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Minutes

Minutes of the meeting of the Metropolitan Police Authority held on 6 September 2007 at 10 Dean Farrar Street, London, SW1H 0NY.

Present

Members

  • Len Duvall (Chair)
  • Reshard Auladin (Deputy Chair)
  • Cindy Butts (Deputy Chair)
  • Tony Arbour
  • Richard Barnes
  • Faith Boardman
  • Dee Doocey
  • Toby Harris
  • Peter Herbert
  • Damian Hockney
  • Elizabeth Howlett
  • Jenny Jones
  • Joanne McCartney
  • Karim Murji
  • Bob Neill
  • Aneeta Prem
  • John Roberts
  • Richard Sumray
  • Rachel Whittaker

MPA officers

  • Catherine Crawford (Chief Executive)
  • David Riddle (Deputy Chief Executive)
  • Nick Baker (Head of Committee Services)

MPS officers

  • Sir Ian Blair (Commissioner)
  • AC John Yates
  • AC Godwin
  • DAC Chris Allison
  • DAC Rose Fitzpatrick

34. Apologies for absence

(Agenda item 1)

Apologies for absence were received from Jennette Arnold, Nicky Gavron, Kirsten Hearn and Graham Tope.

35. Declarations of interest

(Agenda item 2)

No declarations were made.

36. Minutes

(Agenda item 3)

Members considered the minutes of the Authority meeting held on 26 July 2007.

Minute 25 – Domestic Violence Board

It was agreed to substitute the first sentence of the last paragraph of minute 25 with the following:

‘It was noted that in Westminster there was a proposal to move towards a centre of excellence on a broad base range of professionals’

In response to Damian Hockney’s question about Independent Custody Visitors (Chair’s update - minute 22), the Chair asked that Damien Hockney write to the Link Member for ICVs (John Roberts) and himself in order to obtain the information on ICVs he required. He confirmed that a further report on review of ICVs would be presented to the Authority in due course.

The Commissioner, in response to members concerns about information regarding use of informants (minute 28 – Commissioner’s update) explained that this information had been withheld, as it was considered confidential. However, the Audit Commission, under ‘public access rules’, had released the information. It was agreed that as the information was now in the public domain it would be presented in future reports.

Arising from this discussion, and in relation to gangs, guns and knife crime, some members suggested that there was an urgent need to look at how the MPS engage with young people as informants. The Chair and Commissioner agreed that an informal closed session for members should be held on this subject .

Resolved – That the minutes of the Authority meeting held on the 26 July 2007, subject to the above mentioned amendment be agreed and signed as correct record.

37. Minutes of committees

(Agenda item 4)

The minutes of the following committees were received for information:

  • Co-ordination and Policing Committee – 5 July 2007
  • Planning Performance and Review Committee -12 July 2007
  • Equal Opportunities and Diversity Board –12 July 2007
  • Finance Committee - 19 July 2007

In relation to the minutes of the Equal Opportunities and Diversity Board held on 12 July 2007, members were asked to ratify the appointment of a co-opted member to the Board.

Resolved – That

  1. the minutes of Committees be received and noted; and
  2. the Authority ratify the appointment of Lee Jasper as a co-opted member to the Equal Opportunities and Diversity Board for 2007/08.

38. Chair’s update

(Agenda item 5)

Following a recent Audit Commission report that highlighted some weaknesses in current arrangements, the Chair of the Authority proposed that, in the light of the unprecedented reduction in crime, the MPA needed to undertake a scrutiny of data quality which would examine whether arrangements for compliance with national crime recording standards and Home Office counting rules were in place.

He asked Karim Murji and Richard Sumray to undertake this scrutiny and invited other members to join the scrutiny (via the Chief Executive). Co-ordination and Policing Committee would sign off the draft terms of reference of the scrutiny.

Resolved – That the draft terms of reference for the proposed scrutiny on arrangements for compliance with national crime recording standards and Home Office counting rules, be circulated to members and be formally signed off by Co-ordination and Policing Committee.

39. Question to the Authority

(Agenda item 6)

The Authority, in accordance with Standing Order 2.7, received the following question from Mr Bernard Gentry:

‘Why is the level of crime in an area not taken into account when allocating Safer Neighbourhood Resources? Is it right that Lambeth which has amongst the highest crime rates in London has less resources then other boroughs with much lower crime levels?’

The Chief Executive responded on behalf of the Authority as follows:

‘The Resource Allocation Formula (RAF) sets the criteria for allocating police officers to boroughs, excluding officers on Safer Neighbourhood teams. Reported crime levels are one element of the formula. As a result, Lambeth has more police officers than any other borough except Westminster. Lambeth also has an extra 50 Police Community Support Officers to provide increased high visibility in part of the Government’s Security Zone.

Safer Neighbourhoods Teams are in place to provide a visible, familiar and accessible policing presence across London in order to deal with local priorities, reduce crime and provide reassurance to communities. Safer Neighbourhoods Teams deal with the lower levels of anti-social behaviour and criminality that makes communities feel unsafe, and which previously might not have been addressed.

Lambeth has two wards with an extra three PCSOs allocated. These are wards with higher population levels (over 14000) and the extra staffing enables the teams to be more effective.

Reported crime levels also influence decisions about the deployment of pan-London resources such as the Territorial Support Group in boroughs and again, Lambeth is well supported in this regard’.

Resolved – That the Chief Executive’s response be sent to Mr Gentry.

40. MPS response to ‘IPPCC Report Stockwell 2’/ Stockwell 2 IPCC Report

(Agenda items 7a and 7b)

Members received a report that outlined the MPS response to the Independent Police Complaints Commission’s (IPCC) Stockwell 2 investigation into the handling of the public statements following the shooting of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005. The MPS response provided details on the progress made on the six recommendations outlined in the IPCC report and highlighted how the MPS had improved the way it managed corporate knowledge and organisational learning. In conjunction with agenda item 7a, members received a report from the Chief Executive and which suggested points that members might want to raise regarding the MPS response to the recommendations outlined to the IPCC report ‘Stockwell 2’.

Prior to members’ consideration of the reports, the Chair of Authority stated that nobody could be satisfied with the lack of clarity for the family of Jean Charles de Menezes and members of the public on why misleading information remained uncorrected for so long after the shooting of Mr de Menezes. He added that the process for the consideration of the shooting was not closed as there remained a health and safety case and issues of consideration of possible conduct matters.

The Chair proposed to members that after completion of the health and safety case he should initiate a review that would look at outstanding concerns, including those of protocol; identification; timeliness; command structures; ‘salmon letter’ processes and some issues of the limitations within the IPCC report. In doing this, it was in acknowledgment of the family’s and members of the public’s frustrations arising from this case and to achieve some form of closure as far as is possible. The review would be open to all members and he stated that it was the intention that, subject to the completion of the health and safety case, the review would commence in November 2007 and concluded in December 2007, with a report back to the Authority in January 2008.

In response to some members’ requests that Standing Orders be suspended during the debate, the Chair stated that he had not received any formal motions to suspend Standing Orders. He added that whilst there would a degree of constraint on what could be discussed, he felt discussions on issues relating to Stockwell 2 could be raised without a suspension of Standing Orders.

The Chief Executive introduced the MPA report. In doing so she highlighted the recommendations it contained and in particular the need for discussions to take place with HMIC and the Home Office with a view to developing a co-ordinated assessment of whether any further action is needed in order to fulfil the IPCC recommendations to the three bodies. The Chief Executive also took the opportunity to remind members of the distinction between the IPCC reports better known as ‘Stockwell 1’ and ‘Stockwell 2’ and the need for any debate to be conscious of on-going investigations/cases and possible future conduct matters and to note these constraints.

The Chair invited the Commissioner to introduce the MPS report. The Commissioner began by stating that the MPS report was not about the death Jean Charles de Menezes, but was related to it and reiterated that the MPS took responsibility for the death of Jean Charles de Menezes. He also stated that now the complaints against him had been resolved, he was in a position to meet with the family and representatives of Mr de Menezes if they so wished.

The Commissioner drew members’ attention to paragraph 8 of the report, which highlighted that the MPS ‘entirely accepts its internal and external communication processes failed under the pressures of events on 22 and 23 July 2005’ and which ‘increased the distress caused to the de Menezes family and damaged public confidence in policing in London’. He stated that this remained the MPS view and there was no attempt to move away from this acceptance.

Before asking AC John Yates to go through the MPS responses to recommendations in the IPCC report, the Commissioner stated that during this period the MPS went through an unprecedented series of events, not just those terrorist events of July 2005, and that both the leadership and organisation were very changed from where they were in July 2005. He drew members’ attention to the development of the Knowledge Management Change (KMC) centre, which he believed was a fundamental change in the way the MPS handle crisis management. He confirmed that the KMC had been assessed and received very positive feedback from the HMIC.

The Commissioner added two further points. Firstly, he felt there was a need for clarity around why misleading information was not corrected quickly by the MPS and that the public only received that information following a leak from the IPCC. The Commissioner stated that he felt that despite most of information having not been provided by the MPS, it was a mistake by both organisations and that the information should have been corrected. He confirmed that the MPS was now working with the IPCC on ensuring that there was greater clarity on how this issue should be dealt with in future. The Commissioner’s second point related to the MPS having reservations about some aspects of the investigation and conclusions of the IPCC’s report, particularly around the issue of identification. In highlighting this matter, the Commissioner drew members’ attention to Appendix 1 of the report, which included an extract from AC Alan Brown’s statement dated 12 July. The Commissioner indicated that there remained issues around ‘actual identification’ and ‘a name emerging of identification’.

AC John Yates then took members through the MPS responses to recommendations in the IPCC report and the Chair invited members to comment.

Some members expressed disappointment that the MPA were dealing with the ‘Stockwell 2’ report in isolation from the ‘Stockwell 1’ report and whilst they acknowledged that there were sub judice rules and the possibility of further reports arising from the health and safety case and conduct matters, the process of receiving these reports in this manner was unsatisfactory.

In relation to the recommendations, members sought clarification of the role and function of the KMC and the methods of supplying information to leading officers and where necessary questioning that information.

Members asked whether Stockwell 1 contained the main evidence relating to the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes and that the health and safety case was ‘trial ready’. AC Yates confirmed that this was the case and agreed that should there be any slippage in the health and safety case that the Authority would be kept informed.

Members agreed that the public needed to be clear that, at this stage no full conclusions could be made and that when Stockwell 2 became public, the Authority could debate the wider issues.

Arising from the discussion, members suggested that following the IPCC report recommendations, there were two issues that needed to be developed, the first being the issue of identification. It was suggested that there was a need to bring into the public domain a clear understanding of the process of identification, which would help address some of the confusion currently circualted and would be beneficial to the MPS, particularly should Operation Kratos be implemented again. In relation to the MPA report (agenda item 7b), and the recommendation that the Authority receives a report back in a year on the arrangements for a more systematic approach to information handling i.e. the KMC members agreed that this timescale should be amended and the Authority receive a report earlier or as part of the Chair’s proposed review.

The Commissioner stated that it was important to note that the IPCC report was not the whole evidence and added that what the MPS faced on that day was unprecedented in that nowhere in the western world had there been a would be suicide bomber on the run and that this matter must be taken into account during discussion. AC Yates stated that the KMC was not another committee, but an operational arm of the MPS. Regarding the legal action referred to, AC Yates explained that this was known as the ‘Salmon process’. In relation to the amount of information received by officers, he challenged the assumption that senior officers should receive all unconfirmed information during a critical incident and suggested that this could lead to a loss of the strategic picture. He supported the need for greater clarity on the issue of identification and the challenges faced by the MPS in this area. He also accepted the need to review timescales for an assessment of the working of the KMC.

Regarding the KMC members suggested that it would be useful to have published the roles and responsibilities of senior officers within the KMC and that the ‘Salmon letter process’ and the relationship between the IPCC and any police officer during an ongoing investigation should be included in the terms of reference of the proposed review.

Members asked whether since the events of Stockwell 2 had the MPS critical incident management training had been updated? They also raised concerns in relation to external communications, particularly that false comments had remained unchallenged and subsequently damaged both the family of Jean Charles de Menezes and public confidence in the MPS. Reassurance was sought that that work was being undertaken with the IPCC to make sure that this did not reoccur.

Members asked the Commissioner how much damage had there been in public trust and confidence in the police arising from Stockwell 2, particularly as it had taken two years to be published and asked if the IPCC needed more resources in order to conduct such investigations. Some members asked for the Commissioner’s assessment of Londoner’s views following the events of July 2005 and whether any account was taken of these.

The Commissioner agreed that it would be useful for the roles and responsibilities of senior officers within the KMC, the ‘Salmon letter process and relationship issues with IPCC to be included in the review’s terms of reference. He added that he was confident that the KMC would not slow the process down and confirmed that that the previous system of working as a crisis management team had been based on the Government critical incident management system ‘Cobra’. However, the Government was now looking at developing the KMC system for its own use.

In relation to the failure to challenge and correct wrong information, the Commissioner accepted that the MPS should have been robust and should have asked the IPCC to correct this information. He added if this had been refused the MPS should have done so anyway. He declined to criticise the IPCC report, but did state that the MPS did have reservations about it, including the length of time it had taken to publish the report. He could not comment on Londoners views of himself, but added that he felt that Londoners’ had an urgent need to know what happened and accepted their frustrations that at this time that is not available. He added, however, that he felt that the public saw the events of July as a sequence of events and understood that mistakes were made.

Members asked for details, prior to the development of the KMC, on why previous systems in operation did not get to or support the Commissioner and if those procedures were in writing. Some members suggested that the report was being taken in isolation and referred to deaths in custody and disproportionality and misinformation not being challenged and that the report did not address this issue. Regarding KMC, some members asked what systems were in place prior to its inception, drawing on examples of previous terrorist acts in the UK such as those from the IRA.

In relation to the new models of community engagement for Lambeth, which had been praised as excellent, members suggested that these should be ‘rolled out’ London wide. Clarification was sought that following a meeting with the Lambeth Community Police Consultative Group there was some confusion relating to the plea of not guilty by the MPS to the health and safety charges. Members asked about any involvement of the Army/SAS in the operation.

While accepting that senior officers could not have every piece of information members expressed grave concern that the Commissioner had not been briefed on the possibility that an innocent man had been shot. Members also raised concerns that paragraph 11 of the MPS report stated that ‘the shortcomings shown up in Stockwell 2 will not re-occur’ and that there was nothing in the report to support this.

The Commissioner confirmed that there had been an SAS officer involved in surveillance, but not in the shooting incident. In terms of judgement, the Commissioner drew attention to the Appendix 1 of the MPS report and the statement from former AC Alan Brown and suggested that there was confusion around actual identification and a name and that AC Brown was continuing to seek clarification at that time. The Commissioner also added that in trying to make an identification, colleagues would have been working on the basis that there was a possibility the person was innocent and if looked at carefully, statements did not refer to Jean Charles de Menezes as a terrorist. He added that he had to accept the judgement of senior experienced officers.

The Commissioner asserted that he did not intend to resign and that Londoners would judge him on the whole of his term of office. Regarding the leaking of the identification of Jean Charles de Menezes, the Commissioner stated that it was not leaked but included in official statements and the IPCC were therefore criticising official MPS statements. Regarding the misinformation about Jean Charles de Menezes, including comments about bulky coats with wires protruding and people leaping over barriers, the Commissioner stated that these were comments made by members of the public. He added that, despite correcting these statements at an Authority meeting three days later, he agreed that the MPS should have corrected these earlier. He strongly opposed the suggestion that in not doing so that the MPS were looking to ‘smear’ Jean Charles de Menezes.

Regarding the health and safety case, the Commissioner stated that although the matter was sub-judice, with the MPS as defendants and with a degree of latitude he stated that Counsel’s advice was that the MPS were not guilty of the offence charged. He added that if the MPS were to plead, or be found, guilty of a health and safety breach in these circumstances, there would be serious matters of concern for the Authority as there would be a profound operational impact on policing. He added that he did not feel that this was the correct legislation to deal with this issue and that the inquest was the right form to establish the facts about the circumstances of Jean Charles de Menezes death.

AC Yates outlined to members the procedures in place prior to the development of the KMC.

The Commissioner, in response to the request for further information regarding senior officers appearing not to correct information prior to that information being made public, reminded members that the initial statement on the shooting was given at 3.30 p.m. on the Friday following the shooting. He added that AC Brown was not certain of identification until 9.30 am on the Saturday and that there was nothing to suggest that identification was known before then. He added that there was a clear difference of opinion between the MPS and IPCC on this issue.

Some members drew attention to the MPA priorities including that of ‘holding the Commissioner rigorously to account’ and suggested that consideration of this matter should have been a matter for the MPA. As this had not happened and due to the length of time it had taken the IPCC to report, focus had turned to the Commissioner’s role and not the sequence of events that took place. It was very clear that the public questioned why senior colleagues did not provide him with all the known facts and that an MPA investigation could have dealt with these claims very early on.

Some Members stated that it was felt that the Commissioner, following the events in July, was attempting to instil public confidence during difficult times by being as open and transparent as possible. In doing so, however, there was a need to correct wrong information and on occasions this had happened. Members also highlighted the relationship between the MPS and the IPCC during this period. It was felt that the relationship had become strained following the Commissioner’s letter to the Home Office which sought to suspend the Police Act in order to prevent the IPCC taking charge of the control of site of the shooting and implications of officers not cooperating with the IPCC. It was felt that this matter should be of concern to the Authority particularly as the Authority had strongly advised that the letter should not be sent. Members sought to be reassured that there was now in place robust protocols between the MPS and IPCC in order that a similar situation would not occur at any crime scene, not just those relating to Operation Kratos.

Some members welcomed the KMC and suggested that it filled an existing void. AC Yates agreed to circulate any documents about the KMC that may help give an understanding of its operation and function. Members also asked that senior managers and the Commissioner’s office maintained the ethos of ‘no surprises’.

The Commissioner referred to a statement he made on 4 August in which he acknowledged that the request to the Home Office to suspend the Police Act was wrong. He also agreed that as there was a considerable amount of information in the public domain the MPS should have analysed this and corrected any misinformation. He was very clear that if there were a similar incident that information would follow in a different way.

AC Yates confirmed that he was confident that there were robust protocols in place with the IPCC. He also further outlined the role of the KMC and confirmed that a grading system for information operated including what was rumour in order that information can be assessed.

In relation to misinformation and statements regarding clothing, members drew attention to three MPS statements that did use the phrases relating to both clothing and behaviour. In doing so, members emphasised that the correction about clothing should have been more explicit.

Members turned to the relationships between the Directorate of Public Affairs (DPA) and the Crime Reporters Association (CRA) and sought more information about any informal relationships, particularly with individual officers. As part of the proposed review members asked that issues relating to the roles and responsibilities of local press and community be considered and cited the very good protocols and arrangements in Tower Hamlets as an example. Additionally, members supported the need for a protocol on external communication and sought more information on what records are kept of discussions with the CRA and suggested that there was scope for further work between the two organisations.

Some members suggested that there was a need to review the MPS relationship with the CRA.

The Commissioner stated that the IPCC report was based on what was formally said and comments made to the CRA were formal comments. He confirmed that in relation to informal press contact the MPS did have a published media policy.

AC Yates informed members that for informal CRA briefings and relating to this particular case the briefing were not recorded but a note was taken. He confirmed that the ‘July Review Group’ had been established in order to address the issues of ‘corporate memory’. He informed members that papers were not withheld from the IPCC, but the MPS had entered into a debate with the IPCC and subsequently waived legal professional privilege.

Turning to the proposed review, some members suggested that the review may benefit from the inclusion of a independent person/persons in its membership. The Chair agreed to consider this matter, although had planned the inclusion of the HMIC.

In addition, members asked that the review consider looking at the MPS ‘corporate memory’; clarity regarding the future working relationship with the HMIC and Home Office; and to look closely at the area of differences between the MPS and the IPCC.

In conclusion, the Commissioner informed members that, as he had stated before, in hindsight he wished he had been told earlier of the possibility that an innocent man had been shot. He said that he understood the nature of the professional judgement by colleagues as to when they informed him. He stated that this had been an extremely difficult event for the family of Jean Charles de Menezes, Londoners and the MPS and added that it was and remained his leadership style to take responsibility and not to blame colleagues. Whilst he felt that they could have made a better judgement, he believed that it was a reasoned judgement and one he took responsibility for. He supported the MPA’s duty to rigorously hold him and the MPS to account. In doing so he asked that the review be undertaken in a timely fashion and not repeat an investigation that has taken two years to conclude. He undertook that the MPS would fully comply with the requirements of the proposed review.

The Chair of the Authority proposed and it was seconded, that the MPA undertake a review into the concerns raised previously and by members during the debate. He stated that a review was required as many of the issues had been considered fragmentally and this was an opportunity to pull them together. Regarding the timescale for the review he suggested that subject to the conclusion of the health and safety case and with more information in the public arena the review should commence in November, conclude in December and report back to the January Authority meeting. He undertook that, subject to other protocols and requirements, information would be made available prior to the review. He informed members that it was his intention to include representation from HMIC in the review and he would consider independent involvement if it was considered necessary.

It was noted that draft terms of reference for the review would be circulated to members for comments,

Resolved – That the MPA undertake a review into the issues raised by the MPS response to the IPPC report ‘Stockwell 2’ to commence following the health and safety case, with the aim to have concluded its findings by January 2007.

41. Stockwell 2 IPCC Report

(Agenda item 7b)

This report was taken in conjunction with agenda item 7a – minute 38.

Resolved – That

  1. the Chair of the Authority to seek discussions with HMIC and the Home Office with a view to developing a coordinated assessment whether any further action is needed, in order to fulfil the IPCC recommendation to the three bodies;
  2. the Authority agreed to review the new arrangements for a more systematic approach to information handling and reported to the Authority in as soon as possible; and
  3. further reports be called for consideration at future meetings.

42. MPS body armour

(Agenda item 8)

Following questions raised at the May full Authority meeting regarding MPS body armour members considered a report that updated them on the provision of body armour. It was noted that armour does not fully cover the whole body as this would impact on rotational and linear movement and access to officer safety equipment.

It was reported that officers are often issued with body armour when they took up the post. It was suggested that periodical reviews of body armour needed to be undertaken in order to assess if body armour issue still fits appropriately.

Resolved – That the update report on the provision of body armour to police officers and operational members of police staff within the MPS be noted.

43. GLA Group Community Safety Policy Statement

(Agenda item 9)

A report was received that sought approval by the Authority to the GLA Group Community Safety Policy Statement. The Statement is intended to raise the profile of community safety and crime reduction within the GLA Group, to facilitate closer partnership working and prepare for crime reduction becoming a statutory duty across the whole GLA Group.

Resolved – That the GLA Group community safety policy statement at outline in Appendix 1 to the report be approved.

44. Commissioner’s update

(Agenda item 10)

Operational and non-operational news

The Commissioner commended the circulated report on operational and non- operational news to members.

Performance issues

The Commissioner presented performance information and figures, comparing the period April to July 2007 compared with April to July 2006.

In noting the performance information, members were informed by the Commissioner that the MPS where engaging in discussions with the Home Office and ACPO on the wider question of why young people feel safer in gangs and taking into consideration such issues as deprivation.

Other issues

Operation Hargood

Members received details of the policing of the climate change camp protests held at perimeter of Heathrow airport between 11-21 August 2007.

Members were informed that the operation involved 16,576 police officer shifts and 1,002 police staff shifts. Officers were deployed on strategic targets around the site, as well as the camp and on mobile reserve. The estimated cost of the operation was reported as £7m. £4.3m of the estimate is in relation to opportunity costs, £2.8m additional costs of which £2.4m is overtime and £0.4m is non-pay costs (these included transport and catering, road signage/closures and specialist equipment).

Confirmation was given that in total 1,855 searches were made, of which 1,311 (71%) was PACE, 314 (17%) were Section 60 of the CJPO and 230 (12%) was Section 44 TACT. It was also noted that the Section 60 order was put in for 24 hours following violence and weapons being used against police during the breakout from the camp. A total of 70 arrests for a variety of offences were made, with 21 charged, 8 bailed, 3 cautions, 2 fixed penalty notices, 1 penalty notice for disorder, 35 no further actions.

Members suggested and it was agreed that the MPS needed to prepare and brief officers from outside the Metropolitan Police Service better on the community they are going to police.

Notting Hill Carnival

Members received an update on the policing of this year’s Carnival. It was reported that prior to the event a number of operations had been initiated to deter potential identified troublemakers from attending Carnival.

In general, it was noted that Carnival had been relatively trouble-free, however, there was concern that on the bank holiday Monday from 5.00 p m onwards there were several incidents including stabbings and shootings.

Members welcomed the overall policing of the event and the general reduction in crime. They agreed that there was scope for discussing with Carnival organisers the possibility of starting and finishing Carnival earlier each day. They supported the focus on prevention of potential troublemakers attending carnival and requested that some analysis be undertaken on the crime that occurs when Carnival closes. In doing so, members stressed the importance that a small minority should not be allowed to discredit the Carnival.

The Commissioner added that he felt that concern about carnival had in the past been about public order issues, but his concern now was the issues youth criminality brought to Carnival and the need to address these concerns.

It was noted that the MPS were aware of the increase in people attending Carnival with dogs and it was confirmed that several dangerous breeds of dog had been seized. In relation to concern about some young people wearing bandannas and masking of faces, it was confirmed that the MPS had no powers to ask for these not to be worn.

Resolved - That the Commissioner’s update be received.

The meeting ended at 1.43 p.m.

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