Counter-terrorism update

Report: 7b
Date: 24 July 2008
By: Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations on behalf of the Commissioner

Summary

This report provides and overview of MPS activity/achievement in countering terrorism. It includes an outline of proposals for an MPS Counter-Terrorism Strategy that will be aligned to CONTEST and support co-ordination of the very broad range of operational activity that makes up the MPS counter-terrorism effort.

The report also highlights developments in relation to a national counter-terrorism network and the important part the MPS plays within this.

A. Recommendation

That

1. the Authority note MPS achievements in relation to counter-terrorism; and

2. the Authority notes and supports developments in relation to an MPS Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

B. Supporting information

Background/Strategic Context

1. The Government’s Counter-Terrorism strategy, CONTEST, was first published in July 2006. The overarching aim of the strategy is ‘To reduce the risk from international terrorism so that out people can go about their business freely and with confidence.’ CONTEST has recently been refreshed with particular reference to the Prevent strand but the overall aim remains the same. All Government departments are expected to contribute to the strategy and, as a consequence, it is a very broad statement of activities within four principal areas. These can be summarised as:

• Preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals;
• Pursuing terrorists and those who sponsor them;
• Protecting the public, key national services, and UK interests overseas;
• Preparing for the consequences.

2. In support of CONTEST the MPS has developed proposals for its own counter-terrorism strategy. Whilst this will be structured around the four principle areas outlined above, the MPS strategy further defines the areas in order to reflect specific objectives within the National Community Safety Plan 2008/11 and the Strategic Policing Priorities/Key Actions for the Police Service 2008/9. The MPS strategy references the overarching aim of CONTEST and supports the key mission of the MPS i.e. ‘Working together to create a safer London’. The relevant corporate objective of the MPS for 2008/11 is to ‘Enhance our counter-terrorism capability and capacity’. The key strands of the MPS strategy are:

• Prevent – To stop people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists;
• Pursue – To stop terrorist attacks.
• Protect – To strengthen our overall protection against terrorist attacks.
• Prepare – Where an attack cannot be stopped the need to mitigate its impact.

3. The development of an MPS strategy reflects the fact that our response to terrorism comprises a very wide range of different activities and that these are delivered by a number of MPS business groups and units. Such activity is not confined to the Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15) or indeed to Specialist Operations (SO) alone.

4. The adoption of a clear strategy will ensure that all activity related to counter-terrorism is appropriately focussed on strategic aims and is properly co-ordinated. The efforts/performance of the MPS in this respect can then be reported as a whole, rather than through a series of reports from various business groups as to their individual contributions.

5. Whilst the strategy will be ‘owned’ by the MPS as a whole, responsibility for co-ordinating its delivery at a corporate level will rest with the Assistant Commissioner Specialist Operations (ACSO). Performance against the strategy will be reported to MPS Performance Board on a regular basis and be subject to regular MPA oversight through the emerging oversight arrangements.

6. A senior MPS officer has been identified to take a lead role in the delivery of each strand of the strategy. These ‘strand leads’ will meet together to form an MPS Counter-Terrorism Strategic Delivery Board under the chairmanship of ACSO. The first meeting of this Board is due to take place on 18 July 2008. It is intended that this board be ‘inward looking’ to ensure that all relevant MPS capability and capacity is properly aligned and co-ordinated.

7. To ensure that key strategic partners are effectively engaged an MPS Counter-Terrorism Strategic Partnership Board will also be formed. This board will be more ‘outward looking’ and enable high-level engagement and joint working to be achieved. The first meeting of this board is due to take place in 24 July 2008.

8. A draft of the proposed governance structure for the strategy is attached at Appendix 1.

9. A detailed work-plan is currently being developed to support the delivery of the strategy. This plan sets out specific activities to be undertaken, aligns these to the objectives within the strategy and describes how performance will be measured. The plan will also identify which business group will be responsible for delivery of each activity. Some of the activities will be new or re-defined existing actions; others will be a continuation of existing activity within the framework of the strategy. Formal agreement/approval of the plan will be sought at the first meeting of the MPS CT Strategy Delivery Board.

10. Whilst the proposed strategy will provide a future framework, the following paragraphs provide an overview of activity that is currently carried out in support of CONTEST. The data/narrative is structured around each of the CONTEST strands and, where relevant, mention is made of intended developments to support of the emerging MPS strategy.

Prevent

11. The overarching aim of the Prevent strand of the proposed MPS Counter-Terrorism Strategy is:

‘To stop people becoming or supporting terrorists or violent extremists’

12. In support of this aim a number of broad objectives have been developed which mirror those of the national police strategy for Prevent. During 2008/9 the MPS will:

• Undermine extremist ideology and support mainstream voices. So that the ideology sustaining violent extremism is discredited and alternative narratives/messages have greater prominence and credibility.
• Disrupt those who promote violent extremism. Strengthen vulnerable institutions so that people promoting violent extremism are rendered ineffective and institutions and ungoverned places are strengthened against people promoting violent extremism.
• Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists and create mechanisms for supporting them. So that vulnerable individuals are encouraged to see and follow positive and compelling alternatives to violent extremist activity.
• Increase the resilience of communities to engage with and resist violent extremists; So that social structures exist with strong leadership and civic engagement, articulating shared values, isolating violent extremists and those who provide them with support.
• Effectively address grievances; So that genuine grievances that contribute to violent extremism are addressed effectively and perceived grievances rebutted so they do not.
• Developing intelligence, analysis and evaluation. This will allow the MPS to be better informed about violent extremism and the factors that drive it.
• Strategic communications. To allow the MPS to have a better understand of our target audiences, assess language that works and language that does not.

13. Commander Craig Denholm, Specialist Operations, has been nominated as the MPS lead for the Prevent strand of the MPS Counter-Terrorism strategy.

14. Current activities, measures and targets relevant to the Prevent strand are focused on the recruitment and deployment of Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs), the delivery of counter-terrorism briefings to newly appointed SNT staff/teams and responding effectively to the anti-terrorist ‘hotline’. The performance outlined below represents the latest data available (in most cases this is for April - May 2008) and the end 2007/8 financial year position.

15. Recruitment/deployment of CTIOs - Whilst SO provides specialist capability for the investigation of terrorist offences and the management of relevant intelligence, it also supports activity at a local level by maintaining close links and ensuring appropriate knowledge is shared with Borough Operational Command Unit (BOCU) colleagues. This is achieved through a network of CTIOs. CTIOs are specially selected counter-terrorism detectives who work alongside locally based colleagues. This approach enables the officers to improve their own understanding of communities whilst providing a valuable source of expert advice and guidance for patrolling staff.

16. To ensure an appropriate CTIO capability exists, during the 2007/8 financial year SO were committed to increase the numbers of such officers so that at least 85% of London boroughs (including Heathrow) have a dedicated resource. The number of CTIOs has risen steadily and the target for 2007/8 was exceeded with 91% of London boroughs having at least one dedicated CTIO. Additional CTIOs have been recruited during this current financial year and as of the end of May 2008 94% (31 out of 33) boroughs have a dedicated CTIO.

17. The tasking and workload of all CTIOs is closely monitored to ensure that their effort remains focused on their primary role within BOCUs and that abstractions are kept to a minimum. During the 2007/8 Financial Year, 88% of CTIO tasks were based within their BOCU. This achievement exceeds the stated target of 80%. This level of performance is being maintained into 2008/9 and to May 2008 85% of CTIO tasks had been BOCU based.

18. Delivery of counter-terrorism briefings to newly appointed SNT staff/teams - The delivery of counter-terrorism briefings to new members of staff is a responsibility of CTIOs. The briefings ensure that new staff, particularly those serving within SNTs, are fully equipped with the knowledge they need for their operational role. The greatest benefit is derived if such briefings are delivered as early as possible within an individual’s career. For this reason a target has been set that 80% of new SNT staff will receive a briefing from a CTIO within two months of being appointed. With the numbers of SNT staff that have been recruited in the recent past (in support of the MPS commitment to neighbourhood policing) this target has often proved extremely challenging. However, by the end of 2007/8 financial year 81% (162) of staff had been briefed on counter-terrorism within two months of their appointment. This figure exceeded the target set. Recent figures suggest this level of performance is being maintained in the current financial year and up to May 2008 80% (94 out of 117) of newly appointed SNT staff have been briefed within the target time of two months.

19. Response to anti-terrorist ‘hotline’ - The Anti-Terrorist Hotline offers an easy and confidential means for the public to communicate relevant information. The hotline is staffed continuously and normally receives around 300 calls per month; although the number can fluctuate significantly in response to specific events. For example during July 2007 the number of calls increased significantly as a result of terrorist incidents in London and Glasgow. Where demand increases, contingency plans exist to open additional lines and provide additional staff. The promptness of response to calls to the hotline is monitored and a target has been set to answer calls within a set time on 85% of occasions. During the 2007/8 financial year a total of 4346 calls were received with 98% (4254) answered within the set time. During April and May 2008 of the 607 calls to the ‘hotline’ 594 (98%) have been answered within the target time.

20. Following the launch of the ACPO national police strategy for Prevent an MPS Prevent Programme has been developed. This programme will support the delivery of the relevant strand objectives of the MPS Counter–Terrorism strategy and its aims mirror those of the national initiative. The intended outcome of this work will be to fully embed relevant Prevent activity into safer neighbourhood policing. A detailed overview of the programme is the subject of a separate report elsewhere on this agenda.

Pursue

1. The overarching aim of the Pursue strand of the proposed MPS Counter-Terrorism Strategy is:

‘To stop terrorist attacks through detecting, investigating and disrupting terrorists and their networks’

22. In support of this aim a number of broad objectives have been developed. During 2008/9 we will:

• Fully exploit all opportunities to disrupt terrorist networks.
• Exploit opportunities to remove sources of funding for terrorism.
• Ensure that intelligence is collected, assessed and disseminated effectively to maximise its value to counter-terrorism policing and operations.
• Build working relationships with international partners that reflect the global nature of the terrorist threat and which allow an efficient exchange of information and expertise.

23. Deputy Assistant Commissioner John McDowall, Specialist Operations (National Co-ordinator of Terrorist Investigations) has been nominated as the MPS lead for the Pursue strand of the MPS Counter-Terrorism strategy.

24. Current activities, measures and targets relevant to the Pursue strand are focused on:

• The disruption of terrorist networks
• Arrests, charges and convictions for terrorism related offences
• The value of the intelligence reports submitted by Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers (CTIOs)
• The value of ‘intelligence source’ referrals made by CTIOs
• Effectiveness in the assessment of key intelligence reports

In addition to the above, due regard is given to the results of the Public Attitude Survey (PAS) in relation to how well the public feel the police are doing in preventing terrorism and how important they believe the activity is.

25. Disruption of terrorist networks - A key aim of counter-terrorist investigations is to disrupt terrorist networks and to reduce the capability of terrorists to carry out their crimes. To allow the planning of such crimes to continue may present considerable risk to the public. Within the MPS such disruptions are assessed in the same way as they are for conventional criminal networks and the processes/panel that support the assessments are the same.

26. There will always be significant variation in the impact that terrorist network disruptions will have. Some cases may result in the foiling of a planned major bombing campaign others may reduce the funding or resources available to mount such an attack. Given that the disruption of terrorist activity may lead to a reduction in the overall number of networks a decrease as well as an increase in such disruptions may be an indicator of success. For this reason no target for the number of disruptions to be achieved has been set.

27. To date, in the 2008/9 planning year, the MPS disruption panel has not been asked to assess any terrorist network cases. However, overall during the 2007/8 financial year a total of 13 network disruptions were agreed through the MPS panel process.

28. An assessment of the number of terrorist networks disrupted nationally is a proposed measure within the new national framework for police performance – Assessment of Police and Community Safety (APACS). The Home Office propose to set up a national assessment panel for counter-terrorism cases – this will be based largely on the arrangements and thinking currently adopted by the MPS and the experience we have gained through developing our own process. The exact details of how and when the proposed national panel will operate, and its membership, are still to be confirmed by the Home Office. The MPs remains fully engaged with the Home Office in relation to these developments.

29. Arrests/convictions for terrorism related offences - During the first quarter of this reporting year there have been a number of successful prosecutions for terrorism related offences. Most recently on 11th June 2008 at the Central Criminal Court four defendants were convicted of various offences relating to their failure to provide information about acts of terrorism or assisting the offenders involved. These convictions related to the failed terrorist attacks in London on 21st July 2005. Those convicted received sentences ranging from 9 to 15 years. The sentences imposed totalled 44 years.

30. During the 2007/8 reporting year, following investigations led by the MPS Counter Terrorism Command, over 40 people were convicted of terrorist-related offences with sentences imposed totalling over 600 years.

31. During the period 1 January 2008 and 31 May 2008 a total of 46 people had been arrested in relation to terrorist investigations. Of these a total of 10 have been charged. The remainder have either been released without charge or subject to an alternative disposal option i.e. caution, detained pending an immigration enquiry, dealt with under Mental Health Act provisions or bailed.

32. Intelligence reports submitted by CTIOs - To ensure that intelligence reports submitted by CTIOs remain relevant and focused on the intelligence requirements of the CT Command, the proportion of the reports that relate to such requirements are monitored. During the first two months of this reporting year, of the intelligence reports submitted by CTIOs 94% have related to specific requirements. This exceeds the stated target of 70%.

33. During the 2007/8 financial year performance has also exceeded the stated target of 70%. Of the intelligence reports submitted by CTIOs, 89% related to specific requirements.

34. ‘Intelligence Source’ referrals made by CTIOs - As with any other type of crime, access to reliable human intelligence sources is a key element in the development of good quality intelligence. Whilst there is always significant interest in increasing the number of such sources, a measure of the number alone does not enable any assessment of their value or quality. As an indicator of the quality of ‘sources’ being referred by CTIOs a target has been set of 70% of such referrals being suitable for further development within CT Command. In the first two months of the 2008/9 reporting year this target has been exceeded with 76% of the referrals being suitable for further development.

35. During the 2007/8 reporting year, of the ‘intelligence source’ referrals made by CTIOs, 71% were suitable for further development.

36. Effectiveness in the assessment of ‘key information referrals’ - In order to maximise development/investigative opportunities in relation to key information referrals, it is important that assessment takes place as quickly as possible. The CT command has set itself a target to provide an initial assessment of the key information referrals within 5 days on every occasion. During the first two months of this reporting year a total of 615 referrals have been made. These have all (100%) received an initial assessment within the target time of 5 days.

37. During the 2007/8 reporting year a total of 3458 key information referrals were received within the CT Command. 100% of these were given an initial assessment within the target of 5 days.

38. Public attitude survey data - Objective feedback on MPS performance in relation to counter-terrorism in made available through the quarterly Public Attitude Survey (PAS). Questions 79 and 80 of the survey seek views from the public as to ‘how well’ they believe the MPS is doing in relation to a range of activities and ‘how important’ they believe the activities are. Preventing terrorism is included within the list of activities. Respondents are asked to grade their belief in relation to each activity on a scale between 1 (not at all well/important) and 7 (very well/important). Given that this is a quarterly survey, there is no data yet available for the 2008/9 year. Results from the survey run during 2007/8 are now available. These reveal scores of 5.7 and 6.7 respectively. These scores have remained relatively stable over the 2007/8 financial year.

39. A table of the results received to questions 79 and 80 of the PSA for the 2007/8 reporting year (for all activity categories) is attached at Appendix 2. This enables a comparison to be made between public attitudes for all stated activity categories.

Additional issues relating to Pursue

40. HMIC Inspection – ‘Coordinating Pursue’ - During January and February 2008 HMIC carried out an inspection of the ‘national CT network’ - comprising the MPS Counter-Terrorist Command (CTC), regional Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs) and regional Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs). The purpose of the inspection was to ‘… determine whether the build of the national Counter-Terrorism (CT) network has progressed in three critical areas – systems and processes; governance; and tasking and co-ordination.’ The report of the inspection provides a valuable assessment of progress in building the network, identifies key areas for improvement and suggests options for the way forward. The areas for improvement are incorporated into a number of recommendations.

41. The HMIC report recognised that a very good start has been made in setting up the counter-terrorism network – ‘… since October 2006, capacity has been increased by over a third and delivery is a year ahead of schedule’. However, there are clearly key areas where improvement would add significant value – not just in relation to Pursue type activity but also across the entire spectrum of counter-terrorism policing. In the main the recommendations are generic, in that they apply to the developing ‘national CT network’, however they will assist individual units to identify what they need to do to contribute to any improvement.

42. An initial development plan has been created to identify key activities that will be undertaken to address the recommendations made by HMIC. Whilst the CT Command contributes significantly to the ‘national CT network’ the plan also identifies activity that will be undertaken nationally or by ACPO (TAM). This will ensure that progress towards addressing the HMIC recommendations occurs in a co-ordinated way.

Protect

43. The overarching aim of the Protect strand of the proposed MPS Counter-Terrorism Strategy is:

‘To strengthen our overall protection against terrorist attacks’

44. In support of this aim a number of broad objectives have been developed. During 2008/9 we will:

• Deploy a range of tactical options i.e. high visibility patrols and relevant technical solutions in order to make London a hostile environment for terrorists.
• Work with relevant partners to ensure adequate protective security arrangements exist for crowded places, iconic sites, key utilities, critical sites and sites where hazardous substances are located. Where these are private concerns/businesses we will work with relevant owners and provide the necessary advice and guidance.
• Provide effective protection for those who may be the targets of terrorists. This will include members of the Royal Family, members of HM government and other VIPs.
• Maintain the security of London’s international borders and reduce the risk of attacks to London’s transport infrastructure.

45. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Cressida Dick, Specialist Operations, has been nominated as the MPS lead for the Protect strand of the MPS Counter-Terrorism strategy.

46. Current activities, measures and targets relevant to the Protect strand are focused on:

• Intrusions into the most secure/sensitive zones within Royal palaces and the Palace of Westminster
• The efficient appointment of Security Co-ordinators (SecCos) to events and the level of satisfaction with the service they provide.
• Satisfaction of Counter Terrorist Safety Advisor (CTSA) presentations to businesses
• The response of the Diplomatic Protection Group (DPG) to Embassy Warning Systems.

47. Protection of the Royal family and their residences is currently measured by our effectiveness in preventing intrusion to protected areas and how well we respond to related incidents that require an urgent police response. In relation to intrusions our aim is to prevent any intrusion into the most secure areas of a protected Royal residence i.e. those areas where a protected principal is or may be. Overall, during the 2007/8 financial year and for the first two months of this financial year there have been no such intrusions. There has also been no intrusion into the zone immediately adjoining these areas. All related incidents are monitored to ensure the overall integrity of security arrangements.

48. During the first quarter of the current financial year there have been no intrusions into the most sensitive areas of the Palace of Westminster. In addition, during the same period all (100%) of personal attack alarm activations within the Palace of Westminster have been responded to within the stated target time. This exceeds the target of 80% that has been set for this type of response.

49. Security Co-ordinators (SecCos) within SO2 are responsible for providing advice and guidance in relation to the security arrangements for major public events. They work closely with the officer in overall command of the event (Gold) to develop an effective security plan. Performance in relation to their work is currently measured in two ways. Firstly the prompt appointment of a SecCo ensures that the maximum amount of time is available for event planning. For this reason it is our aim to appoint a SecCo within two days of being notified of an event on at least 85% of occasions. During April and May 2008 a SecCo was requested 79 times and appointed within 2 days on 76 (96%) of occasions. This exceeds the stated target. Overall, for the 2007/8 financial year performance was above target at 99.4% with the number of requests (486) consistent with previous years. Secondly, Gold commanders are asked to provide feedback on the performance of individual SecCos. In this respect we seek to achieve a rating of ‘satisfactory’ or better for at least 85% of the events. During the first two months of this financial year the number of responses was 69 and the achievement was 100% - this performance was consistent throughout the 2007/8 financial year during which there were 424 responses.

50. To ensure that the quality of service delivered by SecCos is maintained their ‘operational’ process has been mapped and standards of delivery have been defined. Regular ‘dip sampling’ of events is now taking place to assess the standards being delivered. The results of these assessments will from part of future performance monitoring/reporting. Feedback will be provided to individual SecCos and any learning will be incorporated into future training.

51. Advice and guidance in relation to protective security measures are provided by Counter Terrorist Security Advisers (CTSAs) within SO15. The guidance etc. is provided to the business community within London and other partner agencies. It is our aim to achieve at least a ‘satisfactory’ rating in feedback on at least 85% of occasions. During April and May 2008 a total of 1052 partners etc. responded to the request for feedback on the service provided. For all respondents (100%) an assessment of at least satisfactory was achieved. Overall during the previous financial year (2007/8) 3294 partners etc. responded to the request for feedback with 99.9% (3288) giving an assessment rating of at least ‘satisfactory’.

52. During the first quarter of this financial year the DPG have attended 97% of all embassy warning alarm activations within the stated target time. This exceeds the 90% target set for these responses. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year, this target was also exceeded with 95% of all such alarm activations attended within the target time.

Prepare

53. The overarching aim of the Prepare strand of the proposed MPS Counter-Terrorism Strategy is:

‘To mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks where we cannot stop them’

54. In support of this aim a number of broad objectives have been developed. During 2008/9 we will:

• Work with partners to ensure that effective contingency and consequence management plans exist and that these are tested to minimise the impact of terrorist activities might have on people and communities.
• Minimise any risk to life or disruption to communities through an efficient and effective response to the scenes of suspected or actual terrorist incidents.
• Ensure our own business continuity plans are updated and tested to enable and effective service to be delivered following a terrorist attack.
• Ensure effective CBRN contingency plans exist and that these are tested.

55. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Chris Allison, Central Operations, has been nominated as the MPS lead for the Prepare strand of the MPS Counter-Terrorism strategy.

56. Current activities, measures and targets relevant to the Prepare strand are focused on our response to the scenes of suspected or actual terrorist incidents. This is measured both in terms of the quality of our response and the time for specialist resources to arrive at the scene. During April and May 2008 there have been a total of 29 responses to the scene of suspected terrorist incidents. On 97% (28) of occasions the management of the scene by local officers has been assessed as ‘appropriate’ by specialist Chemical Biological Radiological, Nuclear Explosion (CBRNE) officers. This exceeds the stated target of 90%. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 99.4% of incidents (180 of 181) were assessed as having been managed appropriately. The total number of incidents was similar to 2006/7 (177) but this fluctuated during the year.

57. The prompt attendance of specialist resources to the scenes of incidents is also vital if any risks to public safety are to be minimised. MPS CBRNE Officers from within SO are required to attend such scenes within a target time on 95% of occasions. During the first two months of this financial year the officers have been deployed to 49 incidents and on 100% of occasions they attended within the agreed target time. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 100% of calls (576) were responded to within the target time. During 2007/8 the volume of such calls increased by over 25% on 2006/7 (444). This reflected the increased vigilance following the terrorist attacks in Haymarket and Glasgow in June 2007.

58. In addition to their role in dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) CBRNE officers are also required to attend the scenes of conventional munitions such as: unexploded wartime bombs or grenades. In these circumstances the officers are also required to attend within a target time on 95% of occasions. During April and May 2008 the officers were deployed to 21 such incidents and arrived in all cases (100%) within the agreed target time. Overall during the 2007/8 financial year 100% of calls (176) were responded to within the target time. The volume of such calls was lower than in 2006/7 (245), but similar to earlier years.

Contingency planning and other issues in relation to Prepare

59. There is significant overlap between contingency planning requirements arising from terrorist incidents and those emanating from other major or natural disasters. Within the MPS co-ordination of activity around emergency preparedness is undertaken by or in conjunction with Central Operations (CO3).

60. Since 1973 the MPS has been very much involved in London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP). The Chief Superintendent CO3 chairs quarterly meetings and the MPS has played a key role in the drafting of the LESLP Major Incident Procedures Manual. The partnership has grown from just ‘blue light’ agencies to include several other partners such as London’s Local Authorities. The LESLP manual clearly sets out command and control roles and responsibilities in times of major incident. The protocols are agreed by all partner agencies.

61. Since 2002 the MPS has also been involved in the London Resilience Partnership. Two members of MPS staff (an inspector and a sergeant) are seconded full time to the London Resilience Team. Assistant Commissioner Central Operations and Commander Bob Broadhurst represent the MPS at the quarterly Resilience Forum – which is co-chaired by Tessa Jowell MP and John Healy MP. The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson is the deputy chair.

62. As part of our work with these two key partners the plans and works-streams relevant to Prepare include:

• Command and Control
• Mass Evacuation
• Mass Fatality
• Site Clearance
• Recovery Management
• CBRN
• Media
• Warning and Informing

63. Success in this area has included secondments from all responding agencies to support the development of key plans. This has resulted in the plans being co-written by actual responders rather than solely by ‘plan writers’. Once written, none of the plans is shelved; they are subject to continuing work around review, training and awareness.

64. Local contingency planning is undertaken on a borough basis with support and guidance from CO3. Training has been provided to Borough Contingency Planners and many of them have also undertaken additional training at the Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College. CO3 works with B/OCUs to train and exercise the response to major incidents – these invariably include a counter-terrorism element. During the 2007/8 financial year a total of 23 such exercises were run. Currently, a further six are planned for the 2008/9 year.

65. Some sites in London, because of their nature, are subject to more detailed contingency planning requirements. In these cases CO3 are the MPS single point of contact for the planning authorities in relation to the development of relevant plans. CO3 sit on the Safety Liaison Group for each such site and play an active part (with BOCU representatives) in planning and participating in relevant exercises.

Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)

66. CO3 lead on MPS policy and coordination in relation to Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) and lead on training delivery for the relevant Foundation Course. A series of courses during 2007 and 2008 have brought the number of staff trained in this area to 170 plus a number of specialists within forensics and photography. The MPS has for many years played a leading role in the national development of DVI and has recently assisted NPIA with writing the 2008 Foundation Course. CO3 represent the MPS as members of a Home Office Project Board developing a capability for the DVI process in a CBRN environment. The MPS currently have 52 staff trained in CBRN/DVI. CO3 are currently working with the Specialist Crime Directorate (SCD) on the development of an advanced DVI Course.

Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)

67. CO3 coordinate all CBRN activity within the MPS thereby ensuring our response to both major incident consequence management and counter-terrorist investigation is effective, efficient and corporate. Our approach takes into account the national requirements and guidance from the Police National CBRN Centre (PN CBRN C).

68. CO3 maintains up to date CBRN contingency plans. These are reviewed and tested and any organisational learning from CBRN exercise de-briefs is recorded. To date co-ordination work in relation to CBRN includes:

• MPS wide audit of CBRN Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and other Equipment.
• Development of a Procurement, Servicing & Supply Strategy for CBRN PPE and Equipment
• A re-structure of CBRN training delivery
• Compilation of a database of all CBRN exercises
• Management of CBRN Command Cadre and Advisors
• Identifying the cost of CBRN to the MPS and sourcing funding to match it
• Developing CBRN tactics in partnership with the PN CBRN C
• Developing a National CBRN Olympics Policy in conjunction with SO2
• Rationalising the Operational Deployment/Response to a CBRN incident, including Tasking for pre-planned operations
• A review of CBRN operational plans

Measuring/reporting performance against the counter-terrorism strategy

69. The public reporting of operational performance in relation to counter-terrorism is complex – not least because some of the relevant data will be either classified or sensitive. Therefore, it is necessary to strike the right balance between the need for transparency and a duty to ensure that security and operational capability are not compromised.

70. Counter-terrorism policing activities are often sensitive and high profile. Success will ultimately be measured by an absence of terrorist incidents and/or the safety of the public and protected persons not being compromised. This kind of performance does not lend itself to volumetric/quantative measurement in quite the same way as other fields i.e. serious or volume crime. Whilst a reduction in homicide to just a single offence would be regarded as a significant success for the MPS the occurrence of just one major terrorist incident is unlikely to be regarded in the same way. Clearly it would not be appropriate to judge the success solely on the fact that a terrorist incident doesn’t occur or that a protected person survives a public engagement. It is for this reason that our performance measures tend to be more qualitative or reflective of an element of the operational activity that prevents the terrorist incident or ensures safety.

71. For the above reasons, it is also not possible to identify a single or small number of measures that will truly reflect the breadth of activity that takes place. Work is being undertaken to identify a broader range or measures and this currently suggests that a hierarchical approach may be more appropriate. Such a hierarchy might include measures around:

• Terrorist actions – fatalities, injuries and other casualties etc.
• Disruptions – attack planning/logistical support
• Aggregate measure of threat/risk assessments
• Arrests, charges and convictions (TACT)
• Arrests, charges and conviction (Non TACT)
• Detention issues/monitoring
• Intelligence/investigation processes – compliance/achievement of standards
• Qualitative measures – Public Attitudes

72. Alongside developments within the MPS work is currently being undertaken nationally to develop a performance management framework for the emerging national counter-terrorism network. Any nationally agreed measures will be embedded within the MPS counter-terrorism performance framework.

73. The national Police Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) has been recently been revised into a new Assessment of Police and Community Safety (APACS) framework. It is proposed that new framework will contain measures relevant to counter-terrorism and domestic extremism. The MPS has been involved in the development of the proposed measures and, once again, when agreed these will be embedded into the MPS framework.

Technology to support counter-terrorism policing

74. A key element of the proposed MPS Counter-Terrorism strategy is focused on identifying operational requirements for support technology and the means of addressing those requirements. A counter-terrorism technology group has been formed and this has now met on two occasions. Discussions have identified opportunities to work with business and academia to harness existing technologies and develop these for use within the counter-terrorism field. In addition, the MPS is engaged with European partners in around nine technology projects related to counter-terrorism. Whilst the projects are at different stages of development some already have agreed EU funding.

National developments

75. The national/international nature of terrorism has necessitated the development of a more cohesive national counter-terrorism network. This is built around a number of counter-terrorism units based within certain police force regions. The MPS Counter-Terrorism Command is an essential part of this network.

76. Much of the work in relation to establishing the network is now complete but opportunity exists to develop further the structures, operational focus and business functions to ensure effective co-ordination and support and that all chief officers are appropriately engaged. This work is being taken forward on behalf of ACPO (TAM) through a series of reviews. These are now well underway and draft documents are being prepared for circulation to key stakeholders (including the MPA). It is hoped that a formal paper on this issue might be presented to the next meeting.

77. An integral part of the development of the national network includes ensuring that appropriate arrangements are in place to ensure effective oversight by relevant police authorities at both a local and national level. The MPS will continue to work with the MPA in developing these processes.

C. Race and equality impact

Given the nature of the activities involved in the police response to terrorism there is significant impact on matters of equality and diversity concern. . For this reason, and as part of the development of the counter-terrorism strategy, relevant Equality and Diversity Impact Assessments (EDIA) are urgently being reviewed. A further report on the outcomes of the review will come forward to the full Authority at the appropriate time.

D. Financial implications

CT expenditure in the MPS is funded from the MPS Counter Terrorist Specific Grant and the Dedicated Security Posts (DSP) Specific Grant. At this very early stage in the financial year the MPS CT specific grant (£176.4m) is broadly forecast to be on budget based on May 2008 actual spends, while the DSP Grant (£127.5m) is forecasting a small underspend of £0.8m, mainly due to difficulties in recruiting growth posts.

E. Background papers

None

F. Contact details

Report author(s): Superintendent Neil Haynes SOHQ, MPS

For more information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

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