Report into operation Ribble - 'Cash for Honours' inquiry

Report: 12
Date: 22 November 2007
By: Assistant Commissioner Operational Services on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

On 20 July 2007 the Chair of the Authority wrote to the Commissioner requesting a report on the police investigation in to alleged breaches of the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925. This letter is attached at Appendix 1. The report was sought under the provisions of Section 22 of the Police Act. Specifically, the request made mention of the following areas: the cost of the investigation, an assessment of the proportionality of the resources deployed and the lessons to be learned from conducting such a high profile and sensitive investigation over so long a period. This report is written in response to that request and will show: 1. The investigation was a proportionate and impartial inquiry in to matters of genuine and specific public concern.2. There was continuous oversight and scrutiny of the investigation.3. Stringent measures were put in place to ensure the security of the information obtained by the investigative team in order to avoid the risk of the investigation being compromised.4. Every effort was made to conduct the investigation in a consensual manner in co-operation with all of those involved.5. Processes were followed to ensure that police powers were only exercised when considered absolutely necessary and following detailed consideration of all available options.6. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) liaised closely with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and senior counsel throughout the investigation. 7. The MPS fully accepts the final advice of the CPS and Counsel in relation to the investigation.

A. Recommendation

That members note the content of this report

B. Supporting information

1. This part of the report is divided into a number of areas in order to highlight the central issues of the investigation and, in doing so, to address the Authority’s request.

Introduction

2. This report is produced in response to the Authority’s request of 20 July 2007. It seeks to deal with specific areas referred to in the request; namely, the cost of the investigation, an assessment of the proportionality of the resources deployed and the lessons to be learned from conducting such a high profile and sensitive investigation.

3. The report notes the Authority’s statement that ‘clearly there are aspects of the investigation, including conclusions reached about the conduct of individual suspects and interviewees, which would be inappropriate to cover in a public report, and accept that you will need to consider, carefully, legal and human rights constraints in respect of personal privacy’.

4. Accordingly, it is not considered either fair or appropriate to provide in this report information that might require disclosure of private information, including information obtained from questioning, from voluntary statements or from seized evidence, which was obtained solely for the purpose of the police investigation. To do so may impact on the general principle of confidentiality of a police investigation.

Allegations made to police

5. On 15 January 2006, the Sunday Times published an article under the headline ‘revealed: cash for honours scandal’. The article made specific allegations that honours were available in return for financial support to the City Academy Schools scheme. This article led to a complaint being received by the MPS from a member of the public alleging breaches of the Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925.

6. On 12 March 2006, a further article appeared in the Sunday Times alleging a link between the giving of loans to the Labour Party and the nomination of individuals for peerages. The article made reference to an interview with a Labour Party lender.

7. On 14 March 2006, the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) announced that it would be undertaking an inquiry on propriety issues relating to the honours system, including nominations to the House of Lords.

8. On 15 March 2006, the Labour Party Treasurer appeared on television stating that he had been unaware of the loans made to the party by the four businessmen subsequently nominated for peerages and whose names were submitted to the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) for vetting.

9. Also on 15 March 2006, a formal request was made to the Commissioner of the MPS by Mr Angus MacNeil MP for the matters raised in the Sunday Times article of 12 March 2006 to be investigated.

10. Mr Elfyn Llywd QC, MP, made a similar request to the Commissioner on 21 March 2006. There were a further 21 similar allegations received from members of the public.

11. On 29 March 2006, a Labour Party MP made further allegations and made a further request for an investigation in respect of abuses of the honours and party funding systems by the Conservative Party.

The decision to Investigate

12. The decision to launch an investigation into these matters was an operational police decision. There was an acute awareness by the MPS of the political sensitivities that would be associated with such a criminal investigation and of the danger of the police investigation being perceived as ‘politicised.’

13. The MPS was also aware of the work of the PASC and the review of party funding being undertaken by Sir Hayden Phillips. These both covered areas likely to be central to any criminal investigation.

14. It is also correct to state, in relation to the allegations made, that only the MPS is able to investigate allegations of crime. The Parliamentary oversight bodies, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Parliamentary Ombudsman, are able to refer allegations of criminal wrongdoing to the police. However, it should be noted that neither have a remit to investigate criminal allegations.

15. On 21 March 2006, Assistant Commissioner Yates recorded the following decision:

16. ‘I am in receipt of a letter from Angus MacNeil, MP, concerning possible abuses of the above Act by one/several major political parties. Additionally, there have been several recent articles in the national press on related matters.

17. The political sensitivities around commencing a criminal investigation in these circumstances are obvious. There is a clear requirement for the police to act independently, impartially with the quite proper need to react to well-founded complaints where it is proportionate to do so and there is at least some inference/intelligence/evidence of criminal wrongdoing. Against this there is the risk that police action could be seen to be politicised and as being used for the purposes of gaining political advantage by one party over another.

18. I am aware that a Select Committee (Public Administration Select Committee) is actively considering these matters at the present time. I am conscious of the problems that may arise should they call witnesses to their Committee who may at some stage be either witnesses or suspects in and potential criminal investigation. They are due to hear further evidence on March 27.

19. I am also aware the Sir Hayden Phillips has been asked by the Prime Minister to review the whole issue of funding for political parties and that any enquiry undertaken may cause some difficulties with his review

20. In this case there appear to be some prima facie breaches of the above Act. Additionally I am advised that there may be some wider breaches of other legislation, for instance, corruption in public office.

21. Conscious of the sensitivities I have taken advice from the Directorate of Legal services (DLS), and have today met with the DPP and his assistant at CPS HQ. As ever with such matters the final decision is an operational one for the police. The DPP, whilst making this clear, recognised the sensitivities for the police but suggested that it would be difficult in these circumstances to ignore what are clearly serious matters. He offered the assistance of the Head of Special Case Work Division should an investigation be embarked upon.

22. The advice from the DLS is that the police have ‘an unfettered discretion’ as to whether to carry out an investigation or not. This is a very wide remit. Whilst I am not bound by the Code of Conduct for Crown Prosecutors, viz the evidential test and then public interest, this does appear to me to be a sensible template/approach to take in relation to this case. Additionally, I am bound to consider issues around the proportionality of any police response. The media impact and reputational issues around HMG are not ones that I take into account in reaching this decision, although these will clearly be matters that would have to be considered in due course.

Decision

23. To commence an investigation into the allegations made by the MP Angus MacNeil and repeated/contained within the national media in relation to the potential sale of Honours for gain. It is difficult at this stage to consider the evidential criteria in any detailed sense because an investigation has not commenced. There does appear, however, to be sufficient material available to suspect potential criminal wrongdoing by one/other/all of the major political parties or those acting on their behalf. The public interest, should such matters be proved, is clearly a very high one and thus justifies an impartial police investigation to establish whether or not any offences have been committed.

24. I intend to bring together a small and vetted team to carry out these enquiries on my behalf and will chair an oversight group to ensure that the inquiry remains focused and proportionate.’

Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)

25. Following initial discussions with the Director of Public Prosecutions liaison was immediately established with the Head of the Specialist Crime Division of the CPS. The first meeting with the CPS and the investigative team was held on 28 March 2006.

26. From this date until the completion of the inquiry the investigative team liaised closely with the CPS. In total, there were 19 formal submissions made between 4 May 2006 and 30 July 2007 together with regular conferences with both the CPS and senior counsel. Appendix 2 of this report sets out the submissions made to the CPS during the investigation. These took the form of both detailed submissions of the material being gathered by the investigation and requests for advice in relation to specific operational matters.

27. Additionally, a detailed 86 page interim report (together with supporting documents) was submitted to the CPS and counsel in September 2006.

28. In February 2007, a case conference took place with the CPS and counsel at which a detailed update of the police investigation was provided. In particular, the police sought specific advice from the CPS and counsel in relation to the strength of the evidence, as well as the timeliness, impartiality and proportionality of the inquiry. This conference resulted in the investigative team focusing on specific lines of investigation prior to the submission of a report to the CPS on 20 April 2007. After this date, further lines of enquiry were undertaken by the police at the request of the CPS.

Security Issues

29. In view of the likelihood of the investigation accessing material of a confidential and politically sensitive nature as well as the potential for a high degree of media interest in the inquiry a detailed security assessment was obtained.

30. This resulted in recommendations being made in respect of both equipment and handling procedures. These were implemented in order to provide a secure working environment and storage system. The cost implications of implementing these recommendations are set out in Part D and Appendix 3 of this report.

31. Assistant Commissioner Yates and the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) personally and regularly briefed the investigative team during the inquiry in order to reinforce the importance of operational security.

32. Additionally, an independent review of operational security was commissioned. This was undertaken by an experienced Chief Constable and resulted in a series of recommendations, some highly unusual and intrusive; to ensure that operational security was maintained and that any subsequent review could be satisfied that this was the case.

33. It was identified from the outset that there would be considerable media interest in the inquiry. A detailed media policy was therefore formulated with the aim of providing support to the investigation whilst at the same time maintaining public confidence. The media coverage of the investigation was constantly monitored and close liaison maintained with both the SIO and the Gold Group.

34. The MPS remain very strongly of the view that, despite some media comment to the contrary, no material was leaked to the press from within the investigative team. This view is further confirmed by the fact that the most significant evidence obtained by the investigation has never appeared in the public domain.

Structure of the Investigative Team

35. Detective Superintendent Graham McNulty was appointed as the SIO. It was also decided that due to the sensitive nature of the investigation and the anticipated length of the inquiry (initially estimated to be 8-10 weeks), a small team would be preferable. This also assisted in ensuring that operational security was maintained.

36. Accordingly, officers were identified to fill the roles of deputy senior investigating officer, office manager, exhibits officer and disclosure officer. A further five officers were subsequently identified to assist with the actions raised during the investigation.

Terms of Reference

37. By 30 March 2006, a number of allegations had been received making specific allegations against all three main political parties.

38. As a result of the large number of allegations being received, it was considered necessary to set specific terms of reference for the investigation to ensure that the inquiry remained focused. Therefore, on 24 April 2006, the following terms of reference were set by the SIO:
 

• To review the nominations for peerages referred to the HOLAC in 2005 by the three main political parties.
• To review the nominations made from the office of the Prime Minister for honours and forwarded to the HOLAC in 2005.
• To review all loans to the three main political parties that were still current after 1 January 2005.
• To review nominations for honours/peerages made by the Specialist Schools and Academies Trust (SSAT) specifically identifying individuals who may have sponsored a City Academy.

39. The rationale for this decision was recorded as follows:

• ‘The volume of material that would need to be researched/ examined were we to start in 2001 with the formation of H.O.L.A.C. is simply too great. My team only has six officers at the current time. Hence we need to be focused clearly on a specific period of time or we will simply be swamped in papers.
• At the current time there is a tremendous pressure from the media, public, Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, Public Administration Select Committee and the Electoral Commission to deal with this quickly. I have no doubt that they will all wish to commence/continue their own investigations in the near future and these may inadvertently compromise the MPS investigation. By streamlining the parameters progress will be made in a more expeditious manner.
• The current public interest undoubtedly centres around the most recent HOLAC nominations and also the linked loans issue.
• The view of the CPS is that we should first deal with the 2005 nominations as they are most likely to be the easiest to verify. Clearly the more historic the case the harder it will be to prove. Ultimately the scope of the enquiry can always be widened.’

Investigative Strategy

40. The investigative strategy adopted during the investigation was a matter for the SIO, Detective Superintendent McNulty. His investigative decisions, and the rationale for making them, are fully recorded in the appropriate major incident decision logs. These amount to 14 books containing 361 decisions and provide a detailed and transparent record of the development of the inquiry.

41. The progress and timeliness of the investigation is fully detailed in these decision logs. These documents obviously contain detailed and confidential personal information that it is not considered appropriate to place in the public domain.

Reviewing Officer

42. A Detective Chief Superintendent from the Specialist Crime Directorate was appointed as the Reviewing Officer at the start of the investigation and maintained this role throughout. This meant that each decision made by the SIO was reviewed in order to provide both oversight and a constructive analysis on the progress of the investigative strategy.

Risk Management Gold Group

43. An Operation Ribble Gold Group (chaired by Assistant Commissioner Yates) met on a monthly basis to provide an oversight of the progress of the investigation. The group was made up of representatives from the MPS, Management Board, ACPO, the Specialist Crime Directorate, the Directorate of Legal Services and the Directorate of Public Affairs. The group was regularly updated by the SIO on the progress of the investigation and had a remit to consider specific issues impacting on the impartiality, necessity and proportionality of the inquiry.

44. Additionally, the group met to consider the management of key issues that arose during the investigation. This included all arrests and the interviews of high profile individuals.

Weekly Updating of Assistant Commissioner Specialist Crime Directorate

45. Until his promotion to the rank of Assistant Commissioner, Mr Yates provided Assistant Commissioner Ghaffur of the Specialist Crime Directorate with weekly updates on the progress of the investigation.

Internal Progress Review

46. Once it became apparent that the investigation was likely to last longer than initially envisaged Assistant Commissioner Yates commissioned an internal review of the inquiry. This review was undertaken by officers from the MPS Directorate of Professional Standards and took place during July 2006 (with a remit to produce a report and recommendations by 7 August 2006.) The terms of reference for this review included the following headings:

• Review of the terms of reference for the investigation.
• Review of accountability and decision-making.
• Review of the terms of reference for the Gold Group.
• Review of the focus of the investigation.
• Review of the management of the relationships with stakeholders.
• Review of the resources, accommodation and operational security.

Peer Group Review

47. In September 2006, a further review was conducted involving an external Chief Constable. The membership of this review group had been identified as having experience in dealing with criminal investigations in a politically sensitive environment.

48. This review invited an honest and critical ‘peer group review’ of the central strategic issues that had either been or were likely to be encountered by the inquiry. This review group had access to the interim report referred to above. The broad recommendations from this review were accepted and implemented by the team.

The role of the MPS Commissioner

49. It was acknowledged at the outset of the investigation that the Commissioner’s role in relation to Operation Ribble needed to be clearly defined. It was accepted that it was unrealistic for the Commissioner to be unsighted in terms of significant and exceptional operational developments due to his role and the regular meetings he had with officials who may be the subject of interest to the investigation as either witnesses or suspects. However, it was also clear that there was no need for him to be involved in specific tactical decision-making.

50. It was therefore decided that the Deputy Commissioner would maintain an overarching organisational ‘high risk’ management role. The Commissioner would receive a monthly overarching briefing from Assistant Commissioner Yates but would also receive any exception reports from the Deputy Commissioner as considered appropriate.

The Public Administration Select Committee

51. On 14 March 2006, the Committee announced that it would be undertaking an inquiry on propriety issues relating to the honours system, including nominations to the House of Lords.

52. The MPS and the CPS requested that the Committee suspend their inquiry pending the completion of the criminal investigation. After taking legal advice, the Committee agreed to this request. The MPS has endeavoured to keep the Committee informed of the development of the inquiry by means of both personal briefings and written communications.

53. On 23 October 2007, Assistant Commissioner Yates appeared before the Committee. The transcript of this appearance is available on the Committee’s website.

The Constitutional Affairs Select Committee

54. On 23 March 2006, the Constitutional Affairs Select Committee announced an inquiry into the system of Funding for Political Parties. The MPS was in direct contact with the Committee in order to identify any potential overlaps between the police investigation and the parliamentary inquiry. The MPS and the CPS ensured that the Committee was fully aware of the need to avoid the risk of prejudicing any criminal investigation.

Sir Hayden Phillips Review on Party Funding

55. On 16 March 2006, Sir Hayden Phillips announced his Review of the Funding of Political Parties. The MPS liaised with Sir Hayden at an early stage to ensure that any potential prejudice to the criminal investigation was avoided.

Honours (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925

56. Section 1(1) of the Act provides that: "If any person accepts, obtains or agrees to accept or obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, or for any purpose, any gift, money or valuable consideration as an inducement or reward for procuring or assisting or endeavouring to procure the grant of a dignity or title of honour to any person or otherwise in connection with such a grant, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour."

57. Section 1(2) of the Act provides that: “If any person gives, or agrees or proposes to give, or offers to any person any gift, money or valuable consideration as an inducement or reward for procuring or assisting or endeavouring to procure the grant of a dignity or title of honour to any person, or otherwise in connection with such a grant, he shall be guilty of an offence.”

58. Section 1(3) provided that anyone found guilty under the Act could be liable on conviction on indictment to a maximum of two years imprisonment.

59. The Act is legislation aimed at preventing the ‘sale’ or ‘purchase’ of honours.

60. Whilst it is of course true that the Prime Minister makes the final decision on the recommendation of working peers, the particular wording of the Act clearly indicates that the offence can be committed by anyone ‘procuring or assisting or endeavouring to procure the grant of a dignity or title of honour.’

61. In the context of this particular investigation an offence contrary to the 1925 Act may have been committed where an individual solicited, or the lender offered or gave, a loan in exchange for an individual or political party agreeing to secure or influence the nomination of the lender for a peerage or other honour. Direct evidence of such offences could include a statement by a lender or individual that such a ‘corrupt’ arrangement had been made. It could also include witness evidence of such an arrangement.

62. As such a statement by a lender or official would in itself amount to an admission of the offence and as any such arrangement was likely to have been conducted in private, the inquiry proceeded on the basis that such direct evidence was unlikely to be forthcoming.

63. Rather, the investigation proceeded on the basis that if such offences had been committed then any evidence relied on for a prosecution was likely to be circumstantial. Effectively, this meant obtaining sufficient circumstantial evidence as to allow an inference to be properly drawn that established the guilt of any individual(s) concerned. Nevertheless, the inquiry also investigated any direct evidence that became available or the suggestion of any such evidence.

Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA)

64. This legislation covers a range of areas relating to electoral law and party political funding. One of the aims of the legislation was to provide transparency in respect of party funding by requiring all donors providing more than £5,000 to a party to be identified to the Electoral Commission.

65. The issue of individuals making financial contributions to political parties was a central feature of the investigation. The legislation states that loans made ‘other than on commercial terms’ and donations to parties should be declared to the Electoral Commission.

66. The definition of ‘commercial terms’ was clearly of particular relevance to the investigation. The Act does not contain such a statutory definition and the Electoral Commission had never provided any guidance to parties to establish such a definition. The only such written guidance was published by the Electoral Commission on 21 March 2006. It was not therefore in existence prior to the making of the loans under investigation. This fact made the investigation of this aspect of the legislation particularly difficult.

Perverting the Course of Justice

67. During the course of the investigation, it was considered necessary to investigate whether offences of perverting the course of justice had been committed. Put simply, such an offence might be committed where an individual acts or embarks upon a course of conduct that has a tendency to, and is intended to pervert, the course of public justice.

68. Case law states that an enquiry conducted by the police in order to establish whether an offence had been committed and, if so, who was responsible, is considered to be part of the administration of justice, irrespective of whether it resulted in showing that an offence was committed or not. The concealment or destruction of evidence relevant to an investigation is clearly considered to be an act that would have a tendency to pervert the investigation in turning it from its correct course.

Serious and Organised Crime and Police Act 2005

69. Police powers of arrest are taken from sections 110 and 111 of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. In summary, and in the context of this investigation, a police officer may exercise this power of arrest where:

• There are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been committed.
• There are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is guilty of that offence.
• There are reasonable grounds for believing that the arrest is necessary for the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or the conduct of the person suspected.

70. This power was exercised in the course of the investigation in line with the criteria set out above. It was exercised following careful consideration at Gold Group level and consultation with the CPS.

Management of Key Issues

71. There are a number of significant issues that arose during the investigation that required careful consideration. Included in these are:

• The request to retrieve e-mails from the Cabinet Office
• The decisions to arrest
• The decision to request statements from members of the 2005 Cabinet.
• The decision to request a forensic image of the No.10 computer server.
• The decision to interview a number of significant individuals under caution.
• The decisions to interview the Prime Minister on three occasions.

72. It is fully accepted by the police, and was constantly reinforced by CPS advice, that all these were operational decisions for the police alone.

73. Nevertheless, it was obvious that these decisions were of major significance to all those concerned. For this reason they were not taken without written advice from the CPS.

74. In the case of the arrests of individual suspects and the interviews of the Prime Minister, detailed options papers were also prepared for discussion at Gold Group level. This allowed the impact of the decisions to be fully considered prior to any final operational decision being made. It should be emphasised that the rationale for these decision was always the operational necessity and the needs of the investigation. This is described in detail in the SIO’s decision logs and Gold Group minutes.

75. Particular measures were put in place to ensure that the arrests were effected as efficiently as possible and in such a manner as to minimise any individual embarrassment.

76. Part of the rationale for setting the investigative parameters as outlined above was the desire to undertake an expeditious investigation in recognition of the political sensitivity of the inquiry.

77. Whilst recognising these factors, the inquiry sought to achieve a thorough, even-handed and proportionate investigation into matters of public concern in a manner that scrutinised the available evidence and reassured the public that no individual or organisation is ‘above the law’.

78. The inquiry team was likewise conscious of the need for any criminal investigation to remain proportionate and impartial whilst providing those subject to it with the rights and protection afforded by the law. This often placed the timeliness of such an investigation beyond the direct control of the investigators. Examples of this might occur where:

• An individual chose to exercise their right to silence when interviewed. Whilst this is entirely proper, it does have the effect of requiring the police to establish facts by other, invariably more time consuming, methods.
• Where material obtained by the police needed to be independently analysed to remove any items subject to legal professional privilege prior to review of the material by the investigative team. In this particular investigation, this was a significant factor.
• Where individuals choose not to provide full and open accounts to the police when interviewed as witnesses. This results in further time-consuming investigations.

Lessons Learned

79. The measures put in place to provide a stringent investigative oversight proved to be successful in maintaining a focused and proportionate inquiry.

80. The inquiry took place in the face of massive media interest that resulted in a large amount of inaccurate comment and speculation. The early adoption of a detailed media policy assisted to allow the investigative team to deal solely with operational matters.

81. The early and detailed consultation with the CPS and counsel allowed the investigative team to obtain advice in quick time as required during the investigation.

82. The lack of a definition of ‘commercial terms’ caused investigative difficulties in respect of the PPERA 2000. This term remains undefined within the Act although the reporting requirements of such loans have been clarified as the result of the Electoral Administration Act 2006.

83. The lack of robust oversight by the Electoral Commission in respect of PPERA 2000 resulted in a lack of clarity for political parties and police alike during the investigation.

84. The difficulties of investigating ‘corruption’ offences in general was emphasised during this inquiry. Without referring to this specific investigation, such difficulties include the fact that bribes are seldom paid in the presence of witnesses, any witnesses that are available are likely to be accomplices and unwilling to co-operate and the fact that there is often little documentary evidence because those involved in a corrupt transaction would inevitably tend to act secretly. Whilst these factors make investigating and proving such offences difficult, they do not of themselves provide a reason for not investigating such allegations. It is noted that there is an ongoing Law Commission review in to the laws concerning corruption that is due to report in 2008.

85. It was reinforced during the investigation that, whilst there are a number of regulators with oversight roles in respect of political bodies, only the police are able to conduct an investigation in to allegations of crime. The difference between a ‘regulatory’ investigation and a thorough criminal investigation is significant. The investigative team believes that considerable evidence was obtained only as the result of this being a police investigation.

86. The difference in the types of investigation and the style and manner in which they are carried out would not appear to have been fully understood by all those involved at the outset of this inquiry. This created considerable difficulties and undoubtedly contributed to the length of the investigation.

C. Race and equality impact

At stages during the inquiry there was some media comment that, in respect of a certain individual, the investigation was being motivated and guided by his religion. The investigation was obviously aware of such comment and was anxious throughout to deal with the matter in a fair and unbiased manner. This comment was considered closely at Gold Group level during the inquiry. The manner in which the inquiry was conducted was determined purely by the operational necessity of the investigation.

D. Financial implications

1. The financial costs of the investigation are outlined in detail at Appendix 2 of this report. They can be summarised here as follows:

2. The total salary costs for the investigation between 27 March 2006 and 30 October 2007 amount to £1,155,468. These cover the salaries of the officers involved in the investigation. It also includes partial salary costs for an Assistant Commissioner, Detective Chief Superintendent, Detective Superintendent, Analyst and a Forensic Accountant.

3. Additional costs (ie, those that would not have existed without the investigation) amount to £128,461 in overtime and £2,120 in expenses. There is a further overtime cost of £18,499 in respect of specialist officers who were required to undertake certain technical work during the investigation.

4. The cost of implementing the security recommendations amounted to total expenditure of £69,431. This has however resulted in the acquisition of equipment that is now available to be re-used as required.

5. These figures clearly demonstrate that the vast majority of the costs incurred relate to the salary costs of the investigative team (£963,540.) This amounts to an average monthly cost over the investigation of approximately £50,713.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report authors: Detective Inspector David Jones, Operation RIBBLE, MPS

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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