Health and Safety Branch response to July terrorist attacks

Report: 7
Date: 17 October 2005
By: Commissioner

Summary

This report summarises the Health and Safety Branch response in the immediate aftermath of the July terrorist attacks including safety related issues and radio communications.

A. Recommendation

That members note the report.

B. Supporting information

Health and Safety branch support

1. All underground blast sites following the explosions of 7 July 2005, temporary mortuary, mobile interview suites and the family liaison centre were visited, assessed and supported throughout operations by the MPS Health and Safety (H&S) Branch. In summary:

• Asbestos clearance monitoring was undertaken at all underground sites that were affected by the explosions of 7 July 2005. All assessments and initial monitoring results were completed within 12 hours of Branch assistance being requested and authority to deploy to the scenes being given. The Branch was supported in this initial deployment by a specialist occupational hygiene mobile laboratory to provide on site analysis. Throughout the operation asbestos remained within legal limits.
• A key issue around asbestos was that the asbestos hazard profile at Russell Square could have changed during the operation owing to the damage to a motorised section of carriage (these contain asbestos plates below the carriage flooring). A survey with London Underground rolling stock contactors (Tubeline and 4-Rail) was conducted on 20 July 2005 to review the integrity of the asbestos plates under the blast damaged motorised carriage. Physical and photographic examination indicated that the asbestos plates remained intact and the asbestos hazard minimal.
• Other hazardous materials present on the Russell Square train included mercury (in the door closing mechanism), sodium and phosphorous (in a temperature monitoring switch) and detonators used in emergencies by the driver. A risk assessment of these hazards was conducted and management controls required to reduce the risk to Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) and forensic staff were agreed and implemented.
• Confined space gas detectors were deployed at Edgware Road, Russell Square and Aldgate underground sites. Throughout the operation confined space gases remained within tolerable limits.
• Temperature monitoring equipment was deployed at Russell Square and Occupational Health (OH) issued re-hydration advice to deployed officers.
• An assessment of the concern that leptospirosis (Weil's disease - a serious and sometimes fatal infection that is transmitted to humans by contact with urine from infected rats) could present a hazard to staff at the underground sites was made and leptospirosis advice and guidance cards were issued.
• The branch advised on:
  • Numerous H&S issues on the MPS activity at the temporary mortuary established as part of the London Resilience Mass Fatality Plan.
  • Co-ordinated support from DEFRA Government Decontamination Service and advised on the clean up of a domestic premises following the use of CS ammunition rounds.
  • Draft generic risk assessments for SO13 Anti-terrorist Branch.
• The Branch also supported:
  • Gold and Silver commanders.
  • SO13 Anti-terrorist Branch SMT.
  • Multi-agency site co-ordination of the temporary mortuary.
  • Multi-agency Bronze welfare.
  • H&S planning meetings for the movement of the remaining carriages at Russell Square with SO13, London Underground silver control - recovery team, London Fire Brigade, Tubelines, 4Rail.
  • Multi-agency meetings (London Underground, Tubelines, 4-Rail, Health Protection Agency and Government Decontamination Service) for the clean up recovery operation.

H&S Branch contingency plans

2. The branch met all operational demands and expectations; some learning issues were identified. These included, issues about equipment and numbers of appropriately trained branch personnel to meet some of the specific operational needs (e.g. working in confined spaces underground and enhanced environment monitoring equipment training). Work is underway to close these capability gaps. The branch will report the closure of this work to the MPA.

Radio communications

3. Initial MPS response to the 7 and 21 July was run on the current MPS primary radio system, MetRadio.

4. Within four hours of the incident Airwave O2 PLC (the MPS airwave service provider) deployed a cell enhancer to SO13 Anti-terrorist staff with a number of airwave radios which enabled them to have surface to sub-surface communications at Russell Square. On Friday 8 July, Airwave O2 PLC also deployed a cell enhancer at Kings Cross Station, which provided the same capability.

C. Race and equality impact

There are no direct implications for equality and diversity arising from this report.

D. Financial implications

Estimate immediate costs of £28K to address a number of potential operational capability gaps as identified in paragraph 2. At this stage it is anticipated that these costs will be met within existing HR budgets.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Louis Backwell, Head of Health and Safety.

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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