Review of promoted events assessment form 696

Report: 7
Date: 10 September 2009
By: Assistant Commissioner Central Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

The report provides an overview of Form 696 currently in use across the Metropolitan Police District and the findings of the review conducted into its use and application.

A. Recommendation

Members are requested to:

1. Note that the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) continue to use Form 696.
2. Note that the use of the form assists the MPS reduce violence in licensed premises and keep Londoners safe.
3. Note the form and its use will be modified in response to the findings of the recent review to ensure it remains valid and continues to focus activity on making London safer for all communities.
4. Make any comments in respect of the report.

B. Supporting information

1. The use of a risk assessment process was developed in response to the number of shooting incidents that were increasingly being seen at promoted club nights. Two people were shot at a ‘So Solid Crew’ party in central London in October 2001. Two people were shot in Turnmills nightclub in central London at the end of April 2003. Club promoters were asking for armed police to patrol club nights due to the fear of violence at events.

2. The problems continued and culminated in four shooting incidents over the New Year period 2004/2005, all of which occurred around musical promotions:

• 27 December 2004 Supreme Nightclub Lambeth, a male sustained a near fatal gun shot wound at a promoted club night.
• 1 January 2005 Citizens Nightclub, Wandsworth, a female was injured in the face from a stray bullet which was fired across a packed dance floor during a promoted club night.
• 1 January 2005 Waterfront Nightclub, Marsh Wall, Newham, a male sustained a gun shot injury on the dance floor at a promoted private party night.
• 1 January 2005 For Your Eyes Only Club, Abbey Rd, Brent, a male was shot outside the premises at 6am after a night at a private promoted club night.

3. These incidents identified the need for the MPS to track events to ensure there is proper dialogue between promoter, management of licensed premises and police; and the events are professionally managed and safe for customers, staff and performers. As a consequence, the MPS 696 Risk Assessment Form was first created and piloted in Westminster where continued consultation took place between a number of industry representatives including venues, licence holders and promoters who were in regular contact with police. The pilot was successful and its use extended across the Metropolitan Police area.

4. The objective Form 696 and the feedback Form 696A is to enable advanced warning of some of the more problematic events to be identified, in order for the police to work in partnership with promoters and musicians to reduce the risk to all concerned. The risk assessment process, using form 696 and 696A was launched across the MPS in October 2005 by the MPS Clubs and Vice operational command unit after consultation with various partners including borough licensing units, nightclubs, security firms, promoters and sections of the community involved in the night-time economy. This consultation confirmed the Clubs and Vice experience that a significant amount of serious violence at licensed premises was connected to the promotion or event taking place, rather than the actual club or premises at which it was being held.

5. The risk assessment process is designed to tackle all levels of violence, but focuses on preventing the most serious violence, including gun and knife crime and homicide. Clubs and Vice work closely with Trident on the initiative and in 2007 Trident identified that a significant proportion of discharges of firearms were linked to pubs and clubs. About one in every seven (15%) took place inside or directly outside these venues. Like other discharges and shootings, they affected members of black communities disproportionately (75% of all shootings in London have both a victim and a suspect from black communities). These shootings created enormous fear among those who attended these venues for a social night out. At promoted events in 2007, Annaka Pinto, a 17 year old woman, and James Oyebola, a former boxing champion were shot dead.

6. Convinced these shootings were preventable, Clubs and Vice worked closely with Trident and the Trident Independent Advisory Group (IAG) to develop initiatives that would stop guns getting into clubs, identify risk and ensure an increase in safety. They jointly increased the advice given to managers about the physical safety of their venues. They demonstrated the value of having trained and accredited door staff who managed a rigorous searching regime. They developed the risk assessment process that allows potential vulnerabilities to be identified and advice and support to be given. They developed Operation Argon (a police operation that seeks to disrupt violence in and around pubs and nightclubs), which joined overt armed operations with a Clubs tactical adviser from CO14 Clubs and Vice and were led by Trident intelligence staff.

A voluntary arrangement

7. The Form 696 and Form 696A risk assessment process is a voluntary arrangement between police, promoter and licensee. Unless the use of the form 696 process is a condition on the licence police cannot require that the form be completed. The licensing act 2003 regulates all aspects of licensing and specifically prohibits ‘blanket conditions’ being applied to all or a number of premises. However there is provision for conditions to be applied to individual premises when justified, for example due to problems of crime and disorder occurring at premises.

8. To have a condition added to a licence under such circumstances requires either the agreement of the licence holder or a review of the licence by the local authority licensing committee. The committee can then apply any conditions that it considers necessary to reduce the crime and disorder at the premises. Police estimate that currently about 70 premises in London have the use of the risk assessment process as a condition on their licence. There is no central database for this information as data is kept individually by licensing authorities and the figure constantly changes as conditions are added, removed or altered. This is out of a total of around 17,000 licensed premises in London.

Reduction in crime and disorder

9. The risk assessment process is one part of the overall strategy for combating violence in pubs and clubs. This strategy includes Operation ‘Argon’ patrols and other linked initiatives. Shootings related to pubs and clubs dropped to one in twenty (5%) for the first six months after Operation Argon first ran. They have never regained their previous levels. As a result of the risk assessment process, Argon and other linked initiatives in the year 2008/09 the level of shootings linked to pubs and clubs fell by 25%; the level of shootings in the MPS fell by 19.03%. In the same period the use of the form 696 rose by 44.65% and indicates that the 696 is contributing to the significant drop in gun crime in London’s pubs and clubs. Examples of where form 696 have been used to effectively prevent violence are contained at Appendix 1.

10. The focus of the risk assessment process is to enable police, promoter and licensee to work together and ensure events go ahead safely. Occasionally the premises owner, designated premises supervisor (DPS) or promoter may decide that the risk is too high and decide to cancel the event; this happened on 8 occasions in 2008. Very rarely police have assessed the risk to public safety as unacceptable and have used their closure powers under the Licensing Act 2003, although there were no occasions that this happened during 2008. The MPS are able to achieve this low level of closures as the Form 696 process enables police, premises owners and promoters to work together in advance and make informed decisions on security and potential for disorder. As part of the 696 review a snapshot of promoted events and the link to crime and disorder was conducted for the month of June 2009. This data is contained at Appendix 2. [1]

Working closely with the black community

11. Criticism has been levied against the MPS that the form disproportionately targets the black community. However, Clubs and Vice work closely with music promoters to support them through the use of the risk assessment process. The unit has already set up a promoter’s forum which currently numbers approximately 70 members, the majority of whom are from the black community. In May 2009 Clubs and Vice held a well attended meeting for the forum in Ruby Blue nightclub, Leicester square. Another well attended meeting was held in August 2009. The overwhelming view from those attending is of support for the Form 696 process, with many voicing their belief that it should be a compulsory scheme.

12. Working closely with Trident has ensured that the Form 696 is discussed at Trident IAG meetings. Commander Helen Ball, head of the MPS operation Trident, confirms that Trident IAG discussed the risk assessment process recently. While seeking better monitoring of the use of Form 696 and the actions taken in response to intelligence received, the members present were wholly supportive of a process that they saw as improving the safety of their communities.

13. In conjunction with the Metropolitan Police Diversity Directorate, Clubs and vice are now extending the consultation process within communities through Police Consultative Groups and central IAGs.

Engagement

14. Clubs and Vice have undertaken a full review of the use of the risk assessment process and form 696 in consultation with music promoters, the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS), Live Music Forum, Musicians Union, City of London police and MPS licensing officers. The executive summary of the review is contained within Appendix 3; the key recommendations are listed at paragraph 16 of this report. Each of these recommendations will ameliorate the use of the form. The next meeting of the promoters forum is to take place in November 2009. Engagement continues with Trident and the equality impact unit in the MPS.

15. The use of the risk assessment process and F696 is contributing to improving safety at music events and driving down violence at such events, including the most serious violence and gun crime. Clubs and Vice unit are responding to pressure from the promoters to assist them to professionalise their industry. The MPS is currently working with the professional body representing a wide range of licensees, the British Institute of Innkeepers (BII), to develop a bespoke qualification for music promoters. This is due to be piloted in September 2009.

Review

16. The review undertaken into Form 696 supports the value of continuing with the risk assessment process but identifies areas for improvement. Of key concern is the need to obtain sufficient information without placing an undue burden on those individuals and events that are not considered to be high risk. The key recommendations from the review are contained at appendix 3. All of these recommendations have been accepted and will be progressed by the Clubs and Vice Unit.

Monitoring

17. In order to monitor the use of the form in its application for proportionality the Clubs and Vice unit has embarked on an equality impact assessment using the dedicated MPS ‘EIA’ team. The ‘promoters forum’ continues to meet, representatives and promoters who regularly use the form and give their feedback and views directly to officers. The use of the form is discussed at Trident IAG meetings. Supported by the MPS EIA team, Clubs and Vice unit are in the process of extending this consultation to other Independent Advisory Groups for feedback, this will include groups such as the LGBT community, and various diverse community and youth groups. The aim of the consultation is to engage as many groups as possible who are, or may be affected by use of form 696. Views expressed will be fed-back to Clubs and Vice senior officers. The promoters focus desk will coordinate all uses of the form and record the outcomes weekly on the MPS briefing system ‘MetBats’. In addition a scrutiny panel made up of critical friends and IAG members will be developed to enable dip-sampling of completed reports on a regular basis to ensure consistency of approach and to identify any diversity areas for immediate action.

18. As part of the recent review, a questionnaire was sent out to licensees and promoters who had used the form 696. A total of 270 were sent out and 45 replies were received. There was an option to remain anonymous when replying.

Key Findings

• 93% of respondents are aware of the Form 696 objective to reduce violence in the night-time economy.
• 98% agree with the objective.
• 87% agree that Form 696 assists the objective.
• 91% believe the MPS should continue using Form 696.
• 96% use the form for all promoted events or new events; 4% due to police request.
• 89% find the form easy to complete.
• 69% responded that they always receive feedback from the police in sufficient time, 24% sometimes and 7% never.
• 64% made no requirement to change the form. Of the 36% requesting a change; most addressed specific points within the form; with a handful asking for the form to be generally simplified (9%).
• Of the 34% who made additional comments most were aimed at administrative points about the form.

This exercise will be repeated annually to continually monitor response to the risk assessment process.

C. Race and equality impact

The decision to use Form 696 is for the management of the premises to decide unless it is required as a condition on an operating license by a local authority. The form is currently used by over 270 premises within the MPS area for events that cater for a variety of promoted events that music plays a part in. These range from birthdays and music awards to club nights catering for every music genre. The process of reviewing and risk assessing events is based solely on a pre determined set of risk factors. [2] These factors are not based on the background of the artist(s) or the background of the audience. However analysis from Trident has shown that members of black communities are disproportionately affected by gun crime.[3] Experience of the staff on the promoters desk is that the black and minority ethnic communities using Form 696 are more likely to be subjected to a risk management plan. This is a reflection of the impact of gun crime and its disproportionate impact on black communities. Form 696 provides an opportunity to engage with all communities to work towards providing safe events. It is important that wherever communities are at risk opportunities are identified to reduce this risk without adversely affecting people’s everyday lives. The recommendations within the review provide an open and transparent process. This is reflected in the consultation for the Equalities Impact Assessment that is being undertaken with regard to the proposed changes to Form 696 and the associated products such as SOP that are under development.

D. Financial implications

There are no financial implications arising from this report.

E. Legal Implications

1. The MPS has received external legal advice in respect of its use of Form 696, and it is considered that the Form is an effective tool to assess risk and prevent potential crime and disorder from a small number of events that have caused problems in the past.

2. The decision to adopt the risk assessment scheme by a licensing authority as a requirement of their licensing policy is a decision for the licensing authority itself. However, it is considered that this would not contravene the requirements under the Licensing Act 2003, and would promote the licensing objectives under that Act.

3. Any information that is provided to the police for policing purposes which contains personal or sensitive information will be managed in accordance with the principles set out under data Protection Act 1998.

F. Background papers

• None

G. Contact details

Report author(s): Detective Chief Superintendent Richard Martin. OCU Commander CO14, Clubs and Vice.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Abbreviations

DPS

Designated Premises Supervisor

DCMS

Department for Culture Media & Sport

EIA

Equalities Impact Assessment

IAG

Independent Advisory Group

LGBT

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual & transgender

Appendix 1: Examples of effective use of Form 696

The following examples provide an overview of how form 696 has contributed to reducing the risk of harm in promoted events and provide an indication of the types of music that can be involved.

In November 2008 there was a serious stabbing at a promoted music event where a leading member of a known gang, Gang A, was stabbed by a member of a rival gang, Gang B. Intelligence had been received since then that members of Gang A would be seeking retribution. In December 2008 during Operation Argon intelligence was received that a certain DJ was playing at a promoted event in Greenwich and that both gangs were aware their rivals planned to attend and were looking to take firearms to the event. This was followed by a further 11 intelligence reports that confirmed that Gang A would attend Greenwich and move on to a nightclub in Islington. Further reports indicated that older members of Gang A would be attending a large night club in Southwark.

The information within form 696 enabled police to contact the venue and confirm which DJs/promoters were appearing at each venue. It also provided an overview of the security arrangements in place, which allowed police and the management of the premises to make fast time risk assessments around the events. As a result of this the events at Greenwich were closed voluntarily. However further intelligence was then received that Gang B would try to get into the large club in Southwark prior to going to Islington.

Again form 696 was used to confirm the acts appearing, allowing for security arrangements to be reviewed and the organisers contacted. In this case police were happy with the arrangements at the venue and were just required to deploy uniform patrols around the venue and an Operation Neon in the locality. (OP NEON uses armed officers to stop drivers who may be carrying weapons in their vehicles. Automatic Number Plate Recognition technology connected to police databases is used to identify these vehicles). Finally the Islington club was subject to a closure notice as police feared the risk of the venue remaining open was too great due to the rival gangs expected to attend.

In all the above cases the information on the form 696 assisted in the quick time risk assessment around each event. Initially it allowed for decisions to be made without having to deploy officers to the venues, saving time and money, and for the intelligence received to be properly assessed, e.g. were the artists/DJs being talked about actually appearing at those venues, or others. The fact that officers did not have to attend the venues was particularly beneficial as they were spread across London.

On 1 May 2009 a form 696 was submitted for a planned event at STRATFORD featuring a well known artist. Intelligence identified that the artist was a high profile Jamaican artist known to have previously used violent and homophobic lyrics at his shows. He was last in the UK when he played in London in 2001 and at that time was a victim of a £20,000 robbery. The suspect involved in the robbery was identified as DJ who was murdered shortly afterwards and it was suggested that the Jamaican artist was connected to the murder. The Jamaican artist was never charged for the murder but as a result of this incident there was a direct threat to his life should he enter the UK. It was also expected that Jamaican artist would attract a large crowd beyond the capacity of the venue. The information was passed to the local licensing unit who discussed the promotion with the management of the venue and the promoter. The promoter and performer decided to cancel the event and although we do not know their personal reasons for doing so we believe the Jamaican artist was concerned for his safety because of the threat to his life.

A Form 696 was received in relation to an event taking place at LAMBETH on 7 March 2009. The promotion was for a birthday party. Research identified that the party was for a known gang member from the Brixton area. This man is a known to Trident, heavily involved in drugs and firearms crime in Lambeth. He is known to have access to firearms and to take them into venues. The party was listed as being a private event, however tickets were also available on the door. Anyone could attend the event so rivals in the drugs trade or rival gang members could easily attend. The venue has previously attracted known criminals and intelligence indicated that firearms had also regularly been taken into the venue.

The information was shared with the local licensing unit who discussed the event with the management of the premises. After discussions with the local licensing unit the management of the venue decided to cancel the event.

A Form 696 was received for an event to take place at BRENT on 20 March 2009. The event was considered to be a private party for family and friends of a recently murdered man. Through research it became clear that the party was in fact a post funeral party commemorating the death of a man who was shot dead in a gang related shooting in north London. The deceased was linked to Gang C who had issues with Gang D. Intelligence indicated that the event would be high profile and attended by gang members from both sides and therefore may attract retaliatory activity. Both gangs are actively involved in various criminal activities ranging from the supply of class A drugs, shootings, stabbings, burglaries and intimidating local men to try and recruit them into their gangs. Form 696 also highlighted that there was no planned security for the event and the line up consisted of performers that were not known to CO14. The information was shared with the local licensing unit who met with the management of the venue. A policing plan was put in place that included deploying door security and local police to patrol the area. Patrols were carried out at a distance to minimise distress to the family. This policing plan allowed the event to go ahead and it passed without incident.

In October 2008 Clubs and Vice received a Form 696 from a nightclub in Stratford that could hold up to 2000 revelers. They were proposing to hold an event four weeks later where 27 high profile artists were listed to play to an expected crowd of between 1800-2000.The management of the premises, the security staff and the venue were experienced in holding large events. However, research established that the main artist had performed at events in Jamaica that had attracted violent crime. Police were concerned that this event would attract similar issues. Intelligence suggested that the event would attract attention from a north London based gang heavily involved in the criminal activities related to the gang culture. This information was passed to Newham licensing unit to agree a risk management plan with the venue.

The venue agreed to increase the number of security registered door staff to be deployed to 24 and to deploy a security dog. They paid Newham borough police for one sergeant and six police constables to be in uniform to police the event. They had search arches and all patrons were to be searched as a condition of entry. This was all agreed with the local police and the event passed without incident. The information shared with police by the management of the premises using the Form 696 allowed police to identify a potential risk to crime and disorder. With this information police were able to work with the management of the premises and agree a risk management plan that minimised the risk to public safety.

On 19 June 2009 an event was taking place in central London. During the research an officer identified that one of the performers in the line up was wanted for a burglary. It was established that the performer had actually played in the Home Counties and although the local officers were aware that he was wanted, he had not been arrested due to fears around public safety at the events. The performer in question has previously been involved in violent crime including kidnapping, stabbings and a shooting. Recent intelligence revealed that he has access to firearms. Form 696 identified where the performer would be playing and allowed officers to create a policing plan to assist in arresting him.

Over the Christmas period of 2008 there was a firearm incident at a venue in north east London. The venue was under new ownership and had begun hosting nightclub promotions allowing DJs to perform. The venue had not liaised with either the local licensing unit or CO14 Clubs and Vice, and were not aware of the Form 696 process.

A dispute broke out inside the venue between customers and the incident was initially dealt with by the door staff. The people involved were ejected but an associate of those involved returned to threaten the staff with a firearm. Identifying somebody involved in the original dispute, he shot them in the leg and back.

Engagement in the risk assessment process would have allowed the local licensing unit to advise the venue on the necessary action to help prevent weapons being carried inside, and how to deal effectively with the disorder. Although the DJ line-up would not have flagged up as a high-risk event by CO14, the risk assessment would have identified the need for strict door/security/search policy for the event and highlighted the inexperience of the venue.

Over the Christmas period of 2008 there was a firearm incident at a public house in north east London. The venue was hosting a promoted funky house music event. A dispute had arisen in the venue when a man asked the DJ for the music type to be changed. The man was attacked by up to ten other men. The dispute spilled outside the venue. Passing police officers witnessed eight shots fired in the crowd outside the venue. Despite the number of rounds fired no injuries were reported.

The venue had not engaged in the form 696 process nor informed local licensing of the type of event being held. The proprietor told investigating officers that local DJs would approach him in the street and ask to play at his club. Had a Form 696 been completed the DJs that played that night would have alerted CO14 to the potential for disorder. Referral would have been made to local licensing unit and conditions for a security and search policy would have been put in place reducing the risk of disorder considerably.

On 6 December 2008 premises in LAMBETH were hosting a promoted music event. The venue itself was known to the local borough for significant problems relating to men attending the premises with firearms. The management was keen to work with the police however they were very inexperienced and easily intimidated. The promoter for this event had a street name and intelligence linked him to a small-time gang involved in the supply of class A drugs and knife and gun crime. The promoter had also been the subject of a previous murder enquiry and he purportedly had access to firearms. The line up for this event included DJs with a large Tottenham gang following. At the time of this event the gangs associated to north London were in conflict with gangs associated with south London and intelligence indicated that the north London gang may travel to confront the south London gang. Tensions were running high due to the fact that a month earlier a member of the north London gang was almost stabbed to death. The intelligence gathered through Form 696 was discussed with the local licensing unit and a meeting was held with the management of the venue. This resulted in the event being voluntarily cancelled by the venue.

Appendix 2: Violence linked to Public houses and nightclubs hosting music events

Introduction and Scope

Aim

This report is designed to indicate where serious incidents involving violence or weapons have occurred in public houses or nightclubs hosting music events.

Time Period Covered

This report covers the time period from the 1 June 2009 to 31 July 2009.

Geographical Area Covered

This report is a Level 2 document and covers the pan-London MPS area.

Methodology

Data for this report was obtained from the MPS CRIS system for the months of June and July 2009. Crime reports with a premises code relating to a public house or nightclub were extracted. From these reports those including serious violence (murder, GBH, threats to kill) and those involving weapons and affray were identified and used as the basis for this report. Further information was extracted using the details within the report, contacting the investigating Police Officer, using open source data and if appropriate contacting the venue concerned.

Limitations

The accuracy of the crime data is reliant on the correct completion of the relevant CRIS reports. Some lines of research have been limited due to the possible impact on live investigations if the relevant investigating officer felt this may be the case. Descriptions of venue types rely on the interpretation of the reporting officers.

Sample Size

For the period June and July 2009, 166 crime reports were confirmed as relevant to this report, as being linked to a nightclub or a public house. The 166 reports consisted of 1 Murder, 1 Attempted Murder, 151 GBHs, 3 Threats to Kill, 6 Firearms related offences and 4 Affray or Violent Disorder.

For these 166 crimes research was undertaken to establish if the venues had a music event playing on the same night.

Terminology / Abbreviations Used

MPS

Metropolitan Police Service

CRIS system

MPS crime report system

GBH

Grievous Bodily Harm

Key Findings

Venues with Music Events

From the confirmed sample of 166 crimes, 85 were linked to a venue with a music event at the time. There were 10 repeat venues in the sample, 2 appearing three times and 8 appearing twice.

Promoted Events

61 of the 85 music events were confirmed as having been promoted events. 4 venues had submitted a Form 696 risk assessment, 3 events having 2 violent incidents each. 2 of the 4 events were assessed as low risk, 2 assessed as medium risk.

Live Music / DJs

Of the 85 music events 1 is described as a live band and 1 as being a live “PA” (Covered 2 incidents). 82 events are described as in-house or guest DJs playing.

Music Types

All events were found to include a variety of music types. For example “Funk, House music, Indie, Pop” is given as a description of the music played on the night. The music types have been broken down by the number of times they appear in the sample:

• 48 events are described as including RnB.
• 32 events included House music.
• 31 events are described as including Commercial or Pop music.
• 26 events are described as including Funky House.
• 20 events included disco or dance music.
• 16 included Hip Hop.
• 10 events included Indie.
• 8 included Rock.
• 5 events included Soul.

Other music type combinations included any of the above and Bashment, SOCA, Afro Beat, Hip Hop, Garage, Jungle, Cheesy Classics, Clubs Classics, Funk, Electro, Old Skool, Drum & Bass, African Reggae, Lovers Rock, Bhangra, Grime, Dubstep, Arabic, Irish, Latin, Salsa, Oldies, Uplifting, Soulful, and Reggae.

The one live band listed is described as playing a mixture of Indie, Rock and Soul.

Type of Venue

Of the 85 events, 58 took place in a nightclub, 22 in a public house, and 5 in a bar.

Size of Crowd

The crowd size broke down as follows:

• Unknown - 1
• Less than 100 – 27 (2 Bars, 14 Public Houses, 11 Nightclubs)
• 100 to 200 – 21 (2 Bars, 5 Public Houses, 14 Nightclubs)
• 200 plus – 36 (1 Bar, 3 Public Houses, 32 Nightclubs)

Crowd Breakdown

The crowd ethnicity types were reported as follows:

• Mixed – 48 (4 Bar, 14 Public Houses, 30 Nightclubs)
• Mainly Black Afro/Caribbean – 18 (3 Public Houses, 15 Nightclubs)
• Mainly White European – 16 (1 Bar, 5 Public House, 10 Nightclub)
• Dark European –1 (1 Nightclub)
• Asian – 1 (1 Nightclub)
• Mixed Asian and Oriental – 1 (1 Nightclub)

Victim Profile

From the victim information available the following profile was extracted:

Victim Age:

• Aged under 20 – 12 victims
• Aged 20 to 29 – 71
• Aged 30 to 40 - 33
• Aged 40 to 48 - 7

Victim Gender:

• Male – 109
• Female – 14

Victim Ethnicity:

• White European – 66
• Dark European – 5
• Black Afro/Caribbean – 39
• Asian - 8
• Oriental - 2
• Arabic – 1 each

Suspect Profile

From the suspect information available the following profile was extracted:

Suspect Age:

• Aged under 20 – 24
• Aged 20 to 29 – 75
• Aged 30 to 39 – 21
• Aged 40 to 48 - 2

Suspect Gender:

• Male – 126
• Female – 13

Suspect Ethnicity:

• White European – 62
• Dark European – 12
• Black Afro/Caribbean – 54
• Asian - 5

Conclusion

From the sample available, the following would describe the likely profile of music events where a serious violent or weapon related crime has occurred:

• Location: Nightclub / Large Public House
• Promoted Event: Yes
• Size of Crowd: Various (<100 to 1000+ people)
• Age of Crowd: 20 to 30 years old
• Crowd Gender: Male
• Crowd Ethnicity: Mixed
• Live Music or Recorded? - Recorded (DJs)

Music Type: RandB, House, Funky House and similar

Appendix 3: Executive Summary and key recommendations of review into Form 696

Executive Summary

The review of form 696 was commissioned by Detective Chief Superintendent Richard Martin, the head of Clubs and Vice Unit, in April 2009. The purpose of the review was to establish whether the use of the form remained relevant to the original aims and objectives set out during its development and to take into account some of the concerns raised in relation to its use.

Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference for the review were set out as follows -

1. Working with key partners, conduct a systematic review of form 696 focusing on the following key areas:
   • Conduct research of the links between 696 and the reduction in violent crime in London
   • Review the current definition of ‘significant event’ and its validity against the data collated since 2005
   • Identify whether alternative methods of achieving reductions without 696 are viable
   • Work with the MPS Diversity Citizen Focus Directorate to review the Equality Impact Assessment and the impact on diversity
2. Review legality of 696 with DLS following the concerns raised by the Home Affairs Select Committee.

The review was conducted in consultation with key stake holders which included music promoters, representatives from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), Live Music Forum, Musicians Union, City of London Police and MPS licensing officers. It also included a series of presentations and consultative meetings with the Trident IAG and organisations such as the Black Promoters Forum. Data was analysed over the periods 2005 - 2009 to ascertain what effect the form had on assisting police with reducing violence linked to promoted events. The review team also took into account issues and concerns highlighted by key partners and stakeholders.

The review identified qualitative examples where the use of form 696 had prevented violent incidents. It was identified that the ability to track problematic events remains a vital component in enabling police and organisers to identify and reduce the risk of serious violence occurring at promoted events. Form 696 will not on its own reduce serious violence within London, but added to a suite of tactics provides a key element in early identification and resolution at high risk events.

The review identified a number of areas that need to be changed in order to ensure the form remains effective and reflects the lessons that have been learned since its inception in 2005.

The key recommendations are produced below

Recommendations

• Recommendation 1: Form 696 to remain as a key tactic in reducing violent crime in London linked to promoted events.
• Recommendation 2: Change the current wide definition of a ‘significant event’ to a more focused set of guidelines that reflects the analysis undertaken.
• Recommendation 3: Ensure the new proposals of an ‘event’ provide greater clarity that unless placed as a condition on a licence the completion of Form 696 is voluntary.
• Recommendation 4: Ensure that all borough licensing officers are trained in the use and application of the form and that Clubs and Vice put in place a system to quality assure its use to ensure it is used appropriately.
• Recommendation 5: To develop a scrutiny panel to have access and review the completion of form 696 and the process adopted by Clubs and Vice on a regular basis.
• Recommendation 6: Clubs and Vice need to develop a centralised system for collating information raised by Form 696 to enable effective monitoring of its use.
• Recommendation 7: The follow up feedback Form 696A needs more effective collation to enable assessment and a quality assurance process to be developed.
• Recommendation 8: The requirement to provide details of the music style on Form 696 to be removed.
• Recommendation 9: Form 696 to remain in its current format as a voluntary system unless placed on the conditions of the operating license.
• Recommendation 10: Clubs and Vice to enable the revised form to be available for use by any person who is planning to hold / organise a promoted event.
• Recommendation 11: The current 14 day submission requirement to remain.
• Recommendation 12: The requirement to provide telephone details of the artist to be removed from Form 696.
• Recommendation 13: Cover page to be added to the front of Form 696 to address the issues of what the information is gathered for, how it is stored and how data subjects can gain access to it.

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