MPA Stockwell Scrutiny / HMIC Stockwell Inspection 2009

Report: 7
Date: 9 July 2009
By: Chief Executive

Summary

This report outlines the activity of the Stockwell Panel since February this year. The MPA recognises that progress has been made in a number of areas, but in the remaining areas identified by the HMIC it is the view of the Panel members that further progress should have been achieved. This report makes recommendations on how the MPA should continue to monitor the action plan in place to address the recommendations. It also highlights a number of key concerns arising out of the recently published HMIC Stockwell Inspection.

A. Recommendation

That

1. Members note the findings of the HMIC inspection (appendix 1) and consider the concerns raised in this report about the progress being made by the MPS in addressing the issues arising out of the tragic death of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes in July 2005;
2. Members in particular note the serious concerns of the Stockwell Panel about the failure of the MPS to date to provide members with a sufficiently detailed and robust MPS action plan to allow the Authority to monitor implementation of the findings of the HMIC report; and agree that the Stockwell Panel meets further, to review the more detailed action plan which has been requested from the MPS, with a view to (i) identifying any further improvements needed to achieve a sufficiently robust action plan, and (ii) advising this committee of those areas of concern which will require further regular progress monitoring by the MPA;
3. the regular monthly briefings on progress against the action plan that are provided to the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner are shared with the Vice Chair of the MPA and the Chair of this Committee, who may disseminate to other members to support them in monitoring progress as evidenced in the briefings and who will be responsible for oversight of lessons learned from Stockwell on behalf of the MPA and MPS;
4. the monthly Commissioner’s report to full Authority incorporates progress against the action plan; and
5. members agree that the Stockwell Panel is then wound up and that this committee requires written reports from the MPS on a monthly basis on the progress being made in implementing the action plan.

B. Supporting information

1. At Co-ordination and Policing Committee in December 2007, members agreed the terms of reference for a scrutiny of how the MPS have responded to the learning out of the tragic death of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell underground station on 22 July 2005. The decision to undertake the scrutiny followed the publication of two reports into the shooting by the Independent Complaints Commission (IPCC) and a guilty verdict as a result of the prosecution of the MPS under Health and Safety legislation.

2. The Panel, consisting of Dee Doocey, Faith Boardman, Jennette Arnold and chaired by Len Duvall, took oral evidence from senior MPS and MPA officers and key partners including the IPPC and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). They also undertook a comprehensive review of documentation provided by the MPS to evidence the changes that have been put in place since 2005.

3. The purpose of the scrutiny was to reassure the MPA and Londoners that the MPS had responded appropriately to the lessons learnt as result of the various investigations into the tragedy so that the sequence of events that led to the shooting does not reoccur. In general, the Panel concluded that progress has been good, although there was still work to be done. That said, there were gaps in the Panel’s knowledge of what happened and therefore they would need to revisit the issue, with HMIC assistance, following the Coroner’s Inquest.

HMIC Inspection

4. The Stockwell Panel published its report in July 2008. A key recommendation was to commission HMIC to review progress against the recommendations they had previously made and in light of any new information arising out of the Coroner’s Inquest. They began the exercise in January 2009 and their final report was published in June 2009. The concurrent MPS report to SOP outlines their findings and the MPS response.

5. The Stockwell Scrutiny Panel met on 29 June to consider the findings of the HMIC report and the MPS response. The Panel considered the report and felt it was inadequate. It felt that the MPS should be required to resubmit an action plan addressing fully the HMIC recommendations. The Panel have raised some significant concerns about both reports. The key points are detailed below.

6. The Panel welcomes the findings of the HMIC inspection. The Panel is disappointed however with the length of time it has taken to progress key issues, given the importance of the subject. The Panel felt that some of the slow progress is attributable to the MPS failing to set a clear direction of travel and making it happen. There is also a continuing lack of clarity about the MPS’s willingness to drive through some of the changes and recommendations highlighted by the Coroner, IPCC and Health and Safety trial in addition to the Panel. It is not clear from the report why this has taken so long. The Panel is unhappy about the extent to which the activity examined by HMIC lack clear timelines for delivery although the MPS report provided for the July SOP meeting does indicate that some of these issues have been resolved. The Panel has asked the MPS to provide a clear, prioritised action plan that identifies who is responsible for implementing key actions, timescales for delivery, interdependencies and monthly milestones, so that it can be assured that the 12 month implementation period identified within the report will be achieved.

7. The Panel agrees that successful implementation needs to be driven from a central point, to ensure that activity being led within the various business groups is complementary and focusing on the key issues identified as requiring action. The Panel agrees with HMIC’s assessment in para 1.2.6 that the there has been lots of activity by individual departments but with no guarantee that the initiatives will be operationalised. In the view of the Panel this is indicative of a wider organisational attitude which impacts on the effectiveness of the MPS and therefore provides a key leadership challenge for the Commissioner. The Panel is therefore pleased that the Commissioner has launched a non-departmental approach led by the Deputy Commissioner but notes with concern that the Programme Board is not chaired personally by the Deputy and recommends that it should be.

8. As noted above, the Panel agrees this is a positive and necessary development but would go further however, and recommend that there is continuity with all personnel involved in implementation in order to ensure there is full ownership of the action plan and that progress is not further hampered because of changes in key posts until the plan has been implemented in its entirety. The Panel also recommends that there are regular management board discussions of progress so that all business groups are involved in the development of new corporate models of delivery.

9. As noted in paragraph 3, until the Inquest had taken place, there were gaps in the Panel’s knowledge of what happened on 22 July 2005 that could not be addressed until after the Coroner’s inquest. There were also gaps in the MPS’s knowledge, as they were unable to undertake a full debrief of what occurred. The HMIC report identifies several issues that the MPA Panel found alarming including the absence of an organisational learning model, no decisions around timeframes, no clarity on how learning will be embedded (para 4.9.2), the non-participation of key operational command units and key operational commanders (paras 6.1.12 and 6.1.13). The Panel was particularly concerned that the participation of operational commanders in debriefings was not deemed mandatory.

10. It is clear from the inspection report and from the discussions the Panel had with the MPS earlier this year that full agreement across all business groups on the direction of travel has still not been achieved. The Panel are particularly concerned about the extent of the Specialist Crime Directorate engagement (or not) with the Extreme Threat Cadre proposals (ref HMIC report para 6.1.2). The MPA needs to understand the review that is being undertaken and what implications this will have and to be assured that all business groups will be signed up to the direction of travel.

11. The MPA Panel is pleased that the unified surveillance command has been formed. The concept of corporate specialist resources is not new, but has been lamentably slow to develop, and it is clear that the rotation system being used in this instance can only be to the advantage of all the officers involved and to the organisation. However, the Panel is dismayed that it appears that this may be a one off exercise.

12. The Panel notes the progress being made on ‘role clarity’ (paras 6.1.4 - 6.1.7). In the view of the Panel, it is crucial that this is progressed. The Panel invites the Deputy Commissioner to provide a clear statement on the key roles and how to ensure that officers feel empowered to take appropriate action based on the circumstances they are dealing with on the ground.

13. Members of the Panel visited two of the control rooms during their investigations last year. Progress in this area is pleasing but assurance is required that all the various control rooms are now fit for purpose.

14. Whilst the Panel acknowledges that covert Airwave is now available, it remains seriously concerned about Airwave capacity, particularly in the context of the Olympics, where the system will be severely tested. The Panel recommends that the MPA Olympics sub-committee receives a detailed report on the system that highlights all the known concerns (bandwidth, capacity, equipment, training/understanding) and seeks assurance that these concerns are being addressed and that any budgetary requirement will be made available. The Panel felt that escalation to full Authority of any issues not adequately addressed may be an appropriate avenue. The Panel was particularly concerned about the statement in 6.3.7 about the incidence of user error in training exercises. This could have serious consequences for officer and public safety if it occurred during a live incident and needs to be rectified immediately.

15. In its scrutiny report, the Panel raised concerns about the MPS practice of officers writing up their notes together after an incident. In the view of the Panel, this practice could leave officers open to criticism. The Panel recommends that the practice stop. Similar concerns have been widely raised by, for example, the IPCC. It is not clear from the inspection report whether this recommendation has been fully implemented and further clarification should therefore be sought from the MPS.

16 The Panel recognises that successful implementation will require considerable effort and the consequences of failure are wide-ranging. For that reason the Panel recommends that SOP receives monthly reports outlining progress and that the Vice Chair and the Chair of this committee receive copies of the briefing that is provided for the Commissioner and Deputy Commission on a monthly basis for onward dissemination as appropriate. The Panel would like to have final meetings in late July to understand and review the action plan identified in the concurrent MPS report in more detail before handing responsibility on to SOP.

Coroner’s Inquest

17. At the end of the de Menezes Inquest, the Coroner announced his intention to produce a “section 43” report. This allows a Coroner to raise any issues arising out of inquest that he or she deems sufficiently serious to require a response from the relevant body. In this case, the Coroner requested a response from the MPA as well as the MPS. In order to develop the MPA response, the Panel reconvened and invited contributions from senior MPS officers with responsibility for addressing key areas of concern such as surveillance, extreme threat and control rooms. A copy of the MPA response to the Coroner is attached at appendix 2.

18. The Coroner’s response highlights the concerns of the Panel. As noted above, there were gaps in the Panel’s knowledge – the Panel was unable to interview certain key officers in advance of the Inquest. It is fair to say, that having now covered those issues, the Panel echoes the concerns highlighted by the latest inspection report about the limited debriefing that has taken place to date, and that because of this a full understanding of what contributed to the death of Mr de Menezes on 22 July 2009 may never be known and therefore learning opportunities will have been lost.

C. Race and equality impact

The learning from Stockwell and the work the MPS has done since, has taken into account the need to enhance confidence of diverse communities across London.

D. Financial implications

There are no direct financial implications arising out of this report.

E. Background papers

• Terms of Reference Stockwell Scrutiny – MPA COP December 2007
• MPA Scrutiny Report July 2008
• IPPC reports Stockwell 1 and 2
• HMIC Inspections

F. Contact details

Report author: Siobhan Coldwell (Head of Oversight and Review, MPA)

For information contact:

MPA general: 020 7202 0202
Media enquiries: 020 7202 0217/18

Appendix 2

Letter from Len Duvall, Chair, MPA Stockwell Scrutiny Panel to Sir Michael Wright, HM Assistant Deputy Coroner (HM Coroner for the Inner London South)

20 February 2009

Dear Sir Michael,

Jean Charles de Menezes Inquest: MPA Response to the Section 43 report from the Coroner

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the concerns you had during the course of the de Menezes Inquest. As you know, the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) has long been concerned that the Metropolitan Police Service learns all it can from the events of the 21st and 22nd July 2005, so that the likelihood of such a tragedy occurring again be minimised in the future.

You may be aware that the MPA undertook a scrutiny during 2008, to assess the extent to which the MPS had addressed the recommendations arising out of the various investigations (IPCC, HMIC etc.) into the Stockwell shooting. We published that report in July 2008. A copy is attached for your information. It should be noted that as it stands, the scrutiny is not finalised, as there were, at the time a number of questions we were unable to ask, and a number of witnesses we were unable to interview, given that the Inquest had yet to take place. The panel has yet to decide how the MPA will deal with these questions. In respect of the recommendations we have made, a full response will be presented to our strategic operational policing committee in April 2009, outlining the progress being made against each of the recommendations. Please note this has been delayed by a month to allow consideration of the s43 report.

 The panel has reconvened to consider the issues raised in your report and our response concentrates on the matters of most concern to the Authority.

Our investigations confirm that action is being taken but that progress has been much slower that we would have liked in some areas.

 Command Structure

The MPA believes you were right to raise issues around the command structure. We had concerns during our scrutiny, particularly about how the ‘designated senior officer’ role (DSO) fits with the standard gold/silver/bronze structure. In light of the Olympics in 2012, it is particularly important that these issues are addressed.

Our discussions with the MPS confirm that some changes have been made in response to your report and the recommendations we made last year, in particular the term DSO is no longer in use. However, progress has been slow. It is important that the changes made in London do not conflict with national arrangements, not least because the MPS have national responsibilities and are required to act in partnership with other forces. We have heard that movement at the national level is slow. It is our intention to work with Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to maintain momentum in this area.

We acknowledge that the Gold/Silver/Bronze structure remains the most appropriate command and control structure for policing operations and that it works best where there are clear terms of reference and there is clarity about roles and responsibilities. We have heard from the MPS that new guidelines on command and control are being frequently tested and that a cadre of ACPO officers is being specifically trained to deal with situations where extreme threat is present (i.e. imminent threat to life and public safety). This ACPO officer, if the situation dictates, will sit alongside the silver commander, but will have sole responsibility for taking critical decisions that may result in a death. The post has been described to us as that of ‘Silver Tactical Commander’. We understand the rationale put forward by the MPS for this i.e. the necessity for the Met’s highest ranking officers to take decisions of this magnitude not just because of potential consequences, but also in view of the need to be held accountable in the aftermath. However, in a hierarchical organisation such as the MPS, the MPA still has concerns that this model may create confusion for the staff involved in the incident, particularly in terms of where overall responsibility lies. The MPS have given us assurances that they can overcome these potential risks, but only time will tell if this is borne out in practice.

Communications systems:

You may be aware that since the 22nd of July 2005, the radio system available to MPS officers, particularly to officers from Specialist Operations and covert surveillance officers has been upgraded and so many of the problems that occurred on 22/7 would not occur again today. That said, the Authority remains concerned about the capacity of Airwave to cope in a major incident.

The National Policing Improvement Agency is funding improvements to the underground capacity and we are aware of plans to ensure the facilities above ground are fit for purpose. Our Olympics sub-committee has a particular interest in ensuring progress and we will therefore be asking them to monitor progress.

Rules of engagement and code-words:

he MPA has scrutinised the progress the MPS has made in clarifying the rules of engagement for armed surveillance and firearms officers and the training and testing that is being provided to officers. We are confident that the MPS has learnt lessons in this area from 22nd July 2005. We are aware that the MPS are concerned about your recommendation to introduce a system of code words. We support their concerns, not least because of the potential risks when operating with colleagues from other police services. In our view, it is the clarity of command that is important, not necessarily the words used.

Surveillance officers / Firearms officers:

We have been updated on the progress being made to develop better working relationships between firearms and surveillance teams, including joint training exercises. We are aware the MPS have looked at whether some surveillance  officers should be trained to the level of specialist firearms officers to perform stops on suspected suicide bombers. We accept their contention that training and abstraction burden they would experience as a result would be impractical and that other solutions aimed at ensuring appropriately skilled officers are available in a timely manner would be more appropriate. We will be seeking regular progress reports to ensure that these concerns are being addressed.

Miscellaneous issues:

The MPA echoes your concerns about the weaknesses in record keeping and in some respects this reflects concerns we raised about whether control rooms were fit for purpose. There has been considerable investment in the control room environment since 2005, so that activity can be properly recorded.

As you note in your report, the MPA raised serious concerns about the practice of police officers writing up their notes together after a serious incident and our report made several recommendations in this area. The MPA does recognise that some progress has been made, largely as a result of changes to the ACPO guidance in this area, and in a recent shooting in Romford, the new guidance was successfully followed. Nevertheless we still have serious concerns, firstly about whether there are processes in place to ensure that compliance can be audited and secondly that the guidance only

applies to death and serious injuries involving police officers. We remain of the view that our recommendations in this area should be fully implemented by the Met without further delay. As I say at the start of this letter, the MPA and the MPS are committed to ensuring that every opportunity for organisational learning from the tragic shooting is maximised and we will continue to do what we can to ensure that this learning is embedded.

Yours sincerely

Len Duvall, AM, OBE
Chair, MPA Stockwell Scrutiny Panel

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