Review of police use of counter-terrorism Stop and Search powers in London

Report: 7
Date: 31 May 2007
By: AC Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This review has been completed in response to the MPS recommendations detailed with in the MPA report entitled Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate and in particular the commissioning brief which detailed the concerns relating to the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000.

The MPS takes seriously the issues that have been raised by the MPA and this review. The MPS always looks to improve the way it works and how it deals with the public we serve.

The MPS will build on the MPA and MPS reports to make changes that will make a difference to London’s communities in the way it deals with Section 44 searches.

A. Recommendation

That

1. the MPS continues to appropriately apply to the Secretary of State for authority to use Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 (Section 44) powers (currently pan – London);
2. the MPS continues to constantly review the appropriateness of a pan London authority and based upon the threat, intelligence and operational requirements continue to only apply for pan-London authority when it is needed to support tactics to prevent terrorism. However this recommendation is subject to the further recommendations made throughout this report;
3. the MPS revisits and updates the Section 44 Standing Operating Procedure (SOP), and ensures that staff receive adequate briefing for the appropriate and legitimate use of Section 44 powers. Thorough post event de-briefing will be conducted to ensure effectiveness and highlight opportunities for improvement;
4. the MPS provides sufficient training to enable staff confidently and properly to exercise their powers under all stop / search provisions;
5. the MPS nominates a strategic lead officer for the tactical pan-London use of Section 44, to co-ordinate activity from the receipt of Section 44 authority through deployment and post deployment monitoring;
6. as with the exercise of all other stop and search powers, the MPS promotes the tactical option of ‘stop and account’ within a revised SOP (See Recommendation Three);
7. the MPS maximise opportunities to engage public awareness in the use across London of Section 44 by using appropriate high visibility signs / other equipment, where appropriate;
8. the MPS develop a comprehensive communication strategy and engagement plan to ensure Londoners receive a consistent level of accurate information pertaining to police use of Section 44; and
9. the MPS should conduct an annual MPS Equality Impact Assessment in respect to Section 44 of the Terrorism Act.

B. Supporting information

Introduction

1. Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 (Section 44) is a power exercised by police on the basis of a detailed authority provided by the Secretary of State. The Powers under section 43, 44 and 45 Terrorism Act 2000 can be seen in Appendix 2. Section 44 provides for police to stop and search persons because of the current the terrorist threat present and without the recognised pre-requisite of ‘reasonable grounds’. This is a unique feature, and is one of the main issues of public concern in respect of the reasons for which the power is exercised.

2. This review considers the authorisation process, the briefing / tasking and deployment of resources to the power, and the impact of the use of the power on the broad MPS environment. Precise outcomes of Section 44 use are difficult to demonstrate, but where possible, evidence is provided of the impact of overt Counter Terrorism (CT) policing (including the exercise of Section 44) on suspected terrorist activity.

3. Greater data transparency is being demanded and the MPS must now consider the most effective way to manage the conflicting needs of sound CT operational effectiveness against growing community demands for ‘local’ data.

4. The complexity of cross-business operating environments has been identified through the review process and recommendations made to synergise activity. The recommendations this review makes therefore support the effective pan MPS approach to strategic CT aims, incorporating Section 44 as a valid and appropriate tactic.

5. This review was convened and completed in response to the MPA report ‘Counter-Terrorism: The London Debate’, and their following commissioning brief, detailing MPA concerns relating to the use of Section 44.

Terms of reference

6. The complexity of the issues exposed and discussed is such that it is not practicable to structure this report through the individual issues raised in the commissioning brief forwarded by MPA officers. However, the MPS is confident that these issues are addressed within the report.

7. In essence, the brief naturally divides into two distinct areas – strategic and tactical issues. However, in an operational context these matters are so closely interlinked that they do not form sub categories. This report, therefore, details the totality of the commissioning brief (the questions that the MPA raised are listed below).

8. Strategic use of the power:

1. The MPS should demonstrate and evidence – rather than simply assert – any deterrent, disruptive or preventative counter-terrorist effect of police use of Section 44 and Section 43 Terrorism Act 2000 stop and search powers
2. Review how counter-terrorism stop and search powers are used in London: Authorisation of Section 44: Where? Pan-London? When? Why? Rationale?
3. Particular considerations around use of counter-terrorism stop and search powers when intelligence suggests there is a specific threat to a known location.
4. Review MPS use of counter-terrorism stop and search powers in the context of British Transport Police and City of London Police use of the same powers.
5. Review MPS use of counter-terrorism stop and search powers in the context of use of the same powers by other UK police forces outside of London, especially in West Yorkshire, West Midlands and Greater Manchester.

9. Tactical use of the power:

1. Briefing and tasking processes for counter-terrorism stop and search powers: What are officers told? When? How?
2. Rationale for selection of stoppees: Suspicion? Profile? Stereotype? Random? Arbitrary? Discretionary?
3. Use of Section 44 vs use of Section 43: are the appropriate powers used on the appropriate occasions?
4. Inappropriate (eg non-terrorism related) use of Section 44 and Section 43: does this happen? Are officers who use the powers inappropriately disciplined? Or retrained?
5. Particular considerations concerning use of counter-terrorism stop and search powers with respect to vehicles as opposed to pedestrians.
6. Review the recording and management of information on police use of counter-terrorism stop and search powers in London: are all stops recorded? Self-defined ethnicity too often not stated?
7. Proportionality with regard to stoppees: Ethnicity? Gender? Age?
8. Review the community impact, on both the individual stopped and the wider community, of the use of counter-terrorism stop and search powers in London

Methodology and structure

10. The MPS is grateful for the support and assistance of the MPA (and its’ submission of a commissioning brief), and to the community advisers who contributed to this review through a bespoke community consultation group.

11. Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO) Andy Hayman sponsored this review, which was led by Commander Jarman and co-ordinated by officers from the MPS Stops and Searches Team.

12. The MPS Inspectorate, Stops and Searches Team, Specialist Operations (SO) and Performance Information Bureau (PIB) have all conducted and submitted research to the review team.

13. MPA colleagues, British Transport Police (BTP), City of London Police (CoLP), Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) and stakeholders from the other London forces have been engaged in this review as part of the project and research board.

14. The review examined the end-to-end process for Section 44 from authorisation to deployment and deployment outcomes. The infrastructure for deployments and the quality of the processes were scrutinised using a combination of methods. Senior stakeholders and practitioners were consulted using focus groups, structured interviews and questionnaires. Records, including stop and search slips (form 5090), were sampled, analysed and strategic and tactical meetings were observed.

15. Thus, within the eight week review period, 26,000 data search entries were analysed, over 1,000 MPS staff surveyed, focus groups convened, senior police officers within the MPS and other Police Forces interviewed and key external partners consulted. Full records have been kept of participants, and are available for inspection by the MPA.

16. The governance, consultation and project management structure for the review is documented in Appendix 3.

The Review

Section 44 and the grant of authority for its’ use

17. The review of Section 44 has enabled the MPS to examine the power in a broad context and as an important CT tactic. This requires that the tactical use of Section 44 forms part of a cohesive pan MPS approach to making London safer. At the heart of this is an era of severe and enduring terrorist threat, defined and confirmed by Security Service and Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) reporting, which informs the MPS (and police services nationally) of the depth and type of threat we face.

18. Section 44 Powers are granted to the MPS following a detailed written request submitted by ASCO (on behalf of the Commissioner) to the Secretary of State. The format of the written authority is both devised and owned by the Home Office. Authority is granted for a period of 28 days at a time, and each refreshed request requires a new submission by ACSO. The Secretary of State has power to withdraw his Authority at any time.

19. The request is submitted on the basis of Home Office defined categories requiring detailed information about the terrorist threat. The submission is therefore predominantly based upon the highly confidential documented assessments of that threat from the Security Service and JTAC, as well as specific relevant operational updates. The Secretary of State reviews the documented evidence supplied in each of these categories before granting authority, and thus does so only on the basis of evidence, supplied both by our intelligence partners and by police.

20. Responsibility for developing the threat picture itself lies with the Security Service (MI5 [1]) working to the Director General. Essentially the police respond to the information generated by a complex process of analysis. The current threat picture describes a threat to the Capital that cannot be devolved to single boroughs or distinct areas, but rather to the whole of London. Our intelligence partners assess a wide range of different and generic sites to be (at the very least) aspirational terrorist targets. Of particular importance is the potential vulnerability of sites across the whole of the MPS area. Unsurprisingly, these include the transport systems, economic targets, the utilities, crowded and iconic/tourist attractions, shopping centres and other ‘soft’ targets, making London a ‘special case’ in terms of vulnerability or threat. This is a sentiment strongly expressed by Lord Carlile [2].

21. In light of this enduring threat evidence, the MPS cannot not consider reducing the scope of the Section 44 request until and unless our intelligence partners inform us that the threat itself has changed. If the threat were to reduce, then our submission to the Secretary of State would reflect that change and (if consequently appropriate) any deviation from an MPS wide request would be explained and supported by evidence.

22. Were the threat against London to increase, it is likely that (because of the very high threat level in which we are now continually operating) this would be on the basis of very specific new intelligence. Rather than lowering the threat elsewhere in the Capital, this would simply focus further activity in response to the intelligence received.

The use of Section 44

23. Section 44 has been subject to considerable attention since its inception, most notably through annual reviews undertaken by Lord Carlile [3] and through Judicial Review proceedings. The power has consistently been the subject of significant public and media commentary. It was also the subject of ACPO practice advice published in 2006.

24. There is broad agreement amongst legislators and police (and contained in the judicial and government reviews that have taken place) that the exercise of Section 44 is a tactic to disrupt, deter and prevent terrorism, and to help create a hostile and uncertain environment for terrorists who wish to operate in London. This position needs to be emphasised from the outset. It may be that the mistaken impression that searches under Section 44 will only yield terrorists and terrorism-related articles has contributed to public concern.

25. ‘The London Debate’ MPA report makes reference to ACSO Andy Hayman’s comments in respect of the use and effectiveness of Section 44. It is important, in the context of those comments, to stress that the power is primarily one of prevention through deterrence and disruption; addressing public safety by making the environment hostile to terrorist activity may be considered an assertion, but it is nevertheless a sound probability.

26. Research based case studies from Belfast and the City of London [4], demonstrate in practical terms how a power such as Section 44 can protect and secure major cities.

27. This research indicates the intrinsic value of specific target hardening activity through robust search regimes, described as ‘ opportunity-blocking against highly determined offenders’. Specifically, where robust search regimes were applied to vulnerable locations, terrorist activity was displaced outwards. The implications of this research would support the view that prevention tactics, including searching, can be seen as legitimate and necessary in increasingly wide circles beyond a particular site, event or geographic location.

The effect of, and outcomes from, use of stop and search (and Section 44)

28. The effectiveness of (broad) Stop and Search powers to prevent, deter and disrupt criminality is much debated. The MPA Scrutiny Report on Stop and Search identified issues that arise from the use of these powers, and in particular the impact on minority communities. The scrutiny did not come to a position on effectiveness.

29. Both Lord Scarman in 1981 and Lord McPherson in 1999 addressed the issue of Stop and Search, and both pointed to the same issue of negative community impact - but both believed it was an important tool in preventing and detecting crime.

30. Millar, Bland and Quinton (2000) summarised previous documented evidence on the effectiveness of stop and search, concluding it has a 'disruptive impact on crime by intercepting those going out to commit offences,’ and that ‘where searches are used intensively in particular locations they may have a localised deterrence or displacement effect.' There is 'evidence that the very existence of stops may prevent crime, whether or not they involve searches'.

31. Recent debriefs of police officers deployed in covert activity have provided clear evidence of the effectiveness of stop and search powers. In one London operation where Section 60 was used to reduce the threat from armed gangs, covert officers described the impact of the activity: - “…It was impossible to meet with targets. Those involved in crime would not come to the area and no one would engage in criminal activity because they were unable to freely move around carrying weapons. The operation made our job almost impossible and reduced the activity of the criminals almost to nothing…” (This very specific feedback referred to criminals dealing in significant quantities of class 'A' drugs and firearms, and who routinely used high levels of violence).

32. DAC Peter Clarke has broadly described Section 44 as ‘contributing to the safety and security of the capital’. His recent comment that “Intelligence shows that London is considered by terrorists to be a hostile operating environment.” was made in the context of the commencement of this review and in respect of the tactical role of Section 44 in countering threat.

33. The MPS have found operational evidence that high visibility; overt policing tactics have changed the behaviour and interfered with the activity of terrorist subjects, for example altering travel routes, forcing periods of inactivity etc.

34. Section 44 also has resonance with other stop and search powers exercised daily by the police (locally and nationally) in that it is a disruption / prevention / reassurance measure. It is used pan London and in targeted protection of particular places.

35. The MPS also provides an excellent level of crime prevention in relation to CT, initiated through Operation Rainbow. Subject of scrutiny and praise from HMIC, this ‘toolbox’ approach to CT tactical response measures has been extended under Operation Delphinus, which brings Counter Terrorism measures into the heart of local policing by incorporating them within the Safer Neighbourhood programme.

36. The development of these two sets of tactical options could be enhanced if preventing ‘terrorist’ crime was seen to be as fundamental within the front line operating environment as the prevention of all other forms of crime. The further development of these options should thus include the use of Section 44 and other powers by borough officers to reduce risk at identified ‘local’ sites.

37. Evaluating how Section 44 contributes to the safety of Londoners is a demanding goal, but the process could include customer satisfaction and customer confidence indicators as well rather than a crime detection framework. The MPS recognise and acknowledge the concerns of the MPA and the media and view these matters seriously.

38. The MPS must engage Londoners in a more open discussion about the role, function and legitimacy of the use of this power. Whilst arguing in favour of the legitimacy of this power in a strategic context, this review reveals that tactical use does not always translate into that strategic aim.

39. Indeed, this review has found that some Police officers are unsure of the limits of the power and the reasons for its authorisation, resulting in lack of confidence in the conduct of the searches themselves and in the process by which selection of persons to be searched takes place. This confusion is also manifest in the quality of documentation submitted in some cases.

40. Briefing and de-briefing standards vary significantly and little supervision or scrutiny post a Section 44 search event takes place. It is evident that the MPS must re-visit the existing Section 44 SOP (written Jan 2005) and incorporate these and subsequent relevant issues contained within this report.

41. No bespoke training for Section 44 or Sec 43 exists (Sec 43 power requires no authority and is exercised on the basis of ‘reasonable grounds’), although diversity training and general training for Stop and Search is routine in the MPS. Those officers who participated in this review welcome the prospect of additional training, particularly training that allows for role-play.

42. Of particular importance to Londoners and to the MPA is the process by which officers reach a decision to stop and search. Examining the extent to which this is legitimate, appropriate and fair is of the utmost importance if trust and confidence in the power is to be achieved.

43. There are a number of different types of Section 44 activity across the MPS. These are:

• Officers permanently employed in security and protection roles.
• Officers directly tasked to conduct Counter Terrorism patrols through a central tasking process at a vulnerable location.
• Borough officers utilising the power as part of normal day-to-day duties.

44. Unfortunately, it is impossible to extract precise data from the MPS Stop and Search database to indicate which searches took place under which type of deployment, an issue that needs to be addressed with our Department of Information. However, in order to categorise the MPS data as clearly as possible, the review has used a combination of data analysis based on location and surveys to describe the use of Section 44.

45. This information may serve to provide some reassurance to Londoners that Section 44 searches are being used in ways that meet their expectations and which do correlate with the function and intention of the use of the power herein described.

46. Thus by analysing location data for Section 44 stops, this review reports that 85% of searches in a 3 -month period in the last financial year took place in one of the following areas:

• 26% Transport hubs (London Underground and mainline stations)
• 23% Government buildings, iconic sites and tourist attractions
• 13% financial centres
• 23% Airports.

47. This data also indicates that officers associated with security and protection duties conducted a significant proportion of searching. Unfortunately the data does not permit differentiation between local borough officers who were deployed through central tasking, or those who may have been conducting their searches as part of ordinary patrols on their own borough.

48. In order to explore this data further, officers were then surveyed. The results supported the findings from the database in that the vast majority described their search as falling within the following categories:

• Patrol at high-risk location.
• Patrol at high-risk event.
• Specific Counter Terrorism patrol.
• Deployment to central London.

50. The survey was also designed to gauge the amount of searching undertaken by officers in uniform roles where searching under this power would reasonably be expected to occur. Of those surveyed, 56% stated that they had never used the power. In the remaining sample the vast majority of searches were conducted in the most heavily patrolled boroughs, unsurprisingly linked with the iconic tourist /postcard areas of London or other high threat areas.

51. The review scrutinised the decision-making process by which central deployments are co-ordinated and tasked following the granting of Section 44 authority. This takes place through a series of meetings to determine not only the tactics that will be used in order to respond to the threat, but where the patrols will be deployed. The location of deployment is based upon the current threat assessment and the location of vulnerable areas/ premises.

52. Section 44 is not deployed as an isolated tactic at any stage; it is included in a series of tactical options that form part of a strategy for overt, high visibility policing. An example of this is the deployment of a CT patrol, which may comprise mobile and foot patrols, multiple locations, and other specialist tactical support (e.g. use of mounted branch, Automatic Number Plate Readers (ANPR), overt filming and deployment of counter-reconnaissance teams). Within the framework of a CT patrol, the use of stop and search is encouraged but not directed. Whilst no targets are set for numbers of searches, the search figures, including ethnicity are recorded.

53. The MPS tasking process does not explicitly differentiate between searching of vehicles and pedestrians using this power, and the data reveals fluctuating but broadly similar use of both over time. In terms of deterrence, the potential threat from vehicle-born as well as pedestrian-born explosives means that both aspects of the power are considered to be necessary and appropriate. In disrupting, deterring or preventing terrorist activity both types of search activity are available and utilised.

54. This review finds that more connectivity is required between the strategic and tactical decision-making for the deployment of Section 44 as a pan- MPS CT tactic. There is a need for a co-ordinated prevention approach across the MPS utilising all types of operational exercise of the power. This necessitates the appointment of a central strategic lead, responsible for all use, use outcomes and management of Section 44 matters.

Advice and guidance on practical Section 44 use

55. ACPO have released advice in relation to Section 44 which also deals with the issue of selection for searching, emphasising that the power can be used in both a targeted and non-targeted way but should never be based on stereotypical views of terrorists. In the absence of specific intelligence, search activity may be on a more random basis, with a wide range of people being stopped.

56. ‘The London Debate’ suggests the potential value of adopting a numerical approach to stopping, and this is something that is mentioned specifically in the guidance used by British Transport Police. This has been the subject of some critical commentary in a recent House of Lords decision [5]. A numerical approach is not something that currently appears within the MPS guidance or briefing material for Section 44.

57. This review believes that MPS officers could be provided with greater clarity in relation to processes applied to ‘selection’ for stopping (and searching). The importance of selection is evident – it must be proportionate and avoid stereotyping. This is emphasised within the MPS but this needs to be reinforced with in the SOP and in the regular briefing material produced (see Recommendation Three).

58. Survey findings indicated that 50% of searches are decided upon due to a person acting unusually, 23 % as a result of formulating reasonable grounds for suspicion, 16% as a result of random selection and 9% due to a person fitting a description/ as a result of other intelligence including ANPR. When the results were separated for the boroughs where Section 44 usage was highest, the use of random selection increased dramatically to 32% with a corresponding reduction in the use of reasonable grounds. This would appear to indicate that those officers more familiar with the power and who have the advantage of regular and potentially enhanced briefing through central tasking, are using the type of decision–making framework the MPS would expect (See Recommendation Four).

59. Equally, officers are not given specific guidance in how to explain Section 44 to the public, and this is likely to be linked to the quality of briefing they receive (if any) prior to using the power. (The adoption of Recommendations three and four should address this). Stop and Account is already widely used as an effective tool in prelude to the decision to search under other search powers. If this approach were used prior to a Section 44 search, it may reduce the reported tension in the interaction between police and public- without compromising the deter/ disrupt impact of the power.

60. The review has also found that MPS is not maximising the potential deterrent impact, or the opportunity to draw public attention to this overt CT tactic, by for example the use of prominent signage or other similar equipment to support and advertise the use of Section 44 in a particular location, where appropriate.

Complaints and discipline

61. There have been 19 complaints made in the MPS since Section 44 came into force in 2000, none of which were substantiated. In 2006 0.22% of Stop and Search activity (excluding Section 44) resulted in complaint. For Section 44, the figure was 0.01%. No formal disciplinary proceedings have resulted from complaints in relation to Section 44. However, 5 cases resulted in local resolution and the remainder were classified as unsubstantiated or withdrawn. All the locally resolved complaints related to incivility.

62. Due to the low number of resolved complaints and their wide distribution over time, no meaningful information can be extracted, either in terms of a pattern of complaints, or in terms of a specific organisational response. Officers are reminded in existing briefing material that any use of Section 44 power for reasons unconnected with terrorism will result in discipline.

63. The MPS recognises that low levels of official complaint about Section 44 are not necessarily a good indicator of public dissatisfaction, and acknowledges the significant levels of concern captured in ‘The London Debate’.

Recording and data issues

64. The MPS can give assurance in respect of the validity of the Stops and Searches database for analysis purposes, although it cannot be asserted with absolute certainty (as is the case with all such non-automated recorded information) that the database is 100% accurate.

65. The extent to which MPS data could be undermined by under-recording, incomplete recording or for any other reason has been examined during the review.

66. As part of an anonymous survey, officers were asked to state how often they recorded Section 44 searches. The number of officers stating they did not make a record was negligible. Focus group work reinforced this with officers citing the search record as a vital means by which they justify their actions. Officers were clearly aware of the potential impact of such a far-reaching power on those stopped and the importance of auditing the encounter.

67. There is evidence to suggest all search records are inputted. However, timeliness of inputting is a recognised issue, and is being addressed by Operation Pennant, already having a significant impact on timeliness for all stops. When the ‘lag’ in input times for Section 44 slips is compared with that for PACE slips, the former is very much better.

68. Levels of recording for Self Defined Ethnicity are often used as an indictor of data quality for Stop and Search. The percentage of Section 44 records where Self Defined Ethnicity is not included is 15.1%, lower than for other PACE Searches where the figure is 17.8%, a relatively positive finding. However, the overall level is still considered to be poor.

69. To examine if under-recording may be masking disproportionality, the review analysed the data using the ethnicity information determined by the officer (for which recording rates are high at 99%). The results indicate that serious bias is not introduced by the missing data and that proportionality figures are broadly similar across the data.

70. Examination of records revealed that officers are not providing sufficient information. Many officers simply describe the reason for the stop as being on the authority of the ACSO. Significant numbers do not state whether the search was the result of a pre-planned operation or not. Consequently many records do not provide quality information about the circumstances in which an individual came to be stopped and this is an area where improvement is needed. The new SOP will address these issues. (See Recommendation Three).

71. The MPS are confident that the Stops and Searches database can be used as a basis for meaningful analysis of Section 44 use. Whilst it is not possible to validate the database in any pure sense, the MPS have attempted to establish levels of non-recording through anonymous surveys. The findings suggest that this is negligible. Information from the database has also been analysed to allow for comparison between Section 44 and Sec 1 PACE stops, particularly with respect to gender, ethnicity and age.

72. The MPS release data on Section 44, by ethnicity, and these figures reveal that limited disproportionality is evident, with slight over-representation of Asians and slight under representation of black people. If ethnicity were to be analysed in terms of age groups, some further disproportionality may be in evidence.

73. More than half of all recorded stops under Section 44 have been in the 26-45 age group. Prior to 7/7, the second group was 46-65 (with over 20%), with the 18-25 groups third. Following 7/7 these groups changed places: the 18-25 group now constitute over 20%, with the 46-65 group in third place. Both these profiles differ markedly from that of PACE stops, where the majority group is 18-25 (at nearly 40%), followed by 10-17 (which hardly registers under Section 44) and then 26-45 (with around 30% each).

74. When each age category is broken down by ethnicity, a higher proportion of 18-25yr old Asian people are stopped than white or black. Relatively more black people are stopped in the 26-45 age group. Slightly more white people are stopped in the 46-65 age group than other ethnicities. Approximately 95% of recorded stops under Section 44 are on males, and this level has been consistent over the years.

75. The time profile for recorded Section 44 searches through the day is very different from that of PACE. Over half (54%) take place between 9am and 4pm (the figure for PACE is 43%); 20% take place during the morning rush-hour (ten times the proportion for PACE); and only 9% between 6pm and 7am (whereas the figure for PACE is 33%).

76. The review has examined data for people stopped more than once under Section 44. For 2006 this figure was 147 individuals, 0.6 % of the total stops. This figure has been reasonably consistent over the last three years and has never exceeded 1%. This data has also been examined in term of proportionality with no significant discrepancies from the overall figures.

Quality of communication, public engagement and data share

77. Section 44 data is released monthly on the Internet with other Stop and Search information, and includes stop and arrest rates, breakdown by Self Defined Ethnicity, Identification Code, and age. The MPS does not currently release data on a borough basis which the MPS acknowledge is information that Londoners believe should be released.

78. The MPS does not release specific information concerning threat levels, or operational information regarding CT activity that might be expected in London. Some basic information about the role of Section 44 has been lodged with the press but it is generic. There is little proactive communication taking place in relation to our use of this power.

Use of Section 44 by other forces

79. British Transport Police (BTP), City of London Police (CoLP) and Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) were consulted in relation to their use of Section 44.

80. The areas examined included:

• Strategy and Policy.
• Tactics.
• Briefing.
• Training.
• Community Engagement.
• Data.

81. The geographical area and nature of the work undertaken by both the CoLP and the MDP mean that counter terrorism plays a prominent part of an officer’s day-to-day patrol and tasking.

82. BTP has a specialist team deployed to carry out the majority of Section 44 activity, an approach that lends itself to a more consistent and productive response.

83. Whilst MPS officers do have a terrorism input on their briefings it is clear that in the majority of cases it is not a part of their core business to carry out section 44 searches. However, due to the differing geographical responsibilities that the MPS has, it is difficult to draw direct parallels and there are no specific recommendations.

84. There were however, a number of areas of good practice identified which need further examination and deliberation. These include:

• The use of independent observers at specific section 44 operations

85. Independent observers would demonstrate a greater transparency and would potentially increase community confidence in the use of the power.

• Behavioural Assessment Screening System.

86. Training which ensures officers are more confident in the use of their powers and would potentially improve the quality of the encounter.

• Stop and search video - external communication.

87. Given the relatively unique nature of this power and the potential for it to impact on large groups of people who would otherwise not come into contact with police it is essential that a greater prominence be given to Section 44 in our Stop & Search communication strategy.

Other UK police forces: findings

88. Greater Manchester Police, West Midlands Police, West Yorkshire Police and Strathclyde Police have also completed similar processes to examine the use of section 44.

89. Section 44 is not routinely used by any of the four named UK forces. It is only authorised in relation to a specific incident, event or strategic location. Because of the limited use, direct comparisons cannot be drawn and no recommendations can be made. All forces have procedures in place to deal with any specific threat or raised threat level.

Data comparisons

90. The quantitative Section 44 data for other forces, considered similar to the MPS, was collated in order to make a comparison. West Midlands had 1 search, West Yorkshire had 26 searches and Greater Manchester carried out 1,520 searches in the year 2004/05.

91. During 2004/5 there were 32062 searches under Section 44 performed nationally (excluding BTP). The MPS carried out 40% of these, and the other major contributors were City of London with 20%, Essex 11% and Sussex 8%.

92. For the MPS, the number of searches per thousand population was 2.09 for Asian and 1.65 for White, giving a disproportionality ratio of 1.3 (i.e. an Asian person was 30% more likely to be stopped than a White person). For City of London the equivalent figure was 1.8 (80% more likely); for Essex 4.2 (over 300% more likely); and for Sussex 6.7.

93. However because the calculation of these figures is based on census figures, there are special considerations applying to City of London (low residential population) and both Essex and Sussex (the airports of Stansted and Gatwick), which make direct comparisons inappropriate. Among forces similar to the MPS, only Greater Manchester carries out a significant number of stops under Section 44 - but just 5% of the total. The Asian:White disproportionality there was 2.4.

94. BTP carried out 31490 searches under Section 44 over the entire country between March 2006 and February 2007. The arrest rate from these was 0.7%. The Asian:White disproportionality was approximately 7, but the above comments concerning population apply also to the BTP.

The way forward

95. The MPS takes seriously the issues that have been raised by the MPA and this review. The MPS always looks to improve the way it works and how it deals with the public we serve.

96. A new SOP will be produced to address Section 44 issues and improve the way it is dealt with. The following issues will be addressed in the SOP:

• The strategic goal.
• Menu of tactical options.
• Training.
• Community engagement.
• Stop and account.
• Encounter guidelines.
• Incorporating Counter Terrorism considerations into every uniformed police officers and PCSOs daily work.
• Monitoring, review and supervision.
• Public reassurance.

97. A briefing package will be completed by the end of June. Its purpose is to quickly start the lessons learnt from the MPA report and this review and not to wait until the SOP is completed.

98. The MPS will as well as releasing the current Section 44 data, publish addition information. This will be every 3 months on a borough basis and include numbers, age, ethnicity, gender and search time periods. This will be the only data that the MPS will release. This is based on the current threat picture. Additional information may be given if the threat picture reduces for a period of time.

99. The MPS also reserves the right to withdraw the new data, if releasing it causes CT operational issues.

100. The MPS will appoint a strategic lead for Section 44. This will be Commander Rod Jarman.

Marketing strategy

101. Section 44 legislation and its enforcement by police is highly sensitive and often controversial. It is therefore extremely important that any communication strategy has clear aims and objectives at the outset. Any strategy would require careful handling and undoubtedly involve extensive consultation with internal and external stakeholders and wider research is required into public attitudes to Stop and Search to inform any communication.

102. As outlined in The London Debate the MPS need to engage with communities in a more effective and open fashion. This is acknowledged by the review and the recommendations are designed to bridge this divide in order to gain the trust and confidence of communities while still retaining an operational imperative.

103. The MPS marketing strategy will be delivered through three strands. The first will be focussed externally with a strategic aim to explain the rationale of why Section 44 is a crucial component of a CT prevention strategy. The second strand will be focussed internally to define how the power will be used to support the strategic aim. The third will drive the tactical implementation of prevention options ensuring key messages are given to communities and individuals who are subject to the power.

104. In the short term the MPS will look at ways to improve communication around working with the press, briefing officers and leafleting to communicate Section 44 use. In the long term the MPS will carry out qualitative and quantitative research. The research will provide an insight into attitudes on stop and search and how widely these are spread. The research will define how a targeted message will be delivered.

105. Existing research tells us that the public does not differentiate between Section 44 and Section 43 (other stop and search) and therefore any communication should deal with both together.

C. Race and equality impact

1. The subject matter of the report from the MPA has a considerable impact on both race and equality issues. The use of any stop and search power must take into consideration the potential for disproportionality and ultimately discrimination.

2. One of the recommendations contained within this report is for the MPS to conduct an annual MPS Equality Impact Assessment in respect to Section 44 of the Terrorism Act. This should address race and equality impact issues.

D. Financial implications

The report recommends additional work in terms of data production and analysis, training, marketing and support. This work has not been costed and so financial issues will be resolved at a later date.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author: Commander Rod Jarman, MPS

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1

Glossary of terms

MPA

Metropolitan Police Authority

MPS

Metropolitan Police Service

Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000

Authorisation granted by a ACPO rank Officer where they believe it is expedient to prevent acts of terrorism. An authorisation allows an officer in uniform to stop and search a - vehicle or persons (and any thing) in or on the vehicle
- a pedestrian/anything carried by a pedestrian

- for articles that could be used in connection with terrorism.
(An officer does not require reasonable grounds to carry out this search)

Section 43 Terrorism Act 2000

An officer may stop and search a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist to discover whether he has in his possession anything, which may constitute evidence that he is a terrorist. (This requires an officer to have reasonable grounds to carry out this search)

Stop and Account

Where an officer requests a person in a public place to account for their actions, their behaviour, their presence in an area or their possession of anything.

Self Defined Ethnicity (SDE)

The ethnic group as defined by the person stopped (National Census categories).

The London Debate

The Metropolitan Police Authority’s report on terrorism and counter-terrorism, which has involved consultation with over 1,000 London residents.

BTP

British Transport Police

MDP

Ministry of Defence Police

CoLP

City of London Police

CT

Counter-terrorism

SO

Specialist Operations

TP

Territorial Policing

CO

Central Operations

Safer Neighbourhood Team (SNT)

Community based officers

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

A SOP details the actions to be taken to achieve the policy. A policy is a principle, stance or course of action in respect of a specific issue or piece of legislation.

ACSO

Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations

DAC

Deputy Assistant Commissioner

ANPR

Automatic Number Plate Recognition

Equality Impact Assessment (EIA)

Measures the adverse and positive impact of policing proposals on communities through a structured and transparent process

Appendix 2

Section 43, 44 and 45 of the Terrorism Act 2000

Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000

Section 43 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides for the stopping and searching of persons by a constable. It states:

• 43(1) A constable may stop and search a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist to discover whether he has in his possession anything which may constitute evidence that he is a terrorist.
• 43(2) A constable may search a person arrested under section 41 to discover whether he has in his possession anything which may constitute evidence that he is a terrorist.
  43(3) A search of a person under this section must be carried out by someone of the same sex.
• 43(4) A constable may seize and retain anything which he discovers in the course of a search of a person under subsection (1) or (2) and which he reasonably suspects may constitute evidence that the person is a terrorist.
  43(5) A person who has the powers of a constable in one part of the United Kingdom may exercise a power under this section in any part of the United Kingdom.

Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000

Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 as amended by the Terrorism Act 2006 describes the procedure whereby a constable is authorised to stop and search persons and vehicles in order to prevent acts of terrorism.

44(1) An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to stop a vehicle in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to search:

1. the vehicle;
2. the driver of the vehicle;
3. a passenger in the vehicle;
4. anything in or on the vehicle or carried by the driver or a passenger.

44(2) An authorisation under this subsection authorises any constable in uniform to stop a pedestrian in an area or at a place specified in the authorisation and to search:

1. the pedestrian;
2. anything carried by him.

44(3) An authorisation under subsection (1) or (2) may be given only if the person giving it considers it expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism.

44(4) An authorisation may be given:

1. where the specified area or place is the whole or part of a police area outside Northern Ireland other than one mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c), by a police officer for the area who is of at least the rank of assistant chief constable;
2. where the specified area or place is the whole or part of the metropolitan police district, by a police officer for the district who is of at least the rank of commander of the metropolitan police;
3. where the specified area or place is the whole or part of the City of London, by a police officer for the City who is of at least the rank of commander in the City of London police force.

44(ZA) The power of a person mentioned in subsection (4) to give an authorisation specifying an area or place so mentioned includes power to give such an authorisation specifying such an area or place together with:

1. the internal waters adjacent to that area or place; or
2. such area of those internal waters as is specified in the authorisation.

44(4A) In a case (within subsection (4)(a), (b) or (c)) in which the specified area or place is in, on or in the vicinity of policed premises (within the meaning of section 53(3) of the British Transport Commission Act 1949, an authorisation may also be given by a member of the British Transport Police Force who is of at least the rank of assistant chief constable.

44(4B) In a case in which the specified area or place is a place to which section 2(2) of the Ministry of Defence Police Act 1987 applies, an authorisation may also be given by a member of the Ministry of Defence Police who is of at least the rank of assistant chief constable.

44(4BA) In a case in which the specified area or place is a place in which members of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary have the powers and privileges of a constable, an authorisation may also be given by a member of that Constabulary who is of at least the rank of assistant chief constable.

44(4C) But an authorisation may not be given by:

1. a member of the British Transport Police Force, or
2. a member of the Ministry of Defence Police, or
3. a member of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary,

in any other case.

44(5) If an authorisation is given orally, the person giving it shall confirm it in writing as soon as is reasonably practicable.

44(5A) In this section:

Driver,
in relation to an aircraft, hovercraft or vessel, means the captain, pilot or other person with control of the aircraft, hovercraft or vessel or any member of its crew and, in relation to a train, includes any member of its crew;

Internal waters,
means waters in the United Kingdom that are not comprised in any police area.

Section 45 of the Terrorism Act 2000

Section 45 of the Terrorism Act 2000 sets out when the power to stop and search may be exercised.

45(1) The power conferred by an authorisation under section 44(1) or (2):

1. may be exercised only for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism, and
2. may be exercised whether or not the constable has grounds for suspecting the presence of articles of that kind.

45(2) A constable may seize and retain an article which he discovers in the course of a search by virtue of section 44(1) or (2) and which he reasonably suspects is intended to be used in connection with terrorism.

45(3) A constable exercising the power conferred by an authorisation may not require a person to remove any clothing in public except for headgear, footwear, an outer coat, a jacket or gloves.

45(4) Where a constable proposes to search a person or vehicle by virtue of section 44(1) or (2) he may detain the person or vehicle for such time as is reasonably required to permit the search to be carried out at or near the place where the person or vehicle is stopped.

45(5) Where:

1. a vehicle or pedestrian is stopped by virtue of section 44(1) or (2), and
2. the driver of the vehicle or the pedestrian applies for a written statement that the vehicle was stopped, or that he was stopped, by virtue of section 44(1) or (2),
   the written statement shall be provided.

45(6) An application under subsection (5) must be made within the period of 12 months beginning with the date on which the vehicle or pedestrian was stopped.

45(7) In this section driver has the same meaning as in section 44.

Note:

1. These stop and search powers differ from those provided in section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in that there need be no reasonable suspicion in respect of any individual who is stopped. Thus - these terrorism provisions provide for blanket, routine stops and searches.
2. A suitably designated community support officer (CSO), under paragraph 15 of schedule 4 to the Police Reform Act 2002, has the powers in section 45(2) above.

Appendix 3

Governance and project management structure

Figure 1: governance structure

Project Board

Chair: Commander Jarman, Specialist Operations, Territorial policing, Central Operations, Operation Rainbow, Directorate of Public Affairs, MPA, British Transport Police, City & MOD police

Community Consultation group

Diversity & Citizen Focus Directorate, National Community Tensions Team, Independent Advisory Group, MPA, Stop & Search Community monitoring Network

Practitioner Consultation Network

Operation Rainbow, Specialist Operations, Borough Stop and Search lead, MPS Inspectorate, British Transport Police, City & MOD police

Project Team

Project manager: Superintendent Jupp, Coordination: DCI Wheeler & A/DCI Millichap, Stops and Searches Team, MPS Inspectorate, Performance Information Bureau

Work Strands and research methods

The review process was organised and monitored according to specific work areas. These were scrutinised and adopted by the Project Board and are summarised below along with the range of methods that were used to collect and analyse information.

Strand 1: Assessment of context: theory and practice

To collate and develop information to understand the legitimacy or otherwise of this power through

• A literature Review for Stop and Search considering relevant theoretical policing and criminological models for crime prevention.
• Examination of historical information in order to assess the actual deterrent, disruptive or preventative function of this power.
• Examination of the legislative background for Section 44 including the rationale and purpose for its ratification and all subsequent reviews and judgements, particularly Lord Carlile’s annual reviews.

Strand 2: current practice

To conduct research and analysis of current processes for the use of this power including

• The process for authorisation.
• The tactical options for deployment.
• Tasking and coordinating framework.
• Deployment of resources, briefing and supervision.
• Recording and debriefing.
• Monitoring and evaluation.
• The process for communication and engagement.
• Comparisons or contrasts with other forces operating in London and similar forces nationally.
• Development of case study information illustrating the life cycle of a S44 deployment from authorisation to encounter that demonstrates the power in action in a way that is accessible to a range of audiences external to our organisation.

Strand 3: data

• To conduct research and analysis of the available data in relation to Section 44 in order to assess understand
• Proportionality issues by ethnicity, age and gender.
• Deployment patterns.
• Data standards issues including supervision.
• Data capture: reliability and quality issues for the end-to-end process.
• The extent to which data is published and communicated externally.
• Comparisons or contrasts with other forces operating in London and similar forces nationally.

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