MPS response to the MPA report 'Counter Terrorism: the London Debate'

Report: 9
Date: 28 June 2007
By: Commissioner

Summary

The Authority received the London Debate report in February. The report outlines the MPS initial responses to each of the recommendations.

A. Recommendation

That members note the MPS initial responses to the 46 recommendations for the MPS contained in the London Debate report.

B. Supporting information

1. 'Counter terrorism - the London Debate' was a report presented to the Authority in its February meeting. It was based on the MPA's consultation with over 1000 Londoners. Both the Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman welcomed the report. It was agreed that the MPS would respond more fully to the recommendations relating to the MPS at the June meeting of the Authority.

2. The first, and perhaps most high profile recommendation was Recommendation One, which related to Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The MPS presented a comprehensive response to this at the Full Authority meeting in May.

3. Of the other recommendations, most complement work already underway in the MPS. Many also overlap with recommendations in other reports such as the IPCC report on Forest Gate and the MPA Scrutiny of MPS Media and Communications. They may also apply to other parts of policing beyond Counter Terrorism. Some, although referring primarily to the MPS, also apply to other agencies.

4. The MPS has appointed a senior person to lead the development of each of the recommendations and to report back. The co ordination of responses and developments within the MPS will be undertaken by DAC Cressida Dick on behalf of AC Hayman.

5. The first responses to each of the recommendations for the MPS are outlined below:

Recommendation 1. Present an urgent review of the use of Section 44 Terrorism Act 2000 stop and search to the full Metropolitan Police Authority. Include in this review a clear rationale explaining why a given individual is stopped and searched rather than another. If unable to demonstrate to the Metropolitan Police Authority’s satisfaction through this review that the power is sufficiently effective in countering terrorism to outweigh the damage it does to community relations, stop using it, other than in exceptional circumstances, such as where there is a specific threat to a particular location.

MPS Response: This was subject to a detailed report to the Authority at its last meeting.

Recommendation 2. Publish an explanation of Operation Kratos (the generic title for a series of Metropolitan Police Service standard operating procedures and tactical responses to the threat posed by suicide terrorism), setting out clearly the learning that has taken place since 22 July 2005.

MPS Response: The MPS has published an explanation of Operation Kratos. In addition Kratos is an integral part of Central Operations Community events which have received much media coverage and excellent feedback from those attending.

The MPS is not in a position to publicise the learning since 22 July 2005 because of the outstanding legal processes. However the vast majority of the HMIC recommendations are complete, the others progressing well. The MPS will be inspected on their implementation by HMIC.

Recommendation 3. Accept and apply to current counter-terrorist activity the learning from previous terrorist campaigns.

MPS Response: As the report notes there are many aspects of the terrorist threat currently faced which are fundamentally different from previous campaigns. But there are also similarities and there is learning to be gained from such history, this is acknowledged operationally in investigations and in the MPS approach to community engagement and community impact. Within Specialist Operations there is a continuous improvement unit whose remit is to ensure lessons are learned and within the Counter Terrorist Command (SO15) there is a department that is dedicated to Organisational Learning and Protective Security.

Recommendation 4. Work with partners to initiate more counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation initiatives.

MPS Response: The MPS are involved in a multitude of local and central counter radicalisation and de-radicalisation initiatives with partners. This is a fundamental and growing part of the Government's CONTEST strategy and the MPS is fully engaged with the work being done by Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government. A more detailed report on this subject will follow.

Recommendation 5. Provide the public, the business community and those working in other public services with more guidance as to what activity might reasonably be considered suspicious in a terrorism context.
and
Recommendation 6. Explain to the public what to do with information of use in countering terrorism.

MPS Response: These are an ongoing challenge for the MPS and for other agencies. Encouraging the public to pass information to the police is a focus of publicity campaigns, media interaction and communication by local officers at all levels, most particularly Safer Neighbourhood Teams. The volume and quality of information coming in via the Hotline and other methods continues to increase.

The MPS has sought to improve public awareness through Operation Delphinus and Project Argus (see response to recommendation 45 for a description of Argus). The Met's Directorate of Public Affairs has also recently launched a five week publicity campaign entitled 'Terrorism. If you suspect it report it'. Press advertising appeared in London's major newspapers and on the City's major commercial radio stations. The Press advertisements seek to raise awareness of a range of items which may be needed by, or be of use, to terrorists and asks the public to consider whether they have seen any activity connected with them which may have made them suspicious. Experience has shown that there is no stereotypical terrorist and the public are being encouraged to report any activity which they feel is suspicious to the confidential anti terrorist Hot-line. It is then for experienced counter terrorist police officers to assess and respond accordingly. The DPA campaign highlights the need for terrorists to access information, transport and communication facilities. It highlights their need to travel and their use of computers. It also invites the public to report suspicious activity around storage facilities, the suspicious use of chemicals and protective equipment, their desire to obtain false documentation or identities and engage in fraud to obtain funding. This campaign follows on from a previous media campaign carried out at the beginning of 2007. A summary of results of this previous campaign can be found at Appendix 1.

Recommendation 7. Train parking attendants, traffic wardens, parks staff, neighbourhood wardens and city guardians in counter-terrorist awareness.

MPS Response: The MPS acknowledges the need to raise awareness and provide training for the aforementioned groups. This is being done under the umbrella of Project Griffin. This project delivers CT presentations across Westminster, Lambeth and the City of London to security professionals and other relevant parties. The MPS is working with partners to extend Project Griffin across the rest of the MPS area. Under Operation Delphinus, the Met's counter terrorism and extremism seven point programme, there is also a specific requirement to properly brief police officers and the extended police family to identify signs of violent extremism.

Recommendation 8. Find better ways for council employees to feed to the police 'soft' intelligence which they come across in the communities in which they work

MPS Response: Operation Delphinus also requires local police units to engage with and enhance community, business and statutory partnerships including briefings to local authority staff. The MPS is grateful to the Authority for highlighting the need to continually access sources of 'soft' intelligence and this will be specifically addressed by Operation Delphinus 2

Recommendation 9. Consider what it can say when it comes to counter-terrorism, not what it cannot: a different approach is needed.

MPS Response: The Directorate of Public Affairs has developed an extensive new strategy for communications during counter terrorist operations, this takes account of this recommendation and will result in greater information being made available earlier. The aim is to provide a strategic and co-ordinated communication approach for handling high profile counter terrorism operations and investigations. The objectives of the strategy are to protect the integrity of the counter terrorism investigation and support its aims and objectives. To avoid the risk of prejudicing future judicial proceedings, to mitigate the negative impact of any police action and to provide timely and accurate information to the public and to engage through the media with the community directly affected by the operation, to ensure that they are better informed about what has taken place. To maintain public confidence by explaining the methods and tactics deployed to carry out the operation and to respond and re-butt, where appropriate, speculation or inaccurate media coverage.

Recommendation 10. Explain counter-terrorist terminology, such as ‘intelligence’ and ‘disruption’, to the public

MPS Response: The MPS recognises that these phrases can be confusing and may be poorly understood, and that this can profoundly affect community confidence. The MPS intends to take every opportunity to explain them and will include such explanation in its media campaigns. 'Intelligence' is information which is passed to police from a wide variety of sources. This information has to be carefully assessed by police and the Security Service for its reliability and accuracy. Intelligence is not hard evidence and as such varies in quality and usefulness. The gathering and assessment of intelligence is by its very nature an imperfect science. Where public safety is at risk police have to err on the side of caution and will take action to 'disrupt' terrorist activity in order to minimise potential loss of life, injury or damage. Disruption is any action taken by police or the Security Services to prevent terrorists carrying out their intentions. This may take many forms not only, but including the arrest and charge of suspects.

Recommendation 11. During and after counter-terrorist operations, move quickly to issue accurate, safe information to local residents and business people.

Recommendation 12. In the event of a future attack, give clear and consistent messages to schools as to what to do with schoolchildren; provide clarity to employers as to whether to send their employees home; and appreciate the importance of the single 'top cop' giving clear information and advice to the nation on television

MPS Response: These are part of the London Resilience and the MPS Emergency Procedures Department (CO3) 'Warning and Informing' strategy. The full details of which can be found on the Cabinet Office's UK Resilience and National Steering Committee web site:

http://www.ukresilience.info/preparedness/warningandinforming.aspx

http://www.nscwip.info/

Recommendation 13. Challenge misinformation in the public domain about terrorism and counter-terrorism

MPS Response: This is a principle feature of the MPS's Department of Public Affairs Terrorist media strategy.

Recommendation 14. Enhance public confidence in counter-terrorist policing by being open and transparent about mistakes and by more proactively publicising successes.

MPS Response: The MPS has been publishing successes whenever possible and more pro-actively in the past months. The publicity after the Operation Crevice trial is a good example of this. This approach will continue in the future. A publicity leaflet to support this process is currently being drafted.

Recommendation 15. Strengthen information management systems so that senior officers have up-to-date, accurate information on terrorist and counter-terrorist incidents.

MPS Response: The MPS have designed and implemented a new 'knowledge management centre' to provide such information to senior staff. It has been tested twice, once in an exercise observed by community members, members of the media etc and once live operationally. It has worked well and will be continuously improved.

Recommendation 16. Enhance and publicise its anti-leak measures.

MPS Response: The threat from leaks is an ongoing challenge. The MPS recognise how such leaks can undermine the confidence of the public and partners as well as undermining the security of operations. The anti-leak measures are regularly reinforced and publicised. Prevention and enforcement is based on an intelligence led approach. Wherever possible leaks are investigated thoroughly. The Authority will be aware of recent successful interventions.

Recommendation 17. Communicate directly with Londoners, for example with Ringmaster, by Police Message Broadcast System or in person: do not rely upon the media.

MPS Response: Both the MPS and its partners engaged in London Resilience try to communicate through a range of channels, not just the media to ensure the widest broadcast of key messages. Choosing the most appropriate combination of means is part of our ongoing communication strategies.

Recommendation 18. Use community radio as an effective way to reach into the homes of black and minority ethnic Londoners and to reach relevant communities nationally and internationally.

MPS Response: Following the MPA Scrutiny of MPS Communications the Directorate of Public Affairs is creating a new team whose remit is to concentrate on building closer relationships and co-operation with minority media.

Recommendation 19. Emphasise that the Metropolitan Police Service takes hate crime – including persistent ‘low-level’ hate crime – seriously by investigating hate crimes, including incitement to hatred, as rigorously as possible, by further developing third party reporting schemes, and by publicising more heavily successes in hate crime investigations.

MPS response: The MPS is grateful to the MPA for highlighting this important issue and is re-doubling its efforts in this arena. As a consequence the MPS has invested significantly in human, financial and equipment resources in the form of Community Safety Units (CSU) in all of London's 32 Boroughs. All hate crimes are investigated by specially trained hate crime investigators. In addition the MPS and MPA are working with strategic partners in London Boroughs to further develop and publicise third party reporting sites, self and assisted reporting facilities to offer victims and witnesses the choice to report serious and sensitive crimes in a safe and confidential environment.

Recommendation 20. Improve data collection by flagging religious hate crime by religion more accurately and consistently.

MPS Response: The MPS has been working with internal and external stakeholders to further develop its Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS) to better capture all forms of equalities data in order that the data may be used to inform strategic decisions, identify gaps in service delivery and improve services to victims and witnesses of crime. In addition we will also use this data to identify, arrest and prosecute perpetrators.

Recommendation 21. Demonstrate an appreciation of the level of fear amongst Londoners of both terrorist and counter-terrorist activity, and continue to seek to satisfy people that they are as safe as can be.

Recommendation 22. After high profile terrorist incidents or operations, give reassurance talks in schools and colleges, deploy high-visibility policing, but keep deployment of armed police to a minimum.

MPS Response: The London Debate has created a greater awareness and appreciation of the fears of Londoners and will greatly assist in forming MPS policy. As a result the MPS is seeking to improve community engagement and to enhance its communication with all citizens through a sophisticated media campaign and to reassure people that public safety is our highest priority. We appreciate that not only are Londoners afraid of terrorists but they are concerned about how their police will respond. As such the MPS is giving community engagement and communication the highest priority. Wherever possible the MPS will endeavour to minimise the negative effects of police action keeping the deployment of armed police officers to a minimum.

Recommendation 23. Metropolitan Police Service: Redouble efforts to explain to the public the role of Police Community Support Officers, including in regard to the counter-terrorist effort.

MPS Response: This is an ongoing challenge. The MPS regard PCSO's as having a fundamental role in understanding communities and building trust and confidence. The role of PCSO's is constantly being explained in Newsletters from Safer Neighbourhood teams, through websites, a myriad of articles, presentations and publicity campaigns. A further major publicity campaign is planned for the autumn - this will centre on transport safety and will cover the role of PCSO's.

Recommendation 24. Strengthen links between Specialist Operations and Borough Operational Command units when it comes to counter-terrorism by:

• Sharing more information on terrorism and counter-terrorism with frontline, borough-based officers, especially Safer Neighbourhoods officers and Police Community Support Officers.
• Ensuring that designated counter-terrorism leads on borough senior management teams are fully trained and competent to play that role.
• Increasing awareness of and compliance with Operation Delphinus (which provides structured guidance to borough police on counter-terrorism matters).
• Increasing awareness of and compliance with Operation Rainbow (which provides tactical options for a uniformed counter terrorist response).

MPS Response: There are a number of initiatives to strengthen the links between SO and Boroughs. These include the strengthening of Operations Delphinus and Rainbow. Under the SO restructuring programme many former Special Branch officers are now deployed as CT Intelligence Officers (CTIOs) embedded across all the London Boroughs. After extensive consultation the MPS has also developed a protocol for the joint work between SO and Boroughs during CT operations. This is in final draft.

Recommendation 25. Use local police, as opposed to central specialists, to perform public-facing roles in counter-terrorist operations wherever possible.

MPS Response: Wherever possible the MPS will use local police to perform relevant public-facing roles. However in very large scale operations and emergency response it may be necessary for Central Operations officers (such as TSG) or officers from Central Services (such as Diversity and Citizen Focus) to be deployed.

Recommendation 26. Empower local borough police to comment as Metropolitan Police Service spokespeople about counter-terrorist operations in their area.

MPS Response: The new DPA strategy sets out clearly the very important role of local Borough police as spokespeople in CT operations. There is a programme running during 2007/08 to provide senior Borough officers with media training to front such events and to raise awareness of media in other officers.

Recommendation 27. A Community Impact Assessment to be performed on every counter-terrorist operation and an Equality Impact Assessment to be performed on every counter-terrorist policy.

MPS Response: A Community Impact Assessment is performed on every CT operation. An Equality Impact Assessment will be performed on every new counter terrorist policy.

Recommendation 28. Explain to the Metropolitan Police Authority the Metropolitan Police Service’s proposal to brief and share intelligence with vetted community members prior to counter-terrorism operations. Include an update on progress made towards the realisation of this idea.

MPS Response: Extensive discussions have taken place with colleagues in ACPO (TAM), the Security Service and communities. After protracted discussions with colleagues in ACPO nationally it has become clear that any such work will be London-based and centred. The MPS is determined to find a way to share why and how operations are being carried out in a safe and lawful manner as soon as it is possible to do so. This will allow us to receive 'expert' advice and to learn any lessons as quickly as possible. The consultations continue and the MPA will be kept advised as to progress.

Recommendation 29. Work with the Metropolitan Police Authority to establish a clear strategy and policy framework for police community engagement to counter terrorism.

Recommendation 30. Work with the Metropolitan Police Authority to develop a performance measurement framework for counter-terrorism community engagement.

MPS Response: The MPS continues to engage with communities and is developing its approach with strategic partners to make London safer from terrorism. This includes working closely with the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) and initiatives across 26 London boroughs in receipt of 'Preventing Violent Extremism Delivery Fund' money. Work is ongoing to develop a performance management framework for counter-terrorism community engagement. The MPS is currently working with the Government Office for London (GoL) to develop performance measures to evaluate 'preventing extremism' initiatives across the 26 London boroughs. The framework will be developed alongside any Home Office and ACPO (TAM) models as well as the broader MPA/MPS community engagement strategies. This work is ongoing and the MPA will be updated by a progress report in the near future.

Recommendation 31. Provide evidence that the Metropolitan Police Service is engaging young people more in counter-terrorist efforts.

and

Recommendation 32. Provide evidence that the Metropolitan Police Service is engaging women more in counter-terrorist efforts, for example through women’s sector second-tier organisations and umbrella bodies as well as groups that deal directly with female service users.

Recommendation 33. Ensure a diversity amongst the Muslims with whom the police engage in counter-terrorist efforts, eg. women, non-Asians, Ahmadis, Ismailies etc.

Recommendation 34. Involve local councillors in police counter-terrorism work.

Recommendation 35. Support community activists in organising their own engagement events on counter-terrorism.

Recommendation 36. Replicate successful local models of community engagement.

Recommendation 37. Provide feedback to consultees on all consultation exercises.

Recommendation 38. Assign a local Safer Neighbourhoods officer as a link officer to each place of worship in London. This recommendation has now become in the final report published in March 2007: 'Ensure that local Safer Neighbourhoods Teams build relationships with places of worship in their areas.'

MPS Response: The MPS agrees with the MPA that more can and should be done to engage with young people and women as part of its wider community engagement strategy. The MPS also understands that there is a need to improve the diversity of the Muslim communities with whom we engage both centrally and locally. We also agree that Local authorities and councillors have a very important role to play. The MPS will work with partners to understand how they can be involved most effectively.

The MPS's developing approach to engaging communities to make London safer from the threat of terrorism recognises that community groups are an integral part of any solution. The MPS are actively engaged in supporting the DCLG 'preventing extremism' initiatives across 26 London boroughs as well as working with specific communities on a number of counter terrorism initiatives. The MPS is keen to identify approaches and methodologies that can be shown to work and has therefore limited the number of ongoing MPS sponsored projects to a small number that, once proven, can be financed and rolled out across London boroughs. Successful local models are being replicated and this method of continuous improvement will be adopted in future.

The MPS has made considerable progress in ensuring that every borough has a faith liaison officer. In addition every place of worship is linked to a Safer Neighbourhoods Team and will have regular contact with members of the team. Some places of worship will have a designated Safer Neighbourhoods Officer. Whether it is a team approach or a single designated officer depends upon the needs of the place of worship.

All of the above is part of a wider ongoing body of work the progress of which will be reported to the MPA on a regular basis.

Recommendation 39. Redouble efforts to recruit more Muslim police officers and officers from other minority ethnic and faith groups.

MPS Response: The MPS has been successful in increasing recruitment of Muslims and people from other minority ethnic and faith groups to become police officers, police staff and PCSO's. This continues to be a very important part of the recruitment strategy for our Human Resources Department.

We are committed to achieving a high quality workforce that is representative of the community it serves, and one where difference can be celebrated. As such, we are doing everything we can within the law to help achieve this goal:

• The Met Careers Team (formerly the Positive Action Team) continues to work in partnership with staff associations, to help promote the Met as a viable career option and provide support to under represented groups.
• A new Met Careers Office (MetCO) has opened at Earls Court and will focus on recruiting for police staff roles. To complement this, we have developed the Recruitment Bus. The bus is used to undertake recruitment activity in distinct communities. Since it’s introduction in December 2005, around 2,500 people have registered their interest in careers in the Met - 68% of those come from a black or minority ethnic group.
• Specific advertising campaigns have been developed including the ‘Can you be?’ campaign to address perceived barriers that might prevent groups currently under-represented in the Service from considering a career with us. These include ethnic groups, faith groups, and female applicants. Other campaigns and events have been designed to coincide with religious or cultural events such as Eid, Diwali and Chinese New Year.
• A comprehensive careers website has been developed and provides information on all roles within the MPS. The website includes a section on 'supporting diversity' with links to Police Staff Associations and 'Can You Be?' literature.
• The MPS has targeted a number of London universities where there is shown to be a high proportion of Black and minority ethnic (BME) students in a bid to recruit high quality candidates from BME groups.

As a result of these positive steps the MPS has made significant improvements:

• Of the Met’s total workforce 14% are now from a BME group.
• 8% of all police officers now come from a BME community.
• 15% of all new police officer recruits now going through Hendon Training School are from a BME group. We also anticipate that by the end of the financial year, of all new police recruits going through Hendon during FY 06/07, 23% will have come from a black or minority ethnic group. This is in contrast to 2001 when just 7% of new recruits came from this group.
• In the last financial year, 33% of all police officer applications received came from the black and minority ethnic communities
• Of the Met’s newest staff grouping, Police Community Support Officers, 35% come from a BME community.
• 19% of all police officers, police staff and PCSO's recruited during the last 12 months came from a BME community.

Recommendation 40. Continue to seek to recruit more Londoners as police officers.

MPS Response: The MPS Human Resources current strategy is to recruit more Londoners as police officers.The Met is committed to recruiting Londoners and attends and supports many London based community events in order to answer questions and provide advice about a career in the police service. Further, it holds specialist recruitment events on a regular basis across London and the Met's Recruitment Bus visits areas all over London. The Met is especially interested in applicants with certain 'life skills' such as languages and/or knowledge of communities represented in London.

Recommendation 41. Diversify the workforce in Specialist Operations and particularly in the Counter-Terrorist Command.

MPS Response: Efforts continue to be made to improve the diversity of the workforce in Specialist Operations. This is a considerable challenge, however progress can be described as steady but slow. The SO consultancy has been established with this express purpose: organising careers fairs and events across the MPS and providing advice designed to identify and break down barriers and to encourage recruitment from a wider range of staff. The current diversity ratio for the CTC and SO generally is as follows: for the CT Command there are 987 (92%) from 1066 police officers self declared as white and 75 (8%) are Black or from minority ethnic groups. Of these 99 (9%) are female and the remaining 967 (91%) are male. For police staff the figures are 222 (82%) of 270 self declared as white and 47 (17%) are Black or from minority ethnic groups. Of these 152 (56%) are female and the remaining 118 (43%) are male.

In SO the figures are 7.2% female police officers and 40% female police staff, 5.4% police officers and 19.5% of police staff are black and minority ethnic origin. For the MPS these figures for the same period were 20% police officers and 53% police staff are female and 7.8% police officers and 24.4% police staff are black or of minority ethnic origin.

Recommendation 42. Expand and enhance the diversity training which police officers and Police Community Support Officers receive.

MPS Response: The diversity training for PCSO's was reviewed in February 2007 and has been enhanced as a consequence forming a strong theme throughout the six weeks training. The training is pass/fail and diversity is one of the areas assessed. Diversity training is no longer a standalone module within recruit training, and has now been incorporated by specialists as a 'golden thread' in every element of foundation training. This allows trainees to see 'diversity in action' - applying what they have learnt to the skills they will require as part of their daily role as a police officer. This is further enhanced through the Initial Police Learning Development Programme (PLDP) which is the future of recruit training, and is almost completely rolled out across the Met. This allows recruits to train in the community they will one day work in - enhancing their understanding of the many facets of that local community on an ongoing basis, over 31 weeks.

Recommendation 43. Draft and disseminate guidance for all Metropolitan Police Service staff on appropriate terminology concerning terrorism and counter-terrorism.

MPS Response: Guidance is being developed by the EU and the Home Office and this will be adopted by the MPS. The MPS recognise that the language used about terrorism and counter terrorism is important and will work with communities and others to ensure that we set high standards.

Recommendation 44. Put more information into the public domain about what to do in the event of terrorist attack.

MPS Response: This is a responsibility shared by the MPS and many agencies including the Government and London Resilience. In January 2006 the MPS created a dedicated emergency preparedness operational command unit, CO3. This unit draws together the MPS response to emergency procedure, business continuity and partnership liaison with the London Resilience Team who work together to inform the public.

Recommendation 45. Improve business preparedness for terrorist attack by:

• Publicising the ‘London Prepared’ website to businesses.
• Safer Neighbourhoods teams issuing small businesses with counter-terrorism guidance.
• Convening local business fora to draw up integrated private sector contingency plans.

MPS Response: There are now ten (soon to increase to 15) Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) for the Metropolitan Police area who deliver Project Argus a National Counter Terrorism Security Office initiative which gives presentations to businesses to help identify means they can take to prevent, handle and recover from a terrorist attack, particularly in crowded places. Safer Neighbourhood Teams identify and invite suitable businesses to Argus presentations during which the London Prepared web site is advertised. Businesses can also access a virtual exercise system via the Internet to ensure their preparedness for such an attack.

Recommendation 46. Explore how criminal gangs use discontent at counter-terrorism activity to recruit new members.

MPS Response: This proposed research will form part of the MPS wider work about gangs and the reasons people join them.

7. The recommendations will continue to be developed over the coming months.

8. The MPS recognise it is imperative that we work collaboratively with the MPA to agree an appropriate measurable outcome for each of these recommendations (or groups of recommendations) in order that we can demonstrate to the community and those specifically who contributed to this debate that their concerns have been listened to and acted upon.

C. Race and equality impact

Terrorism affects all Londoners and those to whom we provide a policing service. It has the potential to affect community cohesion severely. Counter terrorism operations have the potential to impact on some localities, faith groups and ethnic communities more than others. The equality and diversity implications of the London Debate report have been extensively considered by the Authority previously. These recommendations are designed to ensure that the potential for unfair and disproportionate impact is minimised and that operations are carried out sensitively and communicated effectively so that trust and confidence in the police and in counter terrorist efforts generally is increased.

D. Financial implications

There are no financial implications identified at this stage.

D. Background papers

None

E. Contact details

Report author: Cressida Dick (MPS)

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 1: Metropolitan Police Service: Campaign Evaluation Report

• Campaign title: Counter-Terrorism campaign (March 2007)
• Campaign manager: Minaxi Patel

Section 1: What did we set out to achieve?

a) Background to the campaign

Since the attacks on 7th July 2005 media coverage of terrorism issues remain high with particular focus on high profile counter terrorism operations in 2006 as well as coverage of terrorist convictions in court. Though media coverage ensures awareness of terrorism is high, life in London has returned to normal. This includes the number of people using the transport system and the number of visitors to London.

The terrorist threat to London and the UK is still very real and there is a need to remind Londoners, and the UK public, of the continued role they can play in the fight against terrorism. The terrorist threat comes not just from overseas but also from British-born individuals.

Research commissioned by the MPS into Londoners attitudes towards terrorism showed that while there is awareness of terrorism issues, alertness is low. When thinking about terrorism, people generally think ‘bombs on tube/bus’, ‘man with rucksack’ because of past events. Their minds jump straight to the point of attack and therefore what they do not necessarily consider are the planning stages leading up to an attack.

We need people to remain vigilant and help police by reporting any suspicious activity. They could have valuable information which could help disrupt or even prevent an attack. On transport and generally in crowded areas people tend to be naturally vigilant mainly about unattended/suspicious baggage and packages. It is within their ‘community’ settings eg. home, local area, place of work etc where we need to increase their alertness.

With funding from ACPO the CT campaign was extended out of London to Greater Manchester Police (GMP), West Yorkshire, and West Midlands police service areas.

b) Operational objectives

• To gather actionable information to minimise the risk from terrorist activity, by disrupting terrorist plans.
• To reassure the public that the MPS and other police forces are continually working hard to combat terrorism.
• To inform people who live and work in areas that may come across suspicious activity, of the continuing terrorist threat and to give them information to prevent it.

c) Campaign objectives

• To raise awareness of, and trust in, the Anti-Terrorist Hotline (ATH)
• To encourage reporting of suspicious activity to the ATH.
• To provide people with information to better understand what suspicious activity could be
• To remind people that acts of terrorism are planned and to look out for suspicious activity which could be linked to terrorism.
• To reinforce and remind the public to remain alert and vigilant to help in the fight against terrorism.
• To reassure the public that the MPS, other police forces and it’s partners are continually working hard to combat terrorism.

d) Target audience

Primary:

• All Londoners, in particular ‘the concerned majority’ made up of two distinct groups:
• Good citizens- aged between mid-20s and mid 40s, mainly C1
• Alert reporters- aged 40+, BC1

Stakeholders:

MPS & MPA staff, The Home Office, The Mayor’s Office, Security Services, Emergency Services, ACPO, BTP, CoLP, TfL, GLA, MoD Police

e) Creative strategy

This year’s creative saw an evolution of our ‘If you suspect it, report it’ campaign. In line with operational efforts to disrupt terrorist activity at the planning stages, this year’s advertising sought to shift the public’s attention away from the point of attack to the broader – and potentially intelligence-rich – preparative process. Although members of the public remain more generally aware of the terrorist threat, their knowledge of what is actually involved in the planning stages is much vaguer. There was therefore a need to both heighten their alertness and help them identify the sort of things they should look out for.

Creatively, we needed to find a vehicle that could encompass a wide range of examples to demonstrate the breadth of preparation that might be involved. To encourage reporting, we also wanted to reassure people that any piece of information whatsoever could be valuable, even information about seemingly everyday actions. Two simple and stark press ads were created, showcasing ten objects – almost all everyday – each accompanied by practical, interrogative copy, intended to engage the reader and get them thinking about how terrorists might plan. Having stirred people’s vigilance, the call-to-action promoted the Anti-Terrorist Hotline, highlighting its confidentiality. The tone of the adverts was consciously authoritative and non-alarmist, so as to minimise any risk of increasing fear of crime. Visually, the familiar red and white colourways from previous years were used to strengthen recognition and standout.

A radio execution was developed to overcome people’s doubts about whether they should call the ATH for fear of time-wasting or making a fuss. Further examples of possible preparations were given, asking how you can tell if someone’s “a normal everyday person or a terrorist”: “the answer is you don’t have to.” The spot ended giving the confidential ATH number, reasserting “you don’t have to be sure. If you suspect it, report it.”

Simple online buttons were also created to promote the ATH and encourage click-through to the Met website, where the press images were leveraged with additional background information.

So the campaign could be run in key conurbations throughout the UK, regionalised versions of all executions were produced; in print, this involved the logos of different forces, in radio, the use of regional actors.

f) Media strategy

The media strategy for London, and out of London (GMP, West Midlands and West Yorkshire) looked to address the key barriers to reporting that were highlighted through the research study.

The first point was that people understand the threat of an immediate attack and are therefore already vigilant on public transport. This eliminated the need for outdoor advertising asking people to look out for suspect packages etc.

As mentioned, people are alert for immediate attacks but it was the planning process that we wanted to make people aware of. The research showed that people are aware of the threat of attack when coming into London but do not let this get in the way of going about their day. They were therefore, less likely to engage with a counter-terrorism message when in this work-focussed task mode dismissing all thoughts of a terrorist attack.

The time to communicate, therefore, was when people were winding down, on their way home from work.

As well as being in this “home mode”, evening communications were reaching people when on their way to see family and friends. The research showed that people do not generally fear for themselves when thinking about terrorism but the effect on those close to them. By communicating our messages at a time when our audience are on their way home to see these people would make the communication resonate even more.

With the requirement to educate people on the planning stages of a terrorist attack we needed to give them the time to absorb the message so dwell time was a key consideration.

These media requirements led to the selection of evening press titles and radio as the key channels.

Evening press fulfilled the need to reach people on their way home and even in their home. It also provided the dwell time necessary to communicate the message using a full-page colour advert to create added impact and standout.

An additional benefit of using evening titles was that during the campaign period, a high profile court case on the subject was being reported meaning that our advertising was integrated within relevant editorial which would have generated higher recall amongst readers.

Top performing radio stations were used to drive high levels of coverage amongst our audience. The nature of radio also meant that specific days and dayparts could be upweighted. This enabled the communication to reach people during drive time, evenings and weekends, as well as more towards the end of the week rather than the beginning when they are in “work mode”.

Radio has continually shown to be a proven explanatory medium for the MPS so was a natural media selection for this campaign.

Finally, we wanted to ensure that once we had started a dialogue with the audience on the subject that any additional information they then look for will be provided by the police. To achieve this we bought a long list of specific keywords on the top three online Search Engines (Google, MSN and Yahoo) to ensure that the counter-terrorism section of the MPS site would appear at the top of the results page.

g) Timing

The campaign went live on 5th March and ran whilst the Crevis trial was still ongoing.

Section 2: What did we actually achieve?

a) Ad awareness

Overall campaign awareness was 41% in London (down on last years 53%), out of London awareness was 43%. As this was not an awareness raising campaign but about giving people the information to understand what may constitute ‘suspicious activity’ and promote the ATH, therefore these results are to be expected.

Awareness of the ATH increased to 48% in London (from 41% in Feb 07). Awareness of the ATH out of London was 43%.

b) Attitudes to the advertising

Whilst awareness may have been lower than previous campaigns those who had seen the ads really understood the messages.

The press ads were able to convey strong messages particularly about vigilance - 27% for London, 33% for out of London, this compares very favourably to the previous campaign result of 18%. 15% of respondents in London and 11% of respondents out of London said the ads would encourage them to call the ATH, however there was an element of confusion with the ads mainly amongst those who had not seen them previously. This confusion may be due to the level of information within the ads.

The radio ads had very good levels of awareness at 29% in London and 32% outside of London. Message take out was very strong: respondents were getting a clear message to report anything suspicious through the ATH. Scores were 52% for London and 48% for out of London- to put this in context the highest take out for the radio ads in the last CT campaign was 32%. Therefore this is a great score amongst a broad audience.

This year’s radio ads outperformed last year’s ads in terms of getting the message across well and catching the listeners’ attention. Most positively 35% of respondents in London felt the ad would encourage them to call the ATH with information (23% for out of London).

With a campaign of this nature there is always concern about raising fear amongst citizens. Results for both London and out of London showed that attitudinally the perceptions of those who had seen the advertising differed from those who had not. People who had seen the advertising were more likely to see the police as being effective, and there was little evidence of ‘scaremongering’.

c) Learnings

• Results from the omnibus survey confirmed that the segmentation for the audience is correct but there was no evidence of movement between groups ie. moving from being a ‘good citizen’ to ‘alert reporter’. Therefore there is much work to be done to encourage people to be vigilant and call the ATH with information.
• The effect of smaller media expenditure in comparison to last years campaign may explain the lower awareness levels for the campaign.
  • 06/07 media spend London -£267k; out of London - £352k (a further £106k has been invested in search marketing for FY 07/08)
  • 05/06: media spend London was £457.5k.
• The radio campaign performed most successfully and was able to cut through other advertising to deliver the need for vigilance and trust of the ATH messages.
• The campaign outside of London appears to have been a success and has done well in generating awareness of the issue and its relevance to all, not just Londoners.
• The campaign has demonstrated that marketing campaigns have a role to play in providing people with not only information, but also in their ability to positively affect people’s perceptions in regards to policing and safety.

Response

There was a significant increase in calls to the ATH during the campaign period. 681 calls were received in March 07 (Jan 07 - 318 calls, Feb 07 - 280 calls, April 07 - 346 calls). There was particularly uplift in calls from the regions where the paid-for campaign went out.

d) Editorial/broadcast coverage

For strategic reasons there was no formal launch of the campaign, however a press release was issued and the media covered the campaign. A recorded soundbite of DAC Clarke speaking about the campaign was available for download. This was used on LBC, Capital, BBC London radio and Heart FM. DAC Clarke also did a pre-recorded interview with Sunrise radio and an article was placed in The Londoner.

Overall the campaign was picked up by various print and online media, including popular news websites such as the BBC. There was particularly good regional coverage in the GMP area which, amongst others, included the Manchester Evening News, South Manchester Reporter, Wigan Evening Post.

The following radio stations in the West Midlands region also covered the campaign on news bulletins: Mercia FM, Heart FM, BRMB, The Wolf and BBC WM.

Due to events in West Yorkshire the decision was made to not proactively ‘push’ the campaign in the area. However, there was a speculative piece about the regional CTU on the local BBC TV which was not very positive.

The campaign also appeared on the marketing industry Marketing Week ‘breaking news’ email alerts.

e) Other

The new ATH pages on the MPS website had 2101 hits in March 07, this increased to 11306 in April 07.

The GMP website saw 328 visitors (March 07) to its relevant CT pages, for April 07 when the campaign was no longer running it decreased to 112 visitors.

There was also a slight increase in the number of visitors to the West Yorkshire and West Midlands CT pages.

A number of forces have also had the campaign posters and postcards printed with their own force logos for distribution in their local area.

To request a copy of the full campaign tracking report contact Minaxi Patel on 020 7230 3509 or email minaxi.patel@met.police.uk

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