

APPENDIX 1 – DETAILED UPDATE ON ALL OUTSTANDING HIGH RISK AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS
(as at 25 February 2010, for inclusion in March CGC paper)

Ref No.	Systems for Intelligence and Detection - SCD Lead <i>(SCD lead with DoI activity required to implement this recommendation)</i>	Update on one outstanding High Risk recommendation raised November 2007	Target date for completion
1	<p>Data held within the Crimint+ system is not encrypted as transmitted over AWARE. This risk is fully documented within the Crimint+ Risk Management Accreditation Document Set (RMADS) and will be kept under regular review as it is accepted as a corporate risk.</p> <p>Recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>data encryption is considered in line with speed of data retrieval and storage.</i> • <i>the benefits of encryption should be reviewed against costs of acquiring and maintaining encryption</i> 	<p>Following a report presented to the MPA Corporate Governance Committee in June 2009, it was agreed that the most appropriate action to address the recommendations was for DoI to undertake another IT Healthcheck Assessment of the CRIMINT Plus system, to validate that the current risks identified in the audit continue to be managed appropriately within the current system controls, until such time as the new release of software can be implemented, which includes encryption, as part of a funded project.</p> <p>Update from DoI - after much consultation with DARA, a progress report was submitted to them in Dec 09. It detailed the actions DoI have put in place to mitigate risks identified in the audit report and confirmed that an IT Security health check (ITSHC) will be conducted early 2010. DARA accepted this course of action, agreed that it was appropriate to downgrade the classification of the recommendation to 'medium risk' and agreed that no further action can be taken apart from a scheduled ITSHC as part of the next change to CRIMINT + SYSTEM. This ITSHC is now confirmed to take place during March 2010.</p>	<p>Further revised to April 2010 <i>[Recommendation now downgraded from high to medium risk as agreed with DARA]</i></p>
Ref No.	Palace of Westminster - SO Lead <i>(SO lead with HR consultation required to implement this recommendation)</i>	Update on the one outstanding High Risk recommendation raised January 2008	Target date for completion
2	<i>The recommendations and updates are now reported in Appendix 2, which is exempt.</i>		

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Ref No.	Crime related property - TP Lead <i>(TP lead with HR (Logistical Services) activity required to implement this recommendation)</i>	Update on the one remaining outstanding High Risk recommendations raised August 2008	Target date for completion
3	<p>Strategic Framework & Culture Recommended that: <i>The current processes, guidelines and instructions for the management of crime property are consolidated into a strategic policy that is approved by Management Board and that:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Includes a performance management framework at corporate and operational level</i> • <i>Identifies and documents the specific arrangements required for central departments and the overlap between BOCUs and central departments.</i> • <i>Documents cash handling requirements</i> • <i>Includes monitoring arrangements to ensure compliance with policies and procedures</i> • <i>Clarifies roles and responsibilities for processing and managing property, inc the roles of operational officers, property staff, the Crime Property Manager and SMT Lead</i> • <i>Is supported by documented and approved corporate and local procedures</i> 	<p>Logistical Services' Criminal Exhibit Stores (CES) - formerly Central Property Services - have taken the corporate lead in partnership with other stakeholders. However, in order for this to succeed, the responsibility for monitoring and compliance must lie with the individual operational units. CES, via a consultation process and working closely with TP, will be revising policy and updating SOPs within the MPS Property Manual. Additional chapters around governance, compliance and audit processes will be developed to link in with the MPA Directorate of Audit, Risk and Assurance recommendations. A team within TP Emerald Custody Directorate is working in partnership with CES to address the issues identified.</p> <p>Following consultation with the TP Finance Modernisation Team and the Payback Team, an exercise to deal with the cash handling issue commenced at the end of November 2008. The results were collated and analysed and informed the future policy on cash handling. Cash handling guidelines were issued to TP BOCUs on 5 August 09 by the TP - METAFOR Team. Work is now ongoing with other Business Groups to develop guidelines appropriate to them.</p> <p>Update : This recommendation is partly implemented. Criminal Exhibit Stores compiled a risk register in December 2009. This risk register continues to be updated as Logistical Services CES managers undertake further audit checks. Discussions are in hand between Logistical Services and DoR - Property Services Department, in regard to future accommodation requirements as stores are centralised. These discussions are linked directly to the SIP strand under Corporate Real Estate - Warehousing and Storage.</p> <p>A performance management framework is in place and monthly performance reports are published. This process will be formally documented in April 2010.</p> <p>Parts of this recommendation will be covered by any new asset tracking application which TP Emerald Custody Directorate is currently working on with CES. This is currently at early feasibility study stage (will further inform revised target date for implementation).</p> <p>It should be noted that this recommendation has links to item 10 below, the high risk recommendation re crime property made in the corporate B/OCU audit conducted earlier this year. The Directorate of Resources is leading on that particular recommendation and the MPS through the DoR - Finance Services Quality Assurance Team - will ensure that these two areas are working closely together.</p>	<p>Original target date was 31 December 2008</p> <p>Revised to December 2009</p> <p>Currently awaits information from Business but links to other outstanding high risk recommendation would suggest at present same target date of April 2011</p>

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Ref No.	Health and Safety legislation implementation - HR Lead	Update on the one remaining outstanding High Risk recommendations raised January 2009	Target date for completion
4	<p>At present the MPS Accident reporting system MetAIR does not provide the MPS with the means to provide data, which can assist in decision making at a corporate and local level. The need for a fit for purpose accident monitoring and reporting system is increased by the introduction of the MPA/MPS annual assurance process for health and safety. Recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A review is carried out of the information requirements for the accident report system and that the MetAIR system is either upgraded or replaced. 	<p>The existing MetAIR system will be replaced as part of the Transforming HR Project.</p> <p>The replacement MetAIR system under the THR project is integral to the THR IT solution. Therefore the delay in THR go live will directly affect the delivery of the MetAIR replacement. There is no scope to bring forward the use of the new MetAIR system prior to the revised THR “go live”.</p> <p>Update: The “go live” date for THR and delivery of this IT solution is 31 May 2010</p>	31 May 2010

Ref No.	Diplomatic Protection Group - SO Lead	Update on the one outstanding High Risk recommendation raised February 2009, now implemented from MPS perspective	Target date for completion
5	<p>The Home Office is reviewing the Dedicated Security Post (DSP) funding arrangements aiming to change them for the 2009/10 bidding process and the MPA Treasurer is involved in the process. Recommended that :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The MPA Treasurer continues to monitor progress on DSP under funding and reports the latest position to the MPA Counter-Terrorism and Protection Services Sub-Committee</i> 	<p>MPA Members (as appropriate) and the Home Office up to ministerial level are aware of the situation and are continuing to consider the under funding of DSP and the risks to which the MPS is exposed. A report will be submitted to the September 2009 Counter-Terrorism and Protective Services Sub-Committee to update progress to date. The MPA Treasurer will continue to monitor progress with all appropriate bodies and report as appropriate.</p> <p>A response from the Home Secretary was received on 26 June 2009, and following internal MPS discussions ACSO and the MPA Chief Executive met with Home Office officials on 18 August 2009. It was agreed at the meeting that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Home Office will write to MPS/MPA regarding proposals for reform of RAVEC (Royal and VIP Executive Committee) • Home Office OSCT (Office for Security and Counter Terrorism) has prioritised funding the current year DSP inflation shortfall out of anticipated under spends in other budgets, however not confident of covering inflation in 2010/11 in current financial climate. • Home Office view is that DSP Grant is a contribution to costs but it will look at setting a ‘floor’ to the level of contribution. • Home Office to await the review by National Co-ordinator Ports Policing (John Donlan) into DSP posts allocated to Ports before considering what to do with any identified savings. <p>A response was received in early November from the Home Secretary indicating that the Home Office need to do some further work on the options for reform of the DSP grant mechanism itself and that both the MPS and MPA have made constructive suggestions about this. The Home Secretary is sympathetic to the MPS request to have additional funds in this financial year to cover the shortfall in inflation provision on the existing grant. The Home Office will continue its dialogue with the MPS and MPA to come up with proposals to improve the present MPS mechanism.</p>	<p>Complete from MPS perspective</p> <p>Recommendation is for MPA Treasurer to progress</p>

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Ref No.	Royalty & Specialist Protection - SO Lead	Update on the one outstanding High Risk recommendation raised March 2009, now implemented from MPS perspective	Target date for completion
6	<p>The Home Office is reviewing the Dedicated Security Post (DSP) funding arrangements aiming to change them for the 2009/10 bidding process and the MPA Treasurer is involved in the process. Recommended that :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>The MPA Treasurer continues to monitor progress on DSP under funding and reports the latest position to the MPA Counter-Terrorism and Protection Services Sub-Committee.</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Please see wording of Diplomatic Protection Group above - high risk recommendations are identical. 	<p>Complete from MPS perspective</p> <p>Recommendation is for MPA Treasurer to progress</p>

Ref No.	Security vetting and clearance - SO Lead	Update on the two outstanding High Risk recommendations raised March 2009	Target date for completion
7	<p>Approval for the creation of a new centralised Vetting Unit has been given following agreement between ACSO and ACSC. Recommended that Senior Management in the new unit develops a strategy for approval by Management Board that;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Supports National and Corporate Policy.</i> <i>A) Includes clearly defined roles and responsibilities;</i> <i>B) Sets out governance arrangements including the remit of the Departmental Vetting Officer;</i> <i>C) Contains a requirement for designated Business Group Vetting Officers to identify the levels of clearance required for key posts within their BGs and to document clearly the rationale;</i> <i>Sets out monitoring and review activities;</i> <i>Is supported by appropriate, documented and approved corporate and local procedures;</i> <i>Includes a requirement for KPIs to be set and monitored.</i> <p>Units within SCD and SO are both responsible for different aspects of the vetting system and both maintain separate stand alone IT systems. To improve control over record keeping it is recommended that;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Each BG Vetting Officer maintains details of non MPS staff clearance requests submitted to the central vetting unit</i> 	<p>MPS Vetting Policy is closely aligned to ACPO National Vetting Policy (NVP) and Home Office Circular 54/2003. These documents are currently under review. Publication of v3 NVP will allow the MPS to carry out a full review of its policies. No publication date is currently available. The management and staffing structure will be agreed prior to amalgamation and reviewed within 6 months</p> <p>MPS Vetting Board, under Professional Standards Strategic Committee, was created in 2004. The relationship between MPS Vetting Board, MetSec Board and PSSC is unclear. Governance will be reviewed in discussion with the Chairs of each Committee/Board and published once agreed.</p> <p>NSVU currently update MetHR when MPS staff have been vetted and are working through back record converting.</p> <p>SCD26 Vetting Unit in agreement with HR Recruitment update MetHR with MSC and 10 year renewal results. Warrantor could be required to facilitate this purpose. However, MetHR is the ideal location for a central database of all cleared persons but is only used for MPS employees not NPP. To achieve this will require HR directorate to direct that NPP are placed on MetHR or a link between Warrantor, or a replacement database, and MetHR.</p> <p>In October 2009 Management Board agreed that the two vetting units in SO and SCD should remain separate at present in order that the good performance in each could be maintained.</p>	<p>March 2010 (Please note - DARA has now conducted the follow up audit and we await their further action)</p>

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	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>An independent central list of all non-MPS personnel is established by a designated individual in liaison with each Business Group</i> <i>The vetting unit compares a sample of individuals on this list against the access logs and their database of non MPS staff who have been security cleared;</i> <i>A central database is maintained showing the security clearance status of all MPS staff and contractors.</i> 	<p>There is a decision pending from ACPO as to whether the MPS will conduct part of the National Security Vetting process on behalf of the police service. Once this decision is made the MPS will be in a position to revisit the decision of where vetting should sit. This was presented to SOP at its November meeting.</p> <p>Update: ACSO will be is producing a paper for Management Board on 25 March 2010 following the review conducted by Commander Pountain (SCD) of MPS Vetting. An update will be given to committee members in due course.</p>	
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Ref No.	Building security - Physical and Technical Guards - SO Lead	Update on the six outstanding High Risk recommendations raised March 2009 - All now Implemented	Target Date for Completion
8	<p>This audit covered building security including contractor provided guarding across MPS and the MPA building. It reviewed and evaluated the adequacy and effectiveness of systems established by management. Recommendations are aimed at introducing effective controls or improving those currently in place. Recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Management Board level directives are issued regularly to ensure MPS wide compliance for building security policy and procedures</i> <i>The Critical Buildings List and supporting records are approved and signed off by Assistant Commissioner, Chair of the Resilience and Business Continuity Board</i> <i>The appropriateness of the Critical Building List is monitored and reviewed by the Resilience and Business Continuity Board and any decisions documented and approved at AC level</i> <i>The risks of large scale access of both cleared and un-cleared individuals is considered and how the risks can be managed effectively across the MPS estate, inc means of access</i> <i>Only MPS security cleared individuals with MPS passes are allowed access to MPS premises</i> <i>Uncleared contractors and visitors should only be given escorted access as appropriate and locations where they are required to visit are given prior warning, inc providing all relevant details</i> 	<p>The Director of Information, in her capacity as chair of the METSEC Programme Board, last year wrote to all Management Board members, Senior Designated Officers and all Building Security Officers reminding them of their mandatory responsibilities under MPS policy 'Security of the Metropolitan Police Estate' and specifically relating to completion of the physical security log.</p> <p align="center">RECOMMENDATION NOW COMPLETE</p>	Complete

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Ref No.	IS/IT Access & Usage - DoI Lead	Update on the one outstanding High Risk recommendation raised April 09	Target date for completion
9	<p>Recommended that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The DoI develop a strategy for delivering security awareness training to ensure all users are aware of their roles and responsibilities for accessing and using MPS assets, data and information.</i> • <i>Delivering security awareness should be monitored to correlate against improvements in security.</i> 	<p>There are currently a number of initiatives in place e.g. 'Computers and You'. Information compliance is undertaking a review of current training deliverables to establish whether a gap exists and to make recommendations to the METSEC Board. If necessary, a business case will be developed for consideration by the MPS Training Board.</p> <p>Update - The findings of the Information Security Training Review were presented to METSEC Board on 11/12/09. The Board approved the recommendation to rationalise existing training with a view to providing consistent messages, reducing overlap and where possible introduce a 'pass' or 'fail' element. Training will be complemented with an Information Security Awareness campaign to regularly reinforce the security message. Officers and staff identified who commit minor breaches of the Information Code of Conduct will be required to retake the security training package. Bob Farley, Head of Information Compliance has been actioned to prepare a Training Strategy. A draft will be presented to METSEC Board for consideration at its May 2010 meeting (25/05/2010).</p>	<p>Revised to November 2009 - Latest update suggested a revised target date of September 2010</p>

Ref No.	B/OCU - Corporate Issues - DoR Lead	Update on the two outstanding High Risk recommendations raised April 2009	Target date for completion
10	<p>This audit highlighted corporate issues identified as part of the B/OCU audit programme for the attention of relevant systems owners. Recommended that:</p> <p><i>On Police Overtime:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The limitations of MetDuties in respect of overtime recording and authorising are highlighted and addressed.</i> • <i>An efficient, effective and consistent interim solution is identified and guidance issued to B/OCUs.</i> <p><i>Corporate guidance in respect of Working Time Directive (WTD) rules is published to increase B/OCU awareness</i></p>	<p>Finance Services and HR are working closely with MPA Directorate of Audit, Risk and Assurance in devising action plans to improve local arrangements for controlling and authorising overtime payments at B/OCU level. The Finance and Resource Modernisation Programme has more clearly defined the role and responsibilities of local Finance and Resource Managers in this area and improved guidance developed in the form of Finance and Resource Manuals which complement the guidance contained within the Police Overtime Manual. The ongoing clustering of Finance and Resource staff within Business Groups will also assist in developing and disseminating best practice for monitoring and controlling Police overtime.</p> <p>The new version of CARM, CARM 3 will be rolled out Q1 2010 as a part of the METTime 2 Programme. CARM 3 has an electronic booking on and off system built in which will remove the need for any duty state/overtime sheet/variations sheet or excel workbook. As it is built into CARM it will be subject of the rules engine in CARM which has been enhanced to cover all police overtime rules. That should remove issues around inconsistency in the application of the rules. CARM 3 also contains an overtime approval process which starts when the</p> <p>officer books on and off, requiring them to chose pay or time etc, is submitted to the person who authorised the overtime to be worked for checking, before finally ending up with finance to add any additional information (codes etc) before submission for payment to Logica.</p> <p>Whilst there is no direct link between WTD and overtime worked HR is working on developing a relevant message on WTD to B/OCUs.</p>	<p>March 2010</p>

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	<p><i>On Crime Property:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>A strategic framework is established that includes the creation of an operational system owner and the development of KPIs and performance monitoring</i> <i>The Crime Property System (TOAST) and accompanying records and activities are reviewed and revised, where appropriate, to ensure that they meet current MPS needs and address key system risks</i> <i>The impact of NSPIS on the crime property system is assessed and the current weaknesses are addressed before the system is rolled out to other B/OCUs</i> <i>Any system interdependencies are identified and that consideration is given to developing a corporate integrated property management system</i> 	<p>The high risk recommendation relating to Crime Property is being progressed by Criminal Exhibit Services (CES) - formerly known as Central Property Services. The original planned replacement for the Crime Property System (TOAST) was to be the development of METAFOR. MPS Management Board took the decision on 16 November 2009 to formally close METAFOR. HR Logistical Services has submitted a high level business case for as feasibility study to meet CES needs for exhibit tracking. It is proposed that the system be scalable and be suitable for use by all MPS business units.</p> <p>Finance Services are involved in the development of NSPIS with regard to the financial aspects of crime property management and this work will contribute towards the ongoing management of this risk.</p> <p>[This recommendation has links to the high risk recommendation re crime related property made in an audit on that subject in 2008. TP Emerald team is leading on this particular recommendation and the Quality Assurance Team in Finance Services is ensuring all relevant parties are connected]</p>	<p>April 2011</p>
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Ref No.	Management of Outsourced Financial Services - DoR Lead	Update on the one outstanding High Risk recommendations raised November 2009	Target date for completion
11	<p>This audit reviewed the internal procedures and controls in place for monitoring the performance of Logica CMG and Paymaster in providing Police Officer and Police Staff payroll services, and Police Officer, Police dependants and Police Staff pension administration.</p> <p>Recommended that: -</p> <p><i>A post implementation review is undertaken to confirm that the benefits set out in the business case for the MPS payroll and pensions contract with LogicaCMG, which commenced in April 2006, have been achieved.</i></p>	<p>A Post Implementation Review has been carried out and the report published on 30 November 2009. The consultants concluded that Logica has been providing the service it was contracted to deliver and is doing so satisfactorily. There remain however further opportunities to improve current processes and the MPS is actively engaged in delivering electronic data transfer, but is currently constrained by the MPS Transforming HR programme (THR). An interface between its HR and payroll systems has been built to deliver efficiencies and savings when it can be deployed safely.</p>	<p>Complete and within Agreed Target Date</p>

Ref No.	Accounts Control - Covert Finance - SCD Lead	Update on the one outstanding High Risk recommendations raised January 2010	Target date for completion
12	<p>This audit was a follow-up to one completed May 2008, auditing covert accounts control in SCD.</p> <p>Recommended that:</p> <p><i>Senior Management within the Covert area liaise with PSD to ensure that a replacement and a nominated deputy are identified prior to the retirement of the current post holder</i></p>	<p>A replacement for the Band A, Covert Properties was appointed in August 2009. A deputy has also now been nominated.</p>	<p>Complete and within Agreed Target Date</p>

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Ref No.	Crime Reporting Information System - DoI Lead	Update on the two outstanding High Risk recommendations raised August 2009	Target date for completion
13	<p>This audit was a follow-up to the one completed in August 2007, on the Crime Reporting Information Systems (CRIS).</p> <p>Recommended that: -</p> <p><i>Formulate, develop and establish an IS/IT strategy for CRIS in line with the MPS Information Strategy to ensure that it meets the long term aims and objectives of the MPS and Bichard recommendations</i></p> <p><i>Consider the feasibility of transferring crime records not related to the MPS electronically to/from other police forces to ensure safeguarding sensitive information.</i></p> <p>(this recommendation has been considered, however due to the high cost of fully implementing a system that has not been put into practice - existing manual process therefore continues to be applied) Therefore further recommendation: -</p> <p><i>the oversight and control of transferring crime records to other police forces is regularly reviewed and reported to DoI management.</i></p>	<p>Update - The current MPS strategy in relation to CRIS, involves making the best use of the current infrastructure, and where necessary replacing an obsolete components (hardware and software) to maintain the resilience and performance of the delivery of the CRIS service. A business case has been drafted, as has a CRIS infrastructure strategy briefing paper, both covering 2009-2013. The work detailed in the business case will ensure the system remains fit for purpose up to and through the Olympic period. Beyond 2013 the IPI programme will be decommissioning many legacy systems and implementing a replacement system for CRIS. The CRIS teams will continue to engage with IPI to ensure that CRIS is maintained up to 2013, until IPI takes over responsibilities for these activities. This will be reflected in the SSA led ICT roadmap.</p> <p>Additionally the strategy in relation to CRIS has been revised to take account of the IPI programme and consideration given to potential delivery points of the various phases of this programme. The Business Case & Briefing paper mentioned above underpins this approach and provides a clear statement of intention in relation to this activity. Additionally, there are ongoing negotiations with the supplier as part of the GEN2+ process to look at the provision of CRIS Services via the ICT contract, and where appropriate renegotiate deliverables accordingly to obtain best value.</p> <p>Update - The feasibility has been considered and the ability to undertake this activity has been proven on CRIS, subject to discussion and agreement with the DoI security team. Therefore we have potential from a technical perspective, to send information to outside bodies and there are clear business benefits in adopting this approach. A proposal has been put to the TP Crime Management Unit (CMU) to carry out the electronic transfer of crimes between the MPS and other forces. However, the business needs to agree areas of responsibility and resources to develop relevant SOP's.</p> <p>An agreement has been reached with the TP CMU to undertake this activity and DoI await confirmation of a date to transfer responsibility for this element of the CRIS business to them. A series of meetings have taken place and relevant processes are now in place to facilitate handover of this activity.</p>	<p>May 2010</p> <p>May 2010</p>

