certain communities will be racially profiled. The MPS must, in order to protect the public at large, plan and have tactical options to deal with emerging and existing threats (i.e. the 'suicide bomber'). This has been subject to separate consultation and community engagement. The learning from this process has been incorporated within the SOP and training as appropriate.

The fact that Operational Command Units (OCUs) are predominantly staffed by white males is acknowledged by all those concerned with their management. It is also recognised that in turn this will influence the predominant beliefs and influences of teams that operate within this SOP. However, as the SOP addresses prescribed procedures and standards that should be adhered to regardless of background, beliefs or any other diversity influence it should not, in itself, cause significantly higher impacts on any individual group.

- (ii) Will any part of the proposal be directly or indirectly discriminatory?

Yes

Explain:

The nature of armed policing requires officers carrying out the task to be continually physically, and mentally fit. Fitness and health requirements appropriate to the role have been established to assist in managing this requirement (i.e. fitness, eyesight etc). These criteria may be considered to impact upon age, gender and disability. The requirements have been established through a number of independent studies commissioned on behalf of both ACPO and the MPS. There is regular monitoring and analysis of these standards to ensure that no

person, or group of persons are unfairly discriminated against.

Additionally in many of the assessment areas within this EIA the statement is made that 'this policy does not target directly, or indirectly, any groups or individuals...' The context of this statement is that there is no direct or indirect discrimination identified as a result of the application of this SOP to firearms operations. This is because their instigation and management is based on an assessment of the risk posed by the intelligence and information and not any factors evolving from diversity considerations.

However the MPS recognises that there may be a perceived secondary impact on communities by the high profile nature of intelligence led, armed policing operations. The priority in these circumstances is the protection of life, with community impact being taken into consideration wherever possible. This EIA has also identified future work to ascertain further methods to enhance community feedback following a firearms operation.

(iii) Is the proposal likely to negatively affect equality of opportunity?

Yes

Explain:

In the areas of age, gender and disability, this may impact with regard to the job related fitness tests. Occupational health screening in areas such as eyesight and hearing may impact on age and disability.

(iv) Is the proposal likely to adversely affect relations between any particular groups or between the MPS and those groups?

No, it is not likely but it is possible.

Explain:

There is community concern in respect of the race, faith, and disabilities in relation to conventional firearms that they will be unfairly targeted by police as outlined in 6(i) above. However, the majority of all communities recognise the need to provide effective policing to deal with armed criminality and are generally supportive of it. This is evidenced through the Armed Policing – Could You programme which shows approximately 95% support for armed policing activity in London (see Annex 4)

There is concern with regard to less lethal technologies that young black males are more likely to be Tasered than white males. Available data sets are so limited (on average 70 incidents a year) as to make statistical analysis unreliable. However all taser incident are monitored on a case by case basis within the FPU.

The disability representative of the IAG stated that disabled persons feel that they are in danger of being Tasered, or challenged with a conventional firearm, due to officers misinterpreting their movements, or communication difficulties.

Armed operations are intelligence led as outlined in 6(i). Significant monitoring of all deployments, and stops is undertaken to offer reassurance to the community that the MPS is not discriminating. As a result of this feedback the database has recently been enhanced to produce a further breakdown, and effective analysis, of deployments in response to MPA and community concerns over deployment of Taser. This database now collects data on self-defined ethnicity and persons who are perceived to have a physical or mental impairment

(temporary, or otherwise).

Additionally continual training has also been developed to assist in early identification and management of persons who are perceived to have a physical or mental impairment (temporary, or otherwise). This would also include people with communication difficulties.

The identification of this issue has also led to consideration being given to people whose first language is something other than English and for whom communication may be difficult. This group are captured within the meaning of SPGs

(v) Are there any other community concerns, opportunities or risks to communities arising from the proposal?

Yes

Explain:

Community concerns are notable around the use of Taser as a less lethal option. This EIA does not deal with the selection of the Taser as a less lethal option, a separate EIA is being completed in respect of this.

The use of the Taser may be justified as a tactical option within the conflict management model, (see Scope, chap 3). The SOP does address the policy around the issue, deployment and post incident procedures in relation to Taser, as used by firearms officers.

Each use of Taser is closely monitored, with a full feedback form being required by the MPS and ACPO. This not only monitors the persons age, ethnicity, and circumstances for use, but also the medical impact and effectiveness of the weapon. Monitoring of this information is undertaken as outlined in (iv) above.

(vi) Is the proposal likely to harm positive attitudes towards others and discourage their participation in public life?

No

Explain:

The public at large show through public satisfaction surveys and direct interaction with MPS armed commands that they are supportive of the work undertaken. They recognise that it is individuals who present threats and not communities and act accordingly.

(vii) Is the proposal a major one in terms of scale or significance?

Yes

Explain:

The proposal relates to the Police Use of Firearms. Any use of firearms by the police has a significant community impact, particularly with the potentially serious nature of offences and risk to life when dealing with any firearms threat. The police have a duty to protect the public, and a failure to do so may have a serious impact on community safety. The consequences of any police action, or lack thereof, in relation to a firearms threat is likely to receive significant community attention, together with extensive media coverage that would also impact upon community confidence.

The use of conventional firearms by police may result in the loss of life, engaging articles of the Human Rights Act (see Legal impact on SOP). Police must therefore be accountable and able to demonstrate proportionality, legality, and necessity.

## 8. Full Impact Assessment

a) Explain the likely differential impact (whether intended or unintended, positive or negative) of the proposal on individual service users or citizens on account of:

Age: older people, children and young people.

Details:

**General:** This Standard Operating Procedure will not negatively impact against any person on the basis of age as this policy does not target directly, or indirectly any groups or individuals on this basis (please note comments on Para 6(ii)).

**Within the MPS:** As highlighted in 6 (iv) above, due to the nature of armed policing occupational fitness levels have been established appropriate to the role. These requirements may be considered to impact upon age. Fitness levels to meet occupational requirements have been established through a number of independent studies within the MPS, and at a national level. Monitoring is undertaken and analysed to identify possible areas for improvement, or areas that may adversely affect a particular group, or groups of people. In the past monitoring has detected trends that are biased against gender (i.e. upper body strength assessment methods biased against females). Once identified appropriate changes have been made to permit equal and fair assessments.

**Outside the MPS:** Each firearms operation is based upon intelligence to identify the suspects irrespective of their age. Statistics are collated to identify and manage any trends (i.e. age, ethnicity, etc) through training (i.e. examining options to deal with young persons carrying firearms), or a change in the SOP if required. This Standard Operating Procedure will not have an impact on any particular age group of people as each subject will be dealt with in the same way regardless of age.

Disability in line with the Social Model.

Details:

**General:** This SOP does not specifically focus upon any groups or individuals on the basis of disability. This Standard Operating Procedure will however positively impact on persons on the basis of disability. Although this policy does not target directly, or indirectly any groups or individuals on the basis upon their disability (please note comments on Para 6(ii)) it does give due consideration to their potential needs and limitations.

The potential for adverse impact will be in situations where police are dealing with an armed incident which requires immediate deployment of armed officers and involve: -

- Persons with a mental health illness (either permanent or temporary), who by their behaviour appear to be a armed, or claim to be armed, but in fact pose no specific threat and are not able to understand or willing to follow an officers verbal instructions.
- Persons with a hearing impairment.
- Persons with a visual impairment.

The result of identifying this potential impact has been that additional training in relation to

mental health, and communication issues has been carried out, and an amendment to the SOP has been made. Additional training has been undertaken following input from mental health professionals.

Included within the practical scenario training, there are scenarios where the persons concerned cannot speak or understand English. This enhanced training for AFOs will decrease the possibility of a negative impact on persons having a disability, mental health illness or communication difficulty when considered against persons from other groups.

Authorised operations will be subject to a community impact assessment. This takes into account disability concerns, and seeks to minimise adverse impact to the community.

As a result of a concern raised by the disability representative from the APRG the authorisation form for armed operations (FA1, FA2, FA3) includes reference to disability within the community impact assessment.

Faith, religion or belief: those with a recognised belief system or no belief.

Details:

**General:** This SOP does not specifically focus upon any groups or individuals on the basis of their faith, religion or belief, therefore does not have a negative impact on individual or groups on this basis (please note comments on Para 6(ii)).

The SOP emphasises the reliance on intelligence for armed operations and it is on this basis that the suspect will be identified in a spontaneous or authorised operation. The APRG examines emerging issues, procedures, and tactics. They have been consulted in the review of this SOP.

It is recognised that armed operations may have a negative impact on certain communities within London, notably in relation to recent terrorism incidents. The MPS must have a proportionate response to emerging, or established threats notably, in this context, suicide bombers. The Muslim community is concerned about police action being based on stereotyping and discrimination. The threat from suicide bombers is subject to a separate EIA and the community engagement from this process has benefited the SOP (i.e. recording of firearms briefings). Relevant learning from the consultation is cascaded as required with suitable training, (i.e. communication difficulties, see disability).

Authorised operations are intelligence led and will be subject to a community impact assessment. This takes into account religion and faith concerns and seeks to minimise adverse impact and promote community confidence.

Gender or marital status: women and men.

Details:

**General:** This Standard Operating Procedure will not negatively impact against any person on the basis of their gender as this policy does not target directly, or indirectly any groups or individuals on the basis upon gender, (please note comments on Para 6(ii)).

It is recognised that the majority of firearm incidents involve male suspects: The SOP emphasises the reliance on intelligence for armed operations.

The diversity groups within armed commands continually review retention of female officers in an effort to seek innovative ways to create a more balanced profile in the workforce. Examples of work undertaken is a mentoring programme for both the application process and job related fitness test in relation to applicants as ARV officers, and examining alternative weapons for persons with smaller hands.

Race, ethnicity, colour, nationality or national origins

Details:

This SOP does not specifically focus upon any groups or individuals on the basis of their race, therefore theoretically does not have a negative impact on any individual or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, colour, nationality, or national origins. It is recognised that this SOP may have a perceived negative impact on certain race groups within London namely Asian, Black and Middle Eastern communities.

Many members of these ethnic groups articulate a perception that there is indiscriminate targeting of persons by police engaged in armed operations based on their ethnicity and race. Officers from the MPS are required to collate the details and record the ethnic background of all persons stopped. This data is forwarded to the FPU who analyse the figures in order to establish those officers are not disproportionately stopping one particular ethnic group.

The MPS undertakes intelligence led operations, underpinned by command and control of an armed operation. Incorporated within this is the authorisation process of an armed operation that requires a community impact assessment to be undertaken. Statistics are collated and interrogated on behalf of Commander CO for all armed operations to offer reassurance to the community that all operations are being undertaken impartially and that the MPS is accountable.

Due regard is also paid to issues surrounding a persons language, where the persons first language is not English. As discussed in previous sections, these people are captured under the generic concept of a special population group.

Sexual orientation, transgender or transsexual issues.

Details:

**Sexual orientation:** This Standard Operating Procedure will not negatively impact against lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgender or heterosexual persons, as this policy does not target directly, or indirectly any groups or individuals on the basis of their sexuality (please note comments on Para 6(ii)).

IAG representation from the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) group exists within the APRG, and wider consultation to the LGBT under SAMURAI has been included within the consultation process. No issues or concerns have been raised nor were any raised through a survey carried out in 2007 in relation to LGBT officers views of armed commands within the MPS. This research is retained by the CO19 strand leader but was promulgated among other commands at the time as it represented best practice.

Additionally, the APRG LGBT member recently conducted a review of CO19's recruitment process. His view was that the process was appropriate and fair and went on to offer his praise

for the quality of objective assessment. He did comment on the predominance of white male faces at the MP Specialist Training Centre (MPSTC).

Other issues, e.g. public transportation users, homeless people, asylum seekers, the economically disadvantaged, or other community groups not covered above.

Details:

This Standard Operating Procedure will not negatively impact against any individual, or group directly, or indirectly on the basis of their political, economic, or social origins (please note comments on Para 6(ii)).

(IAG representation from the Gypsy, and Traveller Community has been made at ARRG).

Recognition has already been given to the fact that people within this group may have communication difficulties and this has been addressed within the generic consideration given to special population groups.

It is agreed that people falling into the 'homeless' or 'asylum seeker' categories may suffer a higher incidence of mental illness than the general populace and again recognition is given to this through the generic consideration given to special population groups.

b) Is the proposal directly or indirectly discriminatory? Is there a genuine occupational requirement?

Details:

If monitoring reveals an adverse impact against any individual or group as a result of this Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), the SOP will be reviewed and if necessary, action taken.

**Gender:** There is a genuine occupational requirement for fitness standards to be maintained among firearms practitioners. Levels are established to reflect role requirements and not gender. There is no evidence that this policy discriminates, either directly or indirectly against people of any particular gender in relation to the employment of armed officers..

**Sexual orientation:** There is no evidence that this policy discriminates, either directly or indirectly against any person of any particular sexual orientation.

**Disability:** There is a genuine occupational requirement for fitness standards to be maintained among firearms practitioners. Levels are established to reflect role requirements and not disability. There is no evidence that this policy discriminates, either directly or indirectly against any person who has a disability

**Age:** There is a genuine occupational requirement for fitness standards to be maintained among firearms practitioners. Levels are established to reflect role requirements and not age. There is no evidence that this policy discriminates, either directly or indirectly against any person of a particular age



**Religion or belief:** There is no evidence that this policy discriminates, either directly or indirectly against any particular religion or belief.

**Race:** There is no evidence that this policy discriminates, either directly or indirectly against people of any race

- c) Explain how the proposal is intended to increase equality of opportunity by permitting positive action.

Details: Mentoring is offered to both male and female candidates to help them address any issues associated with passing JRFTs. This mentoring scheme predominantly helps women. Additionally, some commands are actively using female and Black or Minority Ethnic (BME) mentoring programmes to help candidates from these strands prepare for applications to armed commands.

As an example of their success, in respect of the 2006/2007 CO19 ARV recruit selection process this raised the number of successful women applicants from 1 to 13.

- d) Explain how the proposal is likely to promote good relations between different groups.

Details:

The MPS and MPA community engagement strategies will continue to place the promotion of equality at its centre by enabling diverse Londoners to work together and identify solutions through ongoing debate.

The MPS has held conferences and attended public hearings with representatives from various sections of the community; youth, women, businesses, faith groups etc. Continual MPS community engagements will continue to place the promotion of equality at its centre by enabling diverse Londoners to work together and identify solutions through ongoing debate and therefore minimise the low negative impact that affects certain equality target groups.

Through continual consultation within various faith groups and communities, it is anticipated that this policy will be viewed in a more positive way and that reassurance can be installed into communities and special interest groups by demonstrating that the policy does not indiscriminately focus on people based on any equality issues.

- e) Explain how the proposal is likely to promote positive attitudes towards others and encourage their participation in public life.

Details:

As a result of the EIA the SOP has undergone extensive consultation within the organisation and outside, within the limitations of the SOP being a restricted document. The purpose of the consultation has been to ensure that the SOP is fit-for-purpose by taking into account the needs and expectations of the community. The SOP has been subject to scrutiny to ensure that public engagement is embedded into police firearms operations thereby ensuring that Londoners, our partners and our staff, have confidence in the policing of those operations and that the MPS can be seen to be accountable for its actions.

Additionally, a clear articulation of the requirement for armed operations to be driven by specific intelligence should provide reassurance that individuals and not communities are targeted by police.

f) Explain how the proposal enables decisions and practices to adequately reflect the service users perspective.

Details:

This is adequately explained in the opening chapters of this EIA. In essence the whole SOP is driven by user needs and these are identified by organic consultation and feedback processes. This is extended by anchoring command and control at a local level ensuring that command decision reflect local understanding and need thereby delivering a customer centric response to public demand.

**9. As a result of the Equality Impact Assessment the following modifications have been to the SOP:**

1. Mental health- a new section has been inserted recognising signs when dealing with Special Population Group (SPG), and the subsequent management of the operation.
2. Additional training, and heightened awareness in relation to SPGs carried out at the firearms training facility.
3. Additional training to deal with language barriers.
4. Increased reference to the requirement of the community impact assessment included, and the long term affects of Firearms operations on a borough.
5. Community impact assessment amended to highlight the need to consider disabilities.
6. Post incident procedures where IAG members have been involved. An extension of OH facilities to IAG members has been requested; this has been agreed and will be incorporated into the SOP.
7. Taser database now includes data on usage with collecting data on persons having permanent, or temporary mental or physical impairment.
8. Additionally a number of administrative changes have been made as a result of feedback, these changes are not relevant to the EIA.

**10. As a result of the Equality Impact Assessment the following areas have been identified as requiring further research, and to be progressed as required:**

**Further Research**

1. Operational weapon selection - It has been identified by the women's selection panel that a smaller weapon may assist persons who struggle to cope with the current choice of firearms.
2. Language – The disability representative highlighted concerns over communication with deaf persons. This also raised concerns with regard to communication with foreign nationals. This area has already been addressed in response to consultation from the Kratos review group resulting in enhanced training but continues to be a concern hence the inclusion for further research. Language cards are also being examined as an option for post incident use of Taser.
3. Post incident support - A review of post incident support to local boroughs in the event of a firearms incident, with consideration of presentations to help community understanding (ie. Could you).
4. Special Population Group - the term is not liked by several groups that it should represent. This is a national term originating with ACPO. Appropriate feedback to ACPO has been provided, and we await a response.
5. Making of notes - Community confidence in relation to the ability of officers to confer after an incident is subject to consideration and legal advice at present.
6. Learning from MPA community engagements - This is an ongoing process with continual learning, in particular as it relates to counter terrorism and operation Kratos.
7. Extension of compliance monitoring – This to explore how relevant data stored by the FPU can be used to audit SOP compliance at regular intervals, (i.e. quality of community impact assessment process undertaken).
8. Evaluate methods to capture community involvement in armed operations.

9. Evaluate methods to capture community involvement within the de brief, post incident process.
10. SOP structural review – This will be a review of how the SOP could be better structured to ease access and use. It will also consider the possibility of creating an overarching firearms policy in which this SOP and other will sit.

## 11. Decision-making

a. Name, rank or grade of decision maker:	
b. What is the Decision?	
Reject the proposal	Yes / No <i>(delete as applicable)</i>
Introduce the proposal	Yes / No <i>(delete as applicable)</i>
Amend the proposal (an impact assessment should be made of any amendments)	Yes / No <i>(delete as applicable)</i>
c. Name, rank or grade of SMT/(B)OCU/Management Board endorsing decision:	
<b>Commander J Savill</b>	

## 12. Public Availability of Report/Results

<b>Person completing EIA: PS 7 CO Richard May</b>	
<b>Signed:</b>	<b>Date: 14 May 2008</b>
<b>Person supervising EIA: Insp Aldworth</b>	
<b>Signed:</b>	<b>Date: 15 may 2008</b>
<b>Quality Assurance Approval:</b>	
<b>Name and Unit:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
<b>Date Review Due:</b>	

# **S.A.M.U.R.A.I.**

## **Support Associations Meeting Up Regularly and Interacting**

- **Association of Muslim Police**
- **Association of Senior Female Police Staff**
- **Association of Senior Women Officers**
- **British Association for Women in Policing**
- **Catholic Police Guild**
- **Christian Police Association London Branch**
- **Gay Police Association**
- **Jewish Police association**
- **Metropolitan Black Police Association**
- **Metropolitan Police Service Chinese and South East Asian Staff Association**
- **Metropolitan Police Service Disabled Staff Association**
- **Metropolitan Police Service Emerald Society**
- **Metropolitan Police Service Greek Staff Association**
- **Metropolitan Police Hindu Association**
- **Metropolitan Police Sikh Association**
- **Metropolitan Police Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Association**
- **Police Anglo Italian Staff Association**

## Annex 2

### BIOGRAPHY: - MPS POLICE USE OF FIREARMS STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

Date	Police Notice	Update
26/5/04	21/04 (Items 1 and 2)	SOP Published (Version 1).
11/8/04	32/04 (Item 3)	Update of decommissioned policies
8/9/04	36/04 (Item 2)	SOP (Version 2). Update of specialist munitions. Change of title of Chapter 17 to include body armour + supply and issue.
24/11/04	47/04 (Item 3)	SOP (Version 3). Addition of Taser Change of title. Chapter 9 to include Taser. Command structure (codes of practice) added. Chapter 6. Change of title Chapter 13 to include issue and security of weapons/ammunition. Realignment of previous Chapter 13 instructions.
6/7/05	26/05 (Item 7)	SOP (Version 4).  Form 6620 Authorised Firearms Officers - Annual Report Chapter 20.1 - 20.5.  Fitness Hearing and Eyesight Testing for Firearms officers Chapter 21.1 -21.8.  MPS Reserve Chapter 26.1.  Protocol between Specialist Operations and Territorial Policing regarding the MPS firearms capability Chapter 26.6 - 26.07.
3/8/2005	30/05 (item 3)	SOP (Version 5).  New sections on the Management and Use of MPS Armouries and Weapons Storage Sites (Chapter 14.1 - 14.9).  ARVs Involvement in matters outside their primary duty (Chapter 1.5).
13/9/05	E-mail to all affected firearms OCU commanders	SOP (Version 5.1). Amendment to Chapter 10 Armed Hospital Guards to include new SLA.

31/10/05	N/A	SOP (Version 5.2). THIS EDITION HAS NEVER BEEN PUBLISHED
17/12/05	49/05	SOP (Version 5.3).  The amended SOPs contain revised instructions in relation to firearms coming into police possession  (Chapter 15 - Paragraph 15.12); seeking/administering tactical advice  (Chapter 6 - Paragraph 6.2); and on the replacement of Form 3605A with Forms FA1, FA2 and FA3 in relation to the application and authorisation of firearms operations (Chapter 5 - Paragraph 5.1).
03/06	Unknown notice	SOP (Version 5.4).  Introduction added regarding MPS ACPO Lead on Police Use of Firearms  The Management of Firearms Operations Chapter1) New paragraph at Ch 1.6 Authorisation for CAD Special Address Comments requiring an Armed Police Response i.e. Threats to Life, Alarm calls and vulnerable premises concerns.
03/06	Unknown notice	SOP (Version 5.5)  Chapter 4 Home Office Codes of Practice on Police Use of Firearms added as a new chapter.  Chapter 6.2 Other OCU specific tactical advisors  Chapter 6.14 Required Levels for command training - Bronze commanders added  Chapter 9 New baton gun L104A launcher and rounds to replace previous versions.  Chapter 12.22 community impact assessment added  Chapter 20 Minimum rank endorsing the 6620 i.e. Inspector  Chapter 22 Destruction of Surplus MPS Firearms and now ammunition added.
03/06	11/06 (item 1)	SOP (Version 5.6)  <b>Chapter 4</b> The previous Chapter 4 (Armed Interception Tactics) now forms part of Chapter 1 (under para 1.2).  <b>Chapter 4</b> has been renamed and exclusively deals with the Home

		<p>Office Codes of Practice on Police use of Firearms. Updates as follows:</p> <p>Overview of Codes of Practice on Police use of Firearms at Chapter 4.1</p> <p>MPS Association of Chief Police Officers lead at Chapter 4.2.</p> <p>Firearms strategic committee within MPS at Chapter 4.3</p> <p>Recording and gathering of safety critical information. (Reporting of near misses and reporting of firearms/ammunition failure) at Chapter 4.4</p> <p>Reporting of shots fired by police (including unintentional discharges) at Chapter 4.5</p> <p>Post incident/shooting recommendations at Chapter 4.6</p> <p>Strategic Threat and Risk assessments at Chapter 4.7</p> <p><b>Chapter 6</b> Added Updates concerning:</p> <p>Selection and training of firearms Tactical Advisers at Chapter 6.2</p> <p>Definition of 'Bronze' Firearms Commanders at Chapter 6.14</p> <p><b>Chapter 12</b> New entry concerning:</p> <p>Completion of Community Impact Assessments post-shooting incident at Chapter 12.22</p> <p><b>Chapter 20</b> New entry concerning:</p> <p>Amendment to annual authorisation process at Chapter 20.1</p>
04/06	13/06 (item 1)	<p><b>SOP (Version 5.7)</b></p> <p>There are several changes to the document, which has been updated to version 5.7. Main areas of change are highlighted below:</p> <p><b>Chapter 4</b></p> <p>Chapter 4.3: Added Terms of Reference for Firearms Strategic Committees within MPS.</p> <p>Chapter 4.8: Added Risk Assessments within Firearms Operational Command Units and MPS Firearms Operations.</p> <p>Chapter 4.9: Selection, Testing and Procurement of Weapons Requiring Special Authorization and Ammunition</p>



		<b>Chapter 5</b> Chapter 5.4: A new Form 3605 Armed Operation Record - Silver Decision Log and Log of Events- is now available for use and the relevant guidance has been amended accordingly.
01/11/06	43/06 (item 1)	<p><b>SOP (Version 5.8)</b></p> <p>The MPS Police use of Firearms SOP has been amended in the following areas:</p> <p>The previous Chapter 4 (Armed Interception Tactics) now forms part of Chapter 1 (under para 1.2). Chapter 4 has been renamed and exclusively deals with the Home Office Codes of Practice on Police use of Firearms. Updates as follows:</p> <p>Overview of Codes of Practice on Police use of Firearms at Chapter 4.1</p> <p>MPS Association of Chief Police Officers lead at Chapter 4.2.</p> <p>Firearms strategic committee within MPS at Chapter 4.3</p> <p>Recording and gathering of safety critical information. (Reporting of near misses and reporting of firearms/ammunition failure) at Chapter 4.4</p> <p>Reporting of shots fired by police (including unintentional discharges) at Chapter 4.5</p> <p>Post incident/shooting recommendations at Chapter 4.6</p> <p>Strategic Threat and Risk assessments at Chapter 4.7</p> <p>Chapter 6 Added Updates concerning:</p> <p>Selection and training of firearms Tactical Advisers at Chapter 6.2</p> <p>Definition of 'Bronze' Firearms Commanders at Chapter 6.14</p> <p>Chapter 12 New entry concerning:</p> <p>Completion of Community Impact Assessments post-shooting incident at Chapter 12.22</p> <p>Chapter 20 New entry concerning:</p> <p>Amendment to annual authorisation process at Chapter 20.1</p>
18/07/07	Operational news item	<p><b>SOP (Version 5.9)</b></p> <p>There have been a number of amendments to the Police Use of</p>

		<p>Firearms Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) manual (the new version is 5.9).</p> <p>This is an interim update, due to operational requirements, prior to a full SOPs update later this year.</p> <p>The updates include:  Chapter 2-paragraph 2.9 (Tactical planning for firearms operations).  Chapter 2- paragraph 2.10 (Threat assessment definition for firearms operations).  Chapter 2- paragraph 2.11 (Risk assessments definition for firearms operations).  Chapter 2- paragraph 2.12 (Audio recording of firearms briefings).  Chapter 6- paragraph 6.26 (Post incident reviews).  Chapter 17- paragraph 7.4 Eyesight (Wearing of sunglasses).</p>
01/08/07	Operational News item	<p><b>SOP (Version 6.0)</b>  Taser Extension Policy added at 4.12</p>
3/08/07	Operational News item	<p><b>SOP (Version 6.1)</b>  The Home Office circular allowing a trial in the extended use of Taser from the 20 July 2007 outside firearms incidents, has yet to be fully implemented by the MPS.</p> <p>At this time there is <b>no change</b> in the deployment, and use of Taser.</p> <p>Until further notice the Taser will continue to be deployed within existing protocols and the current firearms SOP.</p>
8/07	Operational News item	<p><b>SOP (Version 6.2)</b>  Taser wording amended again at 4.12</p>
08/07	Operational News item	<p><b>SOP (Version 6.3)</b>  Taser wording amended again at 4.12</p>
17/10/07	42/07 (item 2)	<p><b>SOP (version 6.4)</b></p> <p>Revision of the MPS - Police use of Firearms (Puof) - Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) - 'The Transportation of Weapons and Ammunition Within the MPS'.</p> <p>Minor housekeeping amendments have also been made to Chapter 4 (Para 4.12 and 4.13), Chapter 6 (Para 6.27) and Chapter 7 (Para 7.13).</p>
12/12/07	50/07 (item 2)	<p><b>SOP (Version 6.5)</b>  Revisions to the MPS - Police use of Firearms (Puof) - Standard</p>

		Operating Procedures (SOP) - 'The Extended use of Taser by Authorised Firearms Officers' revised chapter 4
02/01/08	01/08 (item 1)	<p><b>SOP (Version 6.6)</b></p> <p>Changes to Metropolitan Police Service Police Use of Firearms Standard Operating Procedures - The audio recording of 'Silver' firearms briefings. Chapter2</p>
Awaits	Awaits publication	<p><b>SOP (Version 7.0)</b> Changes are as follows-</p> <p><u>CHAPTER 1 Authority for the Issue and Carriage of Firearms</u> Paragraph 1.3</p> <p><i>Definition of Spontaneous Incidents -</i> Change of wording.</p> <p>Paragraph 1.5 Process for Obtaining Armed Operation Numbers, Recording operational Police Use of Firearms/Tasers and recording the result of Firearms Operations -</p> <p>Paragraph 1.12 Deployment of Armed Protection Officers on Horseback This is a new Policy and new paragraph added to SOP.</p> <p><u>CHAPTER 2 The Objectives and Mgt of a Firearms Operation.</u> Paragraph 2.5 Training and Selection Requirement for Firearms Commanders-</p> <p>Paragraph 2.7 New flow chart for the business process in spontaneous firearms incident calls coming through CCC.</p> <p>Paragraph 2.16 Forensic Strategy and suspect transportation- New paragraph on procedures to improve forensic integrity of the movement of prisoners.</p> <p><u>CHAPTER 6 Intentional Discharge of Firearms and Taser by Police.</u> Paragraph 6.7 Making of notes by officers Slight amendment to wording after Legal advice.</p> <p><u>CHAPTER 9 The Deployment and Management of Armed Hospital Guards 9(AHG)</u> Paragraph 9.9</p>

Review Process -  
Change to wording as to the flow of intelligence reports to ACPO reviewing officer.

Paragraph 9.13  
Transfer of guarded persons, re-worded paragraph.

CHAPTER 13 Make-safes of Firearms Coming into Police Possession.

Detailed amendments to entire chapter.

Paragraph 13.3  
MPS Authorised Make-safe Officers and Personnel -  
Updated list of Authorised Personnel to include new Firearms

Paragraph 13.6  
Initial Handling and Packaging (prior to arrival of Forensic Make-Safe officer) amendments

CHAPTER 14 AFO Equipment, Hearing Protection and Body Armour.

Paragraph 14.3  
Authorised Firearms Supplementary Equipment -

CHAPTER 15 Firearms Training Selection Procedure

A link to the new Training SOP.

CHAPTER 17 Fitness Hearing and Eyesight testing for Firearms Officers

Paragraph 17.8  
New paragraph Incapacitating Illness or Injury -

## Annexe 3

# Consultation and Engagement list

## Internal Stakeholders Feedback Summary

### *Commanders*

#### 1<sup>st</sup> Consultation comments

Cmd- Protection Command confidential matter..

#### 2nd Consultation February 2008

Cmd- Concerns have been addressed with the inclusion of a sentence to clarify the role of Specially Trained Officer Tactical advisers providing tactical advice to non-AFO's in non-firearms incidents.

### *Borough Commanders*

#### 1<sup>st</sup> consultation October 2007

Discussion over Command training and expiry and reaccreditation- amendments made.

#### 2nd Consultation February 2008

Concerns over the fact that the SOP does not address issues of Mental Health or dealing with people in this category.

A whole new paragraph on recognising the signs and dealing with persons in 'Special Population Groups'. Under the Chapter dealing with Taser, we have mentioned that those who identified as being in a SPG, should be given enhanced/appropriate aftercare.

Firearms storage site added.

Concerns over Community Impact issues and long term effects of Firearms Policing Operations on the Borough. The SOP does reflect the need for Community Impact Assessment requirements but does not go into broader detail. Community Impact concerns have been added to the SOP in two sections to further compliment existing remarks. Also under the Taser chapter we have mentioned that the team leader must brief the Duty Officer of the pertinent facts after a discharge so as the duty officer can brief their own Senior Management Team.

## Operational Command Units / Firearms' Commands

#### 1<sup>st</sup> consultation October 2007

Concern over the definition of Bronze Firearms Commanders meeting their needs. The definition has been fully revised to meet the needs.

Points in relation to definitions and authority levels for Firearms Operations. This was changed accordingly with a simple amendment.

Also pointed out issues over SOCA protocols and deployment. Work has been done in this area outside of this SOP.

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

Chief Inspector- Confidential concerns relating to restricted operation tactic- resolved.

Detective Superintendent- has pointed out a small number of errors, which have been addressed.

Small errors picked up on by Mgt staff, which are in published edition but have already been remedied in the Draft SOP.

Further feedback identified eight points to be addressed. These have now been discussed and amended into the draft SOP.

### **Superintendents Association**

#### **1<sup>st</sup> consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.

#### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

### **Chief Inspectors at CO19**

#### **1<sup>st</sup> consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.

#### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

'Work in progress' on the subject of Armed Reconnaissance.

### **Inspectors at CO19**

#### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

Comment on the command training and recording of briefings.

Both of these matters have been addressed on both the Draft SOP with a rewritten definitions. Commander

#### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

Comment on the accuracy of the current procedures and protocols for the Making Safe of Firearms coming into Police possession. No amendments made thus far.

### **Firearms Instructional Staff (PC's and PS's)**

#### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

Comment on the Bronze training.

#### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

Comment on the need for an extended version of the Conflict Management Module (CMM). A minor amendment has been made.

## **Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS)**

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

DPS Specialist Investigations voiced concern over Taser and the rollout to Specially Trained Officers and it' inclusion. This has since been superseded by the full extension to the Taser Extension Trial.

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

DPS A Detective Inspector has voiced concerns that the SOP needs updating in terms of incidents or discharges but hasn't detailed specifics.

## **Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA)**

**1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007** No feedback received.

**2nd Consultation February 2008** No feedback received.

## **Directorate of Legal Services (DLS)**

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

A comprehensive response from the Solicitor who specialises in the field of firearms resulted in a meetings and liaison between the Firearms Policy Unit and the DLS and legal advice concerned the 'Making of Notes' by officers and points raised by the IPCC.

**2nd Consultation February 2008** No feedback received.

## **Metropolitan Police Association (MPA)**

**1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007** No feedback received.

## **Occupational Health Branch**

**1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007** No feedback received.

**2nd Consultation February 2008** Head of Nursing and Counselling has fed back some amendments and recommendations. She also proposes that we include the Principle Officer Support Programme in the new SOP. This has now been mentioned in the same context as the Post shooting support Programme.

## **Health and Safety Branch**

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

Identified the usefulness of the chapter on Making safe of firearms coming into Police possession.

**2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

## [Support Associations Meeting Up Regularly And Interacting \(SAMURAI\)](#)

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

## [Diversity and Citizen Focus Directorate](#)

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

## [Police Staff Trade Union](#)

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

## [Police Federation](#)

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

## [Cultural and Communities Resource Unit \(CCRU\)](#)

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

## [Intelligence Standards Unit](#)

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

## [Directorate of Training and Development](#)

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

No feedback received.



## **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

## **Central Communications Command**

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

Detailed response of points to be addressed. FPU staff have met with the respondents and ironed out their concerns and amended accordingly.

Further amendments addressed a change to a paragraph detailing responsibility for the Armed Operation Register.

A flow chart detailing the spontaneous armed Operation Process and this has now been included in the new draft.

They have asked that all phone numbers be removed from the SOP due to frequent changes but is work in progress for future editions when all phone numbers in SOP can be annexed.

### **2nd Consultation October 2008**

No feedback received.

## **Physical Training HR5**

### **1<sup>st</sup> Consultation October 2007**

Highlighted the need for new paragraph on AFOs returning to work having been removed from operational duty now incorporated.

### **2nd Consultation October 2008**

No feedback received.

## **External Stakeholders Feedback Summary**

(All the following were only consulted in the second consultation)

### **British Transport Police**

#### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

Acknowledged receipt and disseminated accordingly. No feedback received.

### **City of London Police**

#### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

### **Ministry of Defence Police**

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

Reference to MOD Police capabilities suggested and included.

### **Military Provost Guard service**

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

No feedback received.

### **Serious and Organised Crime Agency**

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

'The Head of Profession' at SOCA Firearms has acknowledged receipt of the SOP and circulated internally to other interested parties.

### **Independent Police Complaints Commission**

#### **1<sup>st</sup> consultation October 2007, not consulted in 2<sup>nd</sup> round.**

Suggests that SOPO reflects forthcoming ACPO manual rather than existing. Notably over making of notes and debriefs. IPCC expresses concern over continuing practice of officers making notes together.

Advice over EU case law suggested and implications to SOP.

Terminology over reference to IPCC has errors which are now rectified.

### **Armed Policing Reference Group**

### **2nd Consultation February 2008**

An invitation to the group was offered in Feb 2008, following this a meeting with the disability representative took place in April 2008 during which the following points were discussed:

Identification of officers- colours used.

Community impact assessment is broader than race alone

Request for stress management and de briefs of IAGs

Communication- notably with deaf/ blind/ partially sighted, also to include persons whose first language is not English.

## **Annex 4**

### **REVIEW OF CO19 PRESENTATION 'ARMED POLICING – COULD YOU?'**

The first CO19 Armed Policing – Could You? Presentation took place on 11 November 2006 and was delivered to the Chairs of all borough based PCCGs. Since that time, it has been delivered to a further 14 community groups including the London Assembly, the MPA and a number of PCCG's/IAG's. Additionally, it has been delivered, in an abbreviated manner, to a number of other (mostly internal) audiences.

An important part of the presentation involves obtaining feedback.

Feedback is obtained by asking the audience to complete a questionnaire that seeks their views on 4 questions. Over the last 12 months, 176 questionnaires have been completed and returned to us.

Feedback has generally been positive. Over 90% of respondents agree or strongly agree that there is a need for armed policing in the UK. Over 95% of respondents agree or strongly agree that the role of CO19 is clearly explained with a similar number agreeing or strongly agreeing that as a result of the presentation they have a clearer understanding of CO19's role. Approximately 95% also agree or strongly agree that the scenarios they are shown represent good examples of the sort of threat faced by armed police.

The only noticeable disagreement relates to the need for armed policing. It is significant that most of the respondents who disagreed with this statement were members of an audience representing the Muslim Safety Forum. Clearly we must continue to try and build relationships with hard to reach communities who may feel disproportionately affected by CO19's operations.

The detailed analysis of the feedback is shown below but does not include any of the 'free-form' narrative that often accompanies the questionnaires.

Nick Aldworth  
A/Insp  
2 December 2007

<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>No Opinion</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>No response</b>
In light of the current threat, there is a need for an armed response within the UK					
116 <b>(65.8%)</b>	46 <b>(26.1%)</b>	3 <b>(1.7%)</b>	9 <b>(5.1%)</b>		2 <b>(1.1%)</b>
The presentation gave a clear explanation of the role of CO19					
108 <b>(61.3%)</b>	63 <b>(35.8%)</b>	2 <b>(1.1%)</b>	2 <b>(1.1%)</b>		1 <b>(0.6%)</b>
The scenarios were a good example of what armed police could be expected to face					
86 <b>(48.8%)</b>	81 <b>(46.0%)</b>	6 <b>(3.4%)</b>	2 <b>(1.1%)</b>		1 <b>(0.6%)</b>
As a result of the presentation, I have a better understanding of armed policing					
101 <b>(57.4%)</b>	64 <b>(36.3%)</b>	4 <b>(2.3%)</b>	4 <b>(2.3%)</b>		3 <b>(1.7%)</b>

## Annex 5



Working together for a safer London

Form 6119A

## Appendix 5

# Equality Impact Assessment

The Equality Impact Assessment Guidance **must** be used when completing this form:  
[http://intranet.aware.mps/Corporate/Policy/Territorial\\_Policing/SOP/Equality\\_Impact\\_Assessment\\_SOPs.htm](http://intranet.aware.mps/Corporate/Policy/Territorial_Policing/SOP/Equality_Impact_Assessment_SOPs.htm)

<b>Freedom of Information Act Document</b>		
<b>Protective Marking:</b>	<b>Publication (Y/N): Y</b>	
<b>Title:</b>	Taser use by Specially Trained Units (CO20)	
<b>Summary:</b>	EIA covering Taser use within the communities of London	
<b>Branch / OCU:</b>	CO20 Territorial Support Group	
<b>Date created:</b>	<b>Review date:</b>	<b>Version:</b>
8/12/2008	8/12/2009	1
<b>Author:</b> PS Andy Harding 7007U		

<b>Directorate/Department/Borough/OCU:</b>
<b>Name, type or title of proposal</b> (If a corporate policy, a policy workbook must also be completed): Taser use with Specially Trained Units within the Metropolitan Police Service

### 1. Aims and Purpose of Proposal - see Step 1 of the Guidance

The aim of this proposal is to provide information on the training, implementation, use, review and future of Taser.
--

### 2. Examination of Available Information – see Step 2 of the Guidance.

The Home Secretary authorised Taser for specially trained officers in a 10 force pilot commencing in September 2007. The MPS went live with the pilot on 10th December 2007, choosing the Territorial Support Group to conduct the trial. To date in excess of 400 TSG officers have been trained in its use.
The 'go live' date was delayed due to a consultation process with the Metropolitan Police Authority.

A full and comprehensive communication strategy was implemented both pro-actively targeting groups and advertising the presentation widely, this resulted in over 60 presentations across the MPS, delivered internally, to specific interested public bodies (LAS, Mental Health boards) and numerous community groups.

A clear press strategy developed with the DPA ensured corporacy in press statements and comment.

From the outset of the trial clear guidelines and management scrutiny was in place, ensuring that any deployment of TASER is recorded as a use of force by the officer, requiring completion of a detailed form which is then subject to both internal scrutiny, and further study by ACPO Self Defence Arrest and Restraint (SDAR) and Home Office Scientific Defence Branch (HOSDB). These forms identify the officer, the type of deployment, and type of incident the number of times the Taser was used, the details of the person subject to Taser and any injuries or medical examinations that were undertaken.

The following details the rationale for participation in the Taser trial for non firearms, specially trained units;

- Taser has been safely and effectively used by Firearms officers in the MPS since 2003
- In that time the landscape has changed and police are dealing with more incidents of violence that fall below the threshold for ARVs
- The current tactic for dealing with violent people involves numerous officers and can result in heightened risk of injury to both subject and police
- Taser offers an alternative utilising distance control, which can be safer for both Public and officers alike.
- The extension of use to non firearms officers is supported by the Police Federation, the Superintendents Association and the IPCC
- Being part of the trial will allow the MPA/MPS to influence the development of Taser rather than have it imposed on us
- The TSG were selected to pilot this use for a number of reasons: High level of training, (public Order, CBRN, OST), have a pan-London responsibility, a very clear team-working structure, and perhaps most importantly, very high levels of supervision
- Taser only used on Commissioner's Reserve during the trial with two officers per carrier
- TASER officer receive a very comprehensive 24 hour training package, (including strict pass/fail). Non-Taser trained officers also receiving specific training around its use and tactics.
- There is a robust system of accountability including AFIDS (Anti Felon Identity Discs), photography, downloads, reporting to ACPO, mandatory reporting of public complaints to IPCC

### 3. Consultation/Involvement - see Step 3 of the Guidance

a. Who is responsible for managing this consultation/involvement?

Chief Inspector Turner

b. Why is this consultation/involvement taking place?

To inform the communities of London of new equipment and a new tactical option for police officers to use when dealing with incidents of violence or potential violence.

- c. Who is included within the consultation/involvement, including which group(s)? Consider beneficiaries, stakeholders, service users or providers and those who may be affected.

Discussion with local communities has included groups from within the 6 diversity strands including black and minority ethnic community groups; religious groups and faith premises; young people and the elderly; members of the LGBT community and those affected by varying disabilities.

Additional consultation has not been undertaken in relation to gender as all of the above groups include women within the consultation process. However where gender specific issues have been highlighted these have been included.

Consultation methods are constantly evolving as part of the ongoing process of improvement within the Service. Discussion is undertaken with established community groups such as residents groups, Safer Neighbourhoods Ward Panels, Sector Working Groups and Borough CPCGs. These groups contain members of the six equality strands. Further, specific, consultation has been undertaken with groups who represent all Independent Advisory Groups.

This ongoing consultation provides a broad community perspective and has allowed the TSG to engage with many communities. This has had a positive effect on general levels of trust and confidence in the services we provide from diverse sections of the community including Mental Health and multi-cultural communities in general. This has ensured the TSG has raised its profile which has been welcomed by the different groups we have presented to.

- d. What methods of consultation/involvement are employed to ensure full information sharing and participation, e.g. surveys, interviews, community meetings?

A number of differing methods were utilised in this process including surveys, focus groups, general policing meetings, community presentations, de-brief meetings from incidents that involve Taser use, Issues raised at Seminars have also influenced training delivery, particularly with regard to Mental Health concerns.

- e. What are the results of the consultation/involvement? How are these fed back into the process?

Every presentation or meeting is recorded and every person present is invited to complete a feedback assessment. The information has been analysed and any concerns raised addressed in the form of mail shot, training or one to one meetings

#### 4. **Screening Process for relevance to Diversity or Equality issues** - see Step 4 of the Guidance

- (i) Will the proposal have significantly higher impact on a particular group, community or person the MPS serves or employs?

Explain: Taser now forms part of the tactical options available to TSG officers. Authority to deploy with Taser is given at the beginning of the tour of duty in line with the conflict management model and internal policy. The usage has demonstrated that where Taser has been used, it has contributed to the effective resolution of the incident. Taser is not a replacement for existing personal safety tactical options, but is an option to be considered alongside other personal safety tactical options, such as negotiation, batons, incapacitant sprays, and potentially, Firearms. These do not constitute a hierarchy of lawful force and should be viewed as a range of approved options from which the most proportionate and

appropriate should be selected, according to circumstances.

Taser has been deployed with the Commissioners Reserve. One Commissioner's Reserve will consist of one inspector 3 sergeants and up to 24 constables. There are 5 Commissioners Reserve units on duty every day covering a 20-hour period. There are 6 Tasers per Commissioners reserve. Tasers have also been authorised to be used during pre-planned operations subject to a TSG Chief Inspectors authority. It was widely thought that Taser would adversely affect the black community and young people in London. This was mainly out of perception rather than fact. The results of the Taser trial have indicated that this is not the case. All discharges and uses have a high degree of scrutiny placed on them; the device itself is the most accountable equipment the service has invested in. It is widely accepted that the community presentations have allayed many fears the communities had. Mental Health is an area that will inevitably be highlighted regarding Taser use. It is an area that has been of particular concern and is dealt with in 5a of this report.

(ii) Will any part of the proposal be directly or indirectly discriminatory?

Explain: There is no intended direct or indirect unlawful discrimination against any group. Use of force and tactical options to bring a violent incident to a swift conclusion are usually intelligence led or spontaneous. Both options are fully recorded and justified under law.

(iii) Is the proposal likely to negatively affect equality of opportunity?

Explain: Within the service officers who become Taser operators go through a selection process that does not discriminate against any officer within the TSG. Officers who fail selection and/or training do so because a core competency hasn't been met. All competencies are implemented with safety in mind and are an essential part of the process. No one particular group of people within the service have fallen foul of the system.

(iv) Is the proposal likely to adversely affect relations between any particular groups or between the MPS and those groups?

Explain: This past year has seen the Territorial Support Group actively engage a wide range of London's many and diverse communities as part of a consultation and information sharing process. Over 60 presentations were given to community groups ranging from Members of Parliament, local councils, youth projects, Community Consultative groups, Independent Advisory Groups and local Neighbourhood teams.

As the trial commenced the initial community engagement revealed scepticism regarding the TSG involvement in the trial. It was soon very apparent that the scepticism was based on misinformation, bad publicity and the raw information available on the Internet through sites such as You Tube.

Officers engaged in providing the information to the public meetings were well equipped to tackle the most difficult and challenging of questions. As a result of feedback it was revealed that officers responded to concerns in a well-measured and well-mannered way. There were only four officers authorised to provide presentations to high level community groups. The ethos of individual opinion was at the forefront of the officers minds at all times, they were well aware that they were not going to change everybody's minds, but just by engaging with the communities they were able to inform and advise which was generally met with positive response. Unwittingly, the TSG were not only involved in providing information about Taser, but were engaged in a public relations exercise which saw some groups openly congratulate the TSG for making the effort to inform and advise. Some requested the TSG provide regular updates on their work in the future.



(v) Are there any other community concerns, opportunities or risks to communities arising from the proposal?

Explain: The Taser training package was developed by ACPO and further enhanced by CO11 (2) and CO20. The training includes instruction on the Taser and its capabilities, impact factors, ACPO policy, use of force legislation and using the device. The package is 24 hours and builds on the 12 hours officer safety and additional public order training undertaken by the TSG. Officers undertake scenario-based training.

The Conflict Management Model, contained within the ACPO Personal Safety Manual of Guidance sets out the process by which a measured and appropriate response can be made to any situation involving conflict. Operational guidance has been written to inform and support decision making in relation to an operational trial stipulating training, deployment and use. There is no such deployment as a Taser deployment per se.

The Training package itself has received extremely positive feedback. Early on in the trial the Vice President for Taser training based in Arizona, USA attended the training facility at Gravesend to observe and comment on the course. Both Mr Rick Guilbault Vice President of training, Taser International and Mr Peter Boatman QPM Director of Taser UK were extremely complimentary of the course. Mr Boatman stated "I can say without exception, that the course administered at the MPSTC was the best I have seen."

Amnesty International has publicly criticised the use of Taser and have concerns regarding its use around the world as an implement of torture. When the Home Office advertised the Taser trial for unarmed officers, Amnesty warned of the consequences of extending the use of Taser to untrained officers who did not have the same level of 'expertise' as their firearm trained colleagues. Indeed at that particular period in time we saw many commentators scare mongering the public and warning of imminent disasters as a result of the trial. To date there have been;

- 1) No medical emergencies relating to Taser
- 2) No Complaints from the public regarding Taser use by specially trained officers.

The Metropolitan Police extended an invitation to any concerned parties to see our training and to see for themselves what officers had to achieve prior to using Taser in an operational capacity. After 9 months Amnesty agreed to attend an initial course. Oliver Sprague the Director said; **"We are extremely grateful to the Metropolitan Police for allowing us the opportunity to observe the current training package offered to specialist units operating within the Metropolitan police area. In general, the training course we observed was extremely professional, demanding and provides a solid foundation with which to build further safeguards we believe necessary to ensure the continued responsible use of Taser within UK police forces"**.

(vi) Is the proposal likely to harm positive attitudes towards others and discourage their participation in public life?

Explain: No, if anything Taser will reassure the vast majority of law abiding citizens that the police have a safe effective tool to deal with the most violent of people in our society today.

(vii) Is the proposal a major one in terms of scale or significance?

Explain: The introduction of Taser is a quantum leap in terms of routinely unarmed officers protecting themselves, the public and in some instances the suspects themselves. The technology being used, electricity; is associated with danger and dangerous circumstances. All these reasons put together and with the added ingredient of misuse in other countries around

the world has made this project significant in the extreme. There were and probably still are, people and organisations who fear the use of Taser. What can be stated, based upon the evidence gained during the MPS trial, is;

- 1) Taser is used in controlled environments
- 2) The use of Taser will only be in situations that involve violence or the threat of violence
- 3) Officers must always justify their individual use of Taser
- 4) Taser use can be scrutinised by interrogating systems within the device that record use
- 5) Taser training has been recognised as the best in the world
- 6) The supervision of Taser and Taser operators is close and intrusive
- 7) Officers fully deploy Taser in around 10% of situations it is used as a tactical option. The remaining times the Taser was shown and a warning given ensuring the situation was bought under control with little use of force.

From the answers supplied, you must decide if the proposal impacts upon diversity or equality issues. If yes, a full impact assessment is required. If no, complete the following box and enter a review date at the end of the form.

<b>Full Impact Assessment Required</b>	<b>Yes /</b> <i>(delete as applicable)</i>
<b>Signed:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
<b>Supervised:</b>	<b>Date:</b>

**5. Full Impact Assessment – see Step 5 of the Guidance**

a) Explain the likely differential impact (whether intended or unintended, positive or negative) of the proposal on individual service users or citizens on account of:
Age: older people, children and young people.
Details: Older people will be pleased with the Police for having additional equipment to deal with the most aggressive and violent of people. Limited understanding of the new equipment will be the main problem to overcome, however this will be achieved by a number of presentations delivered to community groups. Young people will be concerned due to their perception of Police and the style of Policing adopted by the TSG towards young people. The use of Taser in London will be subject to close scrutiny by a number of different stakeholders both internal and external. By engaging with the young communities in the form of Independent Advisory Groups and Community Police Consultative Groups the Police are providing many opportunities to interact with young people. Officers who liase with schools will provide presentations to the school Children letting them know what Taser is. It is worthy of note that during many dealings with young people in the initial stages of the project, youths were aware of Taser and its capabilities without having had any input from the Metropolitan Police. Their information had come from television and the Internet.
Disability in line with the Social Model.
Details: One of the issues raised by the Disability IAG is the use of Taser within the Mental Health world. Taser is likely to be used on individuals who have mental health issues. This is a lawful and less injurious way of dealing with incidents of violence. To date only 10% of the

incidents utilising Taser as a tactical option result in the device being fully deployed. The key issue is to ensure that the Mental Health organisations are fully aware of Taser and how it works, that officers recognise the MH issues and the difficulties for the individual, ensure colleagues are also aware, and take good care of individuals who have had Taser used upon them. We are satisfied that both MH training, OST and specific TASER training both inform and reinforce these issues.

Faith, religion or belief: those with a recognised belief system or no belief.

Details: Officers have engaged with multi faith groups in different parts of London. At some CPCG meetings people from the clergy have attended and engaged with officers regarding the use of Taser. It is accepted that Taser use, including the fact that most violent individuals stop using violence when they see that Police have Taser, will be less injurious to all parties than using close contact conventional officer safety tactics. The faith communities have cautiously welcomed the Taser.

Gender or marital status: women and men.

Details: Representatives from these groups have raised no specific issues, although it is widely acknowledged that Males will have Taser used against them more than females.

Race, ethnicity, colour, nationality or national origins.

Details: The impact on BME communities overall is likely to be positive, however there will be concern shown from certain quarters within these communities. There is suspicion shown towards officers from the TSG due to their no nonsense assertive style of policing. This can be misconstrued. Certain people will not understand the accountability attributed to this equipment and the strict parameters officers operate within. The comprehensive community engagement programme and interaction with the Race IAG has been critical in informing the public in particular BME communities of Taser use within the Police Service

Sexual orientation, transgender or transsexual issues.

Details: Representatives from these groups have raised no specific issues

Other issues, e.g. public transportation users, homeless people, asylum seekers, the economically disadvantaged, or other community groups not covered above.

Details: The London Underground Police have been consulted due to the possibility of trailing wires being discharged onto the electric tracks. The Home Office Scientific Development Branch are developing tests into this. It is known that current travelling from the live rail up the wires towards the Taser operator will melt the wires thus rendering them useless and breaking the circuit.

b) Is the proposal directly or indirectly discriminatory? Is there a genuine occupational requirement?

Details: This officer safety device is a quantum leap in dealing with violence and acts of violence. Law covers the equipment use adequately and each individual must justify their own use. Once used the equipment provides a comprehensive audit trail detailing times, dates and other information useful for an investigator.

c) Explain how the proposal is intended to increase equality of opportunity by permitting positive action.

Details: Taser will be specifically directed towards people who have a detrimental effect on the vast majority of law abiding citizens. The use of this equipment against violent individuals will create a better quality of life for the majority, thus enhancing equality of opportunity

d) Explain how the proposal is likely to promote good relations between different groups.

Details: Fear of violence is a real issue across different groups and cultures in London. The knowledge that Police Officers have equipment to deal with violent individuals and the community engagement programme the TSG have embarked on have contributed towards reducing peoples fears.

e) Explain how the proposal is likely to promote positive attitudes towards others and encourage their participation in public life.

Details: The use of Taser is a positive move for the Police and advertised in the correct way will install confidence in the wider community, enabling people to be aware that Taser has a deterrent effect on individuals intent on causing misery on others by using violence etc.

f) Explain how the proposal enables decisions and practices to adequately reflect the service users perspective.

Details: Taser is merely a tactical option for officers to use when faced with violence. It is essential for Taser users and supervisors to consider the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000, Disability Discrimination Act 1995, other pieces of equality legislation as well as the Human Rights Act 2000, when policing tactics are planned. It is also important that all officers understand equality legislation when applying the law, probably more so with this equipment than any other. The on the ground decision to use can impact greatly on various groups if not carried out within policy. Reducing or eliminating negative impacts for this equipment is undoubtedly a very big thing to achieve. The only realistic way this can be achieved is by consideration of alternative tactics and by documenting uses to show transparency.

## 6. Modifications – see Step 6 of the Guidance

Could the proposal be modified to reduce or eliminate any identified negative impacts, or create or increase positive impacts? What improvements have been made? Taser use within the MPS has not been taken for granted. At the beginning of the national Home Office Trial, the MPS suspended its involvement whilst further checks and balances were carried out at the behest of the Metropolitan Police Authority. It wasn't until every anomaly, problem, question or concern had been addressed at various working parties were the TSG allowed to carry the device. The strength of the authorisation to use it lies with the training package, which has been hailed as the best in the world. It is likely to be extended within the Territorial Support Group, however it would be presumptuous to expect it to be automatically extended everywhere else. The key to the success of this project also lies in the intrusive supervision of the officers by their direct line managers.

## 7. Further Research - see Step 7 of the Guidance

Given the analysis so far, what additional research or consultation is required to investigate the impacts of the proposal on the diversity strands? Two University students were commissioned to carry out dissertations regarding the use of Taser within the Service. The first dissertation by Peter Whitney provided a comprehensive look at Taser in general and how it has impacted on the operational effectiveness of the TSG. The second dissertation by Helena Murray narrowed its focus onto the psychological effect carrying Taser had on officers. Both projects are available to view upon request.

**8. Decision-making** - see Step 8 of the Guidance

a.	Name, rank or grade of decision maker	
b.	What is the Decision?	
	Reject the proposal	Yes / No <i>(delete as applicable)</i>
	Introduce the proposal	Yes / No <i>(delete as applicable)</i>
	Amend the proposal (an impact assessment should be made of any amendments)	Yes / No <i>(delete as applicable)</i>
c.	Name, rank or grade of SMT/(B)OCU/Management Board endorsing decision	

**9. Monitoring** - see Step 9 of the Guidance

a.	How will the implementation of the proposal be monitored and by whom? The Taser trial will be monitored by the following people and organisations.  Home Office MPA Scrutiny group ACPO NPIA HOSDB SDAR TSG SMT TSG TASLOS Chief Inspector Ops TSG TSG Lead instructor CO11 Diversity and citizen focus directorate CPCGs IAGs
b.	How will the results of monitoring be used to develop this proposal and its practices? Form 6624, and feedback forms will be evaluated and any changes made.
c.	What is the timetable for monitoring, with dates? The trial ended in September, the Home Office have agreed to its wider use at the discretion of Chief Officers. The Met will keep the equipment on the TSG, extending use to TSG Borough Reserve in January 2009

**10. Public Availability of Report/Results** - see Step 10 of the Guidance

What are the arrangements for publishing, where and by whom?  
Home Office will publish material for public consumption.

<b>Person completing EIA: Police Sergeant Andy Harding</b>	
<b>Signed:</b>	<b>Date: 12/12/08</b>
<b>Person supervising EIA: Chief Inspector Simon Turner</b>	
<b>Signed:</b>	<b>Date: 12/12/08</b>
<b>Quality Assurance Approval: Inspector Richard Giel</b>	
<b>Name and Unit:</b>	<b>Date: 12/12/08</b>
<b>Date Review Due:</b>	<b>12/12/09 Reviewed 12/12/2010</b>

Retention period: 7 years  
MP 1083/08

### Appendix 6 CO19 and TSG Taser Complaints

There have been 27 public complaints (cases) made in relation to the use of a taser.

On the 27 public complaints, there are 29 allegations. An allegation count has been used here in order to be able to analyse by allegation type and result.

Complainants ethnicity	2007	2008	2009	2010	Grand Total
White European		3	1	1	5
African Caribbean	3	5	3	2	13
Unknown	2	4		3	9
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>27</b>

Type Description	2007	2008	2009	2010	Grand Total
Oppressive conduct or harassment		1			1
Other			1		1
Other assault	5	9	2	3	19
Other neglect or failure in duty		1			1
Serious non-sexual assault	1	2	1	3	7
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>29</b>

Allegation Result	2007	2008	2009	2010	Grand Total
Substantiated					0
Local Resolution		2			2
Dispensation	1	1			2
Withdrawn			1		1
Not Upheld				1	1
Unsubstantiated	5	9	3	1	18
Ongoing		1		4	5
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>29</b>