
Service Improvement Review of Guarding:

Management Summary

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SERVICE IMPROVEMENT REVIEW OF GUARDING: MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

1. Overview of Current Situation

Current guarding arrangements for the MPS estate are complicated and have evolved around the changing configuration of the MPS estate and the specific needs of particular sites. The MPS has several arrangements in place to deliver guarding services that are based on a mixture of contractual arrangements supplementing an in-house guarding capability and the combined cost for these arrangements is currently in excess of £10 million per year.

2. Background to this Review

This Service Improvement Review (SIR) topic emerged during MPS budget meetings held towards the end of 2003. It was nominated as a subject for review after concerns were expressed about the cost and quality of the service currently being provided. Furthermore, Internal Audit had carried out an Audit of Physical Security in 2000 that highlighted several issues around guarding services and physical security as a whole. In their follow up work, conducted in early 2003, it was found that the majority of the issues identified had yet to be addressed. Accordingly, the topic was selected by Management Board and approved by the MPA's Planning Performance and Review Committee (PPRC) for review during 2004/05. The scoping study for the review was completed in December 2004 and the current work commenced in February 2005. In parallel with this review, Central Operations' Business Continuity Team have been leading on the development of the process for generating a consolidated Critical Buildings List for the MPS estate. The outcome of this work, together with SO16's introduction of a locally-driven assessment process for building security, will standardise the identification of operational requirements for guarding.

3. Objectives

The purpose of the Service Improvement Review of Guarding was to produce recommendations relating to future service provision and the management of service delivery. Specifically, the SIR was required to review the MPS's need for building guarding services by examining the following areas:

- a. **Determination of the MPS Estate's Security Requirements.** How to define the appropriate levels of building security guarding required by the MPS estate.
- b. **Management of MPS Estate's Security Arrangements.** Determining whether appropriate mechanisms exist to monitor and maintain the required levels of security across the estate.
- c. **Cost Effectiveness of MPS Estate's Security Arrangements.** Identification of feasible solution options and definition of suitable evaluation criteria, to include best value / cost benefit analysis, in order to evaluate these options and to select a preferred solution.

- d. **Integration of Guarding and Physical Security.** Review of how guarding services are managed and integrated within the MPS' physical security portfolio.

4. Scope & Methodology

The SIR has provided an opportunity for comparison with other organisations' guarding arrangements, consultation with key stakeholders, challenge to existing arrangements and examination of alternative means of meeting the requirement for guarding. The following factors were taken into account during the course of the review:

- a. Identification of operational requirements for guarding
- b. Evaluation criteria and selection of solutions for guarding
- c. Monitoring of guarding service provision
- d. Management and integration of guarding services within the Physical Security portfolio
- e. Examination of guarding in the context of building security and the opportunities for integrating guarding with the use of technology

5. Boundaries of the Review

The following related areas were considered to be outside the scope of the review:

- 1. How bids for the future outsourcing arrangements such as the 2007 Facilities Management Contract should be assessed;
- 2. The content of Form 2110 and other aspects of security not directly relating to guarding services in a physical security context.
- 3. The marketing and awareness of security issues.
- 4. The use of police officers and police staff to control access at police stations.
- 5. Because of the long lead-time for PFI arrangements, it was agreed that guarding requirements at PFI sites should remain outside the scope of the review.

6. Overview of Current Guarding Arrangements

The MPS currently has several different guarding arrangements in place and these can be summarised as follows:

- a. **In-house Arrangements.** An in-house service is provided by SO16 and deployed at key sites with high-level security guarding requirements, currently New Scotland Yard and Wellington House.
- b. **Contractual Arrangement with Interserve.** A contracted guarding service provided by Interserve, who subcontract staff from several security firms, provide guard personnel deployed at 30 sites across the MPS estate.
- c. **Contractual Arrangement with Amey.** Amey, a contractor employed as part of a larger facilities management contract, provide guarding services for the three Command, Control and Communication & Information (C3i) sites, including the C3i site at Hendon, where their remit is also extended to include guarding for the remainder of the Hendon estate.

- d. **Facilities Management Arrangements.** The MPS also has a long term lease agreement in place at Empress State Building where security guards are provided under facilities management arrangements.

7. Findings


The main findings to emerge from the Service Improvement Review of Guarding concern the apparent cost efficiency of some outsourced guarding arrangements, the types of guarding solution continuing to be appropriate for the MPS estate, and the means of optimising guarding arrangements on the basis of cost effectiveness. The findings are summarised as follows:

- a. While the current costs of guarding in the MPS appear to be broadly in line with the level of expenditure incurred by comparable organisations in the public and private sectors, the MPS does not get value for money from all its guarding arrangements.
- b. Although the MPS' potential solution options for guarding continue to be in-house provision, outsourcing directly for guarding services, guarding provision under facilities management arrangements, or any combination of these approaches, the MPS does not appear to have selected guarding solutions systematically and on the basis of cost benefit analysis.
- c. The MPS has no clear definition of its operational requirements for guarding. Accordingly, an adequate definition of operational requirements for guarding is required that can be translated into comprehensive service level agreements and, where necessary, contractual arrangements with service providers.
- d. The MPS does not have a suite of relevant key performance measures that can be used to monitor performance across all corporate guarding arrangements.
- e. The MPS does not have adequate management and control systems in place to ensure the maintenance of minimum levels of service for all guarding arrangements.
- f. The MPS is not fully exploiting the opportunities afforded by appropriate security technology. The effectiveness of guarding could be enhanced, or the costs of guarding reduced, by the use of appropriate technology such as access control barriers, CCTV and remote monitoring command and control facilities.
- g. The optimum balance of investment in people, process and technology should be determined on the basis of comprehensive cost benefit analysis framework.
- h. The MPS is currently unprepared for the advent of Security Industry Authority Licensing in March 2006.

8. Areas for Improvement

The Review has concluded by highlighting specific areas for improvement and proposing appropriate recommendations to address the identified areas of weakness. If adopted, the recommendations would contribute to the minimisation of risk to the MPS estate from terrorism and other criminal activity by increasing the effectiveness of guarding in conjunction with other physical security arrangements, particularly at the MPS's critical sites. The

main recommendations, which are supported by respective groups of enabling recommendations, are summarised in the following influence map. The influence map also serves to illustrate how the identified areas for improvement are translated into specific recommendations and how the latter address the original four objectives of the Review, as endorsed by the MPA PPRC.



9. Summary of Recommendations

The main recommendations and associated enablers emerging from the Service Improvement Review of Guarding can be summarised as follows in relation to the above-mentioned areas for improvement:

A. Issues Arising from Consultation with Guards

Recommendation 1: In-house Guards. The apparent low levels of satisfaction expressed by in-house guards during the consultation carried out as part of this review should be subject to further investigation by SO16.

B. Impact of Security Industry Licensing

Recommendation 2: Risk Management for Security Industry Authority Licensing. With immediate effect, Facilities Management and SO16 should work in partnership to put in place a risk management strategy to minimise the potential detrimental impact of Security Industry Authority (SIA) Licensing on the ability to sustain appropriate levels of service across guarding arrangements.

C. Formulation of Business Requirements for Guarding

Recommendation 3: Building Security Strategy. Facilities Management in partnership with SO16, Directorate of Information, Risk Management and Business Continuity should consider the development of a Building Security Strategy that focuses on building security requirements, including guarding. The proposed strategy should take into account the existing and planned configuration of the estate, evolving operational requirements for physical security and anticipated developments in security technology. The Strategy should also set out the desired position for the security of the MPS estate in terms of the following:

- Evolving threats and vulnerabilities.
- Available and emerging access control technologies and how they could be deployed across the MPS
- Use of physical security technology to support and enhance process and procedures for guarding and access control, possibly obviating or reducing the need for manned guarding at some sites
- Risk Management criteria for the selection of in-house or outsourced guarding arrangements
- Management and control arrangements for building security, including guarding (linked to Recommendations 11 and 13)
- The process for the ongoing review of security and guarding arrangements (linked to Recommendations 6 and 7).

Recommendation 4: Optimisation of Guarding Arrangements. The Directorate of Resources should increase the transparency of budget lines for corporate security costs in order to facilitate the process of optimising (using cost benefit analysis) investment in a combination of guards, security process and technology to aid building security.

Recommendation 5: Facilitating Local Ownership of Building Security. SO16 should facilitate local ownership of guarding, by means of the following:

- Effective engagement of Senior Designated Officers (SDOs) and Building Security Officers (BSOs).
- Provision of advice for progressing the building security self-assessment process.

Recommendation 6: Generation of Statements of Requirements for Guarding. SO16's Physical Security Unit (PSU) should work in partnership with BSOs to ensure that up-to-date Statements of Requirements for guarding are available, on a site-by-site basis, by November 2005. The ongoing maintenance of statements of requirements for guarding should then be assisted by means of the following:

- Development of the Physical Security Log (Form 2110).
- Contribution of Form 2110 to review of guarding requirements.
- Improvements in process for identifying changes to guarding requirements.

Recommendation 7: Immediate Assessments of Building Security Requirements. SO16's Physical Security Unit (PSU) should conduct immediate assessments of physical security arrangements at select sites to ensure the appropriate balance of guards, technology and process are deployed, in particular assessing the need for guarding at these sites. The PSU should inform the Outsourcing Programme of the results of this assessment. This assessment and review process should be facilitated by means of the following:

- Review of guarding requirements for buildings listed on latest Critical Buildings List (work in hand).
- Review of manned guarding deployments at non-critical buildings (work in hand).
- Review responses contained in Physical Security Logs returned in July 2005.
- Review design and content of Physical Security Log Form 2110.

D. Improving the Management and Control of Guarding

Recommendation 8: Outreach Activity. Facilities Management, working in partnership with SO16 as appropriate, should engage in outreach activities to keep informed of developments in the security and guarding arenas in order to advise on measures to support the retention of guards. This could be facilitated by means of the following:

- Offering competitive remuneration packages as informed by the annual benchmarking of guards' salary levels and terms and conditions.
- Monitoring other trends in the security industry market place, including the advent of SIA Licensing in March 2006.

Recommendation 9: Investment in Guard Staff. Facilities Management, working in partnership with SO16, should co-ordinate measures to enhance and reinforce the status of all security guards, facilitate staff retention and achieve consistency and quality of service delivery through investment in guards by the following means:

- Develop generic job descriptions for guards.
- Review training requirements for guards.
- Ensure professional development reviews are carried out for all guards, both in-house and outsourced.
- Introduction of individual recognition and rewards for guards.
- Integration of guards into the MPS environment.

Recommendation 10: Quality Assurance Arrangements for Guarding. Facilities Management in consultation with SO16 should consider enhancement of quality assurance arrangements for guarding with the following:

- Additional resources should be made available, equivalent to at least one full time member of staff at Band P level, in order to increase the frequency of intrusion testing and to enable ad-hoc checks.
- All sites should be visited at least every 6 to 8 weeks, and be subject to random spot checks as appropriate, in response to complaints and

reported security incidents, especially while service improvements are being delivered.

Recommendation 11: Accountability for Guarding Service Delivery.

Facilities Management in consultation with SO16 should establish an accountability framework within the MPS security arena to ensure that service delivery is always in accordance with the MPS's defined operational requirements for guarding services. To support this, decisions are required concerning the following:

- The ownership of physical security and guarding, including responsibility for the championing security throughout the MPS
- The responsibility for the delivery of guarding services.

E. Delivery of Required Service Improvements

Recommendation 12: Immediate Actions for Service Improvement.

In the interim period before new contractual arrangements are established in January 2007, Facilities Management should take immediate action to implement short-term service improvements in the following areas for all contracted guarding arrangements:

- Day-to-day management.
- Service monitoring using relevant key performance indicators.
- Compliance checking.
- Oversight of professional training and development for guards
- Resilience management and contingency planning
- Improving responsiveness to evolving operational requirements for guards

Recommendation 13: Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities. Facilities Management and SO16 should agree who has the respective lead responsibilities for delivery of both contracted and in-house guarding services. The identified leads should work in partnership to achieve the following during the interim period before January 2007:

- Co-ordination of guarding arrangements
- Sharing of good practice
- Development of a suite of key performance indicators that can be applied consistently across all guarding arrangements
- Improved resilience through contingency planning

Recommendation 14: Contract Formulation and Management. Facilities Management should ensure transparency in the following areas at the inception stage of any guarding arrangement:

- Key performance indicators for monitoring service delivery.
- Potential suppliers to furnish breakdowns of costs
- Need to take into account the vetting process for guards.
- Good practice for management of the vetting process.

Recommendation 15: Co-ordination of Contingency Arrangements.

From January 2007, the proposed 'Head of Security Services' within Facilities Management, should:

- Have oversight of all guarding arrangements and report to the corporate owner for physical security.
- Co-ordinate the resilience management and contingency planning arrangements for guarding


Recommendation 16: Participation in Decision Making for Guarding Arrangements. The Director of the Outsourcing Programme should ensure the following level of participation in, and scope of, the decision-making process for guarding arrangements:

- Involvement of SO16 (PSU), Risk Management Group and Corporate Planning
- Cognisance of progress with the outsourcing programme by the above-mentioned stakeholders.
- Examination of implications for guarding of buildings not to be catered for under facilities management arrangements.

10. Prioritisation of Recommendations

The prioritisation of the above-mentioned recommendations should take into account timescales for the advent of Security Industry Authority (SIA) Licensing (March 2006), the implementation of Facilities Management (FM) arrangements under the auspices of the Outsourcing Programme (July 2006 – January 2007), and the need to cater for guarding requirements that will not be covered by the FM Programme when current contractual arrangements expire in January 2007. Where there is obvious benefit to be obtained by progressing a particular recommendation quickly, a so-called ‘quick win’, this will also influence its prioritisation.

Accordingly, it is proposed that the recommendations summarised in the diagram at paragraph 8 should be prioritised as indicated in the following table:



11. Cost Implications of the Proposed Recommendations

Draft Improvement Plans have been formulated for the implementation of the above recommendations that, in most cases, could be implemented with only additional opportunity costs for management and process. The recommendations that would incur additional expenditure are those arising from the need for more investment in guarding as a result of Security Industry Authority Licensing (Recommendation 2) and the recommendation concerning the enhancement of quality assurance arrangements for guarding (Recommendation 10).

Higher levels of remuneration for guards in order to mitigate the affects of a highly competitive market place for licensed security staff could increase costs by up to an estimated £1.3M per year, based on current guarding staff levels for the MPS estate. This is the estimated cost for the retention of a quality guard force in what is anticipated could become a highly competitive market place. The latter serves to indicate the importance of minimising the number of guards wherever possible by optimising the balance of investment in guarding and access control technology.

The additional cost of increasing the frequency of intrusion testing is estimated to be £26.5K per year, based on average Band P costs excluding pension and annual corporate overhead charges.

