Review of Mayoral powers and responsibilities

Report: 10
Date: 26 January 2006
By: Chief Executive and Clerk

Summary

This report proposes the way forward for the Authority’s response to ODPM consultation on additional powers and responsibilities for the Mayor and Assembly.

A. Recommendation

1. That Members agree a response to the proposals set out in the ODPM Consultation Paper for additional powers and responsibilities for the Mayor and London Assembly;
2. The Chief Executive be authorised to finalise the response in discussion with the Chair, following the draft response being copied to all members; and
3. That, if feasible, a joint response be made with the MPS.

B. Supporting information

1. In November 2005, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) published proposals for the extension of powers and responsibilities for the Mayor and the GLA. Responses to the consultation paper should be received by 22 February 2006. The part of the consultation paper relating to the Metropolitan Police Authority is attached as appendix 1 to this report.

2. Members are invited to comment on those proposals and the paragraphs below set out some of the issues to be considered. However, officers feel that, whatever the merits of the ODPM proposals, they do confuse ‘streamlining lines of accountability’ with ‘effectively holding to account’. It is suggested that the MPA in its response should counter the premise that, “The MPS is not held to account as efficiently and effectively as it could be.” (ODPM, 2005 p57). The Audit Commission Initial Performance Assessment of the MPA stated that the MPA “sets high standards in carrying out its statutory duties and strategic function. It has introduced an effective framework for holding the MPS to account. It is making policing in London more transparent and better aligned to the diverse needs of communities.” The latest HMIC baseline assessment finds that the MPS is the most improved force in the country 2004/05, stating that, “there is a constructive relationship with the MPA, especially in relation to best value, strategic planning and performance scrutiny.” The MPA conducts innovative work outside its committee structure, such as the recent Together Against Terror seminar, disability review, mental health and policing reports, stop and search, and gun crime scrutiny groups, helping it to take strong policy leads and direct action over controversial issues within the MPS. This thorough and detailed oversight role is carried out by all 23 members of the Authority and is not dependent on whether or not the Mayor is the Chair of the Authority.

ODPM proposals, with suggested alternatives are set out as follows:

The Mayor as Chair of the Authority

3. The appointment of Mayor as Chair of the Authority

• Pros – This is probably in line with public perception that the Mayor is responsible for policing the capital. It could strengthen the linkages between GLA and MPA
• Cons – Being the Chair of the MPA is a demanding and almost full time role. Could the Mayor adequately and effectively fulfil this function given the many other commitments on his time?
• Alternative – That the Mayor be empowered to appoint the Chair of the Authority from amongst its membership. (Note that Nolan requires adverts and competitive process).

Powers of direction

4. Whilst not part of the ODPM proposals, it is understood that the Mayor in his response will be proposing that he should be given power of direction over the MPA, presumably in a way similar to his relationship with Transport for London and the London Development Agency.

The MPA would need to understand what this means in practice but:

• Pros –This could strengthen the focused leadership of the MPA.
• Cons – This is not in line with the statutory basis for other police authorities. It is not clear how this would affect MPA capacity to discharge its functions. The law is clear that responsibility for operational matters rests with the Chief Officer, and if any power of direction is granted to the Mayor it should be clear in its terms that it could not apply to any operational policing issues and that it confers no power to direct the Commissioner.

Authority membership

5. The consultation paper makes no recommendations as to the membership of the MPA, but the Government’s White Paper on ‘Building Communities, Beating Crime’, the Consultation Paper proposes the abolition of magistrate members of police authorities. The government proposals for the new strategic police authorities also envisage incorporating more elected members from constituent local authorities. The analogy for London would be borough representation, as is currently the case on the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA). It is likely that other respondents to the ODPM will press for such representation and it seems prudent to cover these points in the MPA response. It is important that responses to this consultation are cross-referenced with the national debate on police restructuring.

Since its creation, the Authority’s magistrate members have played a major role particularly through the Chairmanship of Committees (all magistrate members have been Committee Chairs). Arguably, magistrates bring a particular mix of skills and experience to the Authority that it would be unfortunate to lose.

Members are invited to give a steer to officers on the line to adopt on the ongoing debates about the make up of police authority membership, particularly in respect of borough representation and magistrate members.

Extending provisions of section 17 of Crime and Disorder Act to GLA

6. This will ensure that all functional bodies mainstream crime and disorder and community safety into all aspects of work. It will not affect the MPA, which is already a statutory member of all CDRPs and is subject to the general duty.

Conclusion

7. Members are asked to discuss and agree the direction that should be taken in the MPA’s response to the ODPM Consultation Paper.

Depending on what response is agreed, it might be possible to make a joint response on behalf of the MPA and the MPS. This would certainly help to emphasise the strong and effective relationship that has developed between the two organisations.

C. Race and equality impact

There are no direct implications in this report but diversity issues may arise if increased appointment powers for the Mayor are introduced. In that event they will be identified and will be addressed in the reports that update the Authority on progress.

D. Financial implications

Sir Michael Lyons is currently carrying out an independent inquiry into current and emerging role of local government. He will address critical funding issues and will produce a final report at the end of 2006. The government will take forward impact of proposed changes to GLA funding in light of Sir Michael’s recommendations and it therefore does not form part of this consultation.

E. Background papers

• ODPM consultation paper
• The Greater London Authority, November 2005
• MPA briefing paper 31/2005
• Audit Commission report 2004
• HMIC Baseline Assessment 2005

F. Contact details

Report author: Sally Benton, Corporate Information Officer

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

Extract from ODPM Consultation Paper

5.3 The Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA)

Current arrangements

5.3.1 Prior to the Greater London Authority Act 1999 and the creation of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) was held to account by the Home Secretary, who was in turn answerable to Parliament for its performance. The creation of regional structures under the 1999 Act, including the Mayor and the GLA, provided an opportunity to improve democratic accountability and align the arrangements more closely with the rest of the country by creating a police authority for the MPS. However, the special nature of London has meant that the accountability arrangements for the MPS remain unique in a number of ways.

5.3.2 Although the legislatively prescribed functions of the MPA are identical to that of other police authorities (to secure the maintenance of an efficient and effective police force), there are some noticeable differences including:

• The elected representatives that make up over half of the MPA membership are members of the GLA appointed by the Mayor to reflect the political balance of the Assembly. Elected representatives in other police authorities are drawn from county councils and unitary authorities.
• Uniquely, one of the independent members of the MPA is appointed by the Home Secretary, reflecting the national and international functions of the MPS in relation to the protection of prominent people and places, national security and counterterrorism.
• With 23 members the MPA is larger than other police authorities (most have 17).

5.3.3 Additionally, the Assembly, the Mayor and the Home Secretary have additional roles in holding the MPS to account:

• The Assembly has the power to question the MPA on the discharge of its functions and has, in practice, extended this scrutiny function to the MPS as well.
• The Home Secretary retains a direct role in holding the MPS to account for its national and international functions in relation to the protection of prominent people and places, national security and counter-terrorism.
• Through his high public profile and central role in the budget setting process for the MPS we recognise that the Mayor is able to exert influence over policing priorities for the force.

Issues and challenges for London

5.3.4 We believe that the MPS is not held to account as efficiently and effectively as it could be. The existing structure in which many bodies have a direct or indirect role in holding the MPS to account needs to be streamlined in order to ensure the process is transparent to the people of London. Furthermore, strong leadership is required at the head of the accountability body to ensure that it is effective in holding the MPS to account.

The Greater London Authority: The Government’s proposals for additional powers and responsibilities for the Mayor and Assembly

Proposal

5.3.5 We are convinced that the MPA should continue to be the primary accountability body for the MPS. But we intend to reform it to strengthen its ability to discharge its functions.

5.3.6 We propose to provide for the Mayor to be the chair of the MPA. There is already a strong public perception that the Mayor is directly responsible for the performance of the MPS, even though at present he is limited to exerting indirect influence by means of his high public profile and overall budget setting role. Making him the chair will make real this perception and strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the MPA. Furthermore, we are of the view that the high visibility and direct link to local people will provide the Mayor with sufficient leverage to increase the effectiveness of the MPA as a scrutiny body.

5.3.7 This change will also streamline the accountability arrangements by removing the need for the Mayor to indirectly influence the process. By giving the Mayor a lead role in the formal accountability structure, we will have removed one of the separate parties holding the MPS to account.

5.3.8 Although we recognise that London represents a special case in many ways, we should minimise the extent to which its arrangements are taken out of alignment with the rest of the country. We therefore intend for the other members of the MPS to be comprised of members of the London Assembly, chosen to reflect the political balance of the assembly, and independent members. As chair of the MPA, the Mayor would have an increased role in the selection of independent members (save for the Home Secretary appointment).

Q 35: We welcome comments on the proposed approach.

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998

Current arrangements

5.3.9 Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 places a duty on those organisations that fall within its ambit14 to do all they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder in their area. The organisations to which section 17 applies are responsible for delivering a wide range of services locally, and in delivering these services they are ideally placed to impact on the socio-economic and environmental drivers for crime. Section 17 requires them to routinely consider the implications for crime and disorder as they carry out their day to day business in delivery of these services.

Issues and challenges for London

5.3.10 The GLA has a very important role to play in delivering key services across the capital as a whole, such as transport, planning and the environment. It works closely with the London boroughs in the delivery of these services but there is no requirement in law for the GLA to take account of the impact that delivery of their services may have on crime and disorder. We believe that this anomaly should be addressed.

Proposal

5.3.11 We believe that there is now strong evidence for extending the provisions of section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act to the GLA. This would allow the Authority to ensure that it, and its functional bodies – namely the GLA itself, the London Development Agency and Transport for London, (in addition to the MPA and LFEPA who already fall within the ambit of section 17) – mainstream crime and disorder and community safety into all aspects of their work.

Q 36: We welcome comments as to whether section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act should be extended to the GLA.

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