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EVALUATION OF OPERATION STRONGBOX

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

1. This report is an evaluation of Operation Strongbox after it has operated on three sites across the MPS: Lambeth, Hackney and a joint operation at Camden and Islington. It includes:

    - a description of what Operation Strongbox is, and how it fits into the MPS Volume Crime Reduction Strategy,
    - a brief list of the management of a typical Strongbox operation, and the tactics employed during Strongbox to date,
    - some discussion around issues affecting the success of Strongbox,
    - a look at the effect Operation Strongbox has had on crime statistics (**Appendix 2**), and
    - a summary of the costs incurred in running Strongbox (**Appendix 3**)

2. The evaluation has found that the impact of Operation Strongbox on the overall levels of volume crime in the MPS is still limited, but judicial disposals for most crime categories increase, and arrests increase considerably during Strongbox operations. Overall, this report suggests the Strongbox approach, coupled with the wider MPS Volume Crime Strategy, is sound and will eventually have a continual and significant impact upon volume crime. This is especially so when other complimentary strategies (e.g. Operation Crackdown) and partnerships (e.g. Community Safety Strategies) come to full fruition, and measures to boost recruitment, both police and civilian, produce results. This last point is most pertinent because the proven Strongbox tactics have been difficult to sustain after the additional Strongbox support has left a borough.

3. One of the prime reasons that the full effect of Strongbox is being held back is the time lag in recruiting and up-skilling analysts and forensic staff. The MPS is convinced of the value that can be added to crime fighting by improving intelligence and the use of forensics. Additional staff are being recruited, pay scales are being improved and skills gaps are being addressed, but the full effect of this is still some way off.

4. The shortfall in resources across the MPS during the period covered by this report has meant real problems for Boroughs. The additional staffing requirement identified through Strongbox to properly staff the BIU focus desks, or to staff a number of the proven operational tactics (Q Cars etc – see below) is simply not available once the needs of normal everyday response policing are met. Only the promised increase in police strength will address this. However, there can be significant improvements within current staffing levels if MPS staff get the basics right.

> Recommendation
> There must be a continued emphasis on ensuring Boroughs are properly resourced to enable them to handle response calls and other demands as well as run the Strongbox tactics, which do impact, on volume crime. This means the Resource Allocation Formula must be

effective but efforts to raise the overall MPS establishment are rigorously pursued and efforts to recruit are not lessened. Projects like 'Clearing the Decks' and also the effect of some Strongbox tactics can have on reducing the demand on response staff (the 'one-stop' cars) should help.

Response
This Recommendation is accepted although it is predicated on improved recruitment. A more sophisticated Resource Allocation Formula is in the process of being established by the Metropolitan Police Authority, although it will be some time before this will be implemented.

5. Strongbox has had a critical and beneficial effect in exposing a range of structural and skills improvements needed on boroughs, and driving a focused and consistent approach to tackling volume crime. Through a lead-in period into the operation on individual boroughs, changes are made and new procedures adopted – but these do take time to bed in. The full impact of Strongbox and the MPS Volume Crime Reduction Strategy will not be felt until all this learning is in place.

6. These things do not change overnight and there is still a way to go before the 'ideals' of the Strongbox approach become ingrained into everyday policing. Some of them require officers to go back to basics, some of them require more resources and better 'joined-up' IT, and much is around leadership, supervision and training. Perhaps most important of all is the need to really focus on the problems. The recommendations in this report will go some way to achieving that. Operation Strongbox is playing a major part in the change process – and an eventual impact upon volume crime is inevitable.

7. Another point worthy of note is a vast improvement has been noticed in the 'bidding' for funds from the 'Territorial Policing' and 'Safer Streets' budgets, and the Government's Crime Fighting Fund. The MPS has been commended by the Home Office for the system introduced to bid for and monitor resources used in crime operations. This is part of the Strongbox approach, and is influencing other Strongbox issues i.e. a thorough examination of policing interventions, analysis and results evaluation, and a need for improved professionalism in the borough intelligence units and analytical product.

8. The application of Strongbox involves the Territorial Policing Command Team selecting the borough most likely to benefit from the Strongbox support, based on the current levels of volume crime.

9. The choice of boroughs for the first applications of the approach has been made to maximise the learning from, and development of, Strongbox. This has meant that the impact to date upon the overall MPS figures for volume crime may not have been maximised. The initial application at Lambeth looked to test out the approach in a high crime borough. The operation achieved success in reducing volume crime in the targeted town centre hotspot. Research into the

Strongbox exercise in Lambeth suggested there was insufficient lead-in time and planning and due to the aftermath of a major re-structuring the borough was not well placed to cope with a Strongbox operation. There were benefits, however, because the time at Lambeth was definitely a 'learning experience', which improved methodology and tactics for later operations. The subsequent choice of Hackney allowed much of the learning from Lambeth to be put into practice, and some good results were achieved. To extend the learning, and test the approach on a cross-borough operation the third Strongbox was run on Camden and Islington. This approach had the potential to spread Strongbox more quickly and widely across the MPS and to build upon existing cross borough boundary activity. However, the combination of two boroughs brought logistical problems, which did have some impact on effectiveness. These further lessons have been applied in selecting and running the fourth operation on the borough of Westminster.

<u>Recommendation</u> To make the greatest impact on the overall MPS figures for volume crime, Strongbox needs to concentrate on those Boroughs, which are the highest contributors to the overall figure.
<u>Response</u> This recommendation is accepted.

<u>Recommendation</u> To build up the benefits of an initial Strongbox visit, there should be an advantage in revisiting Boroughs to continue the process, up-skilling staff and improving practices and procedures, especially in the light of the experience of other operations. The initial Strongbox at Lambeth was felt to be a hurried exercise with insufficient preparations and at the wrong time for Lambeth, it may be advantageous to visit once more.
<u>Response</u> This recommendation is accepted and whilst Strongbox is scheduled for the Borough of Haringey next, there is every prospect for it to return to Lambeth in 2001.

10.   The tactics being developed to combat volume crime through Operation Strongbox, the MPS Volume Crime Reduction Strategy, improving forensic capability, and tackling structural and skills improvements on boroughs, are significant and the early signs are they will have a real impact in the long term.

11.   This report concludes that Strongbox increases JDs and arrest rates, although it has not had a significant impact on reducing all volume crime across the whole MPS to date. Because of the obvious loss of additional resources at the conclusion of the operation, the impact of Strongbox has proved difficult to sustain after the additional Strongbox support has left a borough; and there is still a way to go before the 'ideals' of the Strongbox approach become ingrained into everyday policing.

WHAT IS OPERATION STRONGBOX?

12.   Operation Strongbox is one of a number of tactics being developed by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in its effort to reduce 'volume crime'. The crimes that fall under this umbrella are primarily:

- burglary
- robbery (street crime)
- vehicle crime
- and drugs (recognising that the market for drugs fuels a lot of acquisitive crime)

13.   The concept is to provide specialist support (the Strongbox team of around 30 police officers and civil staff) to individual boroughs suffering from high levels of volume crime, in order that they can assist local staff in a concerted effort to impact upon those crimes. TSG and Traffic Officers add considerably to the resource used during each operation. Individual borough operations last for about eight weeks, and it is hoped that timescale will be sufficient to develop the tactics, and the skills and expertise of borough staff, to sustain the attack on volume crime after the additional support has left.

14.   Strongbox has been a learning exercise and a range of tactics has been tried, tested, and improved upon in an effort to develop excellence and best practice which can be spread across London. It is inevitable that such an approach will take time to fully bed in and make a major impact on MPS crime figures.

| |
|---|
| Recommendation |
| The aims and objectives of Operation Strongbox are still not clearly articulated in written form. A Strongbox manual is needed. |
| Response |
| The concept of a Strongbox Manual is being developed under the TP Crime Support OCU. The objective is to publish that manual within 3 months. |

15.   Each eight-week operation is 'owned' and led by Borough staff and has its own name. The three operations supported by Strongbox and covered by this report are:

Operation Windmill - Lambeth Borough - 8th May 2000 to 2nd July 2000
Operation Empire - Hackney Borough - 17th July 2000 to 10th September 2000
Operation Regis - a joint operation across the boroughs of Camden and Islington - 2nd October 2000 to 3rd December 2000

16.   The Strongbox team moved into Westminster Borough on 22nd January and that operation ('Victory') ran until 25th March. The results from Westminster are not included in this evaluation. The next operation will be on Haringey Borough.

17.   This report takes an independent and objective look at the overall impact of Strongbox on volume crime, and on what tactics are being developed and refined, and what changes are being encouraged on boroughs by the specialist expertise that comes along with Strongbox. The individual successes of each operation against its locally agreed objectives have been reported separately, and are not covered here.

18.   Over time, the objectives for Operation Strongbox have developed from simply trying to impact upon volume crime, to developing and enhancing the capability to tackle such crime. The objectives are:
- to identify development opportunities is support of proactive policing
- to examine and improve systems around intelligence-led policing
- to identify good practice for promulgation
- to identify issues requiring remedial action at local and/or Service level

19.   This evaluation assesses the achievements of the Strongbox tactic against these objectives, and also the impact it has had on reducing volume crime, both across the MPS as a whole, and on the individual boroughs.

20.   The specialist staff available under the Strongbox banner are:
- experienced operational detectives from Specialist Operations (SO)
- officers from the Territorial Support Group (TSG)
- Tactical advisers with expertise in intelligence and covert policing techniques
- Special Branch officers
- Traffic officers
- Higher Identification Officers and other staff from the Forensic Science Support Unit.

These staff are under the overall direction of Commander Crime Territorial Policing, and the immediate command of an experienced detective superintendent.

21.   On a borough selected for a Strongbox operation, a *Gold Strategy Group* is formed consisting of senior borough staff, senior Strongbox staff and other essential personnel. They set the objectives and targets for the operation based on an analysis of the crime problems that need to be tackled. This analysis is part of a planning phase, which commences about four weeks before the actual start date. This phase has the vitally important task of ensuring adequate systems and structures are in place to support the operation, with a particular emphasis on building a solid intelligence product, attempting to get 'actionable intelligence' by identifying offenders, hot-spots, a profile of the times and days when offences occur, drugs markets, markets for stolen goods, and victims.

22.   Operational teams are formed mixing Strongbox staff with personnel from the Boroughs, thus optimising the skills and expertise of the specialists with the local knowledge of Borough staff.

23. These teams are tasked through a twice-weekly Tasking and Co-ordination meeting, which enables operations to be prioritised to tackle current and emerging crime problems.

24. The Strongbox approach utilises a whole range of tactics that deal with locations, offenders, victims and markets through the use of surveillance, covert operations, intelligence-led high visibility patrolling and robbery crime cars.

STRONGBOX IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MPS VOLUME CRIME REDUCTION STRATEGY

25. Operation Strongbox does not exist in a vacuum. It has been very central to the developing MPS Crime Reduction Strategy, and operates according to the principles therein. The purpose of this strategy is to focus efforts in reducing crime and improving performance in six key areas: ***investigation, diversion, problem solving, targeting, forensics and intelligence.*** These processes are all linked, but central to the model is intelligence, and its pivotal position is shown in the diagram:

MANAGEMENT OF A STRONGBOX OPERATION, AND TACTICS USED

Management of a 'typical' Strongbox Operation

26. A 'Gold, Silver, Bronze' approach is adopted. Although senior Strongbox personnel have an influential role, it is the borough SMT who have control of each individual operation.

> *Gold* is usually the Borough Commander, and heads up the Gold Strategy Group and sets the strategy for the operation.
>
> *Silver* is usually the Operations Superintendent, who usually heads up the Tasking and Co-ordination Group (TCG), and is in tactical command of the operation, implementing the strategy devised by the Gold Strategy Group
>
> *Bronzes* are usually of inspecting rank, and are responsible for implementing the tactics, either through advising/supporting the TCG, or responding to the outputs of the TCG.

27. The *Tasking & Co-ordination Group* is the mainstay of a Strongbox operation. It devises the tactics to be deployed, and tasks individuals and teams to implement them.

28. The *Borough Intelligence Unit (BIU)* plays a pivotal role, receiving, analysing and disseminating intelligence, particularly feeding the TCG, allowing it to take an intelligence-led approach to devising tactics.

29. The *Operations Office* plays an important role in the day-to-day management of resources and maintaining records about the operation and overtime, etc. In doing this, it feeds information about availability of resources and finance to the TCG and responds to TCG resourcing requirements.

30. *Communication Strategy* – there is a need for both external and internal communication to maximise involvement with a Strongbox operation.

31. *Partnership* – there is a need to inform and involve partners to maximise the potential of a Strongbox operation.

Tactics employed/developed during Strongbox operations to date

32. The tactics listed below have all been part of the Strongbox approach.

- One stop burglary reporting and investigation teams
- One stop street robbery reporting and investigation teams
- Q Cars (plain clothes officers in unmarked cars)
- Conventional surveillance
- Technical surveillance
- Decoy operations
- Test purchasing operations to combat street level drug dealing
- Drugs searches/arrests
- Raids on 'crack houses'
- Static and mobile ANPR (automatic number plate reader) operations to combat autocrime
- Decoy motor vehicle (combating theft of and theft from vehicles)
- Forensication of crime scenes
- Directed operations in crime 'hot spots'
- Teams dealing with fingerprint and DNA identifications
- Operation Seneca (addressing crime on public transport)

33. These have all been successful to a greater or lesser extent (usually dependant upon the quality of the intelligence which feeds them), and they are all being further refined by the work currently being undertaken to build operational capability against volume crime.

34. **The major impact of the Strongbox approach is to introduce these tactics to boroughs, or support and refine their use of them if they already operate them. When they are properly used, and based upon well-researched intelligence they have all proved to be very effective.**

Recommendation
There may be value in the creating a TP Pan-London Strongbox OCU, so all the resources used in Strongbox that come from within TP and SO can be brigaded. This allows continuity, brigading and teamwork. It makes training easier and deployment simpler. It will however, be another drain in the overall Borough resources devoted to front line policing. There needs to be careful thought as to whether this is the best way forward.
Response
This recommendation has been accepted and the SO1(3) Officers will form the above mentioned TP Crime Support OCU. This will minimise any effect on the Boroughs which in all probability will be only be required to give up a handful of posts to supplement the Tactical Advice Teams.

ISSUES AFFECTING THE SUCCESS OF OPERATION STRONGBOX TO DATE

35. Strongbox has been an evolving approach through each of its first three applications. The success against local objectives has been coupled with a number of lessons to learn for the future. Strongbox has received strong public support at Hackney, Camden and Islington and there has been very good feedback from the local community. The operation brings together specialist MPS resources to support the aims and objectives of boroughs in addressing volume crime, and has been successful in it focus on improving borough policing. The MPS has accepted and recognised the improvement points noted below, and action to address many of the recommendations is already in hand.

The BIU

36. Strongbox has exposed that Borough Intelligence Units (BIUs) are not as effective as they might be, and the role of the analyst has been ill defined and undervalued. This has meant the intelligence product on boroughs has often been inadequate. Strongbox staff have a vital role is improving BIUs and spreading best practice. There is clear evidence that this is happening.

PAT Forms

37. Proactive Assessment and Tasking (PAT) forms are an essential element to keeping a track of proactive operations. It is this system that has been commended by the Home Office, and recommended to other forces as best practice. The PAT system involves a series of forms used to:
    - identify problems
    - propose proactive operations to deal with the problem identified
    - to ensure basic searches (PNC, Infos, Crimint etc.) are carried out
    - to seek approval for such operations, including the resources to be deployed
    - to apply for any specialist assistance which might be needed
    - to seek authority for surveillance or specialist technical support
    - to make risk assessments
    - to complete a closing report (arrests made, intelligence gathered, what works, resources used, cost of operation etc.). It is essential this is reviewed to build up intelligence and best practice.

38. It is important that details of PAT forms are entered onto the Crimint intelligence database, and that closing reports are comprehensive, accurate and submitted on time.

39. We recognise that in places the system has not been operated as intended, and particularly the closing reports have been neglected. Work is in hand to address these shortcomings.

Crime Analysts

40. The analyst should be seen as providing information for action, which is essential to the success of intelligence-led policing. However, up until recently the analysts, through no fault of their own, have struggled with the consistent delivery of the required analytical product on boroughs. This was largely because there was a lack of understanding of the role of the analyst by line managers and senior management. Line managers were not adhering to policy guidelines. As a result, many analysts were poorly tasked, and performed functions more akin to those of a Management Information Unit. A development area in which analysts will be employed in future is in identifying and researching factors such as crime displacement.

41. Again, Strongbox staff are playing an important role in improving things. The central role of intelligence to the MPS Volume Crime Reduction Model has also proved the catalyst for a decision to invest in the development of analysis on boroughs. This has included the following:
    - all boroughs to have a Higher Analyst
    - set-up working parties to develop the National Intelligence Model (NIM), including analytical working practices and training.
    - introduction of a Market Related Allowance for analysts.

Recommendation
There must be no let up in tackling problems around the recruitment, retention and training of analysts and forensic staff. These people are fundamental to the task of tackling crime.
Response
This recommendation is accepted. The improved career structure and pay rates have in part been established. Further improvements are being worked on under the Integrated Intelligence Strategy Group and the National Intelligence Model Implementation Group.

Use of Crimint

42. Examination of the criminal intelligence system (CRIMINT) showed an increased capture of operationally linked information reports at all sites, before, during and after the Strongbox operations. However, the results also indicate a failure to comply with agreed Crimint protocols and that analysts are recorded as having a more limited input than expected or required. This situation may have arisen as a result of

- As a result of practical difficulties and an incorrect perception of their role, the analysts are involved in the objective analysis of intelligence matters for PAT applications, but the work they are conducting is remaining on standalones and not being transferred to Crimint.

- As a result of line managers lack of understanding of the role of analysts, the involvement and tasking of analysts does not appear to be wholly in accord with either the National Intelligence Model, or the guidelines provided by the Higher Analyst who supported the Strongbox operations.

- Inconsistent practices in relation to the methods of identifying individual analyst input may have resulted in a failure to identify all entries made by analysts.

Recommendation
There still needs to be a much greater more professional use of CRIMINT by all staff and analysts in particular must make full use of the tool.
Response
This Recommendation is accepted and is being worked upon by the above mentioned Integrated Intelligence Strategy Group and the NIM Implementation Group.

Communication Strategy

43. A communication strategy will aid the dissemination of information to all internal and external customers of a Strongbox Operation.

44. There was some variation in approach across the three Strongbox operations to date. There were some very good examples of innovative ideas for internal communication and their needs to be a sharing of good practice. However, internal communication was not always as good as it should have been, especially as it is vitally

important to get ownership and understanding of *all* staff in a Strongbox operation. Briefing all borough staff prior to the arrival of Strongbox teams is absolutely essential. Lambeth engaged in a very open external communication strategy that not all parties felt was wise, as some tactics were considered to best remain unpublicised.

45. The MPS has recently published its Internal and External Communication Strategies and it would be beneficial to consider the best generic approach to communicating aspects of Strongbox, to internal and external audiences, by utilising DPA staff.

Ethical Crime Recording

46. There is pressure on all staff and managers involved in a Strongbox operation to succeed. The spotlight is on them. Extra resources have been given and good results are expected.

47. Against that background, it would not be surprising to feel the temptation to 'massage the figures' and this must be guarded against by all involved, especially local supervisors. Performance results should continue to be monitored independently, by units such as the MPS Performance Review Unit, which sits within the Policy Review and Standards business group.

48. There is a need to monitor the fair application of police powers, police activities and the recording and detecting of crime, stop and search, arrests and case disposal. This will ensure the operation operates in an ethical way and results have integrity. Independent ethical tests are now in place.

49. Dip sampling of investigations, custody records against CRIS, CAD records against CRIS, CRIS allegations and CRIS classifications are necessary. Overtime and incidental claims should be evaluated by the MIU.

Recommendation
Continued emphasis must be placed on ensuring the integrity of crime recording practices.
Response
This recommendation is fully accepted. This subject is covered in performance visits by Cluster Commanders, was reinforced in a recent seminar conducted by Assistant Commissioner Territorial Policing, and will be the subject of re-visitation this year by PRU and Inspectorate staff.

Leadership

50. Leadership is essential in all areas of police activity, and especially so in a high profile Strongbox operation. There should be visible, tangible and clear leadership. Not only does this include the operation of the Gold Group and the Tasking meetings etc., but also regularly contacting the Operations Office, Control Room, Custody Suite, attending parades, visiting intelligence units, patrolling with uniformed

officers, and discussing the operation with staff to obtain actionable feedback and the like.

51. Feedback from sites where operations have occurred suggests Detective Inspectors and uniformed Inspectors need to have a more clearly defined role and some needed to make more impact, and that some SMT members were not as visible as they might have been.

Partnership and protocols

52. A high profile operation like Strongbox requires close co-operation with partners in the Criminal Justice System, the Forensic Science Service, the Local Authority, and other agencies. Discussions need to be had with the various groups and protocols drawn up.

53. Research suggests that there may be scope for improving consultation and liaison with the CPS to enable them to give full support to the Strongbox initiative. This is being taken up with the CPS.

54. The HMIC report *Calling Time on Crime* debated some of the issues around the Criminal Justice System and the key challenge to the agencies involved in working together to reduce crime. They found police officers targeting persistent offenders were concerned magistrates were all too willing to grant bail. There was a belief on the part of police and Directors of local authority services that the courts should be more attentive to crime and disorder issues in the round, rather than purely on a case-by-case basis. Whilst there was universal acceptance of the need for justice to be administered impartially, there remained a strong view that impartiality should not extend to ignorance of the context within which crimes had been committed and the wider impact upon the relevant community.

55. There are implications for the senior managers of Strongbox operations to ensure all parts of the CJ system are aware of the operation and the intended effect upon crime reduction.

Recommendation
There needs to be a continued dialogue with other parts of the Criminal Justice System to ensure the overall aims of Strongbox are achieved.
Response
An integral part of the roll out of Operation Strongbox on individual Boroughs is to involve local prosecutors in the process.

Combining boroughs and 'initiative overload' (Operation Regis)

56. Research suggests that combining two boroughs into a single Strongbox operation is not effective. The operation tends to be too unwieldy and difficult to manage, communication is difficult, tasking meetings tend to be too long, resources (especially the Strongbox staff) tend to get very stretched, particularly towards the end of the operation when some withdraw to prepare the next borough to receive Strongbox. The learning from Operation Regis – which was

established to test the application across two boroughs – is that the combined approach is not effective. Further, Operation Regis saw difficulties when mid-operation the boroughs were required to respond to another major initiative – Operation Crackdown.

Recommendation
Operation Regis saw difficulties when mid-operation, they were also required to respond to Operation Crackdown. Consideration needs to be given to the problem caused by endeavouring to mount too many initiatives at once.
Response
This Recommendation is accepted. Operation Crackdown initiatives will be programmed in, and where overlap exists, Boroughs running Strongbox will be exempted.

Costings

57. While the PAT system has provided better accountability for resources involved in Strongbox, it has proved difficult to fully quantify the costs of operations that fall under the Strongbox umbrella. This is an area in which further improvements are planned. **Appendix 3** gives a cost estimate of the staff resources used in operation Strongbox. It also provides a short summary of the use of the additional £2M allocated to Strongbox.

Recommendation
Whilst it has greatly improved over time, there is still not sufficient data collected, particularly on costs, to properly evaluate the inputs, outputs and outcomes of Strongbox Operations. A Working Group should be set up to examine the data requirements.
Response
The protocols that were put in place to account for Home Office funds received the approval of the Home Office and were cited as National Best Practice. The imminent creation of the Territorial Policing Crime Support Unit will allow for improved sophistication in the use of data. There is also the prospect that the MetMIS Project will further assist this process, upon its rollout to the MPS this year.

A SUMMARY OF THE EFFECT OF OPERATION STRONGBOX ON VOLUME CRIME

Crime offences

Although significant reductions were experienced at some of the boroughs in the first or second week, sustained reduction does not really start until the middle of the Strongbox operations. Once commenced, it continues until the operations cease, but is generally followed by a rise in crime.

Crime variations have been looked at in two ways: The average weekly crime <u>during</u> Strongbox operations is either up (+) or down (-) compared to:
1. The average of eight weeks **preceding** Strongbox.
2. The average of eight weeks immediately **following** Strongbox.
3. The average weekly performance **excluding** the Strongbox weeks, between week 15 of 2000 and week 4 of 2001 (April-January). (MPS comparisons are shown for the same time periods.)

Lambeth (Operation Windmill)

8/5 – 2/7	vs. Preceding weeks		vs. Following weeks		vs. Non strongbox weeks	
Burglary	**+6%**	MPS -4%	**+7%**	MPS +6%	**0%**	MPS 2%
Street crime	**+10%**	MPS -1%	**-2%**	MPS +11%	**-1%**	MPS +3%
Autocrime	**-17%**	MPS 0%	**+13%**	MPS +11%	**+7%**	MPS 8%

Hackney (Operation Empire)

17/7 – 10/9	vs. Preceding weeks		vs. Following weeks		vs. Non strongbox weeks	
Burglary	**-12%**	MPS –4%	**+12%**	MPS 0%	**-2%**	MPS –5%
Street crime	**-15%**	MPS –6%	**-2%**	MPS –8%	**-22%**	MPS –9%
Autocrime	**-12%**	MPS –9%	**-4%**	MPS –3%	**-12%**	MPS –6%

Islington (Operation Regis)

2/10 – 3/12	vs. Preceding weeks		vs. Following weeks		vs. Non strongbox weeks	
Burglary	**-15%**	MPS +5%	**-16%**	MPS –6%	**-16%**	MPS +1%
Street crime	**+36%**	MPS +8%	**-6%**	MPS –5%	**+10%**	MPS +1%
Autocrime	**+13%**	MPS +6%	**-4%**	MPS +1%	**0%**	MPS +1%

Camden (Operation Regis)

2/10 – 3/12	vs. Preceding weeks		vs. Following weeks		vs. Non strongbox weeks	
Burglary	**+5%**	MPS +5%	**+5%**	MPS –6%	**+2%**	MPS +1%
Street crime	**+2%**	MPS +8%	**+10%**	MPS –5%	**+9%**	MPS +1%
Autocrime	**+5%**	MPS +6%	**-6%**	MPS +1%	**-2%**	MPS +1%

These figures are summarised in the attached charts.

Judicial disposals

JDs for most crime categories increase during the Strongbox operations, the exception being street crime, which sees more judicial disposals after the operations than before or during Strongbox.

Summarised below are the **weekly average** number of JDs, by crime type.

Lambeth (Operation Windmill)

8/5 – 2/7	Preceding weeks	During Strongbox	Following weeks
Burglary JDs	**10.1**	**14.0**	**6.8**
Street crime JDs	**5.1**	**5.4**	**4.8**
Autocrime JDs	**11.0**	**12.4**	**9.2**
Drugs JDs	**22.6**	**28.6**	**19.5**

Hackney (Operation Empire)

17/7 – 10/9	Preceding weeks	During Strongbox	Following weeks
Burglary JDs	**11.1**	**34.6**	**10.4**
Street crime JDs	**4.9**	**5.4**	**4.9**
Autocrime JDs	**8.0**	**7.5**	**6.3**
Drugs JDs	**12.4**	**15.4**	**18.3**

Islington (Operation Regis)

2/10 – 3/12	Preceding weeks	During Strongbox	Following weeks
Burglary JDs	**14.6**	**16.8**	**6.5**
Street crime JDs	**2.1**	**2.3**	**3.3**
Autocrime JDs	**6.4**	**9.3**	**8.0**
Drugs JDs	**9.3**	**12.8**	**16.3**

Camden (Operation Regis)

2/10 – 3/12	Preceding weeks	During Strongbox	Following weeks
Burglary JDs	**17.6**	**11.7**	**11.5**
Street crime JDs	**8.1**	**6.8**	**8.3**
Autocrime JDs	**6.6**	**12.4**	**13.3**
Drugs JDs	**18.9**	**22.2**	**22.0**

Arrests

Overall, arrests increased considerably throughout the Strongbox operations (11.9% increase for drugs offences, 9.3% increase for burglary, 16.7% increase for street crime and 20.9% increase for autocrime). There are more arrests for drugs than for any of the main crime reduction categories.

SUMMARY OF STRONGBOX COSTS

Summary of opportunity costs
All those involved directly on borough on Strongbox operations are already focussed on volume crime. To that extent their time and cost is not additional, but is brought within the Strongbox command and control for the period of the operation. The opportunity costs below are based on average resources per borough.

Pre-planning for a Strongbox operation on average takes 10 people 4 weeks.

The SO7 Strongbox team comprises 1 DSupt, 1 DCI, 2DIs, 4DSs and 22 DCs.
TSG commitments amount to 4 PS and 36 PC

Boroughs provide on average 6 teams of 1 DS or PS and 9 DCs/PCs, plus 1 DCI, 2 DIs and 4 analysts.

The operations generally run for 8 weeks (Camden and Islington ran for 9).

The estimated opportunity costs for an 8 week operation are therefore £1,200,000.

Summary of reimbursements made
Additional expenditure is separately measured for costs such as overtime and vehicle hire. Costs incurred in the relevant boroughs are set out below:

Lambeth	Strongbox team	41,000
	SO12	3,000
	Lambeth	150,000
	TSG/Traffic/Dogs etc	47,000
	Total	**241,000**

Hackney	Strongbox team	69,000
	SO12	10,000
	Hackney	286,000
	TSG/Traffic/Dogs etc	115,000
	Scientific support	12,000
	Total	**492,000**

Camden and Islington	Strongbox team	48,000
	SO12	3,000
	Camden	247,000
	Islington	342,000
	TSG/Traffic/Dogs etc	111,000
	Other costs	1,000
	Total	**752,000**

Reimbursed costs for first three Strongbox operations: £1,485,000